LITTLE SUBSTANCE LIKELY IN JAPAN-CHINA ECONOMIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 004863 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT PASS USTR FOR AUSTRS CUTLER/STRATFORD USTR ALSO FOR BEEMAN, WINTER, NEUFFER GENEVA ALSO FOR USTR NSC FOR TONG PARIS FOR USOECD COMMERCE FOR 4410/ITA/MAC/OJ/NMELCHER TREASURY FOR IA/DOHNER, HAARSAGER, POGGI, CARNES, AND WINSHIP STATE PLEASE PASS TO FEDERAL RESERVE SAN FRANCISCO/A. MAEDA AND FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD/J. KOHLI E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017 TAGS: ECON ETRD PREL ETTC KIPR JA CH SUBJECT: LITTLE SUBSTANCE LIKELY IN JAPAN-CHINA ECONOMIC DIALOGUE Classified By: Amb. J. Thomas Schieffer. Reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The high-level economic dialogue between China and Japan, a product of former Prime Minister Abe's effort to improve relations with China, will likely take place in late November or early December, according to an official of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The Chinese will push for recognition of the PRC as a market economy and a relaxation of some of Japan's controls on high- technology exports to China. The GOJ has no significant requests for the Chinese. Japan's lack of a clear and consistent policy on regional economic integration has exacerbated innate Chinese suspicions of Japan's goals in East Asia, the MOFA official noted. The GOJ objective for the dialogue appears simply to avoid embarrassing concessions to China without damaging the improved atmosphere in the bilateral relationship. End summary. Diet Deliberations Frustrate Dialogue Scheduling -------------- --- ¶2. (C) The ongoing Diet session has complicated scheduling the first substantive meeting of the Japan- China High-level Economic Dialogue (HED),according to MOFA China Economic Affairs Division Director Morio Matsumoto. (The HED had a symbolic kick-off during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Japan in April, but the nominal leader of the Chinese side, Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan, did not attend.) Meeting with econoff October 16, Matsumoto stressed, because the dialogue involves five different Japanese Cabinet ministers, finding a convenient time for all of them to travel to China is difficult. As a result, MOFA, which has the lead, is thinking the meeting will need to take place in Beijing over a weekend, probably in late November or early December. (Note: An October 17 Kyodo News Agency report indicates the target dates for the dialogue are December 1 and 2, but adds the dates could move a week in either direction. End note.) 
China Wants Market Economy Status, Looser Export Controls -------------- --- ¶3. (C) According to Matsumoto, the broad agenda for the dialogue, agreed during an October 12 meeting in Tokyo between Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Masaharu Kohno and Chinese Commerce Vice Minister Chen Jian, would have four main topics: macroeconomic issues; energy and environment; trade and investment; and regional cooperation. Topping the list of Chinese goals for the meeting, Matsumoto said, is recognition by Japan of China as a market economy. In addition, the Chinese would like the GOJ to loosen restrictions on the export of high-technology items to China, notably requirements for Japanese companies to seek permission from METI in order to export to certain Chinese firms. The Chinese hoped for language in the HED's joint statement encouraging transfer of certain technologies from Japan to China, a suggestion the GOJ TOKYO 00004863 002 OF 003 would not accept, Matsumoto noted. Japan Seeks Little Except a Harmonious Meeting -------------- - ¶4. (C) Matsumoto said he wants to keep planning for the dialogue as "low key" as possible to avoid interference from other Japanese ministries. Mindful of the proliferation of issues in the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue, China's Ministry of Commerce -- MOFA's counterpart in orchestrating the HED -- is equally eager to keep control over the agenda, Matsumoto noted. So far, the various Japanese ministries involved have yet to see the HED as a mechanism to push the PRC on specific issues, something which served MOFA's interest in having a harmonious first meeting. In fact, although the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) had a few substantive issues to discuss, notably with respect to intellectual property protection, both the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Economic and Fiscal Policy Minister Hiroko Ota had balked at joining the dialogue. They are participating only because former Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki had pressured them into doing so, Matsumoto recounted. He observed that the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries might have some issues to raise but is not part of the HED team. (The five participating agencies on the Japanese side are MOFA, METI, MOF, the Ministry of Environment, and the Cabinet Office -- the last represented by Minister Ota.) Matsumoto worried the relative lack of Japanese requests meant the public would perceive the dialogue as benefiting China far more than Japan. Consequently, he is working to think of possible Chinese deliverables for Japan so that the HED's joint statement would look more balanced. Japan's Confused Regional Strategy Fuels Chinese Suspicions -------------- -- ¶5. (C) Matsumoto added the GOJ's lack of a consistent position on "regional cooperation" will complicate discussions with the Chinese on this agenda item. China, he noted, is innately suspicious of Japan's regional initiatives, whether they were bilateral FTAs or broader proposals like the "Closer Economic Partnership with East Asia" (CEPEA, the "ASEAN Plus Six" proposal championed by METI). Confusion over Japan's strategy only fueled Chinese worries. According to Matsumoto, the GOJ would seek to allay Chinese doubts about Japan's regional strategy during the HED. ¶6. (C) Matsumoto acknowledged, however, the GOJ still did not have a common voice on regional integration. In addition, no guidance had come from the Prime Minister's office establishing a common position for the bureaucracy. He observed, however, in the few weeks since Prime Minister Fukuda took office, the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren) had become more vocal in supporting an "East Asian Community," including organizing a TOKYO 00004863 003 OF 003 symposium on the topic at the end of September. ¶7. (C) Although Matsumoto said no official study had yet been launched to review the feasibility of a Japan-China-Korea free trade agreement, Japan's National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA),a quasi-official think tank, had issued a report on a three-way FTA. He stressed, however, that the report was a "private" exercise with no formal government- directed study currently in the works. (Note: NIRA issued the report in December 2006 in conjunction with China's State Council Development Research Center and the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. The three institutes also held a symposium in Seoul September 17 at which experts presented detailed analyses of the possible structure and sectoral impact of a three-way FTA. End note.) Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Based on Matsumoto's comments, Japan appears set, at best, to gain nothing immediately tangible from its high-level economic dialogue with China. The question is whether the Japanese can maintain a semblance of goodwill at the meeting while avoiding symbolic or substantive concessions to China, such as explicit recognition of China as a market economy. Japan's "dialogue-envy" was the driving force behind this exercise when it was included as one of the deliverables emerging from former Prime Minister Abe's fence-mending trip to China a year ago. With Abe now gone, there seems to be little motivation among the Japanese to push ahead with the dialogue other than a desire not to be seen as downgrading the relationship with China. SCHIEFFER