SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF CJCS GEN. PACE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 003664 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2017 TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV JA SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF CJCS GEN. PACE Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Abe's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) suffered an historic defeat in July 29 elections, ceding control of the Upper House of the Diet to the opposition. The electoral setback has put at risk Abe's ambitious security agenda, including moves to expand Japan's ability to defend U.S. assets and territories. The most immediate challenge we face is an effort by the opposition leader to terminate Japan's participation in OEF's maritime mission. Abe's hobbled government is also faced with major decisions on Host Nation Support, selection of a next generation fighter jet (FX),and moving forward on realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan. End Summary. Political Turmoil -------------- ¶2. (C) The ruling coalition's dramatic electoral setback in the July 29 Upper House election threatens to usher in an extended period of political uncertainty. While Prime Minister SHINZO ABE still controls an overwhelming majority in the more powerful Lower House, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is in a position to seriously slow or block major legislation. Thus far, the DPJ's leader, Ichiro Ozawa, has threatened to gridlock Diet debate in an attempt to force Abe's government to call for a Lower House election. PM ABE has made clear his intent to remain in office, but he may face growing calls to resign from within his party if he fails to revive his government's flagging polling numbers. ¶3. (C) Although the July 29 election was decided entirely on domestic and good governance issues, it is likely to have negative implications for our bilateral security agenda. The most high-profile bill in the Diet session expected to begin in the coming weeks is the extension of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, which authorizes Japan's maritime refueling operation in the Indian Ocean in support of OEF. DPJ leader Ozawa has publicly pledged to veto the law, although many in his party question his stance. The ruling coalition can override an Upper House veto, but not before the authorization expires on November 1. The Ambassador engaged Ozawa directly on August 8, emphasizing both the importance of Japan's mission for Tokyo's international image and the critical role the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) plays in facilitating operations by coalition partners like 
Pakistan. ¶4. (C) Prospects for other security-related legislation are even dimmer. The cabinet, which is expected to be reshuffled on August 27, may wind up shelving bills that would create a Japanese National Security Council and expand Japan's ability to engage in military activities in space. Prospects for legislation to relax Japan's self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of collective self-defense are also very much in doubt. An advisory commission the Prime Minister assigned to study the issue is likely to issue a report this fall recommending Japan accept new military roles, including intercepting ballistic missiles heading toward the United States. However, disarray in the Diet and cautiousness on the part of the LDP's pacifist-leaning Komeito coalition partner may significantly delay implementation of the panel's suggestions. Realignment -------------- ¶5. (C) The Upper House election is likely to have a less immediate impact on the Japanese government's implementation of the May 1, 2006 Alliance Transformation Roadmap. A realignment bill passed by the Diet in May gives the government a broad array of both incentives and sanctions to encourage local communities to accept the relocation of U.S. bases from more congested areas. As you know, the key element of this package is the transfer of USMC functions from Futenma MCAS to Camp Schwab. The Ministry of Defense TOKYO 00003664 002 OF 002 (MOD) has started its environmental impact assessment to facilitate the move. It formally requested approval for the plan from the Okinawan Governor on August 6. ¶6. (C) Other elements of the realignment package are progressing well. The Japanese Diet has authorized a financing mechanism for housing and infrastructure improvements on Guam and detailed planning is underway for enhancements at Iwakuni MCAS and consolidation of U.S. bases on Okinawa south of Kadena. On the latter issue, the Japanese government continues to press at senior levels for maximum land returns at Camp Foster. Host Nation Support -------------- ¶7. (C) The Special Measures Agreement (SMA) governing approximately USD 1.1 billion of Japan's Host Nation Support (HNS) expires on March 30, 2008. The USG has requested a three-year extension of the existing agreement based on an informal agreement related to cost sharing for the relocation of Marines to Guam reached between then-Defense Minister Fukushiro Nukaga and Secretary Rumsfeld. The Japanese government continues to disavow this "gentleman's agreement," and has suggested making cuts to both utilities payments and benefits for USFJ's local employees. FX -- ¶8. (C) The recent House Appropriations Committee renewal of the Obey Amendment restricting the release of the F-22 Raptor was seen by the Japanese Government and media as a major setback to Japan's efforts to procure the airframe to replace its aging F-4 fleet. The MOD has signaled its intention to keep the Air Self Defense Force's F-4s in service for an additional year to provide more time for the GOJ to lobby the U.S. executive and legislative branches to sell the F-22 to Japan. Japan is also looking at the F-15, F-18, F-35 and several European models and is engaging in a "capabilities assessment group" with U.S. counterparts to identify which aircraft would best meet the air power threat the alliance will face in 2020-25. Information Security -------------- ¶9. (S) Some Japanese officials have linked the U.S. decision on F-22 to recent concerns over Japan's track record on information security. The unauthorized disclosure of sensitive Aegis data earlier this year has set in motion an ambitious bilateral initiative to review Japan's information security infrastructure. On August 3, the two sides agreed to establish a Bilateral Information Security Task Force (BISTF) to exchange information and plan for broad improvements in the legal, policy, and procedural systems Japan uses to protect bilateral data. The objective of this process is not only to fix existing gaps, but to establish a system through which we can expand future bilateral data sharing across the board. In this context, the signing of a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) on August 10 is an important step towards creating a common base for exchanging classified information. SCHIEFFER