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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TOKYO582
2007-02-08 08:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

I/O SILVERBERG'S JANUARY 25 MEETING WITH JAPAN

Tags:   PREL  PGOV  UNSC  JA 
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VZCZCXRO1538
OO RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0582/01 0390857
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 080857Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0538
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5751
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1503
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 5288
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1832
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 0405
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 9825
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 2279
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 3295
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 0817
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3226
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
						C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000582 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC JA
SUBJECT: I/O SILVERBERG'S JANUARY 25 MEETING WITH JAPAN
DVFM KAWAI


Classified By: Ambassador J.Thomas Schieffer. Reasons 1.4 (B) (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000582

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC JA
SUBJECT: I/O SILVERBERG'S JANUARY 25 MEETING WITH JAPAN
DVFM KAWAI


Classified By: Ambassador J.Thomas Schieffer. Reasons 1.4 (B) (D)


1. (C) Summary. MOFA DVM Kawai told IO A/S Silverberg on
January 25 that Japan would contest Iran for the 2009-10 UNSC
nonpermanent Asia slot. A/S Silverberg recalled Washington's
positive experience working with Japan during Tokyo,s last
tenure on the UNSC. She applauded Japan's approach on UNSCR

1718. The DVM expressed support for new UN SYG Ban Ki-moon,
but noted that Ban appeared to be having difficulty with
personnel issues. End Summary.

--------------
UNSC Candidacy
--------------


2. (C) IO A/S Kristen Silverberg met on January 25 with
MOFA's Deputy Vice-Minister for Foreign Policy Chikao Kawai
to discuss a range of issues. Kawai reported that Japan had
just announced its decision to run for a UN nonpermanent
member seat in 2009. PM Abe had telephoned Mongolian
President Nambaryn Enkhbayar to discuss running for the seat
that Ulaanbaatar had originally planned to contest.
President Enkhbayar agreed to let Japan run instead, but
Kawai said he was worried that the Mongolian president might
change his mind. The communication link between the two
leaders had not been good and the telephone call had been
interrupted several times. However, Kawai maintained, PM Abe
clearly heard the part of the conversation where Mongolia had
offered Japan the chance to run for the seat.


3. (C) PM Abe had discussed Japan,s candidacy for the UN
seat with European leaders, including UK PM Blair and German
Chancellor Merkel, during Abe,s recent visit to NATO and
European capitals, Kawai noted. FM Aso, who also recently
toured Europe, also lobbied for a permanent Japanese UNSC
seat during his meetings with leaders. Abe had also
instructed VFM Yachi to discuss Japan's UNSC candidacy with
the State Department officials during Yachi,s visit to the
United States.

--------------
Competition vs. Iran
--------------


4. (C) Japan's decision to enter the race for a nonpermanent

seat was &great news," Silverberg responded. The U.S. had
had a good experience working with Japan during Tokyo,s last
term on the council, she said. Kawai expressed confidence
that Japan had done a great job during its most recent
tenure. He planned to discuss with PM Abe in the near future
Japan's strategy for obtaining support among UN members for
the UNSC nonpermanent seat. Japan hoped to work closely with
the United States. Tokyo, he opined, stood a good chance of
beating Iran for the slot. Silverberg agreed, noting that
Iran did want to be defeated at the UN again. Japan, she
advised, should work to gain support from other members as
quickly as possible. Iran might drop out of the competition
if it sensed that Tokyo was gaining momentum. Conversely,
Tehran would likely stay in the race - if only to challenge
Washington - if support for Japan's candidacy came mostly
from the United States.

--------------
Expansion Criteria Important
--------------


5. (C) Turning to discussion about Japan's candidacy for a
UNSC permanent seat, Silverberg noted that there was a large
gap in expectations among UN members about the kind of UNSC
expansion that would be possible, with some African nations
and India expecting a large expansion. The U.S. has said
that it is open to a modest expansion of up to two permanent
members and two or three nonpermanent countries. However,
some states expect larger expansions. Silverberg said that
she and the U.S. would continue to support Japan,s effort to
obtain a seat at the UN.


TOKYO 00000582 002 OF 002



6. (C) Criteria used to select new permanent members would be
a critical issue, Silverberg noted. Internal political
dynamics among the permanent members often boiled down to the
P3 vs. Russia/China. The U.S. attempted to avoid such
confrontations, but the distinction remained nonetheless.
Washington did not want to take any steps that would alter
that balance. However, the U.S. believed that Japan's
participation on the UNSC would make the Council more
effective.

--------------
Support SYG Ban Ki-moon
--------------


7. (C) Kawai expressed support for new UN SYG Ban Ki-moon,
but noted that the SYG appeared to be having difficulty with
personnel issues. The A/S encouraged Kawai to look for
opportunities to put forward Japanese candidates, whose
experience would be put to good use, to fill some of those
vacancies.


8. (C) Ban's instincts appear to be good, Silverberg
indicated. However, the U.S. and other countries would need
to see that good advisors surround Ban. The Secretariat has
already attempted to alter some of Ban's initiatives, she
said. Kawai suggested that the U.S. and Japan work together
on that issue. UN reform would not be an easy goal to
achieve. Kawai, referring to the former Japanese prime
minister noted for his domestic reform agenda, noted that
Junichiro Koizumi often said that reform efforts were
destined to bring pain to those affected.

--------------
UN Dividends
--------------


9. (C) The U.S. and Japan, Silverberg stated, now had a
closer relationship "across the board" as a result of the two
nations, good coordination on a number issues, including UN
reform, the UNDP's recent decision to suspend its North Korea
program, and Nobuo Tanaka's recent election as IEA Executive
Director. Kawai expressed appreciation for the U.S. support
for Tanaka.


10. (C) Silverberg applauded Japan's strong approach to UNSCR

1718. There were, she suggested, comparisons to be drawn
between the DPRK and Iran outcomes. One important lesson the
U.S. had learned was that UNSC members must be prepared to
take risks. Kawai agreed, noting the need for UNSC members
to use patience and compromise in negotiations. Referring to
his recent promotion to the deputy vice-minister portfolio
after serving as director-general of the North American
Affairs Bureau, Kawai confessed that this would be his first
experience working with multilateral organizations.


11. (C) Kawai noted that Japan's recent successful experience
on the UN Security Council had had a salutatory affect on
Japanese public opinion toward the UN. Japanese voters often
questioned why Japan paid a high monetary contribution when
Tokyo was not a permanent UNSC member. Many Japanese now
appeared to be supportive of Japan's participation in the UN
because the North Korea nuclear and missile issues had given
Tokyo a good opportunity to take an active role.

A/S Silverberg cleared this message.
SCHIEFFER