S/P GORDON DISCUSSES CHINA/TRILAT POLICY PLANNING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 005303 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV JA KN SUBJECT: S/P GORDON DISCUSSES CHINA/TRILAT POLICY PLANNING TALKS WITH JAPANESE COUNTERPART DVM KAWAI Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Japan's primary foreign policy planning official, Deputy Vice Minister Kawai, held wide-ranging discussions November 16 on Afghanistan, Iraq, China, the Six-Party Talks, regional architecture, economic and trade policy, and other issues with visiting S/P Director Gordon. Japan promised to "make its best effort to re-start" the OEF re-fueling mission in the Indian Ocean, despite opposition party efforts to prevent Tokyo from participating. Japan-China relations continue to improve, with leaders of both nations planning to exchange visits in late 2007 or early 2008. Japan, like the PRC, views the development of a single, dominant regional structure in Asia, such as the EU, as unlikely. Tokyo offered to initiate discussion on energy security with the PRC, where opinions were evolving from a "mercantilist" view. End Summary. -------------- Policy Planning Talks -------------- ¶2. (C) Director of Policy Planning David Gordon exchanged views with MOFA Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Policy Chikao Kawai during a two-hour working lunch on November 16. Gordon, explaining that he had just completed formal policy planning discussions with PRC officials, said he did not want to come to East Asia without seeing important friends in Japan and Australia. The Director added that he had just completed tours of Iraq and Afghanistan, and said he looked forward to meeting Kawai during U.S.-Japan-ROK policy planning discussions set to take place in Washington in December. -------------- China and Taiwan -------------- ¶3. (C) The policy planning discussions with Beijing, Gordon said, were aimed at engaging PRC officials on broader issues outside the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. The U.S. side, however, found the Chinese responses to be "formulaic." Drawing a parallel with modernization efforts underway in the PRC military, Gordon opined that Beijing has developed new geopolitical capabilities, but has not yet created the accompanying doctrine to go along with those new abilities -- "the Chinese are doing things, but do not have the doctrine for doing them." ¶4. (C) Kawai said that Japan-China relations had improved following former PM Shinzo Abe's September 2006 visit to Beijing. Japan PM Yasuo Fukuda plans to visit the PRC in late 2007 or early 2008, depending on the Diet schedule. Chinese President Hu Jintao hoped to come to Tokyo in March or April 2008. Tokyo wants good relations with Beijing, but does not want to "gang-up on" or contain China. In return, China seeks good relations with Japan in order to establish profitable trade. Tokyo plans to "take advantage of that fact to lead China in the right direction," Kawai noted. ¶5. (C) Turning to Taiwan, Gordon and Kawai agreed that Beijing's primary immediate goal is to maintain the status quo. Gordon observed that the Chinese "fear any move that might ultimately prevent re-unification." Kawai offered that, in the short run, the Taiwan issue should remain manageable because the United States, Japan, and the PRC want to maintain the status quo. Political Minister Counselor noted that moderate influences in Taipei also seek to keep that status quo. -------------- Regional Architecture -------------- TOKYO 00005303 002 OF 004 ¶6. (C) Chinese officials assured Gordon that Beijing does not view the rise of regional arrangements, such as the East Asia Summit, as part of an effort to exclude the United States. The PRC expressed openness to establishing international arrangements, but saw the development of a single, dominant institution in Asia, such as the EU, as unlikely. The U.S. side, Gordon said, told their Chinese interlocutors that APEC plays an important role in effecting trade policy, and provides a forum for the participation of officials from a range of countries. He added that Washington sees a Free Trade Agreement for the Asia Pacific (FTA AP) as a logical next phase. ¶7. (C) Japanese officials agree that the complicated, diverse political situation in East Asian will prevent development of a single regional structure, Kawai said. Tokyo will support "multi-layered strategies," while giving "economic priority to the East Asian Summit" mechanism. He urged the United States, which often times appears to be frustrated with ASEAN, to be "careful" in approaching the organization - "too much pressure might be counterproductive." Kawai argued that ASEAN is trying to "change its attitude" and had become more active that before. -------------- Six-Party Talks -------------- ¶8. (C) Kawai sought United States views on how the two countries might take advantage of the Six-Party Talks process to promote a regional architecture. Japan sees a Northeast Asian grouping as positive, but first wants to resolve Korean Peninsula issues. The DVM noted that Tokyo has never said that the abduction problem is more important than denuclearization, which remains an important issue. Japanese officials want to "synchronize" the abduction and nuclear problems -- no one has ever announced that Tokyo would pay more attention to abductions than to denuclearization, Kawai concluded. Gordon opined that the promise of economic benefits arising from any future regional structure would add to the momentum that would keep the DPRK engaged in the Six-Party Talks process. -------------- Iraq -------------- ¶9. (C) Gordon reviewed developments on the ground, noting that sectarian violence had markedly decreased. Al-Qaeda is "down but not out," he observed, and the stand-up of Iraqi forces is moving forward at a "good" rate. However, challenges remain: top-level Iraqi leadership remains divided, and the coalition has yet to see bottom-up reforms reach the top. Still, U.S. commanders believe that military forces would begin to transition to reconstruction mode by the "end of the calendar year." Gordon added that the U.S. domestic political situation regarding Iraq had "substantially stabilized" during the last few months. ¶10. (C) Kawai described Gordon's briefing as "encouraging." Debate in Japan's Diet is focused on two issues: 1) passage of a law authorizing Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) to re-start re-fueling operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in the Indian Ocean, and 2) an opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) measure aimed at halting the SDF's activities in Iraq. Kawai noted that the S/P Director's explanation would be "helpful" to Japanese government officials during parliamentary discussion. -------------- Afghanistan -------------- ¶11. (C) The situation in Afghanistan is "less positive," TOKYO 00005303 003 OF 004 Gordon observed, where coalition forcers are "not losing, but not winning" either. The Afghan Army build-up is proceeding well, and Kabul forces have achieved military success against al-Qaeda. It has been difficult, however, to turn those factors into a strategic success, Gordon concluded. The "political center" around President Karzai appears to be "not as firm" as desired, and the Taliban remain a resilient foe with strongholds in Pakistan. The international community needs to strengthen its coordination, and commit to a long-term role in funding economic activities and security measures. ¶12. (C) Kawai expressed appreciation for U.S. logistical support of SDF personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Japanese people pay attention to events in Afghanistan. The Japanese government has maintained a two-pillar approach to Afghanistan and Iraq: 1) overseas development assistance (ODA),along with economic and social development, and 2) military participation. DPJ politicians feel that ODA is sufficient, but government leaders have argued that both pillars were needed, Kawai noted. ¶13. (C) Tokyo is "making its best effort to re-start" the OEF re-fueling mission, Kawai noted. Gordon responded that the re-fueling effort is symbolic and very important in sending a signal to the region and to other military powers that Japan is committed to playing a role in the region and elsewhere. -------------- Chiang Mai Initiative -------------- ¶14. (C) In response to Gordon's question, Kawai urged the United States not to worry about the Chiang Mai Initiative. The effort arose from the 1997 East Asian financial crisis at a time when many economies felt "resentment" or a sense of "competitiveness" with the U.S. dollar, according to Kawai. In the current environment, however, Japan believes that no currency could sustain itself without support from the U.S. dollar. Kawai suggested Tokyo better coordinate on the issue. ¶15. (C) As the world financial system becomes more complex and diverse, Gordon answered, the United States believes it is important not to undermine the main international financial institutions. Every country has an interest in promoting a robust international monetary system, but not at the expense of the major multilateral financial institutions. -------------- Energy Security -------------- ¶16. (C) Kawai offered to initiate discussion with the PRC on energy security, where opinions were evolving from a "mercantilist" view. Japan hopes to encourage Chinese thinking on supply, security in oil producing regions, and promoting robust market mechanisms. Tokyo likewise sought cooperation on ways to increase energy efficiency using two pillars: government control and market mechanisms. Technology transfer was a "complicated issue," with direct implications for economic competitiveness. As a result, Japan would need to be careful. Kawai agreed that technology transfer is crucial to solving global warming. -------------- Middle East -------------- ¶17. (C) Gordon applauded Japan's "Corridor of Peace and Prosperity" initiative, while briefing Kawai on next month's international conference on Israel and Palestine. The United States hopes for progress in three areas -- creation of a TOKYO 00005303 004 OF 004 Palestinian state, investment in West Bank infrastructure, and security and confidence building measures. ¶18. (U) S/P staff has cleared this message. SCHIEFFER