REGULATING THE "DESCENT FROM HEAVEN": STILL A SOFT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 003339 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE PASS USTR FOR BEEMAN/MEYERS PARIS PASS USOECD JUSTICE FOR ANTITRUST DIVISION - CHEMTOB GENEVA ALSO FOR USTR COMMERCE FOR 4410/ITA/MAC/OJ/MELCHER E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2027 TAGS: PGOV ECON JA SUBJECT: REGULATING THE "DESCENT FROM HEAVEN": STILL A SOFT LANDING? Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reason: 1.5 (b,d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: A new law aimed at mitigating the problems created by senior bureaucrats taking post- retirement jobs at organizations and companies they once regulated contains substantial loopholes that put its efficacy in doubt. Although a significant step in overall civil service reform, the new law appears to do relatively little to eliminate the structure of quasi-official "public interest entities" that frequently employ civil servants forced out of their agencies by custom before reaching the mandatory retirement age of 60. A senior official of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) expressed strong reservations about the new measures as creating a possible disincentive for public service but acknowledged that tenures in the bureaucracy were lengthening as many civil servants increasingly opt to finish their careers at lower ranks rather than face uncertain job prospects outside government. In the end, the political significance of the Japanese government's efforts to address this phenomenon may be as important as the possible economic benefits. End summary. -------------- Scandals Drive Anti-Amakudari Legislation -------------- ¶2. (U) "Amakudari," the so-called "descent from Heaven" by retiring Japanese bureaucrats who take up employment in private firms or quasi-official "public interest organizations," is one of the most deeply ingrained practices of Japan's civil service. Acknowledging amakudari as a factor in a series of high-profile bid rigging scandals, the Abe Administration and its minister for administrative reform, Yoshimi Watanabe, pushed through a legislative package aimed at addressing the phenomenon in the Diet session that ended July 5. This bill, which passed with the raft of other legislation that Abe and his allies rammed through the Diet in anticipation of Upper House elections at the end of July, mandates the establishment of a "public-private personnel exchange center" under the Cabinet Office by the end of 2008 that would replace an ineffective existing "human resources bank" in the central government. Most importantly, the personnel offices of individual central government agencies will be banned from arranging post- retirement employment for their respective retirees within three years after the establishment of the new center. ¶3. (U) The main purpose of the center will be to accept requests for assistance from the personnel departments from central government agencies on behalf of employees seeking to retire before the mandatory age of 60. Although ostensibly "voluntary," this early retirement is, in fact, the result of another longstanding custom in the Japanese bureaucracy: "katatataki" (literally, the "tap on the shoulders") that requires all officials who entered their ministry in a particular year to retire from service once one of their number becomes administrative vice minister, the pinnacle for career civil servants. This applies mostly to the elite "Type I" (isshu) or "career" officials who are qualified to staff the senior ranks of the bureaucracy; the more numerous "Type II" (nishu) TOKYO 00003339 002 OF 005 officials can reasonably expect their tenure to last until age 60 although they will rise no higher than the level of division director (kachou). It is the "katatataki" custom, which forces bureaucrats out before they reach full retirement benefits, that supplies a steady stream of amakudari candidates. ¶4. (U) Administrative Reform Minister Watanabe indicated dealing with amakudari would be one of his priorities when he came to office in December last year. Subsequent events, most notably the implication(and eventual suicide) of then Agriculture Minister Toshikatsu Matsuoka in a bid rigging scandal tied to a non-profit entity riddled with former Ministry of Agriculture officials, generated increased urgency in the Abe Administration to be seen as taking measures to control amakudari prior to the July 29 Upper House election. Watanabe's ambitions extend beyond just reducing amakudari, however. In an interview carried in the July 14 edition of the economic weekly magazine Toyo Keizai, Watanabe described the legislation creating the personnel exchange center as the first of a possible series of measures aimed at destroying the seniority system within the Japanese bureaucracy. The Abe Administration's ultimate goal, according to Watanabe, is to create a new merit-based system under which talented individuals could rise to the top whatever their age. Bureaucrats in their 30s should be able to become directors-general and "A 42-year-old administrative vice minister will no longer be a dream," Watanabe stated to the Toyo Keizai interviewer. -------------- --- "Public Interest Entities" Absorb Most Amakudari -------------- --- ¶5. (U) Despite Watanabe's obvious determination, some observers note that the currently existing central "job bank" for retiring government officials set up under the Cabinet Office has placed only one individual at a private company since it opened in ¶2000. Others doubt that simply by adding another office or centralizing the function that anything will change. Moreover, several loopholes in the new law allow for continued influence by the various central government agencies over the operation of the personnel exchange center. Senior members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party with the support of officials in the bureaucracy forced several changes that weakened Watanabe's original proposal, notably the three-year "transition period" during which ministries would still be able to assist their retirees to find new employment. In fact, according to one clause in the law, the center "will cooperate with personnel affairs authorities on an as-needed basis for the purpose of collecting information on career and human resources," a provision that effectively authorizes continued meddling by the ministries in the reemployment process. ¶6. (SBU) However, the potentially most significant loophole is that bureaucrats often do not go to work directly for the private sector at all. Interestingly, although the connection between amakudari and bid rigging on government contracts has attracted the most public attention, most retiring bureaucrats wind up, at least initially, not at companies but at various non-profit "public TOKYO 00003339 003 OF 005 interest entities" (koueki houjin) while they wait out a cooling off period. These organizations include foundations, associations, educational institutions, medical facilities, religious organizations, and public welfare groups. According to a study compiled by Toyo Keizai magazine and published in its July 14 edition along with the Watanabe interview, "public interest entities" employed 44.8 percent (1676 individuals) of the approximately 2500 retiring central government bureaucrats at the level of division director or above in the period between August 2003 and August ¶2006. Only 13 percent (488 individuals) went to work for "profit-making entities"(i.e., companies) while another 17.5 percent (655 individuals) became self-employed over that period. Quasi-official "independent administrative entities" -- such as METI's Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry and the Japan National Tourism Organization, which belongs to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport -- absorbed another 6.1 percent. ¶7. (U) Although retiring officials are already banned from taking jobs with companies or non-profit entities they had regulated for two years following retirement, no similar provision applied to the quasi-governmental independent administrative entities. Service at one of these organizations effectively provides a bridge for former bureaucrats to make their way to more lucrative private sector employment. The Asahi Shinbun newspaper, reviewing government data on retiring bureaucrats, estimated that 366 officials from central government ministries made their way to private or semi-private corporations via a stint at one of the independent administrative entities between 1996 and 2006. The Asahi report also noted that the legislation passed by the Diet in June also failed to close this potentially significant loophole. -------------- -------------- Trillions of Yen Funneled to Amakudari Recipients -------------- -------------- ¶8. (U) The fact that most of these entities are technically "non-profit," however, does not mean that they do not consume a substantial amount of public money. Using data from a report compiled by the Research Office of the Diet's Lower House, Toyo Keizai magazine calculated that, from April- September 2006(i.e., the first half of the last Japanese fiscal year),the Japanese government spent JPY 5.9 trillion(USD 49 billion) in total on approximately 4,500 different organizations (including "for profit" entities) employing around 28,000 retired government officials. Most of these funds (JPY 4.1 trillion) were distributed as "support payments", while nearly all of the remaining funds (JPY 1.8 trillion) were provided on the basis of "limited tendering agreements" not requiring competitive bidding. Although the degree of reliance on government support among the various public interest entities varies substantially, in general, the data collected by Toyo Keizai indicates that half or more of their income derives from government transfers. ¶9. (U) Examples of some of the big recipients of public money that also employ large numbers of government retirees were the "Civil Law Association" TOKYO 00003339 004 OF 005 (JPY 10.2 billion in government transfers and 786 former officials),the "Chubu Construction Association" (JPY 10.2 billion in transfers and 223 former officials),and the Workers' Accident Insurance Information Center (JPY 13.9 billion and 85 former officials). According to the recent Toyo Keizai article, the largest corporate employers of amakudari officials were two security companies with ties to the Ministry of Defense(614 individuals), Sumitomo Electric (237 individuals),Fuji Aviation Servicing (164 individuals),Mitsubishi Electric (98 individuals),and Mitsubishi Precision (91 individuals). Government payments during the first half of Japan Fiscal Year 2006 ranged from zero(in the case of the two security firms) to JPY 4.7 billion received by Mitsubishi Electric. -------------- -------------- Insiders Skeptical of Measure's Efficacy, Benefits -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) The deep roots of amakudari has generated substantial skepticism, if not opposition, among Japan's career bureaucrats to reform measures. Keisuke Sadamori, former head of METI's Americas Division currently serving as a counselor in the Cabinet Secretariat, told ECOUNS recently that the efficacy of any new measures to mitigate the effects of amakudari is questionable. Government bureaucrats, he stressed, basically received a guarantee of employment to age 60. Because of "katatataki," any effort to eliminate the potential for lucrative post-retirement employment would also destroy an important recruitment incentive for the civil service. Although Sadamori acknowledged that the independent administrative corporations or the public interest entities, where many bureaucrats are placed following their retirement, might not be the most efficient bodies, he maintained that they had substantive work to do, some more so than others, and sometimes their functions were stipulated in law. ¶11. (C) The real key to addressing the amakudari phenomenon, according to Sadamori, would be comprehensive civil service reform, centered on recruitment and promotion as well as on retirement. Most "Type I" bureaucrats, Sadamori stated, retired at the level of deputy director-general (shingikan, equivalent to a deputy assistant secretary). Only a handful are promoted to the level of director- general (kyokuchou). An official could expect to spend around a decade as the director of various divisions before having a chance at a 1-2 year stint as a deputy director-general, after which he or she would be expect to retire. ¶12. (C) It is this cadre of retiring officials, Sadamori indicated, who are only in their early to mid 50s and still in need of work, who are the main beneficiaries of the amakudari system. Although these individuals are not required by law to take early retirement, custom within the bureaucracy demands that they move on in order to make way for the next generation of senior officials. Sadamori noted, however, that promotions have slowed down in the ranks of the bureaucracy even during his career, suggesting that officials were becoming more willing to work for a longer period at a lower grade, thereby extending the total length of their career, rather than to face rapid promotion followed by TOKYO 00003339 005 OF 005 increasingly uncertain employment prospects in the private sector. -------------- -- Comment: Political Aims Clearer Than Econ Gains -------------- -- ¶13. (C) Fundamentally, it is difficult to assess the economic cost of the phenomenon of amakudari in Japan. As Sadamori pointed out, the entities that employ retired officials are in some -- perhaps most -- cases doing work that is either necessary or mandated through the democratic process. Obviously, more efficient alternatives are probably available in many cases, but efficiency is frequently not the ultimate goal of public policy in any country. One can well ask, however, whether Japan, which has one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios in the OECD, can afford such arrangements. Augmenting pensions for senior bureaucrats to the extent that reemployment is less necessary or attractive may be more efficient. ¶14. (C) As for the role of amakudari in bid rigging and other cartel-like behavior, it has contributed to a system in which the great majority of government projects continue to be contracted at well over 90 percent of budget. It is a particularly insidious form of graft because no money changes hands. Consequently, quantifying the impact of amakudari on Japan's fiscal situation is difficult if not impossible. What amakudari does unquestionably affect, however, is the public perception of bureaucrats in a country where the bureaucracy remains a leading political institution. Every time another former top bureaucrat is found to have assisted in bilking the Japanese taxpayer of a few hundred million yen, the prospects for more sweeping reform of the government personnel system should improve, strengthening the political hand of Watanabe and others pushing hard for change. SCHIEFFER