Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
07TOKYO582 | 2007-02-08 08:57:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO1538 OO RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH DE RUEHKO #0582/01 0390857 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 080857Z FEB 07 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0538 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5751 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1503 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 5288 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1832 RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 0405 RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 9825 RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 2279 RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 3295 RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 0817 RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3226 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000582 |
1. (C) Summary. MOFA DVM Kawai told IO A/S Silverberg on January 25 that Japan would contest Iran for the 2009-10 UNSC nonpermanent Asia slot. A/S Silverberg recalled Washington's positive experience working with Japan during Tokyo,s last tenure on the UNSC. She applauded Japan's approach on UNSCR 1718. The DVM expressed support for new UN SYG Ban Ki-moon, but noted that Ban appeared to be having difficulty with personnel issues. End Summary. -------------------------- UNSC Candidacy -------------------------- 2. (C) IO A/S Kristen Silverberg met on January 25 with MOFA's Deputy Vice-Minister for Foreign Policy Chikao Kawai to discuss a range of issues. Kawai reported that Japan had just announced its decision to run for a UN nonpermanent member seat in 2009. PM Abe had telephoned Mongolian President Nambaryn Enkhbayar to discuss running for the seat that Ulaanbaatar had originally planned to contest. President Enkhbayar agreed to let Japan run instead, but Kawai said he was worried that the Mongolian president might change his mind. The communication link between the two leaders had not been good and the telephone call had been interrupted several times. However, Kawai maintained, PM Abe clearly heard the part of the conversation where Mongolia had offered Japan the chance to run for the seat. 3. (C) PM Abe had discussed Japan,s candidacy for the UN seat with European leaders, including UK PM Blair and German Chancellor Merkel, during Abe,s recent visit to NATO and European capitals, Kawai noted. FM Aso, who also recently toured Europe, also lobbied for a permanent Japanese UNSC seat during his meetings with leaders. Abe had also instructed VFM Yachi to discuss Japan's UNSC candidacy with the State Department officials during Yachi,s visit to the United States. -------------------------- Competition vs. Iran -------------------------- 4. (C) Japan's decision to enter the race for a nonpermanent seat was &great news," Silverberg responded. The U.S. had had a good experience working with Japan during Tokyo,s last term on the council, she said. Kawai expressed confidence that Japan had done a great job during its most recent tenure. He planned to discuss with PM Abe in the near future Japan's strategy for obtaining support among UN members for the UNSC nonpermanent seat. Japan hoped to work closely with the United States. Tokyo, he opined, stood a good chance of beating Iran for the slot. Silverberg agreed, noting that Iran did want to be defeated at the UN again. Japan, she advised, should work to gain support from other members as quickly as possible. Iran might drop out of the competition if it sensed that Tokyo was gaining momentum. Conversely, Tehran would likely stay in the race - if only to challenge Washington - if support for Japan's candidacy came mostly from the United States. -------------------------- Expansion Criteria Important -------------------------- 5. (C) Turning to discussion about Japan's candidacy for a UNSC permanent seat, Silverberg noted that there was a large gap in expectations among UN members about the kind of UNSC expansion that would be possible, with some African nations and India expecting a large expansion. The U.S. has said that it is open to a modest expansion of up to two permanent members and two or three nonpermanent countries. However, some states expect larger expansions. Silverberg said that she and the U.S. would continue to support Japan,s effort to obtain a seat at the UN. TOKYO 00000582 002 OF 002 6. (C) Criteria used to select new permanent members would be a critical issue, Silverberg noted. Internal political dynamics among the permanent members often boiled down to the P3 vs. Russia/China. The U.S. attempted to avoid such confrontations, but the distinction remained nonetheless. Washington did not want to take any steps that would alter that balance. However, the U.S. believed that Japan's participation on the UNSC would make the Council more effective. -------------------------- Support SYG Ban Ki-moon -------------------------- 7. (C) Kawai expressed support for new UN SYG Ban Ki-moon, but noted that the SYG appeared to be having difficulty with personnel issues. The A/S encouraged Kawai to look for opportunities to put forward Japanese candidates, whose experience would be put to good use, to fill some of those vacancies. 8. (C) Ban's instincts appear to be good, Silverberg indicated. However, the U.S. and other countries would need to see that good advisors surround Ban. The Secretariat has already attempted to alter some of Ban's initiatives, she said. Kawai suggested that the U.S. and Japan work together on that issue. UN reform would not be an easy goal to achieve. Kawai, referring to the former Japanese prime minister noted for his domestic reform agenda, noted that Junichiro Koizumi often said that reform efforts were destined to bring pain to those affected. -------------------------- UN Dividends -------------------------- 9. (C) The U.S. and Japan, Silverberg stated, now had a closer relationship "across the board" as a result of the two nations, good coordination on a number issues, including UN reform, the UNDP's recent decision to suspend its North Korea program, and Nobuo Tanaka's recent election as IEA Executive Director. Kawai expressed appreciation for the U.S. support for Tanaka. 10. (C) Silverberg applauded Japan's strong approach to UNSCR 1718. There were, she suggested, comparisons to be drawn between the DPRK and Iran outcomes. One important lesson the U.S. had learned was that UNSC members must be prepared to take risks. Kawai agreed, noting the need for UNSC members to use patience and compromise in negotiations. Referring to his recent promotion to the deputy vice-minister portfolio after serving as director-general of the North American Affairs Bureau, Kawai confessed that this would be his first experience working with multilateral organizations. 11. (C) Kawai noted that Japan's recent successful experience on the UN Security Council had had a salutatory affect on Japanese public opinion toward the UN. Japanese voters often questioned why Japan paid a high monetary contribution when Tokyo was not a permanent UNSC member. Many Japanese now appeared to be supportive of Japan's participation in the UN because the North Korea nuclear and missile issues had given Tokyo a good opportunity to take an active role. A/S Silverberg cleared this message. SCHIEFFER |