DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN ON POST-ELECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 003725 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USTR/MBEEMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL JA SUBJECT: DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN ON POST-ELECTION PROSPECTS, INDIAN OCEAN MISSION Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 (b,d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Embassy Tokyo officers spoke to a Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) staff member and a DPJ House of Councilors member about a range of issues following the July 29 Upper House election. The staff member discussed the post-election timeline, economic reforms, the upcoming Diet session and what the DPJ would face when it took control of the Upper House. The Diet member spoke about the ramifications of the election and touched on Japan's economic challenges. He also defended DPJ President Ichiro Ozawa's plan to oppose renewal of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures law but characterized Ozawa's move as part of "a game" with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for political advantage rather than opposition to OEF on the merits. End Summary. Diet and Cabinet Timing -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting on August 2 with Embassy Tokyo Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Election Headquarters General Manager Masato Akimoto predicted that the extraordinary Diet session would probably start around mid-September. He admitted that despite the election results, the DPJ had no direct influence over a cabinet reshuffle, but he stressed that Prime Minister Abe needed to carefully consider whether to appoint his friends again or instead choose politicians with experience. Akimoto believed Abe would have a tough time for a while due to the strong public reaction against Abe's decision to continue as Prime Minister. Akimoto noted that usually when a party lost as badly as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) did, the leader either quit or quickly set up a new team. The longer Abe made the public wait, the higher the expectations and the greater the criticism, and therefore the risk, warned Akimoto. Koizumi Reforms Were Necessary -------------- ¶3. (C) Akimoto stressed that the election was not anti-reform, especially not former Prime Minister Koizumi's reforms. He explained that the government had for years pumped the rural regions full of pork barrel projects, which led to the current extremely high national debt. (Note: Japan's 2006 gross national debt was almost 180 percent of GDP, the highest of the G7 countries.) Koizumi's reforms were launched in order to correct this, and he succeeded in substantially changing the central government distribution of funds. The rural areas were not yet ready to stand on their own two feet, however, and as a result, regional and income disparity had grown. Reforms were necessary but whether they were done well was another question, he opined. ¶4. (C) Koizumi had an advantage over Abe in that Koizumi was in power at the beginning of the reforms whereas Abe had only begun his tenure when problems started to arise, Akimoto explained. Public criticism, which was reflected in the recent elections, was not so much about the reforms but about Abe's implementation, which first focused on economic prosperity in urban regions with the hope that these economic improvements would then spread to the rural regions. ¶5. (C) Akimoto warned that the DPJ would face the same problems Abe now faced and would struggle to solve them. The DPJ had chosen to tackle agricultural reconstruction first by introducing an income subsidy system. Agricultural decline TOKYO 00003725 002 OF 003 meant regional communities were weakening, especially those in the mountain regions, he said. Akimoto also wanted the government to introduce programs that would help the regions become more self-sufficient. Vote was Anti-Abe, Not Pro-DPJ -------------- ¶6. (C) Akimoto admitted that the DPJ recognized the electorate had voted against Abe and the LDP and not for the DPJ; this meant the DPJ had homework to do. The DPJ needed public support for the party in order to take over the government. Whether the DPJ successfully gained this public approval depended on whether it accomplished anything substantive before the next Lower House election. If the DPJ failed, its fate would be the same as the LDP's. Although the DPJ's strength lay in its Lower House decision-making structure not in the Upper House, it would not make any major personnel changes to strengthen the Upper House, Akimoto believed. DPJ Plans for the Autumn -------------- ¶7. (C) Control of the Upper House and the Lower House was in the hands of two different parties for the first time since the war, but it would remain unclear what this meant until the autumn session began, said Akimoto. One thing was clear, however: the DPJ now could stop or amend bills the public disliked, including the National Civil Service Law (the so-called Amakudari bill) and the bill to revise the political fund control law. In addition, the DPJ could introduce its own bills in the Upper House, and it currently was considering one that would allow pension premiums to be used only to provide benefits. Another would assure a certain level of income subsidy to farmers. DPJ Faces A Dilemma -------------- ¶8. (C) DPJ House of Councilors member Kazuya Shimba, who spoke to Embassy officers on August 9, speculated that PM Abe would resign very soon, because the past couple of days had been difficult and shocking for him, and this would likely continue for the next several weeks. Shimba acknowledged, however, that the Upper House and the DPJ could not dissolve the Lower House. He speculated that the Upper House would hold up many Lower House bills. Shimba commented that the DPJ faced a dilemma over whether to attempt to fully take over the government or only to force a political realignment. He admitted that even if a snap election were called, the DPJ might not win a Lower House majority, which meant the current situation could continue for a while. DPJ and the Economy -------------- ¶9. (C) Asked about the DPJ's plans for the economy, Shimba cited productivity, the falling birth rate and aging society, and the minimum wage as areas that would need to be addressed. As for the postal privatization bill the DPJ was supporting, Shimba said it was just a political gesture and that he doubted it would amount to much more. Middle East Policy -- It's a Game -------------- TOKYO 00003725 003 OF 003 ¶10. (C) Shimba admitted that in an ideal world diplomacy stayed the same regardless of who was in power. Middle Eastern policy was gaining in importance, he acknowledged, and the US-Japan relationship was vital. Shimba explained that the DPJ did not oppose the Indian Ocean mission but instead wanted the LDP to be more accountable and transparent about the operation rather than simply telling the opposition to trust the LDP. Shimba added that he also had heard that three Self Defense Forces members had been killed on the mission but that there had been no coverage of this. (Note: we know of no such deaths.) ¶11. (C) Shimba revealed that within the LDP were many different views on the Indian Ocean operation. He reckoned that the DPJ challenge would be to explain why it opposed the mission; it could not oppose it simply for the sake of opposition. Shimba also stressed that this was a game being played by the DPJ with the LDP, and not with the United States. Shimba assured us that Ozawa and other Diet members who opposed this measure were not opposing the United States. Shimba believed that public opinion was turning against the situation in that part of the world, however, and that there was more opposition to the Iraq war in Japan than there used to be. He agreed that the Indian Ocean mission had no connection with Iraq but worried that not all Japanese understood that. Shimba also commented that Ozawa and the Japanese public was conscious of the changing US public view of the war and suspicious of President Bush's policy toward the Middle East. ¶12. (C) Shimba repeated the need for more information about the Indian Ocean mission. He worried over which was the riskier choice: to oppose the United States and the anti-terrorism law and thereby lose credibility or to vote for it and lose the trust of the public. Ozawa believed the second choice was riskier, Shimba noted. Whatever the DPJ decided to do, however, it must be ready to explain its actions to the United States. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Akimoto's assessment of the election was surprisingly realistic as was his acknowledgment that Koizumi's reforms were necessary. Shimba's comment that the DPJ strategy on the Indian Ocean mission was "a game," on the other hand, was disturbing but probably accurate. Certainly what we have seen since DPJ President Ozawa first voiced his opposition to extending the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures law suggests that the DPJ is playing chicken with the LDP on the issue without fully understanding the international ramifications of this position. Former DPJ President Seiji Maehara continues to say publicly that he recognizes the importance of extending the law, however. Embassy Tokyo will continue to work with other Diet members, including DPJ members, to explain the important international nature of the Indian Ocean mission. SCHIEFFER