PDAS STEPHENS JULY 23 MEETINGS WITH JAPANESE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 003470 SIPDIS SIPDIS MANILA FOR D/KAYE LEE E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017 TAGS: PREL KNNP JA DPRK SUBJECT: PDAS STEPHENS JULY 23 MEETINGS WITH JAPANESE OFFICIALS ON THE NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY MECHANISM Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons 1.4 (b)/(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: MOFA officials took a very cautious line on the Six-Party Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism Working Group during meetings with Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Stephens on July 23. They were also cautious in SIPDIS reacting to initial U.S. ideas for core principles for regional security, emphasizing that such principles should focus heavily on denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula. They emphasized that too rapid movement on this track runs the risk of taking the focus off denuclearization and affording the DPRK an opportunity to slow down the Six-Party process. PDAS Stephens said the mechanism could in fact reinforce denuclearization. She noted that while the United States envisioned this issue remaining within the Six-Party process as we focus on full implementation of the September 2005 Agreement, the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism might eventually become a separate forum, growing out of success in the Six-Party Talks. PDAS Stephens also reassured MOFA officials that the U.S. would consult closely with Japan on the four-party Korean Peninsula peace regime process. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kathleen Stephens had separate meetings July 23 with MOFA North American Affairs Director General Shinichi Nishimiya, Deputy Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs Junichi Ihara, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs Kenichiro Sasae, Deputy Director-General of Foreign Policy Yasumasa Nagamine, and Deputy Vice Minister Chikao Kawai. Explaining that she was embarking on a series of bilateral consultations to prepare for the August meeting of the NEAPSM Working Group and the September Six-Party Ministerial, she outlined initial U.S. thinking on the NEAPSM and the separate (though people sometimes blurred the two) issue of the Korean Peninsula peace regime process. ¶3. (C) PDAS Stephens said we envisioned a general discussion on regional peace and security at the Six-Party Foreign Ministers meeting and a ministerial tasking to the Working Group to develop a charter, or core principles, for the NEAPSM. Deputy Ministers might subsequently meet to finalize and endorse the set of core principles. Stephens outlined initial U.S. thinking on what these core principles might cover, emphasizing that our thinking was still in its early stages. DDG Nagamine agreed that because the six parties might not be able to agree on NEAPSM principles by September, it was more realistic for the ministers to task that effort to the Working Group. He stressed that even these basic principles would require close U.S.-Japan consultations. Nagamine also expressed concern over using the word charter ("We don't like the word."),saying it suggested something legally binding and requiring legislative action. He made clear Japan would not support anything legally binding. PDAS Stephens said we were not attached to any particular word. ¶4. (C) DDG Nagamine questioned the involvement of Deputies, asking if we envisioned Deputies launching a new forum or grouping. PDAS Stephens clarified that we envision a possible Vice Ministers meeting as a one-off event to boost the Working Group's efforts at an appropriate time to agree to a set of principles. DDG Nagamine cautioned that a Vice Ministerial should not be held only for the NEAPSM Working Group; if Vice Ministers were to meet, it should be for Six-Party working groups across the board. ¶5. (C) PDAS Stephens told DDG Nagamine that in regard to talks on a Korean Peninsula peace regime as envisioned by the September 2005 Joint Statement, the directly related parties were the two Koreas playing the central roles, plus China and the U.S. She emphasized that the Korean peace talks would only get underway after the denuclearization process was in disablement phase. PDAS Stephens added that the U.S. would TOKYO 00003470 002 OF 003 closely consult with Japan as those talks unfolded. DDG Nagamine emphasized that peace on the Korean Peninsula was a vital concern for Japan and the image that Japan was involved in the process was politically important. DDG Nagamine suggested that Korean peace talks should "report" to the NEAPSM Working Group, an idea to which, he said, Russia was sympathetic. ¶6. (C) In a separate meeting, Deputy Vice Foreign Minister for Foreign Policy Chikao Kawai emphasized that the Japanese government believed the Six-Party Working Groups should focus first on 1) confidence-building among the parties; and 2) issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula. The agenda could expand over time, but the parties needed to keep their attention on the immediate task at hand -- the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, any discussion of Northeast Asia peace and security should be within the overall Six-Party framework; creating a new framework outside the Six-Party process was vulnerable to DPRK manipulation. ¶7. (C) Kawai agreed that China's taking on a constructive role in the Six-Party process was a positive step, but such a "by-product" ought not to displace the DPRK nuclear issue among the Six-Party priorities. He acknowledged that, while premature, the parties needed to think about the future. Responding to PDAS Stephens's comment about looking to examples of confidence-building measures (CBMs) from other multilateral fora, Kawai opined that neither ARF nor OSCE presented a viable model for a Northeast Asian security framework due to the former's questionable effectiveness and the latter's relatively simple framework (i.e., East versus West blocs). In the Six-Party process, the DPRK, China, and Russia all had different regimes and separate interests that ran counter to the relatively consolidated stance of the U.S., Japan and the ROK. From Japan's perspective, addressing the DPRK's missile program and the abduction issue remained important factors in engaging with the DPRK. ¶8. (C) Director-General Nishimiya said MOFA's "gut reaction" to the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NEAPSM) was that it was premature, and he advised against introducing "new, untested ideas" at this point in the Six-Party process. Establishing a set of guiding principles for the mechanism would also be quite difficult, he predicted. Even nomenclature was problematic, he asserted, since there was no clear agreement on the geographic boundaries of Northeast Asia. DG Nishimiya recommended that U.S.-Japan discussions focus on specifics, to avoid us "talking past one another." Citing initial confusion in the Japanese press over the proposed security mechanism and a separate four-party Korean peace process, Nishimiya stressed the need to carefully manage public perceptions. ¶9. (C) Denuclearization was the immediate task at hand, stated Director-General Sasae, a point later reinforced by DVM Kawai. Sasae doubted the effectiveness of the NEAPSM process, contending that it would turn into just another "academic" forum. DDG Ihara cautioned that the NEAPSM would send the wrong signal to the DPRK and ran the risk of being used by the North Koreans to drive a wedge between allies, or to slow down the denuclearization process. Six-Party participants needed to be careful about whether denuclearization was a "driver" or "follower," observed DDG Nagamine, adding that only if denuclearization moved forward would confidence grow in the Six-Party process. ¶10. (C) Discussions on alliances could also be problematic, DDG Nagamine said. Although Japan and the U.S. agree that our alliance is key to peace in the region, that view was not universally held by all Six-Party participants. First North America Division Director Mori seconded this line, saying we should be extremely cautious about bringing alliances into the Working Group discussions. North Korea might try to use TOKYO 00003470 003 OF 003 seemingly unobjectionable things, such as UN principles, for its own purposes, cautioned DDG Nagamine. Statements about peaceful settlement of disputes, especially territorial, was another area where there might be unwanted connotation applied to specific issues, continued DDG Nagamine. On the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),where Japan had doubts about the DPRK's resolve, there might be difficulty in reaching a common definition among the six parties of what constituted the NPT regime. North Korea, Nagamine noted, had already called for nuclear inspections in the ROK. Should we, he asked rhetorically, be prepared to accept a North Korean demand for denuclearization in areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula? ¶11. (C) DDG Nagamine said Japan wanted to be constructive and was "not being negative for the sake of being negative." He agreed that Northeast Asia lacked the kind of multilateral security institutions that existed in Europe, but argued that the Six-Party process was not a good "fit" for addressing issues such as China's expanding military capabilities, the China-Taiwan issue, or the U.S.-Japan security alliance. He advocated concentrating on confidence building mechanisms and then identifying principles that would assist that focus. DG Nishimiya said that while China may have warmed to the idea of a ministerial meeting, it did not want to put sensitive issues on the table. The views of South Korea also needed to be addressed with care, he said, at least until after South Korea's presidential election in December. ¶12. (C) PDAS Stephens responded that the U.S. was not proposing to create a separate process outside the Six-Party Talks and that we agreed the NEAPSM should not detract from denuclearization, but rather reinforce it. She explained that if Six-Party talks achieved success on denuclearization and normalization of relations among the parties, then there was a hope, or a vision, that the Six-Party process could develop into a multilateral forum to address other regional security issues. She made clear that the U.S. did not have a roadmap at this point. But, in Washington's calculus, she observed, discussing a framework for the long-term security interests of the region was not only possible, but desirable. ¶13. (U) PDAS Stephens has cleared this cable. SCHIEFFER