GOVERNMENT SUBMITS NEW OEF BILL; MSDF TO WITHDRAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 004903 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS JA SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT SUBMITS NEW OEF BILL; MSDF TO WITHDRAW FROM INDIAN OCEAN ON NOVEMBER 2 REF: A. TOKYO 4678 ¶B. TOKYO 4816 ¶C. TOKYO 4674 ¶D. TOKYO 4636 ¶E. TOKYO 4467 ¶F. TOKYO 4043 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, reasons 1.4(b),(d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The Fukuda Cabinet voted to forward a new bill authorizing a continuation of Japan's Indian Ocean refueling efforts in support of Operation Enduring Freedom to the Diet late on October 17. Maritime Self-Defense Forces assets will be withdrawn on November 2, one day after the current law expires. The new measure will be valid for only one year, in response to concerns from junior coalition partner Komeito that it does not contain a provision requiring prior Diet approval for each dispatch. The legislation also differs from the current law in that it limits Japan's Maritime Self-Defense forces to providing only fuel and water to coalition forces engaged in maritime interdiction operations in the Indian Ocean. The bill will be introduced to the Lower House for committee deliberations on October 23. The main opposition DPJ has already indicated it will hold the measure for up to 60 days in the Upper House and then reject it. This DPJ tactic would force the ruling parties into a tactical decision on whether to extend the Diet beyond its November 10 end date and use their two-thirds majority in the Lower House to pass the measure this term. End Summary. Legislation Partially Responds to Opposition Complaints -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) As expected, Japan's Cabinet approved a new anti-terror special measures law on the evening of October ¶17. The new law: -- aims at contributing to the prevention of international terrorism by providing re-supply support for foreign forces engaged in anti-terrorism maritime interdiction operations (MIO); -- defines that support as supplying oil and water to foreign vessels engaged in MIO in the Indian Ocean; -- bans the threat or use of force in carrying out these refueling activities; -- limits operations to "non-combat" areas in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere; -- required that the Diet be notified of any Cabinet-approved implementation plan defining the framework of the activities, or any changes to the plan, and of any termination of the activities; -- allows Self-Defense Forces (SDF) personnel engaged in these activities to use weapons to protect their own lives, other SDF personnel, or people under their control; and, -- expires one year after coming into forces, but its validity can be extended within the set period of up to one year, if the activities are deemed necessary. The current law was enacted in 2001 for an initial period of two years, and has been extended three times. It allows for a more expansive list of approved activities than the new bill. ¶3. (C) By specifically citing UN Security Council Resolution 1776, the ruling parties hope to overcome objections by the opposition that Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) refueling efforts in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) are unconstitutional. (Note: UNSCR 1776 expressed "appreciation for the contributions of many nations to ISAF and to the OEF coalition, including its maritime interdiction component." TOKYO 00004903 002 OF 003 End Note.) The decision to limit the bill to a validity of one year, with a possible one-year renewal, represents a compromise between the ruling Liberal Democratic (LDP) and Komeito parties over the issue of civilian control, in the absence of a clause requiring Diet approval for each dispatch. Opposition control over the Upper House is assured through at least 2010, and the LDP is eager to avoid a fight in the Diet every time MSDF assets are dispatched. The opposition will still challenge the bill over the lack of a prior approval clause, as well as the failure to include safeguards for assuring that all MSDF-provided fuel is used in support of OEF-MIO, and that none is diverted to Iraq or elsewhere. The ruling parties have promised to address those concerns in an exchange of notes with the United States, once the bill is passed. "Heavy-handed" Tactics Needed for Passage Could be Risky -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) The upshot of this new bill's submission is that there will be an interruption in MSDF operations in the Indian Ocean. The government will not recall the supply ship Tokiwa and the escort destroyer Kirisame until November 2, but they are expected to wrap-up refueling operations as of October 27, according to press reports. No new vessels can be dispatched until a new measure is passed. Embassy contacts expect the bill to be taken up in Lower House committee deliberations as early on October 23, despite opposition attempts to stall the legislation in the Diet Affairs Committee. ¶5. (C) The bill's passage in the Lower House, where the ruling coalition enjoys a greater-than two-thirds majority, is a certainty. Prospects in the opposition-controlled Upper House are much less certain. If the Upper House immediately votes down the measure, it will be returned to the Lower House, where it can be enacted on the basis of the ruling coalition's two-thirds majority (Ref A). A more likely scenario is that the opposition will exercise its right under the Diet rules to hold the bill for up to 60 days in the Upper House, after which the bill will automatically be returned to the Lower House, where the ruling coalition can still pass it with the same two-thirds' majority. ¶6. (C) While the ruling parties have the numbers for an override, Embassy contacts note that some members may be reluctant to take this unprecedented step, particularly if public opinion polls show less than a majority in favor of renewing participation in OEF-MIO. Many in the LDP and elsewhere say the government will need at least 60 percent public support before deciding to override the Upper House. Support for refueling in most polls is currently running slightly under 50 percent. Public support could be eroded further if the current extraordinary Diet session is extended well past its scheduled end date of November 10 to accommodate the parliamentary maneuvering, a move that could backfire on the ruling parties if public opinion views them as being too heavy-handed. Public opinion polls over the past year demonstrate that voters are largely disaffected with politics, and want their elected representatives to pay greater attention to livelihood issues. A long extension to focus on OEF-MIO will distract from the necessary compilation of a national budget, not to mention needed action on pensions, health care and economic revitalization. ¶7. (C) The real disaster scenario, according to some LDP Embassy contacts, is that exercise of the two-thirds override could generate sufficient public discontent that Prime Minister Fukuda would have no choice but to dissolve the Lower House and call an early general election. Passage of a non-binding censure motion against the Cabinet by the opposition parties in the Upper House could provide the tipping point. Even before the flap over OEF-MIO, most observers expected the ruling parties to lose a large TOKYO 00004903 003 OF 003 proportion of the seats won under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in the 2005 "postal privatization" election. ¶8. (C) More cautious elements in the ruling parties worry that "ignoring the will" of the Upper House might be seen as ignoring the will of the people, who gave the opposition control of the Upper House less than three months ago in July 29 elections. Embassy contacts are unanimous that the results of the Upper House elections were meant to send a clear message to the LDP. Furthermore, they are equally unanimous that the message had very little to do with security issues, such as OEF-MIO. For now, polls indicate that nearly two-thirds of the public want to see more cooperation and less divisiveness in the Diet. Prime Minister Fukuda has played to that sentiment since he first announced that he was running for LDP President and Prime Minister back in early September. LDP Divided; Some Call to Delay Until Next Diet Session -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Given these concerns, there is a possibility that the ruling parties will feel compelled to hold off on the new legislation until January's regular Diet session, sandwiched between passage of the budget in late March and the G8 Summit in July. Former LDP Secretary General Hidenao Nakagawa acknowledged that possibility in a meeting with Embassy Tokyo, expressing concern that a lengthy extension could have an impact on budget compilation and tax reform. Senior LDP leader Taku Yamasaki was also pessimistic about timing issues in a conversation with Embassy Tokyo earlier this week (Ref B). ¶10. (C) For now, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura and LDP Secretary General Bunmei Ibuki are continuing to call publicly for passage this Diet session, but divisions within the ranks are already being referred to in the press as a "lack of unity" in the LDP. In a conversation with Embassy Tokyo, former Defense Agency Chief Tokuichiro Tamazawa was blunt, labeling his nervous colleagues "weak-kneed." The tremendous pressure applied by the opposition's constant demands for information on OEF-MIO is beginning to wear on ruling party leaders, as evidenced by the recent televised comment by former Defense Agency Chief Nakatani Gen that anyone opposed to the MSDF's refueling efforts is a "terrorist." The longer the debate continues, the more chances the opposition will have to make the government look bad. SCHIEFFER