Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TOKYO3336
2007-07-20 07:30:00
SECRET
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

AEGIS UPDATE: JAPANESE DEFENSE MINISTER AND VICE

Tags:  PREL MARR PINR PGOV JA 
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DE RUEHKO #3336/01 2010730
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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5702
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY IA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKO/MLG TOKYO JA
RUYNAAQ/NAVCRIMINVSERVFO FAREAST YOKOSUKA JA
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKO/USDAO TOKYO JA
RUALSFJ/USFJ DIA REP YOKOTA AB JA
S E C R E T TOKYO 003336 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

OSD FOR APSA SHINN/SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA; COMUSJAPAN FOR
J00/J2/J3/J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR PINR PGOV JA
SUBJECT: AEGIS UPDATE: JAPANESE DEFENSE MINISTER AND VICE
ADMIRAL REGRET NEW LEAK CASE

REF: TOKYO 3028

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)

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SUMMARY
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S E C R E T TOKYO 003336 SIPDIS SIPDIS OSD FOR APSA SHINN/SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA; COMUSJAPAN FOR J00/J2/J3/J5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017 TAGS: PREL MARR PINR PGOV JA SUBJECT: AEGIS UPDATE: JAPANESE DEFENSE MINISTER AND VICE ADMIRAL REGRET NEW LEAK CASE REF: TOKYO 3028 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) In a July 19 update for the Ambassador on the Aegis leak investigations, Vice Chief of Staff of the MSDF Vice Admiral Kato stated that Kanagawa Prefecture Police and the MSDF planned to indict the MSDF seaman who had copied AEGIS information onto his personal computer by mid-August before the five-year statute of limitations expires. He also raised a separate case involving an MSDF officer who had photographed classified U.S. military documents while participating in an exercise on board a U.S. naval vessel in Hawaii. MOD was currently investigating whether the photos had been obtained by third parties. Kato, and subsequently Defense Minister Koike, expressed deep regret over the incident and voiced concern whether this new case would negatively affect bilateral information sharing even more than the AEGIS case. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) On July 19, Vice Chief of Staff of the Japanese MSDF Vice Admiral Tamotsu Kato called on Ambassador Schieffer to provide an update on the Ministry of Defense's (MOD) investigations into the AEGIS leak and details of a separate incident involving the mishandling of U.S. classified information by a member of the MSDF. -------------- CLEARER PICTURE OF AEGIS DATA MOVEMENT -------------- ¶3. (S) Kato stated that investigations into the AEGIS leak had progressed to the point where MOD could trace the movement of the AEGIS data from the Program Generating Center (PGC),where the data was compiled for training purposes, to the Gunnery Division of the First Maritime Service School (FMSS). The PGC, renamed from the Service System Center (SSC) in 2002, created the data the same year. Four staff members of the PGC compiled the information and created seven files of AEGIS training material. LCDR Matsuuchi, who was stationed at the PGC, and LCDR Kanda from the FMSS participated in AEGIS system training in the United States in the summer of 2002, shortly after completing the PGC's AEGIS overview course. After returning from the United States, Kanda -- now assigned as course instructor for a new AEGIS overview course at the FMSS --
obtained from Matsuuchi the PGC's AEGIS files due to the lack of adequate teaching materials. LT Miyawaki, who was an instructor at the FMSS, subsequently copied Kanda's files to distribute to students as reference material. -------------- POLICE, MOD TO INDICT SUSPECT BY MID-AUGUST -------------- ¶4. (S) Kato assured the Ambassador that the level of cooperation between the NCIS and MOD's Damage Assessment Group was excellent. They were checking all personal and workplace computers used by all people who had worked at the PGC, the FMSS, and the SSC to make sure that the AEGIS data had not spread any further. He added that Kanagawa Prefecture Police and the MSDF planned to conclude investigations by mid-August in order to indict the suspect before the five-year statute of limitations expires. -------------- -------------- NEW INCIDENT: PHOTOS OF U.S. CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS -------------- -------------- ¶5. (S) Kato also informed the Ambassador that MOD was currently investigating a separate incident involving LCDR Matsumoto -- an MSDF officer who, in 1999, had photographed classified documents with his digital camera while participating in an exercise on board the USS Port Royal in Hawaii. Matsumoto, who had previously worked at the PGC and was tasked with compiling information to be used in designing MSDF weapons systems, had followed standard bilateral procedures for borrowing documents on U.S. weapons systems from the crew for note-taking, but had deviated from standard practice by taking photographs. Kato, observing that this was highly unusual behavior, said that Matsumoto had told MSDF investigators that he could not take sufficient notes in the time permitted for note-taking and that photographing was easier. The four documents photographed by Matsumoto comprised files on the CG-65 (AEGIS-related),SM-2 missiles, Lamps Mark III helicopters, Mark-45 gun system, and Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile system. All of the documents were classified CONFIDENTIAL and involved systems already in the JMSDF inventory, except for the Tomahawk system. -------------- -------------- MOD TO TAKE ADDED MEASURES; DEFMIN, KATO APOLOGIZE -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) Kato said MOD was currently investigating whether the photos had been obtained by third parties. He promised the Ambassador a briefing after MOD finalizes its plans for new preventive measures against classified information leaks. Kato, noting that MOD was reviewing possible disciplinary actions against the officer, expressed regret over the incident and voiced concern that this case could have more serious repercussions on bilateral information sharing than the AEGIS case. (Note: In a subsequent call on the Ambassador, Defense Minister Koike personally apologized for the incident and assured the Ambassador that Matsumoto would be discharged from the MSDF.) ¶7. (S) Comment: It is noteworthy, and welcome, that MOD Administrative Vice Minister Moriya had tasked Kato to brief Ambassador Schieffer immediately after Kato briefed him on the discovery of another information assurance problem. So far, there has been no mention of this problem in the press. SCHIEFFER

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