Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TOKYO558
2007-02-07 23:27:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

FEBRUARY 25-26, 2007 ASTOP IV MEETING

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VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #0558/01 0382327
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 072327Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0490
UNCLAS TOKYO 000558 

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SENV JA
SUBJECT: FEBRUARY 25-26, 2007 ASTOP IV MEETING


UNCLAS TOKYO 000558

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SENV JA
SUBJECT: FEBRUARY 25-26, 2007 ASTOP IV MEETING



1. SUMMARY: On February 25-26, 2007, the Japanese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs hosted the Fourth Asian Senior-Level Talks
on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP IV) in Tokyo. Senior-level
government officials in charge of non-proliferation policies
from the ASEAN member countries, Australia, Brunei
Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore,
Thailand, Vietnam, the United States and Japan attended the
meeting. In addition, ASTOP IV marks the initial
participation of both New Zealand and Canada. The first day
of meetings focused on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT),IAEA's Additional Protocol, United
Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) concerning North
Korea and Iran, the Six-Party Talks, nuclear fuel supply
assurances, and export control systems. The second day was
devoted to a discussion on the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) and a thought-provoking PSI mock table-top
exercise. China did not attend the PSI portion of the
meeting. END SUMMARY.

OPENING SESSION
--------------


2. Senior Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Katsuhito Asano's
opening speech urged ASTOP member countries to act in concert
and implement UNSCR 1718. Asano felt strongly that last
year's missile launch by North Korea not only put peace and
security in the Asia region in jeopardy but the entire world.
Therefore he called on all countries to collectively work
together to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Asano
expressed his hope that the Six-Party Talks will resume soon
in an effort to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear
weapons and existing nuclear programs. He also stated that
humanitarian concerns must be addressed, namely the abduction
issue. In Asano's final comments, he expressed gratitude to
United Nations Under-Secretary for Disarmament Nobuaki Tanaka
for his role in helping to realize UNSCR 1718. In MOFA's
Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Director-General
Takeshi Nakane's opening remarks, he stated that the ASTOP's
purpose is to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and
promote better understanding of each country's
responsibilities to achieve security.

--------------
Universalization of the Additional Protocol
--------------


3. After opening remarks, the conference took up the first
agenda item universalization of the Additional Protocol (AP).
Having recently signed the AP, Thailand and Singapore
presented first. Thailand reviewed its long and still
continuing process toward AP ratification, which requires
revision of relevant legislation prior to AP accession.

Thailand highlighted the difficulties of educating GOT
agencies on the meaning of the AP and of assessing and
adjusting its internal procedures to carry out AP
obligations. Singapore stated that it is now putting in place
the necessary measures to ratify the AP and drew attention to
the successful December 2006 visit of an IAEA team to advise
GOS agencies on AP implementation. Vietnam noted that its
president had decided in November 2006 to sign the AP and the
GOV is now negotiating complete WMD disarmament. Echoing
Vietnam, Malaysia noted it views non-proliferation in the
context of disarmament and expressed its disappointment in
the lack of disarmament progress.


4. Indonesia updated the assembly on its efforts to bring the
AP into force and note it is in the process of establishing a
first nuclear reactor in 2011. Indonesia pointed out that
only 78 states had ratified the AP and urged the United
States and Russia to ratify as a clear example to others.
(Note: Foley later responded to the comments by Indonesia and
Japan on AP ratification by apprising the group that the U.S.
had signed the AP in 1998, the Senate provided its advice and
consent in March 2004, and the Congress passed necessary
legislation in December 2006. USG is one step closer, but
work remains to be done, Foley summarized. End note.)
Australia presented a detailed paper on its experience in
signing and ratifying the AP. Australia also highlighted its
May 2005 announcement that it would make the AP a
pre-condition for supply of uranium to non-nuclear weapon
states. South Korea, noting its accession to the AP and its
position as a leader in the peaceful use of nuclear energy,
added that it has also made AP adoption a pre-condition for
nuclear supply. The Philippines regretted that although it
had signed the AP in 1997, the AP is one of over 30
international treaties or agreements awaiting ratification.

-------------- --
U.S. Statement on Nuclear Fuel Supply Assurance
-------------- --


5. Opening the next agenda item on assurance of nuclear fuel
supply, Foley called attention to President Bush's February
2004 speech urging suppliers to provide reliable access to
nuclear fuel at reasonable cosIo the sensitivity of the subject, which could be
perceived as restricting access of NPT-compliant states to
peaceful nuclear technology or limiting access to the full
fuel cycle to a handful of states, Foley stressed the need
for vigilance regarding transfers of sensitive enrichment and
reprocessing technology. Since the existing commercial
nuclear fuel market is working well, the objective in
developing fuel supply assurance is not to solve an existing
supply problem; rather, it is to provide a mechanism to
address possible future supply problems with sufficient
certainty that recipient states can avoid devoting
substantial resources to the indigenous development of
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, Foley underscored.
Such a mechanism would thus promote the benefits of expanded
nuclear energy use while the creation of this back-up
mechanism, including establishment of a multilateral
mechanism at the IAEA, coordination among enriched uranium
commercial suppliers to back each other up, establishment of
enriched uranium reserves, and foundation of an international
center or centers to provide uranium enrichment services.


6. In response to the USG presentation, Japan took the
opportunity to circulate again its "IAEA Standby Arrangements
System" proposal, previously distributed at the September
19-21, 2006 50th IAEA General Conference Special Event, which
supports the IAEA multilateral mechanism but seeks to broaden
it by taking into account not only uranium enrichment, but
all major front-end fuel cycle activities: uranium supply,
storage, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication.
Australia (Note: Holder of 40 percent of the world's low-cost
uranium reserves and the world's second largest uranium
producer. End Note.) stated its position that the
international nuclear fuel market has worked and continues to
work efficiently, but that GOA supports international
examination of proposals to strengthen nuclear fuel supply
assurance. Australia expressed its hope that the IAEA
Secretariat analysis now in progress will address as-yet

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unexplored fundamental questions, such as any new mechanism's
impact on national supply policies, the existing uranium
market, and legitimate national fuel cycle choices. Canada,
the world's largest supplier of uranium, noted that its
position was broadly consistent with Australia's, that it was
open-minded with respect to a new mechanism, and that it
recognized the central role of the IAEA in reviewing the
merits of current proposals.

-------------- --------------
Japan's Efforts for Strengthening Nuclear Security
-------------- --------------


7. Japan provided a brief overview on its approach to nuclear
security and counter-terrorism mechanisms. In an effort to
enhance national counterterrorism measures, Japan asserted
that it has become party to all twelve counter-terrorism
conventions and protocols. Currently, it is working to
implement additional international instruments, such as, the
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism and the Amendment on the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Japan is also
enhancing counterterrorism through promotion of
international cooperation, such as actively contributing to
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. On the
nuclear security front, sustained and comprehensive efforts
to expand the framework includes the introduction of the
Design Basis Threat. Government officials are in close
cooperation with National Security Authorities to provide
nuclear installations with round-the-clock security guards by
the Riot Police Unit (anti-firearms squads) and by Japan
Coast Guard patrol boats. Customs is also playing a major
role by actively installing sophisticated equipment to detect
nuclear and other radioactive materials. In May 2005, Japan
amended its law for "regulation of nuclear source material,
nuclear fuel material and reactors." The changes in the law
mainly focused on physical protection inspection and physical
protection information confidentiality and penalties.

-------------- --------------
China's Summary of the Status of the Six-Party Talks
-------------- --------------


8. Moving to regional non-proliferation issues, China
presented a paper on the current status of the Six-Party
Talks on North Korea. China asserted that the second phase of
the fifth round of the Talks, held in Beijing in December
2006, proved useful, with all sides reaffirming the spirit of
the Joint Statement on September 19, 2005 through dialogue.
Acknowledging the wide differences still exist between North
Korea and the USG, China suggested that the most important
events of the December meetings were the frequent contacts
between the DPRK and U.S., including the two discussions
between financial experts from the two sides, which had never
occurred in previous rounds of the Talks. China disputed the
view that the sanctions regulated by UNSCR 1718 would alone
be sufficient to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue,
arguing that the resolution should be implemented in a
comprehensive way. Finally, China hailed that the January
16-18, 2007 bilateral talks in Berlin between North Korea and
the USG has a positive development and expressed the hope
that they would lead to the early resumption of, and
substantive progress in, the Six-Party Talks.


9. In response during the later open floor session, Australia
admonished the group not to forget that North Korea had
exploded a nuclear weapon on October 9, clearly showing the
threat of WMD to the Asian region. The North Korean return to
the Six-Party Talks was "nice, but insufficient." Australia
encouraged all to look carefully at the cargo inspection
provision of UNSCR 1718, consistent with international law.
South Korea took notice of the positive development in Berlin
in exasperation that 90 days have already passed since
adoption of UNSCR 1718 but the 1718 Committee is still
discussing the matter in New York.

--------------
USG Presentation on Iran
--------------


10. Mr. Foley began the USG presentation of recent
developments with respect to Iran by noting that Iran has
refused to suspend its uranium enrichment, reprocessing, and
heavy-water related activities and has failed to comply with
UNSCR 1696 and 1737. Pointing out that in December 2006 the
UNSCR had unanimously adopted Resolution 1737, imposing
sanctions on Iran as a result of Iran's refusal to comply
with UNSCR 1696 and of long-standing IAEA safeguards
noncompliance, Foley reviewed the specific UNSCR 1737
measures intended to prevent Iran from moving forward with
its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and nuclear
weapons-capable delivery systems. Foley highlighted steps the
USG has taken to implement its obligations under UNSCR 1737
and called on all member states to follow through on their
obligations under the Chapter 7 UN Resolutions.


11. In response, Indonesia encouraged the P5 1 to take
measures to try to engage Iran and queried the U.S. whether
any steps pursuant to UNSCR 1737 Paragraph 21 had been taken
on engagement of Iran. Foley responded by reiterating
Secretary Rice's recent assertion that the USG remains open

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to the P5 1 diplomatic approach but stressed that Iran must
cease enrichment efforts as a precondition. South Korea
expressed its wishes that Iran not take any further
aggravating measures and that Iran fully implement UNSCR 1737.

-------------- ---
UN U/S Tanaka Report on Implementation of UNSCRs
-------------- ---


12. UN Under-Secretary for Disarmament Affairs Nobuaki Tanaka
presented on the next agenda item of UNSCR implementation.
Opening with the declaration of 2006 as a year of milestone
UNSCR resolutions to curb WMD proliferation, Tanaka focused
his remarks on resolutions 1540 and 1673 aimed at the
long-term goals of strengthening national capacities and
enhancing international cooperation to combat proliferation.
Tanaka offered the view that the adoption of all recent
non-proliferation resolutions by the UNSC, rather than by the
UN General Assembly, reflected the preference of might
nations to persuade only 15 nations instead of 192 and then
make the deacons mandatory under Chapter 7. Tanaka pointed
out that while certainly the easier path, this approach might
leave UN member states outside the UNSC less inclined to
implement vigorously the UNSCR resolutions.


13. Tanaka stated that UNSCRs 1540 and 1673 obligated all
states to take legislative and administrative action to put
in place national regulatory measures on non-proliferation,
but implementation remains a national responsibility. Some
countries are facing difficulties in addressing the initial
requirements of 1540 due to a lack of administrative and
technical ability. To underscore this point, Tanaka cited the
widely varying regional rates at which member states have
submitted first national reports to the 1540 Committee. In
particular, the Pacific Islands are facing the greatest
challenges, with only 25% of states having submitted first
reports. Tanaka stressed that states lacking the necessary
legal and regulatory infrastructure, or capacity and
resources, may require assistance in implementing the
provisions of UNSCR 1540.


14. In response, Foley picked up on the statement that
several nations need assistance in implementing 1540 to
advertise the USG-hosted ASEAN Regional Forum Workshop on
UNSCR 1540 Implementation on February 13-15, 2007 in San
Francisco and encouraged all interested parties to attend.
New Zealand responded that the Pacific Island under-reporting
was not due to a distaste for the process, but rather to a
lack of capacity for performance. Vietnam noted its own
shortage of human and technical resources to fulfill its 1540
obligations and appealed to the UN to look carefully at these
issues.

--------------
PSI Mock Exercise
--------------


15. On the last day of the ASTOP meeting, MOFA put together a
stimulating PSI mock table-top exercise for participants.
The purpose of the exercise was to increase the understanding
about what types of operations are needed and what elements
need to be considered in dealing with proliferation cases,
with particular emphasis on: (1) relevant government
agencies, their roles, relevant domestic laws and
regulations; (2) relevant international law/norms; (3) types
of coordination/cooperation with other countries and (4)
applicable domestic legislation. China was the only country
not to participate in the PSI portion at ASTOP.


16. Please contact Tokyo ESToffs Ayanna Hobbs on
HobbsA@state.gov or Daniel Walter on WalterDK@state.gov for
full text versions of the presentations.

--------------
Participants
--------------

Australia
--------------
--Mr. John Sullivan, Assistant Secretary, Arms Control and
Counter-Proliferation Branch, International Security
Division, DFAT
--Mr. Murray Perks, Assistant Secretary, Security Policy and
Programs, Department of Defence
--Mr. Greg Manning, Assistant Secretary, International
Security and Human Rights Branch, Office of International
Law, Attorney General's Department
--Ms. Sophia McIntyre, Executive Officer, Arms Control and
Counter-Proliferation Branch, International Security
Division, DFAT
--Dr. Jerry Edward, Director, Counter Proliferation,
Scientific and Technical Analysis Branch, Defence
Intelligence Organisation
--LDCR Letecia van Stralen, Deputy Fleet Legal Officer, Royal
Australian Navy
--Mr. Paul Power, Deputy Director, Counter-Proliferation and
Arms Control, International and Domestic Security Branch,
Department and Defence
--Mr. Robert Matthews, Manager, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
Arms Control, Defence Science and Technology Organisation,
Department of Defence
--Mr. Christopher White, Director, Maritime Strategy,
Australian Customs Service
--GRPCPT Matthew Dudley, Defence and Armed Services Attache,
Australian Embassy, Tokyo
--Ms. Jenny Bloomfield, Counsellor (Political),Australian
Embassy, Tokyo
--Mr. Robert Rushby, Counsellor (Customs),Australian
Embassy, Tokyo
--Ms. Pauline Lee, First Secretary, Australian Embassy, Tokyo
--Mr. Shane Flanagan, Second Secretary, Australian Embassy,
Tokyo

Brunei Darussalam
--------------
--Ms. Datin Paduka Hjh Maimunah Dato Paduka Hj Elias, Deputy
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
--Ms. Roslizawati Hj Ibrahim, Second Secretary, Department of
International Organisations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade
--Mr. Mahadi Maidin, Minister Counsellor, Negara Brunei
Darussalam Embassy

Cambodia
--------------
--Mr. Sun Suon, Director, International Organizations
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation
--Ms. Sun Malen, Third Secretary, Cambodia Embassy

Canada
--------------
--Mr. Mark Gwozdecky, Director, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament Division
--Mr. Philippe Tremblay, Second Secretary, Embassy of Canada
in Japan
--Ms. Michelle Slade, Deputy Head of Mission at the Canadian
Embassy of Tokyo

China
--------------
--Mr. Hu Xiaodi, Ambassador, Arms Control and Disarmament
Department, MFA
--Ms. Chen Zhiwen, First Secretary, Chinese Embassy

Indonesia
--------------
--Mr. Andy Rachmianto, Deputy Director, Directorate of
International Security and Disarmament, Department of Foreign
Affairs
--Mr. Edwin Suchranudin, Second Secretary, Indonesian Embassy
--Ms. Dewi J. Meidiwaty, Third Secretary, Indonesian Embassy

Laos
--------------
--Ms. Kanika Phommachanh, Director General, Department of
International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
--Mr. Virasac Somphong, First Secretary, Embassy of Lao PDR
Tokyo

Malaysia
--------------
--Mr. Shahrul Ikram, Undersecretary, Multilateral Political
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Myanmar
--------------
--Mr. Htin Lynn, Deputy Director, International Organizations
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

New Zealand
--------------
--Ms. Dell Higgie, Director, Security Policy Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Ambassador for
Counter-Terrorism)
--Mr. Mike Pointer, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy

Philippines
--------------
--Mr. Aladin G. Villacorte, Assistant Secretary, Office of
United Nations & Other Int'l Organizations, DFA
--Mr. Sulpicio M. Confiado, First Secretary, Philippines
Embassy

Republic of Korea
--------------
--Mr. Choi, Sung-joo, Deputy Director-General, International
Organizations, MOFAT
--Mr. Kang, Young-hoon, First Secretary, Korean Embassy, Tokyo
--Mr. Oh, Jae-Soon, Deputy Director, Export Control Division,
Ministry of Commerce, Industry & Energy
--Mr. Kim, Jae-woo, Second Secretary, Disarmament and
Non-Proliferation Division, MOFAT

Singapore
--------------
--Ms. Yvonne Ow, Assistant Director, International
Organizations Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
--Mr. Eng Chuan Ong, Deputy Chief of Mission, Singapore
Embassy, Tokyo

Thailand
--------------
--Mr. Kittichaisaree Kriangsak, Director-General, Department
of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

United States
--------------
--Mr. Tony Foley, Director, Office of Counterproliferation
Initiative, Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation, Department of State
--Mr. Steven Schleien, Director for Transnational Threats
Policy, OSD
--Ms. Elizabeth Phu, Assistant for Transnational Threats
Policy, OSD
--Mr. Eric DeSautels, Senior Advisor, ISN, State Department
--Mr. Randall Beisecker, Regional Affairs, ISN, State
Department
--Ms. Ayanna Hobbs, Scientific and Technical Affairs Officer,
Embassy Tokyo
--Mr. Daniel Walter, Advanced Technologies Officer, Embassy
Tokyo

Vietnam
--------------
--Mr. Pham Vinh Quang, Assistant Director-General,
International Organizations Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs

Japan
--------------
--Mr. Takeshi Nakane (Chair),Director-General, Disarmament,
Non-Proliferation and Science, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
--Ms. Tomoko Ichikawa (Head of Delegation),Director,
Non-Proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
SCHIEFFER

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