LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY MEMBERS DISCUSS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 003778

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. PLEASE PASS TO USTR/MBEEMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2017/08/14
TAGS: PGOV PREL JA
SUBJECT: LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY MEMBERS DISCUSS IMMEDIATE
FUTURE


Classified By: Classified by CDA Michael Meserve for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Discussions with three Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
Diet members during August 9-10 revealed concern over the
upcoming cabinet reshuffle and Diet session, speculation on
Prime Minister Abe resigning, and possible scenarios for
dissolving the Lower House. The three recognized that Abe
might be forced to call a snap election and were aware of the
risks the LDP faced if that were to occur. They agreed that
the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) would obstruct Diet
legislation as much as possible in the new session,
especially the Anti-terrorism Special Measures law. One
politician also worried that once the LDP's traditional
support base was lost it was unlikely to return. End summary.


Election Lessons Learned
--------------


2. (C) In a meeting on August 9 with Embassy Tokyo officers,
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) member and former Defense
Agency Director General Gen Nakatani claimed that the Upper
House election defeat, especially in single-seat districts,
was due to the LDP's inattention to the rural regions.
(Note: Nakatani's Kochi Prefecture district on the island of
Shikoku is very rural and all of the Shikoku seats went to
the opposition in the Upper House election.) The LDP had
paid for structural reform in this election, he said.
Traditional supporters of the LDP in the farming and
construction sectors no longer felt the LDP was reliable.
Whether they would switch their loyalty to the Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) was uncertain, however. Nakatani also
argued that further structural reform was necessary in order
for the Japanese public to become more self-reliant. At the
same time, the LDP had to ensure that those engaged in the
farming and fishing industries in particular were able to
work without worries.


3. (C) LDP Diet member Yasuhide Nakayama in a meeting on
August 10 noted that because PM Abe was a third generation
politician and had always enjoyed easy re-election in
Yamagachi Prefecture, he did not know how to fight. Abe also
failed to understand the importance of the LDP's coalition
partner Komeito in the elections and because of that blind
spot, he had pushed Constitutional revision too hard.
Nakayama surmised that if Abe represented a district in Osaka
-- Nakayama's home district -- he might have a better
understanding of why the LDP cannot win any seat in that
district without Komeito support. Nakayama also stressed
that once an LDP stronghold had gone to the DPJ it would be
extremely difficult to get it back.


Cabinet Reshuffle and Abe's Future
--------------


4. (C) LDP Diet member Masahiko Shibayama confided to Embassy
Tokyo officers in a meeting on August 10 that there were
rumors the new Cabinet would be another "friends of Abe"
compilation or that posts would be distributed by faction;
neither development was appropriate, he thought. Japan
needed to continue carrying out structural reform and cutting
expenditures, despite the income disparity and welfare
problems that it caused. Shibayama suggested the new cabinet
must do more to promote equal opportunity, not equal results.
He predicted that the opposition would harp on regional
disparities and slower rural economic recovery, but he

TOKYO 00003778 002 OF 003


believed the coalition had to stick with its current reform
initiatives. He hoped that new cabinet members would be
selected based on their willingness to be team players, to
implement current policies, and to offer Abe constructive
criticism when necessary.


5. (C) Nakayama grumbled that Abe had no political sense,
which he had proved in the Six-Party Talks by focusing only
on the abduction issue while the other countries were heading
in a different direction. He groused that the cabinet
reshuffle should have occurred immediately after the July
election, maybe even immediately after Health Minister Hakuo
Yanagisawa had called women "baby-making machines." Nakayama
also thought Foreign Minister Taro Aso's prospects for
becoming Prime Minister were dim but that his chances for
another cabinet post or party position were good. Nakayama
added that he hoped Defense Minister Yuriko Koike -- for whom
he had once worked -- would retain her post but admitted he
had heard much criticism of her within the LDP.


6. (C) Nakatani said bluntly that a cabinet reshuffle would
not help strengthen Abe's leadership. (Note: On the same day
officers met with Nakatani he publicly called for Abe to
resign.) He thought Abe should have been replaced
immediately after such a massive defeat but lamented there
was no one to force him out. He also speculated that if the
new cabinet were to become completely ineffectual, Abe would
have to dissolve the Lower House.


Scenarios for Dissolution
--------------


7. (C) Shibayama outlined three scenarios for dissolving the
Lower House. The first was to wait until the timing was most
advantageous for the LDP. The second was for PM Abe and the
LDP to wait out the remaining two years at which point
expiration of the Lower House term of office would force an
election. During that period the coalition would still enjoy
an absolute majority in the Lower House, something unlikely
to be retained in the next election. Suggesting that the LDP
was more afraid of public opinion than the opposition,
Shibayama said the third option was the worst: if more
scandals were to surface, it would increase anger toward the
Abe Cabinet and force Abe out while further diminishing
public confidence in the coalition's ability to govern. If
there were enough public discontent, the new Prime Minister
might even have to dissolve the Lower House, in which case
the opposition would almost surely take over the government.



Anti-Terror Bill and the Diet Session
--------------


8. (C) Nakatani believed that the start of the extraordinary
Diet session would be delayed until possibly the second week
in September and that its focus would be Anti-terrorism
Special Measures law. He reminded Embassy Tokyo officers
that he had headed the Defense Agency when the law was
established and fully understood that the law was based on UN
resolutions. Nakatani speculated that the coalition would
succeed in passing only those bills that the DPJ supported,
the one exception being the Anti-terrorism law.


9. (C) Observing that outcomes were never certain during
heated political debate, Shibayama wondered whether the two
opposing sides would decide to cooperate or to immerse
themselves in a power struggle. He was convinced the
opposition's goal was to stir things up in the new Diet

TOKYO 00003778 003 OF 003


session, especially on the Anti-terrorism law. The task for
the coalition would be to persuade the general public and the
media -- rather than the opposition -- to support the law, he
thought.


Comment
--------------


10. (C) Unhappiness with the Abe administration permeated our
discussions with these three LDP politicians. The outlook
for the Extraordinary Diet session continues to look grim
with most observers expecting a confrontational,
make-no-compromises DPJ to make as much trouble as possible.
With Ichiro Ozawa at the helm, the DPJ has just the man to
make this happen.
MESERVE