DIET EXTENSION, OVERRIDE VOTE ON OEF BILL GROW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 005503

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS JA
SUBJECT: DIET EXTENSION, OVERRIDE VOTE ON OEF BILL GROW
MORE LIKELY

REF: TOKYO 5236

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, reasons
1.4(b),(d).


1. (C) Summary. Prime Minister Fukuda appears poised to
extend the current Diet session beyond December 15, with the
expectation that his ruling LDP-Komeito coalition will use
their two-thirds majority in the Lower House to override the
opposition-controlled Upper House and pass key anti-terror
legislation by no later than mid-January. The Diet session
has already been extended once, and can be extended one more
time. The main opposition DPJ has staunchly refused to
cooperate on the measure thus far, and can hold the measure
in the Upper House for up to 60 days, through January 12,
before the measure is considered rejected and returned to the
Lower House for a re-vote. End summary.


2. (C) The legislation to extend Japan's refueling support
for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was introduced to the
opposition-controlled Upper House on November 13, where it
can be held for a maximum of 60 days (through January 12),
before it is considered rejected and can be passed into law
by a two-thirds vote of the Lower House. Full-fledged
deliberations did not begin in the Upper House Foreign
Affairs and Defense Committee until December 3, as the
opposition used its control to stall the proceedings by
pursuing allegations of defense-related scandals. The ruling
parties have failed thus far to overcome opposition
resistance to increasing the frequency of Upper House Foreign
Affairs and Defense Committee beyond the current Tuesdays and
Thursdays, making it impossible to meet opposition Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) demands that the Upper House match the
41 hours of deliberations in the Lower House. (Note: Upper
House committees generally spend only 70-80 percent of the
time on deliberations that their Lower House counterparts
do.)


3. (C) For their part, DPJ leaders have instead shifted the
blame to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),pointing out
that the real delays came earlier in the session, with the
sudden resignation of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and
the two-week pause to elect his successor. The DPJ has also
refused repeated requests from the LDP to engage in policy
discussions, other than the three meetings between Prime
Minister Yasuo Fukuda and DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa over the
past five weeks, or to otherwise cooperate on the measure.


4. (C) The ruling coalition must decide this week whether to
extend the session, and for how long. Embassy contacts in
both the LDP and DPJ have various theories, but admit that it
is impossible to predict exactly how this will play out.
Several major dailies reported on December 6 and 7 that Prime
Minister Yasuo Fukuda has already decided to use the ruling
coalition's two-thirds majority in the Lower House to pass
the refueling bill into law, although the reports carried no
direct attribution. Fukuda has, however, repeatedly said
that he believes the bill will be passed. An Embassy media
contact related on December 6 that the LDP Diet Affairs
Committee proposed four scenarios to the Prime Minister on
December 3, noting that none of the four had mentioned the
possibility of not extending the Diet session.


5. (C) Coalition partner Komeito contacts have told the
Embassy on several occasions that they are ready to support
the override vote, even if they are reluctant to say so
publicly for their own political reasons. Some recent
indications point to a vote in the Upper House before the end
of the year. DPJ Secretary General Yukio Hatoyama told the
press December 3 that his party has no plans to obstruct
passage of the OEF refueling bill, assuming there is ample
time for deliberation, and suggested that the bill could pass
before the end of the year.


6. (C) The current extraordinary Diet session has already

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been extended once -- from November 10 to December 15 -- and
can only be extended one more time under the Diet Law.
Public support for the OEF measure continues to run in the
mid-40's, but non-support levels are at nearly the same
level. Faced with the twin pressures of completing the
budget compilation process by the end of December and gearing
up for the beginning of the 150-day ordinary Diet session in
January, and no other real business to conduct in the current
extraordinary session, neither party really gains from
dragging this on until mid-January.


7. (C) The public is already growing weary of what it sees as
a complete stalemate in the Diet since the opposition gained
control of the Upper House in July, despite the passage of
nine out of ten LDP-sponsored bills, with full DPJ support,
over the past few weeks, and would likely hold both sides
accountable for additional delays. A quick end to the
session also leaves less time for an Upper House censure
motion, which has no binding effect, unlike a no-confidence
motion in the Lower House, but could further paralyze the
Diet and trigger Lower House elections. DPJ Acting President
Naoto Kan said on an evening news program on December 3 that
the chances for Lower House dissolution will increase if the
session is extended into January. A media contact told the
Embassy recently that Kan is much more committed to a censure
motion than either Ozawa or Hatoyama. (Note: The DPJ holds
115 of 242 Upper House seats, and would require support from
several of the smaller opposition parties to pass a censure
motion.)


8. (C) Some DPJ members, paradoxically, have told the Embassy
that they fear being backed into a position where they will
need to pass a censure motion, knowing that they are
unprepared for a snap election. A December 3 Asahi poll
showed the LDP and DPJ even at 32 percent when respondents
were asked which party they would like to see win the next
general election. One DPJ staffer said that a censure motion
over the perfectly valid use of the override vote could very
well be seen as a censure motion against the Constitution,
putting the DPJ in a difficult spot. Komeito contacts, too,
have emphasized the need to avoid a censure motion and new
elections at all cost, although they support the OEF measure.
LDP contacts have tended to be more sanguine, disavowing any
real impact from a censure motion. Either way, failure to
pass the bill this term will almost certainly push possible
passage back to the spring, sometime between a vote on the
budget at the end of March and the G8 meetings in June.


9. (C) DPJ members have made no secret of their disagreements
with Ozawa's policies and management style in conversations
with the Embassy. Former DPJ leader Seiji Maehara continues
to publicly criticize Ozawa's insistence on requiring a UNSC
resolution for SDF deployments. He recently told the Embassy
that Ozawa's insistence on classifying the SDF mission in the
Indian Ocean as unconstitutional had "screwed up" the debate.
DPJ contacts have emphasized to the Embassy that the United
States shouldn't read too much into policy positions in this
highly politicized political environment, where both sides
are jockeying for advantage in the next general election.
Public criticism of the DPJ has also mounted, as the party
has waffled between support for OEF and some sort of civilian
participation in the International Security Assistance Force
in Afghanistan in its own counterproposal, which has yet to
be finalized.


10. (C) Longer term, both sides recognize that the government
cannot continue to conduct business with a divided Diet
unless some sort of compromise is reached. The Upper House
cannot be dissolved, meaning that if the opposition fails to
gain a majority in the Lower House in the next general
election, the legislative gridlock could continue at least
until the next Upper House election in summer 2009. Part of
the debate concerns whether it is appropriate for the
opposition to undertake consultations with the ruling parties
on legislation outside the view of the public, as opposed to

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deliberating openly in the Diet. The opposition gains little
from asserting its views to the ruling parties outside of
public view. At the same time, the opposition will not
always be able to take contrary positions on popular
measures, and will suffer from appearing to be obstructionist
in every case. The closed door discussions on several
recently passed measures are a good demonstration of how the
LDP and DPJ were able to overcome obstacles to passage by
each side and come up with a compromise bill.


11. (C) This is particularly true as momentum has slowly
drifted back toward the ruling parties after their lopsided
loss in the July Upper House election. The LDP now outstrips
the DPJ in every major media poll measuring party support, a
reverse of the situation in July and August. Several major
Ozawa missteps have hurt the main opposition party's
standing, including his bid to form a grand coalition with
the ruling parties, his subsequent flip-flop on resigning as
party leader, and the aborted attempt to implicate Finance
Minister Nukaga in a defense-related scandal. Fukuda and his
administration, on the other hand, have managed to avoid
being dragged into the ongoing investigations into improper
ties between former Administrative Vice Minister of Defense
Takemasa Moriya and a former executive of defense contractor
Yamada Corp. Fukuda has also benefited from achieving his
limited legislative agenda for this term, with the obvious
exception of the refueling bill, unlike the DPJ, which has
failed to use its control of the Upper House to even
introduce most of the legislative measures promised during
the July Upper House campaign.
SCHIEFFER