Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TOKYO659
2007-02-15 08:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:
A/S SILVERBERG'S JANUARY 25 MEETING WITH MIDDLE
VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHKO #0659/01 0460842 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 150842Z FEB 07 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0693 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL PRIORITY RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5797 RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0195 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0210 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0406 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1703 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1510 RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 0125 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 5299 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0467 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1880 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0647 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0284 RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 000659
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2017
TAGS: PREL UN KPAL IS IR LE SU JA
SUBJECT: A/S SILVERBERG'S JANUARY 25 MEETING WITH MIDDLE
EASTERN AFFAIRS DG OKUDA
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 000659
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2017
TAGS: PREL UN KPAL IS IR LE SU JA
SUBJECT: A/S SILVERBERG'S JANUARY 25 MEETING WITH MIDDLE
EASTERN AFFAIRS DG OKUDA
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Japan views positively recent steps taken by
the United States to reinvigorate the Middle East Peace
Process and is hopeful that progress will be made, MOFA
Director General for Middle Eastern and African Affairs
Norihiro Okuda told visiting Assistant Secretary for
International Organizations Kristen Silverberg on January 25,
in Tokyo. He also described Japan's "Corridor of Peace and
Prosperity" initiative and discussed with her the
difficulties being faced by the Palestinians as they seek to
resolve internal differences. A/S Silverberg assured Okuda of
the Administration's commitment to the peace process but
reminded him that ultimately it is the parties themselves who
must decide to make meaningful progress. She also pressed
Japan to make a meaningful contribution to Lebanon, stressing
the importance of financial as well as political support for
the Siniora government. Okuda replied that it would be
difficult for Japan to make more than a small contribution.
Other topics discussed included Japan's concern over the high
cost of United Nations assistance programs, the fact that
both Japan and the United States are taking steps to comply
with UNSCR 1737 regarding Iran, and the situation in Darfur.
END SUMMARY.
--------------
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
--------------
2. (C) DG Okuda opened the meeting by saying Japan is
impressed by recent steps by the United States toward
reengaging in the Middle East Peace Process. He observed
that achieving peace between the Palestinians and Israelis is
a very difficult undertaking and it would be completely
understandable if the United States were to choose to remain
disengaged given the more immediate pressing concerns in the
region, i.e., Iraq, Iran, Lebanon. That said, Okuda wondered
how sincere these most recent initiatives are. Was the
Secretary's trip simply a fact-finding, listening-mode visit,
SIPDIS
or was it undertaken with a plan of action in mind?
3. (C) A/S Silverberg replied the Secretary and the President
are sincere about making progress toward peace in this
critical region, but that it has always been the Secretary's
position not to engage in meetings for meetings' sake, and it
is clear to us that peace will not be achieved in the region
unless the underlying conditions are in place, namely, the
presence of parties who are committed to peace. Accordingly,
the main purpose of the Secretary's visit was to listen to
the parties and to assess whether there is an opportunity to
make progress. The United States remains committed to the
sequencing of the road map. The Quartet meeting had been
anticipated before the Secretary visited the region, as it is
important to get the new Secretary General involved and up to
speed on the process.
4. (C) Japan welcomes the holding of a Quartet meeting, said
Okuda, and even though Japan wishes it were part of the
process, Tokyo supports its work nonetheless. He said he
hopes the Quartet meeting will bring new and positive
developments but is concerned that negotiations between
Palestinian factions toward the formation of a unity
government are going nowhere. It will be difficult for Japan
to resume support to the Palestinian government unless there
is a unity government. In addition, it is hard to see how
the peace process will be able to move forward in the absence
of an acceptable Palestinian partner.
5. (C) The United States agrees that the intra-Palestinian
conflicts need to be resolved, explained A/S Silverberg, and
we realize there are some risks involved in holding early
elections. We are trying to empower Abu Mazen to strengthen
his hand. Okuda told her that Israeli Foreign Minister Livni
had visited Tokyo the previous week and that, in general, the
Japanese were encouraged by her talk of how Israel is trying
to support Abu Mazen. That said, it is Japan's belief that
the Israelis should have extended such support much sooner,
prior to the last elections. In the meantime, Japan will
continue to provide financial support intended to bolster
confidence building measures directly to the Presidential
office of Abu Mazen.
6. (C) Okuda expressed his personal view that even extending
financial and material support to Abu Mazen and his Fatah
organization is problematic, as Fatah's problems with
corruption and mismanagement are known to pose concerns. In
addition, Abu Mazen must be supported very delicately so as
not to detract from his ability to portray himself as an
independent, Palestinian leader who is not beholden or
connected to outsiders such as the United States, the
European Union, or other donors. Broadly speaking, the same
can be said of all Arab countries. Even leaders who support
reform must not be seen by their people as too closely
associated with outside influences. But at the same time,
they need support and assistance from the outside to initiate
change. They need political will and resources.
7. (C) Okuda asked for A/S Silverberg's view on the role of
the United Nations in the peace process. She explained that
the United States views the Quartet as the principle
mechanism and is opposed to a broader role for the UN in this
process, pointing out that the design of the organization -
large and unwieldy - makes it poorly suited to play a role as
an effective negotiator. In addition, by its own actions,
the UN has made it clear to us that Israel cannot get a fair
hearing within the organization. To illustrate her point,
she provided Okuda with a graph showing the number of
condemnatory resolutions targeting Israel introduced in the
UN. She agreed with Okuda that perhaps the UN might have a
role to play in helping to "seal a deal" when the time comes,
but this will depend on the desires of the parties.
8. (C) With regard to Japan's contributions to the peace
process, Okuda described for A/S Silverberg Japan's "Corridor
of Peace and Prosperity" initiative that involves Japan,
Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians. This initiative was
proposed by former Prime Minister Koizumi and calls for the
construction of an "agro-industry" park in the West Bank that
would provide jobs for Palestinian youths and also export
those products through Jordan to the Gulf states and others.
All the parties support this concept in general, but Israel
wants to make sure there is no Hamas involvement on the
Palestinian side. Japan would like to host a meeting of the
parties soon, but this might not be possible unless Israel
can be assured Hamas is not involved. Okuda said he briefed
Department officials on this initiative during a recent trip
to Washington but wanted A/S Silverberg to be aware of it as
well.
--------------
LEBANON
--------------
9. (C) Following up on Okuda's earlier remark that outside
powers need to provide Middle East reformers with political
will and resources, A/S Silverberg pointed out that this is
precisely the case with Lebanon. The UN has an important
role to play in Lebanon. A Security Council resolution has
been enacted and must be enforced. And the UN can play a
positive role in enabling a commission to investigate the
Hariri assassination. The Siniora government needs resources
and support to help it to deliver services to the people of
Lebanon. The United States will be making a major financial
commitment at the upcoming Paris III conference and hopes
that Japan will also be able to play a significant role.
10. (C) Okuda replied by noting the Secretary's call to
Foreign Minister Aso two days earlier and said that Japan had
responded by agreeing to send the Minister of Environment to
the conference, even though this involved much wrangling on
the domestic political scene given the fact the conference
date conflicts with the opening session of the Diet. For
this reason, FM Aso was unable to attend. With regard to
possible assistance, Okuda said Japan will only be able to
offer a very small additional grant, given the fact that
Lebanon is too wealthy to qualify for ODA assistance. With
regard to possible loans, this too is problematic, as Lebanon
still has one very old loan that is still active, and the
Diet will be unlikely to grant additional loans if this is
the case. On the subject of debt relief, Japan will be
willing to consider this option as long as it part of an
international arrangement. Tokyo will not offer debt relief
to Lebanon on a bilateral basis. In any case, Lebanon's debt
to Japan, at $20 million, is less than one percent of
Lebanon's overall debt. A/S Silverberg urged Japan to take
measures to provide critical assistance to the Siniora
government.
11. (C) Japan also questions the need for large donations
because it believes that Lebanon's problems are not economic,
replied Okuda. Lebanese expatriates have large amounts of
cash outside the country and the reconstruction efforts they
have undertaken in the past on their own have been
impressive. It is likely this performance will be repeated
when the political situation improves. What is more
important is that the majority of the people support the
government, so steps must be taken to reach this goal without
it appearing to be tied to outside intervention. Okuda
agreed that economic support helps, but opined that sometimes
the focus on economic assistance overshadows the need to
resolve political issues.
12. (C) A/S Silverberg rejoined that in Lebanon, the need for
both political and economic support are related and equally
important. In the days preceding the war the economic
situation in Lebanon was promising. Now there is terrible
economic insecurity and a critical lack of jobs. The Siniora
government is in a competition with Hizbollah to deliver
services and help to the people. The Prime Minister must be
able to demonstrate that his government can provide services
better than Hizbollah, and for this reason it is critical
that the international community help enable him to do so.
He can't do this without foreign financial contributions, she
argued.
--------------
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
--------------
13. (C) Okuda said that as Ambassador to Afghanistan he had
enjoyed positive relations with a variety of UN agencies
working in the region, but lamented that the fees the UN pays
consultants are way too high. Japan has raised for some time
the need to get control of the expenses incurred by UN aid
organizations and, said Okuda, hoped the United States shares
this view. The United States, replied A/S Silverberg, agrees
and would like to see the UN focus more on technical
assistance than cash on delivery of ODA; the UN should not
try to be the World Bank. The UN has a valuable role to
play, as it has credibility and can work in countries where
western donors can't, but not be a principal deliverer of ODA.
--------------
IRAN
--------------
14. (C) Japan does not believe it needs to enact new laws to
comply with UNSCR 1737, said Okuda. Interministerial
discussions have been under way since the resolution was
adopted to decide what Japan needs to do to be in compliance.
The outstanding issues involve technical problems with
definitions regarding possible dual-use items. A/S
Silverberg explained that the United States already had
comprehensive sanctions in place against Iran but that we are
now taking additional steps to fully implement our
obligations, citing the Bank Sepah designation.
--------------
DARFUR
--------------
15. (C) The issues surrounding Darfur are much more complex
than he had originally realized, Okuda said. The attitude of
Khartoum toward the approval of UN activities is very
disappointing. Nevertheless, Japan wants to keep moving
forward with the current process, rather than simply giving
up on it. Japan cannot resume assistance to Sudan until the
Darfur issue is settled. In the meantime, Tokyo will watch
and wait. The United States, explained A/S Silverberg,
supports the three-phased Kofi Annan plan but is skeptical
about Bashir's commitment to implement Phase Three. We
believe he must be tested by the deployment of the "heavy
package" of UN forces to assist the African Union
peacekeepers already there. If he rejects them or other
difficulties arise, the United States is likely to propose
tougher measures, although we hope it does not come to this.
She confirmed to Okuda that at this time there are no United
States troops in Sudan, as any such deployment would feed
Bashir's propaganda claim that Sudan is being invaded by
outsiders.
16. (C) Okuda concluded that it is up to Sudan to decide if
it will remain a single nation. If it were to split into
two, this would lead to much damage in the region. Although
there may be bigger problems in the world to deal with,
Darfur is an issue that requires more attention. A/S
Silverberg asked whether it would be possible for Japan to
consider providing support to troop-contributing countries,
to which Okuda replied that Japan already makes large
contributions to the UN Peace Keeping Operations budget. It
is not possible to send Japanese troops to Sudan without
special legislation, and the coming months in Japan will be
politically charged with two major election cycles coming up.
Although he senses that the attitude of the Japanese people
to dispatching peacekeeping troops is becoming more "normal"
than it used to be (meaning there is growing support for such
missions),given the domestic political season, most
politicians don't want to touch this issue at this time.
However, Okuda agreed to discuss with his counterparts in the
Foreign Policy Bureau whether any mechanisms exist for
providing assistance to troop-contributing countries.
--------------
PARTICIPANTS
--------------
17. (U) The following participants were present:
United States
--------------
Assistant Secretary Kristen Silverberg
International Relations Officer Raymond Hotz
Embassy Tokyo Political Section Deputy Carol Reynolds
Control Officer Scott Hansen
Notetaker Evan Reade
Japan
--------------
Director General Norihiro Okuda
First Middle East Division Deputy Director Jiro Kanzawa
Second Middle East Division Deputy Director Masaki Yasumatsu
18. (U) A/S Silverberg has cleared this cable.
SCHIEFFER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2017
TAGS: PREL UN KPAL IS IR LE SU JA
SUBJECT: A/S SILVERBERG'S JANUARY 25 MEETING WITH MIDDLE
EASTERN AFFAIRS DG OKUDA
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Japan views positively recent steps taken by
the United States to reinvigorate the Middle East Peace
Process and is hopeful that progress will be made, MOFA
Director General for Middle Eastern and African Affairs
Norihiro Okuda told visiting Assistant Secretary for
International Organizations Kristen Silverberg on January 25,
in Tokyo. He also described Japan's "Corridor of Peace and
Prosperity" initiative and discussed with her the
difficulties being faced by the Palestinians as they seek to
resolve internal differences. A/S Silverberg assured Okuda of
the Administration's commitment to the peace process but
reminded him that ultimately it is the parties themselves who
must decide to make meaningful progress. She also pressed
Japan to make a meaningful contribution to Lebanon, stressing
the importance of financial as well as political support for
the Siniora government. Okuda replied that it would be
difficult for Japan to make more than a small contribution.
Other topics discussed included Japan's concern over the high
cost of United Nations assistance programs, the fact that
both Japan and the United States are taking steps to comply
with UNSCR 1737 regarding Iran, and the situation in Darfur.
END SUMMARY.
--------------
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
--------------
2. (C) DG Okuda opened the meeting by saying Japan is
impressed by recent steps by the United States toward
reengaging in the Middle East Peace Process. He observed
that achieving peace between the Palestinians and Israelis is
a very difficult undertaking and it would be completely
understandable if the United States were to choose to remain
disengaged given the more immediate pressing concerns in the
region, i.e., Iraq, Iran, Lebanon. That said, Okuda wondered
how sincere these most recent initiatives are. Was the
Secretary's trip simply a fact-finding, listening-mode visit,
SIPDIS
or was it undertaken with a plan of action in mind?
3. (C) A/S Silverberg replied the Secretary and the President
are sincere about making progress toward peace in this
critical region, but that it has always been the Secretary's
position not to engage in meetings for meetings' sake, and it
is clear to us that peace will not be achieved in the region
unless the underlying conditions are in place, namely, the
presence of parties who are committed to peace. Accordingly,
the main purpose of the Secretary's visit was to listen to
the parties and to assess whether there is an opportunity to
make progress. The United States remains committed to the
sequencing of the road map. The Quartet meeting had been
anticipated before the Secretary visited the region, as it is
important to get the new Secretary General involved and up to
speed on the process.
4. (C) Japan welcomes the holding of a Quartet meeting, said
Okuda, and even though Japan wishes it were part of the
process, Tokyo supports its work nonetheless. He said he
hopes the Quartet meeting will bring new and positive
developments but is concerned that negotiations between
Palestinian factions toward the formation of a unity
government are going nowhere. It will be difficult for Japan
to resume support to the Palestinian government unless there
is a unity government. In addition, it is hard to see how
the peace process will be able to move forward in the absence
of an acceptable Palestinian partner.
5. (C) The United States agrees that the intra-Palestinian
conflicts need to be resolved, explained A/S Silverberg, and
we realize there are some risks involved in holding early
elections. We are trying to empower Abu Mazen to strengthen
his hand. Okuda told her that Israeli Foreign Minister Livni
had visited Tokyo the previous week and that, in general, the
Japanese were encouraged by her talk of how Israel is trying
to support Abu Mazen. That said, it is Japan's belief that
the Israelis should have extended such support much sooner,
prior to the last elections. In the meantime, Japan will
continue to provide financial support intended to bolster
confidence building measures directly to the Presidential
office of Abu Mazen.
6. (C) Okuda expressed his personal view that even extending
financial and material support to Abu Mazen and his Fatah
organization is problematic, as Fatah's problems with
corruption and mismanagement are known to pose concerns. In
addition, Abu Mazen must be supported very delicately so as
not to detract from his ability to portray himself as an
independent, Palestinian leader who is not beholden or
connected to outsiders such as the United States, the
European Union, or other donors. Broadly speaking, the same
can be said of all Arab countries. Even leaders who support
reform must not be seen by their people as too closely
associated with outside influences. But at the same time,
they need support and assistance from the outside to initiate
change. They need political will and resources.
7. (C) Okuda asked for A/S Silverberg's view on the role of
the United Nations in the peace process. She explained that
the United States views the Quartet as the principle
mechanism and is opposed to a broader role for the UN in this
process, pointing out that the design of the organization -
large and unwieldy - makes it poorly suited to play a role as
an effective negotiator. In addition, by its own actions,
the UN has made it clear to us that Israel cannot get a fair
hearing within the organization. To illustrate her point,
she provided Okuda with a graph showing the number of
condemnatory resolutions targeting Israel introduced in the
UN. She agreed with Okuda that perhaps the UN might have a
role to play in helping to "seal a deal" when the time comes,
but this will depend on the desires of the parties.
8. (C) With regard to Japan's contributions to the peace
process, Okuda described for A/S Silverberg Japan's "Corridor
of Peace and Prosperity" initiative that involves Japan,
Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians. This initiative was
proposed by former Prime Minister Koizumi and calls for the
construction of an "agro-industry" park in the West Bank that
would provide jobs for Palestinian youths and also export
those products through Jordan to the Gulf states and others.
All the parties support this concept in general, but Israel
wants to make sure there is no Hamas involvement on the
Palestinian side. Japan would like to host a meeting of the
parties soon, but this might not be possible unless Israel
can be assured Hamas is not involved. Okuda said he briefed
Department officials on this initiative during a recent trip
to Washington but wanted A/S Silverberg to be aware of it as
well.
--------------
LEBANON
--------------
9. (C) Following up on Okuda's earlier remark that outside
powers need to provide Middle East reformers with political
will and resources, A/S Silverberg pointed out that this is
precisely the case with Lebanon. The UN has an important
role to play in Lebanon. A Security Council resolution has
been enacted and must be enforced. And the UN can play a
positive role in enabling a commission to investigate the
Hariri assassination. The Siniora government needs resources
and support to help it to deliver services to the people of
Lebanon. The United States will be making a major financial
commitment at the upcoming Paris III conference and hopes
that Japan will also be able to play a significant role.
10. (C) Okuda replied by noting the Secretary's call to
Foreign Minister Aso two days earlier and said that Japan had
responded by agreeing to send the Minister of Environment to
the conference, even though this involved much wrangling on
the domestic political scene given the fact the conference
date conflicts with the opening session of the Diet. For
this reason, FM Aso was unable to attend. With regard to
possible assistance, Okuda said Japan will only be able to
offer a very small additional grant, given the fact that
Lebanon is too wealthy to qualify for ODA assistance. With
regard to possible loans, this too is problematic, as Lebanon
still has one very old loan that is still active, and the
Diet will be unlikely to grant additional loans if this is
the case. On the subject of debt relief, Japan will be
willing to consider this option as long as it part of an
international arrangement. Tokyo will not offer debt relief
to Lebanon on a bilateral basis. In any case, Lebanon's debt
to Japan, at $20 million, is less than one percent of
Lebanon's overall debt. A/S Silverberg urged Japan to take
measures to provide critical assistance to the Siniora
government.
11. (C) Japan also questions the need for large donations
because it believes that Lebanon's problems are not economic,
replied Okuda. Lebanese expatriates have large amounts of
cash outside the country and the reconstruction efforts they
have undertaken in the past on their own have been
impressive. It is likely this performance will be repeated
when the political situation improves. What is more
important is that the majority of the people support the
government, so steps must be taken to reach this goal without
it appearing to be tied to outside intervention. Okuda
agreed that economic support helps, but opined that sometimes
the focus on economic assistance overshadows the need to
resolve political issues.
12. (C) A/S Silverberg rejoined that in Lebanon, the need for
both political and economic support are related and equally
important. In the days preceding the war the economic
situation in Lebanon was promising. Now there is terrible
economic insecurity and a critical lack of jobs. The Siniora
government is in a competition with Hizbollah to deliver
services and help to the people. The Prime Minister must be
able to demonstrate that his government can provide services
better than Hizbollah, and for this reason it is critical
that the international community help enable him to do so.
He can't do this without foreign financial contributions, she
argued.
--------------
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
--------------
13. (C) Okuda said that as Ambassador to Afghanistan he had
enjoyed positive relations with a variety of UN agencies
working in the region, but lamented that the fees the UN pays
consultants are way too high. Japan has raised for some time
the need to get control of the expenses incurred by UN aid
organizations and, said Okuda, hoped the United States shares
this view. The United States, replied A/S Silverberg, agrees
and would like to see the UN focus more on technical
assistance than cash on delivery of ODA; the UN should not
try to be the World Bank. The UN has a valuable role to
play, as it has credibility and can work in countries where
western donors can't, but not be a principal deliverer of ODA.
--------------
IRAN
--------------
14. (C) Japan does not believe it needs to enact new laws to
comply with UNSCR 1737, said Okuda. Interministerial
discussions have been under way since the resolution was
adopted to decide what Japan needs to do to be in compliance.
The outstanding issues involve technical problems with
definitions regarding possible dual-use items. A/S
Silverberg explained that the United States already had
comprehensive sanctions in place against Iran but that we are
now taking additional steps to fully implement our
obligations, citing the Bank Sepah designation.
--------------
DARFUR
--------------
15. (C) The issues surrounding Darfur are much more complex
than he had originally realized, Okuda said. The attitude of
Khartoum toward the approval of UN activities is very
disappointing. Nevertheless, Japan wants to keep moving
forward with the current process, rather than simply giving
up on it. Japan cannot resume assistance to Sudan until the
Darfur issue is settled. In the meantime, Tokyo will watch
and wait. The United States, explained A/S Silverberg,
supports the three-phased Kofi Annan plan but is skeptical
about Bashir's commitment to implement Phase Three. We
believe he must be tested by the deployment of the "heavy
package" of UN forces to assist the African Union
peacekeepers already there. If he rejects them or other
difficulties arise, the United States is likely to propose
tougher measures, although we hope it does not come to this.
She confirmed to Okuda that at this time there are no United
States troops in Sudan, as any such deployment would feed
Bashir's propaganda claim that Sudan is being invaded by
outsiders.
16. (C) Okuda concluded that it is up to Sudan to decide if
it will remain a single nation. If it were to split into
two, this would lead to much damage in the region. Although
there may be bigger problems in the world to deal with,
Darfur is an issue that requires more attention. A/S
Silverberg asked whether it would be possible for Japan to
consider providing support to troop-contributing countries,
to which Okuda replied that Japan already makes large
contributions to the UN Peace Keeping Operations budget. It
is not possible to send Japanese troops to Sudan without
special legislation, and the coming months in Japan will be
politically charged with two major election cycles coming up.
Although he senses that the attitude of the Japanese people
to dispatching peacekeeping troops is becoming more "normal"
than it used to be (meaning there is growing support for such
missions),given the domestic political season, most
politicians don't want to touch this issue at this time.
However, Okuda agreed to discuss with his counterparts in the
Foreign Policy Bureau whether any mechanisms exist for
providing assistance to troop-contributing countries.
--------------
PARTICIPANTS
--------------
17. (U) The following participants were present:
United States
--------------
Assistant Secretary Kristen Silverberg
International Relations Officer Raymond Hotz
Embassy Tokyo Political Section Deputy Carol Reynolds
Control Officer Scott Hansen
Notetaker Evan Reade
Japan
--------------
Director General Norihiro Okuda
First Middle East Division Deputy Director Jiro Kanzawa
Second Middle East Division Deputy Director Masaki Yasumatsu
18. (U) A/S Silverberg has cleared this cable.
SCHIEFFER