KOMEITO THINKING ON DIET ROADBLOCKS, OEF BILL,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 005347 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL EFIN JA SUBJECT: KOMEITO THINKING ON DIET ROADBLOCKS, OEF BILL, DPRK POLICY REF: TOKYO 5219 Classified By: A/DCM Mike Meserve, reasons 1.4(b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Senior leaders of the LDP's coalition partner Komeito and its Soka Gakkai religious support group offered insights on Japan's current Diet impasse and the outlook for the next Diet session, prospects for the OEF refueling bill, and relations with the DPRK, during recent meetings with Embassy Tokyo. The conversations confirmed that Komeito remains a steadfast partner of the ruling LDP, as it seeks to break through the deadlock of the divided Diet and pass key legislation. That said, the Komeito and Soka Gakkai leaders still voiced a good deal of uncertainty and worry about the current political situation. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Embassy Tokyo met separately with Soka Gakkai Vice Chairman Yorio Yahiro and five-term Komeito Lower House member Isamu Ueda recently to discuss Japan's domestic political situation. The Soka Gakkai lay Buddhist religious group is the primary support organization for Komeito, and while it disclaims any political role for itself, its ties to Komeito politicians -- the majority of whom are themselves Soka Gakkai adherents -- through individuals like Yahiro run deep. Policy Consultations Needed to Break Deadlock -------------- ¶3. (C) Yahiro and Ueda described the current legislative stalemate as a "lose-lose situation" for both the ruling coalition and the opposition, and stressed the need for policy consultations and legislative cooperation. This view, they noted, is behind junior coalition partner Komeito's willingness to consider the idea of a "grand coalition" incorporating the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Komeito, and the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Under the circumstances, an expanded coalition is the only way to ensure a "stable daily life for the people" and security for Japan, Yahiro asserted. A three-party coalition is only possible, however, if DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa is able to sell the idea to his own party members, he added. ¶4. (C) According to Yahiro, Ozawa was confident after his second meeting with Fukuda on November 2 that he would be able to persuade other DPJ members to accept the idea of a grand coalition. Yahiro also assumed that DPJ President Naoto Kan and Secretary General Yukio Hatoyama probably knew about the plan in advance. Unable to "find a place" in the LDP when he offered up his resignation as DPJ leader, however, Ozawa had no choice but to return to the DPJ. Yahiro referred to Ozawa's resignation as a "complete farce," noting that he only offered to resign when he realized that his plan had been rejected and there was no other way to recover. If Ozawa had been really serious about resigning, Yahiro said, he would have gone into hiding, as he had done in the past. Instead, his performance showed that he is a much more skilled politician than any of his DPJ colleagues. Yahiro described the relationship between Ozawa and the DPJ as being just like that of a father and child. ¶5. (C) Yahiro speculated that Ozawa was driven to form a grand coalition by his desire to return to power. Prime Minister Fukuda, on the other hand, was motivated by a genuine interest in breaking through the current gridlock in the Diet, even to the point that he was willing to "bow down to Ozawa" to realize the idea, Yahiro asserted. ¶6. (C) Regarding communication between the coalition partners, Yahiro was not convinced that the Komeito leadership had ever been directly consulted about the idea of a grand coalition. He suspects that Prime Minister Fukuda intended to hint at the possibility when he told Komeito leader Akihiro Ota that: "Whatever happens, the relationship of trust between the LDP and Komeito is assured." Komeito leaders were therefore probably not surprised when the grand TOKYO 00005347 002 OF 003 coalition idea was first reported by the media. Ueda disagreed, expressing his belief that the two coalition party leaders had discussed the idea before the Fukuda-Ozawa meeting. ¶7. (C) Ueda dismissed reports from the Yomiuri Shimbun that broke down the number of Cabinet posts to be allocated to each of the three parties in the event a grand coalition had been formed. Attributing the story to wishful thinking on behalf of Yomiuri Chairman Tsuneo Watanabe, he affirmed that the issue was never discussed at the Fukuda-Ozawa meeting. Forced Passage of New Refueling Bill Likely -------------- ¶8. (C) While the recent political "confusion" had eased passage of the ruling coalition's new anti-terror bill in the Lower House, Ueda wondered how the measure would fare in the opposition-controlled Upper House. In the worst-case scenario, he opined, the bill would never come up for deliberation, because no one in the DPJ could make a final decision regarding its disposition. Yahiro said that major progress had been achieved at the first Fukuda-Ozawa meeting on October 30, but feared that discussions had returned to the beginning stages after the second meeting. ¶9. (C) A more important issue for Yahiro is what the ruling coalition will do if the bill is rejected by the Upper House, or held for the statutory maximum of 60 days. In theory, he offered, the coalition should and will use its constitutional power to pass the bill into law via a two-thirds majority re-vote in the Lower House. That comes with the risk of a censure motion by the DPJ, however, which could freezing all further deliberations on other legislation in the Upper House and possibly force dissolution and a snap election, he cautioned. Some argue for forced passage on the grounds that the DPJ is unlikely to adopt a censure motion for their own political reasons, Yahiro noted, while others argue that the ruling coalition has the most to gain from an early election. From his perspective, none of the political parties is prepared at this point, or has any particular advantage. Various scenarios are still being considered, he concluded, but the coalition and opposition parties will continue fighting a war of nerves. ¶10. (C) Ueda was slightly more positive on prospects for the bill, noting that while the decision to use the override vote would depend, in part, on the political situation at the time, the coalition would ultimately have no choice but to force the bill through in the current Diet session. He expressed his belief that the DPJ would lose public support if it continued to bottle up deliberations in the next Diet session on the basis of a censure motion, but had little hope that the political situation would allow the ruling parties to re-introduce the bill at the next ordinary Diet session. Ueda emphasized the importance of the bill for strengthening SIPDIS the U.S.-Japan relationship, as the two countries cooperate closely on key issues such as North Korea and defense realignment. That said, he was not concerned that failure to pass the bill would greatly harm the relationship. ¶11. (C) Ueda is supportive of the need for a permanent dispatch law to obviate the need to pass a special measures law for each Self-Defense Forces deployment overseas, although he recognizes that this will require a great deal of coordination with the DPJ and other opposition parties. Hurdles for the Next Diet Session -------------- ¶12. (C) Ueda named two big hurdles facing the upcoming ordinary Diet session -- the bill to issue deficit-covering bonds and the renewal of a number of temporary tax measures. Given that one-quarter of the current budget is covered by deficit bonds, Japan's budget will not stand without passage of the bond bill, he asserted. Several temporary tax TOKYO 00005347 003 OF 003 measures, meanwhile, will expire March 31, and one of the measures up for renewal concerns the provisional tariff on gasoline. If passed, the price of gasoline will drop by 20 yen per liter, Ueda said, lowering tax revenues and possibly affecting road construction and other public works projects. ¶13. (C) Another important issue will be the appointment of a new Bank of Japan (BOJ) Governor, which requires approval by both houses, Ueda noted. If the Upper House fails to approve the Lower House candidate, then the BOJ will have to appoint an Acting Governor. (Note: The DPJ has expressed opposition to appointing current Deputy Governor Muto to the governorship in March, because he is a former Finance Ministry official. The DPJ has not stipulated any criteria for a nominee that it could support, so it remains unclear whether that position is a principled one trying to promote the independence of the BOJ, or another tactic to thwart the LDP no matter who they nominate.) Japan-DPRK relations -------------- ¶14. (C) Japan is searching for ways to open dialogue with North Korea, according to Ueda, as public reaction toward the abduction issue continues to cool down considerably from what it was just a few years ago. At this point, he speculated, the government is waiting for some small compromise from the DPRK so that it can proceed to open a consultative process. He does not necessarily agree with the suggestion that Japan is somehow "missing the bus," but does think that not being more substantively involved in the Six-Party Talks process could be damaging to Japan's national interest. It's clear, Ueda continued, that the nuclear issue is the most important SIPDIS and that Japan should be engaged and cooperating with denuclearization efforts as well. ¶15. (C) Ueda ascribed the lack of movement by the DPRK on the abductions issue to one of two possibilities: Either they have used up all of their cards, i.e., all of the abductees really are dead; or, they fear that a return of any additional abductees to Japan could re-ignite a strong and emotional public response. DONOVAN