SUBJECT: A/S SILVERBERG MEETINGS ON UN REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 000585 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017 TAGS: PREL UNSC KUNR KPKO JA BM SUBJECT: SUBJECT: A/S SILVERBERG MEETINGS ON UN REFORM WITH MOFA Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d) ¶1. (C) Subject: Improving efficiency in peacekeeping operations, promoting strong ethical practices, insisting on improvement in the Human Rights Council, and cooperating behind the scenes on upcoming international organization elections are some of the ways the United States and Japan can work together to bolster reform in the United Nations, A/S Kristen Silverberg told UN Affairs Ambassador Masato Kitera on January 25, 2007. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is committed to building momentum for UNSC reform, Ambassador Kitera told A/S Silverberg. When discussing criteria for expanding UNSC membership, A/S Silverberg outlined challenges for Japan and suggested shifting the debate away from regional representation. Turning to the elections for a 2009-10 non-permanent UNSC seat, Kitera declined to speculate on whether Iran would withdraw from the race. The U.S. will remain a quiet supporter of Japan's candidacy for a new non-permanent term, but will openly avoid active campaigning to avoid having Japan pegged as a U.S. proxy, agreed A/S Silverberg and Kitera. It is important for Japan to complete internal discussions before beginning to campaign for the post, and consult with the United States as the process gets underway, Kitera stated. End Summary. UN Security Council Reform -------------- ¶2. (C) In a January 25 meeting with Assistant Secretary for International Organizations Kristen Silverberg, Ambassador for UN Affairs Masato Kitera opened the discussion by noting that Japan had been continuously revising its position on UNSC Reform over the past two years. Japan had been in contact with the very top levels of the USG seeking support for its "Model D" plan, and did not yet have a direct US reaction. Ambassador Kitera noted that new Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo was personally committed to UNSC Reform, having made it part of his campaign platform last year and raising it in his first speech to the Japanese Diet. Abe was keenly interested in receiving as much insight as possible on US positions toward the issue and had instructed Foreign policy Bureau Director General Kawai Chikao to make the best possible use of A/S Silverberg's visit. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Kitera, who had just returned from G-4 �00A;consultations, noted that Prime Minister Abe had discussed UNSC Reform with the UK, France, Germany, and Belgium during his early January European tour. The Prime Minister received British, French, and German assurances of support for Japan's candidacy for a permanent UNSC seat. Foreign Minister Taro Aso also raised the issue in visits to Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Hungary. Aso also used those visits to follow up on his earlier proposal for an "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity," to explain Japan's philosophy of assisting its neighbors in an arc from South Asia to Eastern Europe, build greater levels of freedom, democracy, and human rights, and boost their economic prosperity. ¶4. (C) Japan believed there was still momentum for UNSC reform, Ambassador Kitera affirmed. He raised the December 11 discussions at the UN in New York, when a majority of the members touched on the topic in their speeches. Japan recently met in New York with the other G4 members, who all agreed that momentum still exists, but who also believe that a new version of the G4 resolution is needed in order to garner broader support. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Kitera conceded that Japan's "Model D" was not highly popular, but argued that Japan's aim was to hold down the increase in permanent UNSC seats as much as possible. Japan was also trying to urge other countries not to be "too ambitious" on the issue of veto power. Japan was seeking G4 consent to the concept of a review conference to discuss additional members in 10-15 years. He also suggested a review mechanism whereby the UN General Assembly would have a vote of "no confidence" in new members if they performed badly. Kitera judged that reaching a common G4 position would be difficult, despite the desire of the other G4 members to find one. ¶6. (C) A/S Silverberg noted the United States had encountered the same difficulties as Japan in reaching a solution that would achieve the joint U.S.-Japan goal of a permanent seat for Japan. A major challenge in the process, in the U.S. view, was bridging the gap in expectations between countries that wanted a large expansion of the UNSC, and members leery of any expansion at all. A/S Silverberg TOKYO 00000585 002 OF 005 noted that India's proposal to African countries favoring a large increase and its position on veto rights were not constructive because it raised African expectations regarding a large expansion. The United States and a few other countries found themselves in the middle of the expectations gap, supporting a modest expansion. In the U.S. view, the solution would lie in moving the opposing ends toward the center, partly through convincing India not to feed Africa's ambitions. ¶7. (C) China was another large challenge in the process, A/S Silverberg noted, and the US applauded the efforts Japan had made with China. While China's focus on securing new seats for developing countries was not unexpected, the Chinese were more positive on India than anticipated. The U.S. and Japan needed to continue pressing China, and ongoing Japanese outreach to China would also help. A/S Silverberg suggested Japan's assuming the 2009-10 non-permanent seat could be helpful in this process. ¶8. (C) The United States was very focused, A/S Silverberg noted, not just on determining numbers of new permanent seats, but which countries should take the new seats. Establishing election criteria would feed into the selection process, and the U.S. hoped for more direct private talks with Japan on criteria. The USG had not come to any clear view yet on which countries it wanted to support, aside from Japan, but was reviewing the question. ¶9. (C) Without having a clearer idea of criteria, A/S Silverberg explained, it was hard to agree on a framework resolution. The G4 was unlikely to be happy with any new resolution, because each country expected to be included and was unlikely to sign on otherwise. The U.S., on the other hand, could not support four new permanent members. The U.S. did not want Japan to have unrealistic expectations on this question. ¶10. (C) Japan has told the African countries they missed a great opportunity to affect UNSC reform two years ago, Ambassador Kitera remarked. Japan was staying in touch with the African countries as much as possible, and had developed a substantial information network through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process. Japan was hearing from medium and small countries that their positions were more flexible than that of the African Union as a whole, and was asking these countries to be more realistic. Overall, Japan was not pessimistic on the prospects for progress with African states. ¶11. (C) On China, Ambassador Kitera noted that Prime Minister Abe's October 2006 visit to Beijing had produced an agreement to cooperate on UNSC reform. He noted Vice Minister Shotaro Yachi would visit Beijing shortly for discussions on the topic with Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo. Yachi would propose that Japan dispatch Deputy Vice Foreign Minister Kawai to China for in-depth talks with his Chinese counterpart, meaning, Kitera suggested, the two countries were not far away form real, substantive discussions. Japan believed China was considering the question seriously, and might be willing to accept at least a provisional solution. A/S Silverberg noted that she had pressed Japan's candidacy with the Chinese, who had expressed reluctance to support any expansion and supported, if anything, the addition of a developing country. ¶12. (C) On the issue of criteria, Ambassador Kitera said Japan guessed Brazil and Germany were the G4 countries least happy with Japan's "Model D". India was more confident of its chances as a candidate, and was also more patient and less concerned with the timeline for its membership. ¶13. (C) United Nations Policy Division Director Takizaki Shigeki added that any model must include Japan as a candidate. Japan knew the U.S. preferred a model with Japan as either the first or the only candidate, but this was a non-starter as other countries would not support it. Japan and the other G4 countries all agreed, however, that election criteria could be used as instruments to remove potential UNSC members from contention without excluding them from the start. One such instrument that Japan strongly supported was to have only one round of voting in each election, and to hold vacant seats to which no member was elected until the review period was up. Another instrument the G4 was discussing was to allow no-confidence votes on new members, either periodically or after the initial review period, to ally concerns about new members' performance. Takizaki added that a clearer idea of which countries the US favored as TOKYO 00000585 003 OF 005 members would help greatly in establishing election criteria. ¶14. (C) A/S Silverberg regretted she could not provide any new U.S. insights on other potential members, as the issue was still under discussion. She agreed that Japan's idea on limiting voting rounds was very helpful, although not airtight, as a country such as Cuba, which was very popular in the General Assembly, could be elected in one round but still not be a constructive UNSC member. She added her view that a no-confidence vote might be unhelpful, if new members become so worried about the General Assembly's support that they found themselves inhibited from making necessary but unpopular decisions. ¶15. (C) U.S. criteria for new permanent UNSC members, A/S Silverberg continued, included a necessary ability to make tough decisions, as well as the capability to take on international responsibility and sufficient authority to make their voices heard. In the U.S. view, these qualities were not limited to developed countries, although developing-country candidates should be able to wield international, not just local, influence. Some of the potential African and Latin American candidates were likely to have trouble with the last criterion. ¶16. (C) Ambassador Kitera agreed that Japan's criteria were much the same: putting these criteria on paper, however, without causing misunderstandings or raising false expectations, was the challenge. Takizaki believed one possible solution was to elect new permanent members on a global, rather than a regional, basis, which would eliminate the regional slant of candidacies. A/S Silverberg agreed it might be possible to shift the debate away from regional representation. Takizaki added it might be possible to gain African support by offering to reserve a future seat for Africa, if it was unable to select a current candidate. Possible Term as Non-permanent Member -------------- ¶17. (C) Ambassador Kitera told A/S Silverberg Prime Minister Abe had met January 24 with Mongolian President Nambaryn Enkhbayar, who informed Japan that Mongolia had decided to withdraw as a candidate in the 2008 elections for a 2009-10 non-permanent UNSC seat. This opened the seat to other Asian candidates, and Japan was fully engaged in plans to run for the seat. President Enkhbayar, Ambassador Kitera added, had pledged Mongolia's support for Japan's candidacy. Kitera was unable to speculate, in response to A/S Silverberg's query, on whether Iran would also withdraw from the non-permanent seat race. A/S Silverberg noted that, until Japan requested otherwise, the U.S. would be a quiet supporter of Japan's candidacy for a new non-permanent term, but would avoid openly campaigning for Japan to avoid having Japan pegged as a U.S. proxy. Ambassador Kitera agreed and added that Japan needed to complete its own internal discussions before beginning to campaign for the post, and would consult with the US as the process got underway. United Nation Peacekeeping Operations -------------- ¶18. (C) Japan agrees with the United States on the need to improve UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) efficiency and training, and it is important to focus on completing "old PKO missions," Ambassador Kitera said. Japan has historically shouldered a substantial portion of UN PKO costs and this expense is a big concern for the Japanese government and public, he emphasized. When asked about Japan's plans to participate in future UN PKOs, Ambassador Kitera suggested that with the elevation of Japan Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) earlier this month, Japan will be likely be more open to participating in future PKOs. MOD may participate in a proposed PKO for Nepal, he added. Japan is launching a pilot program this summer to provide civilian PKO training, observed International Peace Cooperation Division Director Masahiko Kiya. ¶19. (C) Japan is working on providing humanitarian assistance to Darfur by increasing political engagement with the African Union, Ambassador Kitera continued. Participating directly in a Darfur PKO would be difficult for Japan because the existing Japanese law requires formal consent from the recipient government. Japan would need to receive a formal letter from Sudan requesting help before Japan could provide assistance. Asked whether consent is required before Japan can provide bilateral assistance to a country providing troops to a PKO, Kiya explained that if a TOKYO 00000585 004 OF 005 peace agreement is in place, Japan can provide assistance to the UN to be used in the PKO. Japan would appreciate it if the United States could recommend a partner for Japan to provide bilateral assistance to, Ambassador Kitera noted. A/S Silverberg explained that the United States is working on a "Plan B" that could involve sanctions, in the event of a deterioration in the human rights or political situation, or if Sudan does not accept a UN PKO mission in Darfur. ¶20. (C) Japan welcomes U.S. views on the role of UN PKO under secretaries, Ambassador Kitera said. Japan has avoided publicly announcing that the disarmament director post will be downgraded but understands the need for two DPKO under secretaries. Kitera requested that A/S Silverberg confirm SIPDIS the U.S. position on dividing the under secretaries for DPKO. The U.S. is not likely to oppose a decision to divide the DPKO under secretaries, A/S Silverberg explained. Human Rights Council -------------- ¶21. (C) It is important to increase "best practices" at the Human Rights Council (HRC) while maintaining a country-specific approach, Ambassador Kitera said. A/S Silverberg noted that a united effort had produced a strong result in the Third Committee, and that a similar joint effort was needed in the HRC. Canada is carrying too much of the burden. International Organization Elections -------------- ¶22. (C) The U.S. was very happy Nobuo Tanaka was elected IEA Executive Director. Next time, however, Japan and the U.S. should set up an informal mechanism to discuss potential candidates in order to avoid a delay of U.S. support for Japanese candidates in the future, A/S Silverberg suggested. Japan appreciates U.S. support for its candidates and agreed it is very important for Japan and the U.S. to inform each other in advance, responded UN Planning and Administration Division Director Akira Chiba. Chiba provided A/S Silverberg with a list of upcoming UN elections in which Japan will likely participate. Japan will run for the UN Security Council, UN Economic and Social Council, and UN Human Rights Council. Japan is also planning on fielding individual candidates for the Director of the International Hydrographic Bureau, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ),Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, and UN Joint Inspection Unit. In addition, Chiba provided background information on the potential candidates (faxed to EAP/J). A/S Silverberg thanked Chiba for the information and added that the U.S. is seeking a seat on the Commission for Science and Technology for Development. UN Reform Under New Secretary General -------------- ¶23. (C) It is very important to jump-start UN management reform under the new secretary general, A/S Silverberg told Kitera. A/S Silverberg recommended steps SYG Ban should take within his first 30 days in office to improve ethics and oversight. Necessary steps include cooperating fully with fraud investigations, reissuing bulletins requiring staff to cooperate fully with investigations of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the UN Board of Auditors (BOA), and to hold managers accountable for implementing their recommendations, A/S Silverberg emphasized. Kitera agreed on the need to improve ethics and reduce fraud, and reiterated the need to wrap up previous PKO missions, but emphasized the UN cannot be run like a private company. We cannot compromise on ethics, we need strong protections in place to prevent fraud, and when fraud is discovered it must be punished, replied A/S Silverberg. President Bush has already told Ban twice that the U.S. will not tolerate another "oil for food" problem and that the U.S. public will not tolerate U.S. participation in UN activities rampant with fraud, A/S Silverberg told Kitera. Japan understands the U.S. position and agrees we need to work to avoid this, Kitera replied. Burma -------------- ¶24. (C) A/S Silverberg thanks Kitera for Japan's support on the UNSC resolution on Burma, noting that it had not been easy for Japan. The United States is now thinking about next steps and invited Kitera's views on a possible special envoy. TOKYO 00000585 005 OF 005 Kitera observed that it is important that the UN play a role in Burma, otherwise it will be influenced only by China. A/S Silverberg noted that it was in China's interest to try to influence both North Korea and Burma positively because instability in either nation could directly affect China. ¶25. (U) A/S Silverberg has cleared this cable SCHIEFFER