S/P GORDON DISCUSSES CHINA/TRILAT POLICY PLANNING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 005303

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV JA KN
SUBJECT: S/P GORDON DISCUSSES CHINA/TRILAT POLICY PLANNING
TALKS WITH JAPANESE COUNTERPART DVM KAWAI


Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary. Japan's primary foreign policy planning
official, Deputy Vice Minister Kawai, held wide-ranging
discussions November 16 on Afghanistan, Iraq, China, the
Six-Party Talks, regional architecture, economic and trade
policy, and other issues with visiting S/P Director Gordon.
Japan promised to "make its best effort to re-start" the OEF
re-fueling mission in the Indian Ocean, despite opposition
party efforts to prevent Tokyo from participating.
Japan-China relations continue to improve, with leaders of
both nations planning to exchange visits in late 2007 or
early 2008. Japan, like the PRC, views the development of a
single, dominant regional structure in Asia, such as the EU,
as unlikely. Tokyo offered to initiate discussion on energy
security with the PRC, where opinions were evolving from a
"mercantilist" view. End Summary.

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Policy Planning Talks
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2. (C) Director of Policy Planning David Gordon exchanged
views with MOFA Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Policy
Chikao Kawai during a two-hour working lunch on November 16.
Gordon, explaining that he had just completed formal policy
planning discussions with PRC officials, said he did not want
to come to East Asia without seeing important friends in
Japan and Australia. The Director added that he had just
completed tours of Iraq and Afghanistan, and said he looked
forward to meeting Kawai during U.S.-Japan-ROK policy
planning discussions set to take place in Washington in
December.

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China and Taiwan
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3. (C) The policy planning discussions with Beijing, Gordon
said, were aimed at engaging PRC officials on broader issues
outside the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. The U.S.
side, however, found the Chinese responses to be "formulaic."
Drawing a parallel with modernization efforts underway in
the PRC military, Gordon opined that Beijing has developed
new geopolitical capabilities, but has not yet created the
accompanying doctrine to go along with those new abilities --
"the Chinese are doing things, but do not have the doctrine
for doing them."


4. (C) Kawai said that Japan-China relations had improved
following former PM Shinzo Abe's September 2006 visit to
Beijing. Japan PM Yasuo Fukuda plans to visit the PRC in
late 2007 or early 2008, depending on the Diet schedule.
Chinese President Hu Jintao hoped to come to Tokyo in March
or April 2008. Tokyo wants good relations with Beijing, but
does not want to "gang-up on" or contain China. In return,
China seeks good relations with Japan in order to establish
profitable trade. Tokyo plans to "take advantage of that
fact to lead China in the right direction," Kawai noted.


5. (C) Turning to Taiwan, Gordon and Kawai agreed that
Beijing's primary immediate goal is to maintain the status
quo. Gordon observed that the Chinese "fear any move that
might ultimately prevent re-unification." Kawai offered
that, in the short run, the Taiwan issue should remain
manageable because the United States, Japan, and the PRC want
to maintain the status quo. Political Minister Counselor
noted that moderate influences in Taipei also seek to keep
that status quo.

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Regional Architecture
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6. (C) Chinese officials assured Gordon that Beijing does not
view the rise of regional arrangements, such as the East Asia
Summit, as part of an effort to exclude the United States.
The PRC expressed openness to establishing international
arrangements, but saw the development of a single, dominant
institution in Asia, such as the EU, as unlikely. The U.S.
side, Gordon said, told their Chinese interlocutors that APEC
plays an important role in effecting trade policy, and
provides a forum for the participation of officials from a
range of countries. He added that Washington sees a Free
Trade Agreement for the Asia Pacific (FTA AP) as a logical
next phase.


7. (C) Japanese officials agree that the complicated, diverse
political situation in East Asian will prevent development of
a single regional structure, Kawai said. Tokyo will support
"multi-layered strategies," while giving "economic priority
to the East Asian Summit" mechanism. He urged the United
States, which often times appears to be frustrated with
ASEAN, to be "careful" in approaching the organization - "too
much pressure might be counterproductive." Kawai argued that
ASEAN is trying to "change its attitude" and had become more
active that before.

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Six-Party Talks
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8. (C) Kawai sought United States views on how the two
countries might take advantage of the Six-Party Talks process
to promote a regional architecture. Japan sees a Northeast
Asian grouping as positive, but first wants to resolve Korean
Peninsula issues. The DVM noted that Tokyo has never said
that the abduction problem is more important than
denuclearization, which remains an important issue. Japanese
officials want to "synchronize" the abduction and nuclear
problems -- no one has ever announced that Tokyo would pay
more attention to abductions than to denuclearization, Kawai
concluded. Gordon opined that the promise of economic
benefits arising from any future regional structure would add
to the momentum that would keep the DPRK engaged in the
Six-Party Talks process.

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Iraq
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9. (C) Gordon reviewed developments on the ground, noting
that sectarian violence had markedly decreased. Al-Qaeda is
"down but not out," he observed, and the stand-up of Iraqi
forces is moving forward at a "good" rate. However,
challenges remain: top-level Iraqi leadership remains
divided, and the coalition has yet to see bottom-up reforms
reach the top. Still, U.S. commanders believe that military
forces would begin to transition to reconstruction mode by
the "end of the calendar year." Gordon added that the U.S.
domestic political situation regarding Iraq had
"substantially stabilized" during the last few months.


10. (C) Kawai described Gordon's briefing as "encouraging."
Debate in Japan's Diet is focused on two issues: 1) passage
of a law authorizing Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) to
re-start re-fueling operations in support of Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) in the Indian Ocean, and 2) an
opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) measure aimed at
halting the SDF's activities in Iraq. Kawai noted that the
S/P Director's explanation would be "helpful" to Japanese
government officials during parliamentary discussion.

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Afghanistan
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11. (C) The situation in Afghanistan is "less positive,"

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Gordon observed, where coalition forcers are "not losing, but
not winning" either. The Afghan Army build-up is proceeding
well, and Kabul forces have achieved military success against
al-Qaeda. It has been difficult, however, to turn those
factors into a strategic success, Gordon concluded. The
"political center" around President Karzai appears to be "not
as firm" as desired, and the Taliban remain a resilient foe
with strongholds in Pakistan. The international community
needs to strengthen its coordination, and commit to a
long-term role in funding economic activities and security
measures.


12. (C) Kawai expressed appreciation for U.S. logistical
support of SDF personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq. The
Japanese people pay attention to events in Afghanistan. The
Japanese government has maintained a two-pillar approach to
Afghanistan and Iraq: 1) overseas development assistance
(ODA),along with economic and social development, and 2)
military participation. DPJ politicians feel that ODA is
sufficient, but government leaders have argued that both
pillars were needed, Kawai noted.


13. (C) Tokyo is "making its best effort to re-start" the
OEF re-fueling mission, Kawai noted. Gordon responded that
the re-fueling effort is symbolic and very important in
sending a signal to the region and to other military powers
that Japan is committed to playing a role in the region and
elsewhere.

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Chiang Mai Initiative
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14. (C) In response to Gordon's question, Kawai urged the
United States not to worry about the Chiang Mai Initiative.
The effort arose from the 1997 East Asian financial crisis at
a time when many economies felt "resentment" or a sense of
"competitiveness" with the U.S. dollar, according to Kawai.
In the current environment, however, Japan believes that no
currency could sustain itself without support from the U.S.
dollar. Kawai suggested Tokyo better coordinate on the
issue.


15. (C) As the world financial system becomes more complex
and diverse, Gordon answered, the United States believes it
is important not to undermine the main international
financial institutions. Every country has an interest in
promoting a robust international monetary system, but not at
the expense of the major multilateral financial institutions.

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Energy Security
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16. (C) Kawai offered to initiate discussion with the PRC on
energy security, where opinions were evolving from a
"mercantilist" view. Japan hopes to encourage Chinese
thinking on supply, security in oil producing regions, and
promoting robust market mechanisms. Tokyo likewise sought
cooperation on ways to increase energy efficiency using two
pillars: government control and market mechanisms.
Technology transfer was a "complicated issue," with direct
implications for economic competitiveness. As a result,
Japan would need to be careful. Kawai agreed that technology
transfer is crucial to solving global warming.

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Middle East
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17. (C) Gordon applauded Japan's "Corridor of Peace and
Prosperity" initiative, while briefing Kawai on next month's
international conference on Israel and Palestine. The United
States hopes for progress in three areas -- creation of a

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Palestinian state, investment in West Bank infrastructure,
and security and confidence building measures.


18. (U) S/P staff has cleared this message.
SCHIEFFER