LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY MEMBERS DISCUSS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 003778 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT. PLEASE PASS TO USTR/MBEEMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 2017/08/14 TAGS: PGOV PREL JA SUBJECT: LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY MEMBERS DISCUSS IMMEDIATE FUTURE Classified By: Classified by CDA Michael Meserve for reasons 1.4 (b,d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Discussions with three Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Diet members during August 9-10 revealed concern over the upcoming cabinet reshuffle and Diet session, speculation on Prime Minister Abe resigning, and possible scenarios for dissolving the Lower House. The three recognized that Abe might be forced to call a snap election and were aware of the risks the LDP faced if that were to occur. They agreed that the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) would obstruct Diet legislation as much as possible in the new session, especially the Anti-terrorism Special Measures law. One politician also worried that once the LDP's traditional support base was lost it was unlikely to return. End summary. Election Lessons Learned -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting on August 9 with Embassy Tokyo officers, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) member and former Defense Agency Director General Gen Nakatani claimed that the Upper House election defeat, especially in single-seat districts, was due to the LDP's inattention to the rural regions. (Note: Nakatani's Kochi Prefecture district on the island of Shikoku is very rural and all of the Shikoku seats went to the opposition in the Upper House election.) The LDP had paid for structural reform in this election, he said. Traditional supporters of the LDP in the farming and construction sectors no longer felt the LDP was reliable. Whether they would switch their loyalty to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was uncertain, however. Nakatani also argued that further structural reform was necessary in order for the Japanese public to become more self-reliant. At the same time, the LDP had to ensure that those engaged in the farming and fishing industries in particular were able to work without worries. ¶3. (C) LDP Diet member Yasuhide Nakayama in a meeting on August 10 noted that because PM Abe was a third generation politician and had always enjoyed easy re-election in Yamagachi Prefecture, he did not know how to fight. Abe also failed to understand the importance of the LDP's coalition partner Komeito in the elections and because of that blind spot, he had pushed Constitutional revision too hard. Nakayama surmised that if Abe represented a district in Osaka -- Nakayama's home district -- he might have a better understanding of why the LDP cannot win any seat in that district without Komeito support. Nakayama also stressed that once an LDP stronghold had gone to the DPJ it would be extremely difficult to get it back. Cabinet Reshuffle and Abe's Future -------------- ¶4. (C) LDP Diet member Masahiko Shibayama confided to Embassy Tokyo officers in a meeting on August 10 that there were rumors the new Cabinet would be another "friends of Abe" compilation or that posts would be distributed by faction; neither development was appropriate, he thought. Japan needed to continue carrying out structural reform and cutting expenditures, despite the income disparity and welfare problems that it caused. Shibayama suggested the new cabinet must do more to promote equal opportunity, not equal results. He predicted that the opposition would harp on regional disparities and slower rural economic recovery, but he TOKYO 00003778 002 OF 003 believed the coalition had to stick with its current reform initiatives. He hoped that new cabinet members would be selected based on their willingness to be team players, to implement current policies, and to offer Abe constructive criticism when necessary. ¶5. (C) Nakayama grumbled that Abe had no political sense, which he had proved in the Six-Party Talks by focusing only on the abduction issue while the other countries were heading in a different direction. He groused that the cabinet reshuffle should have occurred immediately after the July election, maybe even immediately after Health Minister Hakuo Yanagisawa had called women "baby-making machines." Nakayama also thought Foreign Minister Taro Aso's prospects for becoming Prime Minister were dim but that his chances for another cabinet post or party position were good. Nakayama added that he hoped Defense Minister Yuriko Koike -- for whom he had once worked -- would retain her post but admitted he had heard much criticism of her within the LDP. ¶6. (C) Nakatani said bluntly that a cabinet reshuffle would not help strengthen Abe's leadership. (Note: On the same day officers met with Nakatani he publicly called for Abe to resign.) He thought Abe should have been replaced immediately after such a massive defeat but lamented there was no one to force him out. He also speculated that if the new cabinet were to become completely ineffectual, Abe would have to dissolve the Lower House. Scenarios for Dissolution -------------- ¶7. (C) Shibayama outlined three scenarios for dissolving the Lower House. The first was to wait until the timing was most advantageous for the LDP. The second was for PM Abe and the LDP to wait out the remaining two years at which point expiration of the Lower House term of office would force an election. During that period the coalition would still enjoy an absolute majority in the Lower House, something unlikely to be retained in the next election. Suggesting that the LDP was more afraid of public opinion than the opposition, Shibayama said the third option was the worst: if more scandals were to surface, it would increase anger toward the Abe Cabinet and force Abe out while further diminishing public confidence in the coalition's ability to govern. If there were enough public discontent, the new Prime Minister might even have to dissolve the Lower House, in which case the opposition would almost surely take over the government. Anti-Terror Bill and the Diet Session -------------- ¶8. (C) Nakatani believed that the start of the extraordinary Diet session would be delayed until possibly the second week in September and that its focus would be Anti-terrorism Special Measures law. He reminded Embassy Tokyo officers that he had headed the Defense Agency when the law was established and fully understood that the law was based on UN resolutions. Nakatani speculated that the coalition would succeed in passing only those bills that the DPJ supported, the one exception being the Anti-terrorism law. ¶9. (C) Observing that outcomes were never certain during heated political debate, Shibayama wondered whether the two opposing sides would decide to cooperate or to immerse themselves in a power struggle. He was convinced the opposition's goal was to stir things up in the new Diet TOKYO 00003778 003 OF 003 session, especially on the Anti-terrorism law. The task for the coalition would be to persuade the general public and the media -- rather than the opposition -- to support the law, he thought. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Unhappiness with the Abe administration permeated our discussions with these three LDP politicians. The outlook for the Extraordinary Diet session continues to look grim with most observers expecting a confrontational, make-no-compromises DPJ to make as much trouble as possible. With Ichiro Ozawa at the helm, the DPJ has just the man to make this happen. MESERVE