TENTH U.S.-JAPAN COMMISSION MEETING ON NOVEMBER 8, 2007

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 005492



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TAGS: ENRG, KNNP, MNUC, PARM, PINS, PTER, TRGY, KGIC, IAEA,

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SUBJECT: TENTH U.S.-JAPAN COMMISSION MEETING ON NOVEMBER 8,

2007



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Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 b,d.



1. (C) Summary: Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms

Control and International Security, John C. Rood, led the

U.S. delegation to the tenth U.S.-Japan Commission on Arms

Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Verification on

November 8 in Tokyo. The Commission meeting made clear that

Japan shares a common view on important areas in

nonproliferation and will continue to be a strong ally. The

meeting covered a wide range of issues, including North Korea

and Iran; the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and

proliferation finance; disarmament and non-proliferation

issues; U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation; the Global

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI); and the Global

Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). End Summary.



Opening Remarks

--------------



2. (C) Following brief introductions by Acting U/S Rood and

head of the Japanese delegation MOFA Director-General for

Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Ambassador Takeshi

Nakane, Acting U/S Rood began by highlighting the broad range

of important issues on the Commission's agenda and pointing

out the last scheduled Commission meeting one year ago was

cancelled due to the press of business following the October

North Korean nuclear test. Representing the U.S. at the

Commission meeting for the first time, Acting U/S Rood noted

the close cooperation with Japanese counterparts he had

enjoyed while working missile defense issues in his earlier

work at DOD. Nakane noted Japan,s position on arms control

and non-proliferation often very closely tracked with that of

the U.S., and added while the Japanese people have a strong

aspiration for nuclear disarmament that occasionally leads to

some difference of views, these differences should not

undermine our close bilateral security. Stressing this

latter point, Nakane stated the U.S. and Japan must strive to

contain discussion of such divergent issues at the UN General

Assembly lest they disturb the U.S.-Japan relationship.



North Korea

--------------



3. (C) Nakane stated that the Six-Party process would enter

an important phase toward the end of 2007, with North Korea

implementing its commitment to disable its nuclear facilities

and to make a complete and correct declaration of its nuclear

programs. Noting with approval President Bush's public

references on October 3 and October 17 to the need for North

Korea to dismantle its nuclear programs and declare its

nuclear activities, Nakane pointed out the importance Japan

attaches to ending North Korea's uranium enrichment program.

Although the current focus is on three critical facilities at

Yongbyon, the DPRK must disable all nuclear facilities.

Nakane added the GOJ is working on the schedule for Japanese

nuclear experts to join the U.S. team in Yongbyon toward the

middle of November, and that Japan is coordinating the

details with U.S. counterparts. Nakane hopes disablement

would happen in the context of the Six-Party Talks and ROK,

China, and Russia would also participate in the disablement

process. However, Nakane added the GOJ had learned Russia

and China were not interested in participating in disablement

at this time. Nevertheless, the GOJ intends for Japanese and

ROK experts to join the U.S. team, Nakane stated.



4. (C) Nakane continued conveying Japan's concern about a

possible Syrian-DPRK proliferation link, calling it a very

serious issue for peace and stability, as well as for the

global non-proliferation regime. If reports of DPRK nuclear

proliferation to Syria were true, Nakane asserted, then the

Six-Party framework must deal with the issue. However,



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Nakane added Japan had little information on this topic and

he asked the U.S. to provide information on the Syria

connection in particular and on DPRK proliferation activities

in general.



5. (C) Turning to IAEA involvement in the DPRK disablement,

declaration, and verification process, Nakane stated Japan's

understanding that North Korea has not been negative toward

ongoing IAEA inspection activities, and stated continued IAEA

involvement is very important. According to the Japanese

delegation to the IAEA, the Agency is frustrated because the

role the agency should play in disablement is unclear.

Nakane highlighted the urgent need for the Six-Party Talks to

establish links between the denuclearization process and the

IAEA role, underscoring Japan's position that the IAEA is

indispensable in the process and the six parties should issue

clear guidance on IAEA participation.



6. (C) Concluding his remarks on North Korea, Nakane noted

Japan's contribution of 500,000 USD to support the special

activities of the IAEA in North Korea, and he explained the

GOJ is now examining ways to make further contributions to

the denuclearization process. Nakane noted that the DPRK

missile issue remains a serious matter for the world and it

is imperative to deal with the issue within the Six-Party

process in the future.



7. (C) In response, Acting U/S Rood noted the time would

soon come to test DPRK intentions. Pointing out that the

DPRK had in the past reversed steps to freeze nuclear

facilities, Acting U/S Rood stated in the next phase, North

Korea's willingness and commitment would be put to the test.

The U.S. hopes for the disablement of core facilities at

Yongbyon by the end of 2007, Acting U/S Rood said, and the

U.S. also believes the DPRK declaration should include

uranium enrichment. However, North Korea continues to deny

the existence of a uranium enrichment program.



8. (C) Acting U/S Rood briefly summarized the September

visit of nuclear experts to North Korea, the negotiation of

disablement steps, and the subsequent positive movement, with

the U.S. nuclear team now on the ground in North Korea

reporting good cooperation.



9. (C) Acting U/S Rood pointed out the U.S. had set aside

about USD 20 million from the Non-Proliferation and

Disarmament Fund to finance disablement in North Korea,

adding the U.S. would like to talk to other Six-Party

countries to assist in additional financing. In response to

DG Nakane's comments on IAEA involvement, Acting U/S Rood

stated the U.S. view is similar to the GOJ,s and too regards

the IAEA as indispensable. Acting U/S Rood affirmed that

North Korea has not been as negative toward the Agency, and

that U.S. anticipates it will be the primary mechanism by

which to monitor the shut-down of DPRK nuclear facilities.

Acting U/S Rood called attention to the one caveat that, in

the area of nuclear weapons themselves, there are

restrictions on IAEA access to nuclear-weapons design

information. South Africa, he noted, is a successful

instance of nuclear weapons disposal under IAEA supervision

with involvement from P5 states.



10. (C) Bringing the exchange on North Korea to a close,

Acting U/S Rood said there is no news on the delisting of the

DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism. The Acting U/S

clarified the President can begin rescission of a country's

designation by notifying the Congress of his intent to do so.

If within 45 days no action is taken by Congress, the

President has the authority to take such action, though the

country is not automatically removed from the list. A

country is de-listed only when the Secretary of State



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formally executes such action at the President's direction.



Iran

--------------



11. (C) Turning to Iran, Acting U/S Rood stated the U.S. is

increasingly concerned about steps Iran has taken to boost

its nuclear capabilities, stressing profound concern over the

possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran. He noted it is a bad

assumption to think Iran would behave similarly to the other

states that have acquired nuclear weapons thus far. Acting

U/S Rood stressed the magnitude of this security challenge

and explained Iran achieving a capability to produce fissile

material would place it on a glide path to a nuclear weapon.

He stated the U.S. wants to avoid having to choose between

two terrible outcomes, namely Iran with a nuclear weapon or

military options. The U.S. is concerned Iran is using the

IAEA to shield itself from UN action, and that IAEA DG

ElBaradei does not share our apprehensions regarding Iran.

At the same time, Acting U/S Rood pointed out, the U.S. is

open to face-saving measures should Iran undertake a full

suspension of its nuclear activities.



12. (C) Acting U/S Rood stated it is difficult to know the

status of Iran,s centrifuge operation, as the GOI has tried

to create "facts on the ground" for political reasons.

However, while Iran is no doubt exaggerating its progress,

Iran is making progress, which is of concern to the U.S.

Acting U/S Rood outlined the several approaches the U.S. is

pursuing. First, within the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the

U.S. is discouraging other supplier countries from conducting

any nuclear business whatsoever with Iran and a U.S. effort

is underway to sensitize other countries to the dual-use

nature of many petroleum-sector goods. Second, on the

Security Council track, if the next ElBaradei report does not

show clear suspension, then the U.S. will push for a third

UNSC resolution. (Acting U/S Rood noted the Political

Directors meeting the previous week did not go well, as

Russian and Chinese views have hardened and the two countries

are opposing further steps.) Third, the U.S. recently took

further steps on the financial front, designating the IRGC,

the Quds force, three major Iranian banks, and a number of

IRGC-owned companies for involvement in terrorism or

proliferation-related activity. In concluding his remarks on

Iran, Acting U/S Rood stressed the U.S. is encouraging all

countries to reduce export credits to Iran, and he noted

current levels of pressure on Iran are not sufficient to

compel the GOI to come to the negotiating table.



13. (C) Nakane responded Japan is also pessimistic about

Iran and hopes to avoid the two extreme outcomes described by

Acting U/S Rood. Nakane stated Iran's implementation of the

Additional Protocol would be desirable, that it is important

for the international community to be united in increasing

pressure on Iran, the GOJ believes it is important to adopt

another UNSC resolution, and that Japan hopes Iran will

return to the EU 3 3 negotiation. Nakane added Japan

maintains good contacts, even at the ministerial level, with

Tehran and at every opportunity encourages Iran to suspend

its nuclear activities. Iran, however, has not been

receptive.



14. (C) Noting Japan has faithfully and completely

implemented UNSC resolutions 1737 and 1747, Nakane pointed

out China in 2006 overtook Japan and is now Iran,s number

one trading partner. Nakane, adding Japanese banks refrain

from new transactions with Bank Sepah and Bank Saderat,

stated "Japan will not sacrifice its non-proliferation policy

for economic interest." Promising Japan will continue to

exert pressure on Iran to engage in dialogue, Nakane added if

Japan suspends transactions with the Iranian Central Bank, it



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could have a serious effect on imports of crude oil --

serious not only for Japan but also for more vulnerable Asian

countries. Acting U/S Rood clarified that the U.S. is not

encouraging Japan to take action against the CBI. Rather,

the U.S. is cautioning we must protect the international

financial system against Iranian abuses. Acting U/S Rood

stressed while China had been able to replace Japan as Iran's

number one trading partner in trade volume, on the financial

side, Japan is one of very few countries that are major

players. Japan therefore can play an important role in

exerting financial pressure on Iran.



15. (C) Participants briefly discussed proposals for

international enrichment centers. Acting U/S Rood noted the

U.S. saw merit in the proposal for a Russian enrichment

center, with Kazakh participation and an Iranian managerial

and financial stake, but barring Iran access to enrichment

technology. Iran, however, was not interested in the

proposal. In response to a Japanese query, U.S. Senior

Advisor Timbie noted the Saudi enrichment center plan was

troubling, and not supported by, the U.S., as we do not want

to see the spread of this technology to states which do not

currently possess it.



Proliferation Finance

--------------



16. (C) Acting U/S Rood reported the U.S. is pleased with

the work of the Financial Action Task Force. Nakane asserted

Japan will continue to cooperate with the U.S. and other

partners on financial enforcement, both from a

money-laundering and non-proliferation standpoint. Regarding

implementation of FATF recommendations, when queried whether

the GOJ had issued an advisory to banks, MOFA

Non-Proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division

Director Ichikawa replied the relevant authorities were

informing banks of the outcome of discussions. Acting U/S

Rood responded the USG urges Japan to take steps to

financially isolate itself from those entities recently

designated by the U.S.



PSI and Outreach Activities

--------------



17. (C) Nakane thanked the U.S. for sending assets and

personnel to the recent PSI exercise hosted by Japan. He

said the exercise was a success, having drawn the

participation of 40 countries, up from 21 in Japan's previous

2004 exercise. Japan was pleased India, Pakistan, Vietnam,

Malaysia, and many Middle Eastern countries sent observers to

the exercise. Although Japan repeatedly invited China and

South Korea, neither country sent observers. After the

exercise, Japan gave a detailed briefing to both, to

emphasize that the exercise did not target any particular

country. China appreciated these briefings, Nakane said, and

he stressed the importance of continuing to reassure China.

(Note: During the coffee break of the Commission meeting,

MOFA showed a brief video, still in production, on the

mid-October PSI exercise. End note.)



18. (C) In response, Acting U/S Rood commended Japan for

hosting such a large and successful exercise, noting it was

particularly gratifying to see India participating as an

observer. Acting U/S Rood pointed out 2008 marks the 5th

anniversary of the start of PSI, and the U.S. is planning a

large celebration in Washington, with the aim of taking the

group to a higher level of effectiveness. Nakane, stressing

bi-partisan domestic support in Japan for PSI, stated it was

necessary to show good examples of PSI results and other

success stories beyond the BBC China. Nakane asked the U.S.

to supply one or two additional concrete success stories



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which would contribute to Japanese support; the U.S.

delegation promised to look into the matter and respond.



19. (C) Nakane recapped the 4th Asian Senior Level Talk on

Non-proliferation (ASTOP) meetings held in January 2007,

which included a mock table-top PSI exercise. He stated

Japan's intention to host the next ASTOP meetings in April or

May 2008. Nakane noted Japan's desire to include an element

to deepen Asian countries, understanding of PSI. He said

Russia is interested in being invited to the ASTOP meetings,

but added his personal concern regarding the Russian attitude

toward the export control regime. Pointing to their

disruptive behavior when they first joined PSI, Acting U/S

Rood noted the U.S. shared Japan's concerns about Russian

intentions as well.



Conference on Disarmament

--------------



20. (C) Taking the lead on CD discussions, Acting U/S Rood

stated the last year has been the most active in the past

decade. Acting U/S Rood said the U.S. supports the L-1

proposal, and the highest priority is to break the deadlock.

Pakistan remains a problem, as do China and Iran, Acting U/S

Rood explained. Furthermore, Israel does not support the

FMCT, but will not openly object at the CD at this time.

Acting U/S Rood asserted there needs to be a two pronged

approach: 1) a greater focus on China to drop their

opposition, by increasing their discomfort especially in the

run up to the Olympics; and 2) an attempt to not create

further linkages. Acting U/S Rood stressed the U.S. had made

compromises, to set the FMCT negotiations in motion. Adding

France, UK, and Germany are of like minds, the Acting U/S

exhorted coordinated action to highlight Chinese opposition.



21. (C) In response, Nakane pointed to Diet references to

former Secretary of State Kissinger's WSJ op-ed on

disarmament and to the Japanese public,s enthusiasm for

eliminating nuclear weapons. While Japan is encouraged by

recent signs, Nakane added, the country remains realistic

about the security situation. Nakane conveyed Japanese

appreciation for U.S. efforts to be forthcoming in the CD and

for progress on FMCT discussions. Stressing the FMCT is a

top priority of Japan in the CD, Nakane stated the GOJ will

continue to push Pakistan, although little change can be

expected prior to the election there. Regarding PAROS,

Nakane relayed Japanese concern with China's ASAT test and

stated Japan believed Russia was not eager to start

negotiations on prohibition of space weapons.



22. (C) Acting U/S Rood replied the U.S. agreed that the

FMCT should be the CD's priority. Regarding Russia's stance

on space arms control, Acting U/S Rood suggested the U.S. had

a slightly different perspective on Russian interest in this

area, as Chinese or Russian interest in such arms control

seemed a likely "back-door" approach to limiting U.S.

capabilities. Finally, Acting U/S Rood expressed the U.S.

concern with the extensive and long-lasting debris cloud

caused by the Chinese ASAT test.



2010 NPT Review Process

--------------



23. (C) Touching only briefly on the ongoing preparations

for the 2010 Review Conference, Nakane conveyed Japan's

appreciation for U.S. cooperation to bring about a successful

Revcon. He noted U.S. efforts to explore disarmament

measures contributed to a positive outcome to the recent

first session of the PrepCom, and noted a time and venue for

the 3rd session of the PrepCom must still be decided. On the

latter point, Acting U/S Rood replied the U.S. has little



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interest in finding a new and more costly venue away from New

York, and he dismissed Iranian complaints that restrictions

placed on them in New York hampered the discharge of their

duties.





NPT Article VI Issues

--------------



24. (C) Turning to NPT Article VI, Nakane opened by

expressing Japan's interest in the current state of

U.S.-Russian negotiations on strategic-force reduction and by

saying Japan had received a demarche from Russia to support

INF treaty negotiations. Nakane also conveyed Japanese

appreciation of U.S. support in developing the international

monitoring system for the CTBT. He added, however, Japan

remains concerned that the U.S. contribution be spent in the

same areas as in the past. On the UNGA de-alerting

resolution sponsored by New Zealand and others, Nakane

emphasized Japan continues to rely on U.S. nuclear

deterrence, especially given the current unsettled security

situation, and noted the U.S. deterrent plays an important

role in maintaining peace and stability. He explained

Japan,s press closely watches GOJ actions on disarmament and

asked for U.S. understanding that Japan's intention is not to

undermine the U.S.-Japan security arrangement. Acting U/S

Rood subsequently responded while the U.S. understands

Japan's position, we would have preferred a GOJ abstention or

rejection of the de-alerting resolution. Acting U/S Rood

also stressed the U.S. posture has been markedly reduced in

recent years.



25. (C) On Nakane's queries, Acting U/S Rood reported the

U.S. and GOR agreed at the 2 2 in Moscow to support a legally

binding START follow-up. While neither party wished to

continue with START, the objective is to take the best

elements of START, with the goals of stability, confidence,

and transparency. Acting U/S Rood cautioned that although

the U.S. believes the INF Treaty has been a success, the USG

will not launch a global campaign for a global treaty. In

conclusion, he thanked Japan for feedback on the U.S.

disarmament record, and added a personal comment from his

direct experience at the Department of Defense to underscore

the deep but often-overlooked cuts in the U.S. strategic

arsenal. The United States has not made fissile materials

for weapons for decades, and has reduced its nuclear forces

to levels not seen since the Eisenhower administration.



Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

--------------



26. (C) Touching on NSG-related topics, the U.S. delegation

argued a ban on the spread of enrichment technologies would

make the most sense, even if it would be difficult to

persuade all NSG members to join in to such an approach.

Timbie underscored the U.S. is not just interested in

blocking Iran and North Korea, but in preventing any spread

of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do

not already possess such facilities. In response, Nakane

stated there was no chance to achieve a total ban on transfer

of these technologies to other states. Nakane indicated the

GOJ had heard of a recent high-level communication from the

Canadian government expressing displeasure with this U.S.

stance. Nakane added it would be difficult for Japan to

continue this approach, and he urged the consideration of

alternate strategies. Acting U/S Rood countered that

settling for weak criteria would in fact set our efforts

back. Ichikawa chimed in that a source of Japanese concern

is the current moratorium is non-binding beyond the G-8.



U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation



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--------------



27. (C) Acting U/S Rood reviewed the status of the

agreement, citing the two key criteria set by the Congress,

namely a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and India and a

Safeguards Agreement to be concluded between the IAEA and

India. In addition the NSG would need to change its rules.

Acting U/S Rood pointed to the fluid internal political

situation in India, of which the Japanese were well aware,

explaining the BJP opposes the agreement on the basis of pure

political opportunism, while several Communist parties were

against the deal because it would bring India closer to the

West and the U.S.



28. (C) Nakane responded by conceding there was strong

criticism in Japan of nuclear cooperation with India, and

noted Japan will closely watch the talks on the IAEA-India

Safeguards Agreement. Nakane further suggested a reference

to weapons testing might be necessary in the agreement.

Although likely premature, Nakane stated Japan also hopes to

carry out constructive discussions within the NSG as well.



Preventing WMD Terrorism

--------------



29. (C) Leading off on chemical terrorism, Acting U/S Rood

raised U.S. concerns about improvised chlorine gas devices

used for terrorist attacks in Iraq. Turning next to

bioterrorism, he mentioned U.S. monitoring has shown growing

interest in bioterrorism methods among terrorist groups. He

added the growth of the biotech industry in Southeast Asia,

particularly Indonesia, brings many benefits, but it also

makes potential biological weapons more available to Al-Qaida

and other terrorist groups. He mentioned that Al-Qaida

bioterrorism plans found in Afghanistan revealed greater

advances than was previously known. Acting U/S Rood

highlighted U.S. efforts on pathogen security, noting the G8

Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX) and APEC are promising fora

for this initiative. He also mentioned DOS participation in

the U.S. Biosecurity Engagement Group, along with HHS, DOA,

EPA, and other agencies. Acting U/S Rood noted Japan,s

considerable expertise and practical history in the area of

chemical and biological terrorism and welcomed Japan,s

advanced capabilities in global efforts to prevent terrorist

attacks.



Nuclear Terrorism

--------------



30. (C) Acting U/S Rood outlined progress expanding the

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI),which

comprises 62 countries, including all G8 members and 24 of

the 27 EU members, as well as the IAEA and EU. He noted Asia

is well represented in GI, notably in Central Asia where both

Afghanistan and Pakistan are participating. Acting U/S Rood

conceded some priority countries, including India, Brazil,

Argentina, and South Africa, have not yet joined, but is

optimistic they will do so. The U.S. is also encouraging

China to contribute more to GI.



31. (C) On the future of GI, Acting U/S Rood mentioned the

need to deepen the substance of the work, build more capacity

among member countries, and expand participation. He noted

ideas to put together an experts group for planning GI

exercises, and to expand the use of the GI Internet portal,

used regularly by around 40 countries, to serve as a platform

for collaborative planning.



32. (C) Nakane thanked Acting U/S Rood for U.S. efforts to

prevent WMD terrorism and highlighted Japanese work with

Asian countries on chemical and biological terrorism



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prevention. He noted Japan,s support for the upcoming Asia

Export Control Seminar that aims to strengthen the capacity

of the region,s law enforcement agencies. Nakane also

stressed the importance of enhancing the BWC and CWC in the

fight against terrorism and voiced support for Iraq joining

the CWC.



33. (C) Regarding G8 initiatives, Nakane said the GOJ was

not in a position to host a BTEX workshop, but will continue

to send high-level experts to U.S.-organized BTEX events.

Nakane stressed the importance the GOJ places on supporting

the GI, noting Japan has hosted seminars on physical

protection of nuclear materials and sent vice minister-level

officials to recent GI meetings. He underscored the role

Japan plays in Asia and the former Soviet Union by providing

bilateral assistance to improve physical protection

capabilities and encouraging countries to join international

conventions. He noted specific GOJ support for IAEA programs

in Belarus and Ukraine to improve systems for accounting for

nuclear material, and added that Russia, with its strong

economy, should step up cooperation with its neighbors.



34. (C) Turning to the Radiation Emergency Response

Workshop, Nakane announced Japan will send experts to the

workshop, noting coordination among GOJ ministries had taken

three months. Nakane asked the U.S. to agree not to disclose

the existence of the workshop and welcomed U.S. proposals for

dealing with sensitivities around the issue. Acting U/S Rood

praised Nakane,s announcement of Japanese participation as

&very good news,8 adding coordinating among multiple

agencies is often challenging. He underscored the value of

participation in the workshop and that DOE has particular

equipment and procedures to demonstrate. He added the U.S.

will give proper sensitivity to the workshop, but the

workshop can also send a positive signal to the public that

governments are working actively to deter and prepare for a

radiation emergency.



Nuclear Energy Cooperation

--------------



35. (C) Nakane began the discussion on nuclear energy

cooperation by stressing the importance of a clear G8 message

on nuclear safeguards, safety, and security (the 3Ss) to

countries that aspire to civil nuclear power. He mentioned

Japanese assistance to several countries, including

Kazakhstan, where the GOJ is negotiating an agreement for

civil nuclear cooperation. He recounted the GOJ,s

successful efforts to encourage Kazakhstan to ratify the

Additional Protocol as a condition to concluding a bilateral

agreement, noting that such an incentive could be useful in

dealing with other countries. Nakane also mentioned recent

GOJ civil nuclear efforts with Vietnam, which recently

announced intention to sign the Additional Protocol. As for

civil nuclear cooperation with Indonesia, Nakane said Japan

is proceeding carefully, taking into account the political

situation and risks of terrorism. Responding to the U.S.

position on South Africa,s choice of new reactor design,

Nakane said the GOJ must remain agnostic on the reactor

design type, as Japanese firms other than

Toshiba-Westinghouse are making offers.



36. (C) Acting U/S Rood responded the U.S. has no

proliferation concerns with regard to South Africa and noted

the interest in nuclear cooperation expressed by Indonesia

and Vietnam, as well as Egypt and Jordan. Nakane added

Bangladesh has ratified relevant treaties and has expressed

interest in civil nuclear power, but Japanese companies are

less interested in prospects there. Acting U/S Rood

expressed skepticism Bangladesh possesses the physical

infrastructure and skilled labor necessary to support a



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standard-sized nuclear power plant.



37. (C) Regarding Russia, Nakane mentioned upcoming meetings

with his Russian counterpart, Mr. Kuchinov, on November 9 and

12, to continue the third round of negotiations on a

bilateral civil nuclear agreement. He said Russia is showing

new flexibility on GOJ demands safeguards apply to a broader

range of nuclear activities. Nevertheless, he thinks

concluding a final agreement will be a slow process. MOFA

International Nuclear Cooperation Division Director Yasuyoshi

Komizo added Russia has agreed to apply safeguards to

enriched uranium storage facilities, though not to

centrifuges. Komizo said Russia could provide 120 tons of

nuclear fuel for a reserve at an international fuel center at

Angarsk, but the IAEA will insist Russia apply safeguards.

Nakane added that as nearly all Japanese nuclear fuel has

some U.S. involvement, the GOJ sees a U.S.)Russia agreement

as important. Acting U/S Rood said the U.S. has concerns

that Russia is not being constructive in work on a UNSC

Resolution on Iran and does not plan to move forward to

finalize our bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement at this

time. However, Russian desires to become a mainstream

nuclear supplier, rather than a supplier of &last resort,8

may give the U.S. leverage with Russia on Iran. Komizo

agreed Russia has strong aspirations to be a &major league8

nuclear player and needs both U.S. backing and new technology

in order to get out of the minor leagues. He added Japan has

a unique opportunity to obtain maximum concessions from

Russia at this moment, as they are eager to make progress on

substantive portions of the agreement before Putin leaves

office.



38. (C) Turning to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

(GNEP),Nakane congratulated the U.S. on success at the

second GNEP Ministerial. He looks forward to discussions

within GNEP on expanding the partnership and assured fuel

supply. However, he raised concerns about cooperation on

fast breeder reactor (FBR) technology with Russia and China,

adding such cooperation should be limited to the U.S., Japan,

and France. Komizo said FBR cooperation has been omitted

from the scope of civil nuclear agreements with Russia and

China. Timbie noted the GNEP Statement of Principles has

been drafted to address this concern.



39. (C) Acting U/S Rood acknowledged GNEP,s strong momentum

and emphasized the need for further discussion on financing

for nuclear power in developing countries, particularly

through multilateral lending institutions which do not

currently finance nuclear power projects.



40. (C) Ichikawa raised the issue of assured fuel supply,

underscoring both the importance of nonproliferation and the

risk of alienating aspirant countries. She suggested a

Russia-IAEA agreement for use of the Angarsk fuel center

could serve as a model agreement and the U.S. and Japan

should have input. Timbie responded the Angarsk concept is a

good opportunity to make progress on an assured fuel supply

framework and noted the IAEA is unlikely to insist on the

Additional Protocol or safeguards as conditions for access.

However, he noted suppliers could put more stringent

conditions on their contributions, and this could be the

beginning of a fuel supply assurance framework.



G8 Issues

--------------



41. (C) Turning to the G8 agenda under Japan,s presidency

in 2008, Nakane highlighted that G8 political discussions

would likely include nonproliferation items, particularly

relating to DPRK and Iran. He suggested civil nuclear power

cooperation be raised in the discussion on environment and



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climate change. On the G8 Global Partnership (GP),Nakane

said it is premature to try to agree on an extension, but

added a consensus is emerging. Arms Control and Disarmament

Division Director Yasunari Morino, who participated in the

most recent GP working group meeting, added Russia has been

more forthcoming on the expanding the GP, but there remains

disagreement on how to do so. Russia, Morino continued,

prefers a formal procedure, while others prefer a more

flexible approach, and is interested primarily in extending

the GP to Kazakhstan and other CIS states. Morino said, as

G8 Chair, Japan will take a &careful8 approach and will

circulate a questionnaire to G8 members to learn more about

bilateral efforts and reach consensus.



42. (C) Acting U/S Rood voiced support for expanding the GP,

but asserted the need to maintain the present structure as

the best vehicle for expanding the geographic scope. He

encouraged Japan to use its G8 presidency to expand the GP

along these lines. Timbie noted the difficulties involved in

creating a new entity for the GP, adding that without

obtaining additional resources, a new structure would not be

productive. Nakane thanked the U.S side for their comments,

suggesting the ASTOP meeting would be a good forum to explain

the GP and pointing out Japan has several financing schemes

for funding cooperation on prevention of nuclear terrorism.



Conventional Weapons

--------------



43. (C) Turning to conventional weapons, Nakane said CCW

states must come to consensus on the cluster munitions issue.

He said an agreement need not be a complete ban and he

recognized the need for a transition period. Acting U/S Rood

responded the U.S. is willing to work constructively in CCW,

but there needs to be real work done. Responding to

Nakane,s suggestion Russia be persuaded to join the

consensus, Acting U/S Rood said he had sent Moscow,s Defense

Foreign Minister Kislyak a letter urging Russia to be

supportive at the CCW in lieu of a Norwegian forum.



44. (U) This message was delayed in order to obtain Acting

Under Secretary Rood,s clearance.



SCHIEFFER