Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TOKYO5624
2007-12-20 07:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

CLUSTER MUNITIONS DEMARCHE DELIVERED TO JAPANESE

Tags:  PREL PARM MOPS JA 
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DE RUEHKO #5624/01 3540753
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R 200753Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0472
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2480
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 0128
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0276
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0544
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RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 6809
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0648
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0132
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1014
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/USFJ
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 005624 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR PM/WRA KATHERINE BAKER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM MOPS JA
SUBJECT: CLUSTER MUNITIONS DEMARCHE DELIVERED TO JAPANESE

REF: STATE 167308

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4(b) a
nd (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 005624 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR PM/WRA KATHERINE BAKER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017 TAGS: PREL PARM MOPS JA SUBJECT: CLUSTER MUNITIONS DEMARCHE DELIVERED TO JAPANESE REF: STATE 167308 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4(b) a nd (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Japan believes the optimal solution to the cluster munitions issue is a legally binding agreement arrived at through the CCW process. However, because such an outcome is not certain, Japan will continue to participate in the Oslo Process in order to be able to influence any final outcome it may reach. Japan concurs with our position regarding the utility of cluster munitions, but is also heavily influenced by press and public opinion which is generally strongly supportive of disarmament efforts. MOFA officials would like to coordinate closely with counterparts from both the United States and Europe to assure we are all speaking with one coherent voice, and is interested in meeting bilaterally with U.S. officials either before or during the upcoming January 14-18 CCW meetings in Geneva. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Per reftel, Embassy Tokyo Political Officer met December 19 with MOFA officials Michiko Makino of the Conventional Arms Division of the Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, and Science Department, and Takuma Kajita of the Treaties Division of the International Legal Affairs Bureau to discuss U.S. views on cluster munitions. The discussion emphasized that the U.S. shares humanitarian concerns about the use of cluster munitions and that we fully support negotiations on this issue within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) process. Both papers contained in reftel were discussed and left. -------------- JAPAN SHARES OUR VIEWS, BUT... -------------- ¶3. (C) Japan shares our views on the utility of cluster munitions, said Kajita, and agrees completely that the most desirable outcome is to resolve any concerns about their use within the CCW process. However, because the CCW process works by consensus and it is unclear whether the Russians are fully on board, it is uncertain whether an agreement will be possible. Accordingly, Japan believes it necessary to participate in the Oslo Process in order to be able to influence any final outcome or agreement in that forum. Kajima pointed out that several NATO members are also participating in the Oslo Process. ¶4. (C) Ideally, Japan would like to see a legally binding
agreement worked out in the CCW process, rather than simply a set of guidelines. Kajita noted that since the CCW process includes major producers of cluster munitions, any agreement reached will be more effective than anything the Oslo Process will achieve, even if any restrictions on use are not as comprehensive. ¶5. (C) Kajita said it is critical to understand what the ""red lines"" are for both Japan and the United States on this issue. Obviously, a total ban is a red line, but it seems inevitable that some restrictions are forthcoming, and it would best to understand right now what is acceptable to each party. Japan believes it important for countries sharing like views to coordinate our approach on this so we can speak with a single coherent voice, and welcomes the opportunity to meet bilaterally with us prior to or on the sidelines of meetings coming up in Geneva January 14-18. -------------- ... PUBLIC OPINION PLAYS A ROLE -------------- ¶6. (C) Despite the fact Japan's view on the utility of cluster munitions is similar to ours, Kajita and Makino pointed out that on this issue, public and press opinion in Japan will play a key role. Although there are many activists in the United States who are campaigning against cluster munitions, Kajita asserted they are not as organized or effective as those in Japan, where disarmament is always a hot-button political issue. He claimed that, for example, at the November Oslo meeting, eighty percent of the journalists who attended were from Japan, and that the only television news camera there was from Japan's NHK network. In addition, the day prior to the meeting, parliamentarians held a conference on cluster munitions. Japanese attendees included Liberal Democratic Party Diet member and former Minister for Gender Equality Kuniko Inoguchi, who also served as Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in 2003-2004, and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) representative and former ""shadow Foreign Minister"" Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi. And as recently as December 18, the question of a ban on cluster munitions had been raised in Upper House debates. Because the Upper House is now controlled by the opposition DPJ, the potential for cluster munitions to become a major subject for debate is a real possibility, warned Kajita. ¶7. (C) Political Officer replied that we are aware of the political sensitivities in Japan concerning cluster munitions, but that we hope MOFA and MOD officials, along with like-minded Diet members, will use the materials in our two papers to help explain to the public the true facts about the utility of these munitions and the possible ramifications of enacting bans that also include criminal penalties. ¶8. (C) A copy of the two non-papers were also provided to Ministry of Defense officials. SCHIEFFER

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