JAPAN WELCOMES SIX-PARTY AGREEMENT, REMAINS UNEASY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 000696

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2027
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP KN JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN WELCOMES SIX-PARTY AGREEMENT, REMAINS UNEASY
ABOUT ABDUCTION ISSUE

REF: STATE 18387

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reason: 1.4 (b)(d).


1. (C) Summary. Japanese reaction to the Six-Party Talks
(6PT) agreement is mixed. Popular reaction to the 6PT
agreement is shaped by the strong and passionate view the
Japanese public has on the abduction issue. PM Abe, who
holds deep personal views on the abductions, shares the
public view that progress in 6PT issues must include concrete
moves to resolve the abduction issue. However, some members
of Abe,s own LDP, as well as members of the opposition, are
arguing that Japan,s security requires resolution of the
nuclear issue and that the abduction issue should not be a
roadblock. The President,s call to Prime Minister Abe has
had a very positive effect, with a senior MOFA official
describing it as &the right message at the right time.8
End summary.

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Hard-Line vs. Pragmatic Reaction
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2. (C) Japan,s reaction to the February 13 Six Party Talks
agreement has been characterized by a mixture of pragmatic
realism and disappointment. Politicians, bureaucrats,
academics, journalists, and the public generally expressed
relief at the prospect of ending North Korea's nuclear
aspirations, combined with varying degrees of anxiety and
pessimism about the way the abduction issue was handled in
the Beijing accord.


3. (C) Publicly, advisors and policymakers close to Prime
Minister Abe, such as LDP Policy Research Council Chairman
Shoichi Nakagawa, continue to take a hard line against North
Korea, stressing the importance of the abduction issue.
Nakagawa told a February 15 LDP gathering that "(North Korea)
is dishonest and a liar. We don't have to change our
position." On February 15, FM Aso,s Policy Secretary Ichiro
Muramatsu, who is a Diet staffer, not a Foreign Ministry
official, confirmed that hard-line view to embassy officers,
warning, "the ball is in the DPRK court . . . The Japanese
public will never view the abduction issue as resolved until
the fate of Megumi Yokota is fully clarified."


4. (C) Several mid-level LDP officials, including LDP Asia
Diplomacy and Security Vision Research Council chairman
Koichi Kato and former LDP Vice President Taku Yamasaki,
openly opposed the PM's decision to prioritize the abduction
issue over DPRK denuclearization. They were joined by
leading DPJ official Seiji Maehara who, during a face-to-face
confrontation during a budget committee hearing on February
14, accused PM Abe of being "excessively caught up on the
abduction issue" to the detriment of Japan's national
security. The majority of mid-level MOFA bureaucrats,
academics, and political observers with whom we have spoken
believe the Six Party agreement is a good first step, but
only a first step.


5. (C) PM Abe, who has made relatively few public statements
about the agreement, suggested during the budget committee
confrontation with Maehara that Japan might pursue a
pragmatic, two-track approach to the denuclearization and
abduction issues. Abe refused to back down from his stance
on abductions, but noted that "the nuclear issue is a matter
of extremely serious concern to us from the perspective of
our national security, and we really think it necessary to
have North Korea take concrete action to give up its nuclear
program. Things are going on in a framework with Japan
providing no fuel oil, and this is not against the national
interests of Japan. We must have North Korea become aware of
how important it is to resolve the abduction issue. The
moment they think it's all right that the issue is not
settled, this issue will freeze."

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Unease Persists
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6. (C) Despite the generally positive assessment of the
agreement as a major first step toward resolving the North
Korean nuclear issue, a strong undercurrent of unease about
Washington,s true intentions persists. LDP Upper House
member Yutaka Kobayashi stated it most bluntly, suggesting
that the U.S. "again passed Japan" and cut a deal with the
DPRK. Several interlocutors, including Komeito
representative Isamu Ueda, expressed concern about Japan's
ability to move forward on the abduction issue now that it
has been largely separated from the nuclear issue in the
Japan-DPRK working group. Many Japanese, in and out of
government, feel insecure about the U.S. intentions and fear
that the U.S. will remove North Korea from the list of state
sponsors of terrorism before the abduction issue has been
resolved.


7. (C) Teruaki Masumoto, brother of an abductee and Secretary
General of the Association of Families of Victims Kidnapped
by North Korea (AFVKN),expressed concern about "the real
U.S.intention" about removing the DPRK from the terrorism
list. He said, however, that AFVKN members recall President
Bush's meeting with Megumi Yokota and believe that the recent
Bush-Abe telephone call confirms that the U.S. and Japan will
continue to cooperate on the abduction issue. (Note:
Masumoto,s group has requested to see Vice President Cheney
when he visits Japan, February 20-22.) Leading DPRK
specialist Prof. Hajime Izumi argued that U.S.-DPRK
discussions aiming to remove North Korea from the list of
state sponsors of terrorism would, in fact, help facilitate
resolution of Japan,s abduction issue, since removal of the
&terrorist state8 designation requires resolution of that
issue.


8. (C) The abduction issue is not simply &another political
issue8 in Japan. There is a deep popular revulsion about
the abductions. Popular reaction to the Beijing agreement is
largely colored by strong feeling that the abductions were a
criminal affront to human rights and an attack on Japan. Abe
and other politicians, including LDP PARC Chairman Shoichi
Nakagawa, by making the abduction issue priority number one,
are reflecting this strongly held popular view.

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Impact on Domestic Elections
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9. (C) Opinions vary on whether the Six-Party agreement will
become an issue in the upcoming April unified local elections
and the July Upper House elections. Much will depend on what
progress is made on the abduction issue in the coming weeks.
Having made resolution of the abduction issue a focus of his
administration, Abe and the LDP are vulnerable if progress is
not forthcoming. Osaka Prefecture DPJ Vice Secretary General
Yoshimura reflected that view when he said "the result of the
bilateral talks between Japan and North Korea in the working
group will affect this year's elections. DPJ leaders will be
carefully watching how the talks proceed."


10. (C) If the working group talks fail to make progress, LDP
member Yutaka Kobayashi suggested that Abe might have a ready
scapegoat for his difficulties - MOFA. Kobayashi voiced the
view that "There are voices within the LDP that Japan was
deceived by the U.S., especially among those distant from the
current government leadership. They argue that after all,
because of Japan's (MOFA) diplomacy, the U.S. again "passed
Japan" and made all the deals with the DPRK."


11. (C) Keio University professor Masao Okonogi reminded us
that Abe will need to steer a course mindful of public
opinion and his plunging poll numbers. Okonogi opined that,
with Upper House elections taking place in July, Abe will
need, for the time being, to balance a policy of
international cooperation with one of pursuing an abduction

TOKYO 00000696 003 OF 003


issue that is supported by Japanese voters - all without
drawing public backlash.

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Comment
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12. (C) We believe PM Abe will pursue the pragmatic approach
he suggested in the Diet. The government will exert its best
efforts to make progress on the abduction issue, while
refusing to allow the abduction issue to impede the broader
goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Successfully pursuing this balanced approach will require
skillful diplomacy and close U.S.-Japan cooperation. In a
February 16 meeting with the Ambassador, MOFA Director
General for North American Affairs Shunichi Nishimiya
described the President,s remarks to Prime Minister Abe as
&the right message at the right time.8 In television
interviews and meetings with Japanese officials, the
Ambassador has been stressing that getting a working group
established on Japanese-DPRK issues as part of the Six-Party
process showed movement on the abduction issue. Before the
latest agreement, nothing had happened. Generally, this
argument is getting a good response.
SCHIEFFER