PM ABE'S LDP TAKES A BATH IN UPPER HOUSE ELECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 003475 SIPDIS SIPDIS MANILA FOR D/KAYE LEE E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2017 TAGS: PGOV JA SUBJECT: PM ABE'S LDP TAKES A BATH IN UPPER HOUSE ELECTION REF: TOKYO 3453 Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER, REASONS 1.4(B),(D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Abe's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) suffered a crushing defeat in the July 29 Upper House elections, returning only 37 of 64 incumbent seats and, in the process, losing control of the chamber. The main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was the big winner, garnering 60 seats to make it the largest party in the Upper House. Prime Minister Abe reiterated in a July 30 press conference that he intends to remain in office, despite the party's near-record losses, but his future remains uncertain. Embassy contacts and the media are divided as to whether Abe eventually will be forced to resign, and if so, when. Regardless of Abe's personal fate, the election has significantly weakened the ruling coalition and Abe's ability to deliver on contentious issues of importance to us. End summary. The Final Tally -------------- ¶2. (C) Half of the 242 seats in the Upper House, originally filled in 2001, were up for election this year. The other 121 seats were elected in 2004, and will not be contested again until 2010. In the chart below, (D) stands for electoral district, and (P) stands for proportional district. Total Won (D/P) Up for Election Retained Total LDP 37 (23/14) 64 46 83 Komeito 9 (2/7) 13 11 19 DPJ 60 (40/20) 32 49 109 JCP 3 (0/3) 5 4 7 SDP 2 (0/2) 3 3 5 PNP 2 (1/1) 2 2 4 NPJ 1 (0/1) 0 0 1 IND 7 (7/0) 1 6 7 Coalition 46 (25/21) 77 57 103 Opposition 75 (48/27) 43 64 139 Historic LDP Loss -------------- ¶3. (C) Voters delivered a stinging rebuke to the LDP. The party's 37 seats is its second-worst showing in history, just one seat more than the record-low 36 seats won in 1989 under Prime Minister Uno. Uno resigned shortly after the elections to take responsibility for the defeat. It is a notably worse performance than the 1998 election in which then-Prime Minister Hashimoto's LDP won only 44 seats. Hashimoto, too, resigned. ¶4. (C) Most damaging to the LDP were losses in 23 of 29 single-seat electoral districts. Aside from 1989, when the LDP won only three of 26 single-seat races, the predominantly rural single-seat prefectures are traditionally regarded as LDP strongholds. This time, the party's rural base turned its back on the LDP, choosing mostly younger, untested DPJ candidates. In Saga Prefecture, for example, the LDP lost for the first time in 51 years. The LDP lost all four rural constituencies in Shikoku, and won only two of seven in Kyushu. In Okayama, three-term LDP member Toranosuke Katayama, LDP deputy leader in the Upper House, lost to a DPJ newcomer. In Shimane, home turf of LDP Upper House chief Mikio Aoki, two-term incumbent Shuntaro Kageyama lost to a newcomer from the People's New Party, a minor party composed primarily of LDP members who were expelled from the party in 2005 for opposing postal privatization. TOKYO 00003475 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) Junior coalition partner Komeito fell four short of maintaining its 13 seats won in 2001. Most significant were losses in the three of five multi-seat districts where it ran candidates -- Aichi, Saitama, and Kanagawa prefectures. This marks the first time since 1989 that Komeito candidates have failed to win in an electoral district race. (Comment: Komeito only runs candidates in district races where it knows it has strong support from its Soka Gakkai religious base and, thus, a high chance of winning. Failure this year is likely attributable to the inability of the LDP to deliver support to its coalition partner.) ¶6. (C) The opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was the big winner, gaining a plurality of seats in the Upper House. While the LDP was losing 27 incumbent seats, the DPJ nearly doubled its seats, from 32 to 60, doing even better than its most optimistic predictions. Other opposition parties fared poorly, as most of the "protest vote" against Abe went to the DPJ. In particular, the elections marked the continuing decline of the left in Japan. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) won just three proportional representation seats, and now holds not a single electoral district seat in either house of the Diet. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) retained two of its three seats up for election. Small parties like the People's New Party (PNP) and New Party Japan (NPJ),which won a combined three seats, were once considered potential coalition-makers for the LDP and Komeito. They are now largely irrelevant, given the DPJ's margin of victory. ¶7. (C) Female candidates scored big gains, taking 26 seats, including 14 for the DPJ and 8 for the LDP. The previous record was 22, back in 1989. Only 14 women won seats in the Upper House in 2004. Turnout -------------- ¶8. (C) Voter turnout nationwide registered 58.64 percent, up 2 percent from 2004. Many election forecasters were predicting turnout rates in excess of 60 percent. Over 10 million voters submitted absentee ballots, up more than 50 percent from the last election and accounting for slightly more than 10 percent of all ballots cast. Shimane Prefecture, where the daughter of an LDP "postal rebel" bested the LDP incumbent on the home turf of LDP Upper House Chair Aoki, featured the highest voter turnout, at 72 percent. Aomori Prefecture recorded the lowest turnout, at 54 percent. Altogether, 39 of Japan's 47 prefectures registered higher voter turnout figures than in 2004. Pensions, Economy Alienate LDP Base -------------- ¶9. (C) According to a Yomiuri exit poll, only 56 percent of LDP supporters voted for their party's proportional slate, while 25 percent of LDP supporters crossed lines to vote DPJ. The LDP received support from over 60 percent of its supporters in only nine prefectures, down from 25 in 2004. LDP supporters deserted their party across all demographic lines, although the gaps were particularly pronounced among younger voters. ¶10. (C) The pension issue played the key role in the election, according to exit poll data published by several media companies. Over 50 percent of voters who described themselves as distrustful of the pension system said they had voted for the DPJ as a result. In an Asahi poll, only 20 of voters concerned with the pension issue said they had voted LDP. That number was even lower -- just 10 percent -- in the Yomiuri poll. Of unaffiliated voters, over 70 percent in the Asahi poll said they voted DPJ because of the pension TOKYO 00003475 003 OF 003 issue. Frustration over growing economic disparities also proved fatal in the largely rural single-seat districts. Abe administration scandals were an issue in every electoral district. ¶11. (C) DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa exploited the Abe administration's gaffes to maximum effect during the campaign, delivering a message to both urban and rural voters that the LDP was responsible for their concerns. The strong showing by the DPJ bears out Ozawa's strategy for hand-picking candidates, emphasizing regional disparities, and campaigning early and often in areas where the DPJ had traditionally lacked support. Ozawa was noticeably absent from Sunday's post-election victory celebrations, amidst indications he had been advised by his doctors to rest. Abe Insists He Will Stay, Continue Reforms -------------- ¶12. (C) A chastened Prime Minister Abe on election night declared his intention to stay, despite the embarrassing electoral defeat. (Note: Asahi's exit polls show that 56 percent of voters -- including 30 percent of LDP supporters -- wanted Abe to resign.) "This humiliating setback is my responsibility," he told the press, "but our nation-building has just begun." Abe said he would consider reshuffling the Cabinet and party executive posts, but did not give a specific timeline. A meeting of the LDP executive board on July 30 reportedly affirmed Abe's decision to stay on. Although news reports speculate that Abe will convene an extraordinary Diet session the second week of August, and reshuffle the Cabinet sometime during the month, Abe refused to be pinned down on timing when he appeared before the press after the executive board meeting. ¶13. (C) For the time being, at least, faction leaders within the LDP have stressed the need for unanimity within the party and have not called for Abe to step down. LDP Secretary General Hidenao Nakagawa and LDP Upper House Caucus SIPDIS President Mikio Aoki continue to offer public support for Abe, even as they have offered their own resignations. Komeito leader Akihiro Ota has also publicly given Abe the nod to continue as Prime Minister, although press reports suggest that Komeito, blaming its losses on Abe and the LDP, will become more assertive within the coalition on policy matters. Media analysts and Embassy contacts predict rough going in the Diet, despite calls from the business community, in particular, for bipartisan cooperation. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) Whether or not Abe eventually has to step down, the election has significantly weakened the ruling coalition and Abe's ability to deliver on issues of importance to us. The emboldened DPJ is certain to challenge the LDP-Komeito coalition, trying to force a political impasse that could lead to dissolution of the Lower House and a general election. While they are unlikely to succeed, particularly in the near term, the DPJ will almost certainly use its new-found power to thwart Abe's legislative agenda, leaving key bills at risk, such as the Anti-Terror Special Measures extension of Japan's Indian Ocean deployment in support of coalition efforts in Afghanistan. SCHIEFFER