DCM RAISES BIATF PARITICIPATION WITH ASSISTANT

S E C R E T TOKYO 003222 SIPDIS SIPDIS OSD FOR APSA SHINN/SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA; USPACOM FOR J00/J2/J5/POLAD; COMUSJAPAN FOR J00/J01/J2/J5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV PINR JA SUBJECT: DCM RAISES BIATF PARITICIPATION WITH ASSISTANT CABINET SECRETARY Classified By: Ambassaador J. Thomas Schieffer, Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (S) Summary: During a July 13 meeting with Assistant Cabinet Secretary Kyoji Yanagisawa, the DCM emphasized that all Japanese agencies involved in counter-intelligence should participate in bilateral efforts to enhance Japan's information assurance structure. Yanagisawa said that Japan is committed to making fundamental changes in its information security structures not simply to "ease U.S. frustrations" over the Aegis disclosure, but to protect Japan's own national security. In this context, Yanagisawa urged that the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Bilateral Information Assurance Task Force (BIATF) make clear that the BIATF is meant to address Japan's comprehensive information assurance systems, and not review the facts of the recent Aegis case. If the BIATF is too closely linked to the Aegis case, agencies like the Cabinet Information Research Office (CIRO) and National Police Agency (NPA) will not take part in the process, Yanagisawa said. The DCM and Yanagisawa agreed that the end state for BIATF should be to create an improved alliance information security structure that can facilitate even deeper information sharing relationships. End Summary. ¶2. (S) During a July 13 meeting with Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Kyoji Yanagisawa, the DCM said it was critical that SIPDIS the U.S. and Japan move quickly to fix shortfalls in Japan's information assurance structures. Failure to do so could endanger critical ongoing information sharing arrangements, he added. The DCM said that the recent Aegis incident should serve as a wake-up call, just as failures on both the U.S. and Japanese sides in the wake of the 1998 Taepodong launch led to a fundamental reevaluation of our alliance procedures. If handled correctly, the two countries can similarly learn from past mistakes to create an information security structure that would facilitate even broader information sharing arrangements. Two Track Approach -------------- ¶3. (S) Yanagisawa said that Japan fully understands the seriousness with which the U.S. takes the information assurance issue and frustration with the pace of the Aegis investigation. It is committed to fixing the problem, not just to ease U.S. concerns, but to address a major national security vulnerability. Yanagisawa stated that the Japanese government is working the information security issue on two tracks: 1) establishing the facts of the Aegis disclosure; and 2) creating a system to prevent a reoccurrence. On the Aegis case, Yanagisawa said that Japan will produce written reports on both the counter-intelligence implications of the disclosure and a technical damage assessment. The counter-intelligence report, he added, cannot be completed until after the Kanagawa Prefectural Police (KPP) and Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) complete their criminal investigation. The damage assessment, Yanagisawa noted, is being compiled by U.S. and Japanese technical experts in military channels. BIATF TOR Key -------------- ¶4. (S) Regarding the second track, Yanagisawa agreed with the DCM that future BIATF discussions must involve the full range of bureaucratic players on both sides. In this context, Yanagisawa said it was critical that the BIATF TOR be crafted to make clear that this is not an exercise linked only to the Aegis incident but rather a comprehensive initiative to enhance future information assurance structures. If the BIATF is too closely tied to the Aegis investigation, he continued, organizations like CIRO and the NPA will refuse to participate. Yanagisawa noted that CIRO and NPA have already made clear that they will not discuss Aegis investigation information they are providing to U.S. counterparts in a broader inter-agency setting. ¶5. (S) Yanagisawa noted that the Japanese government created an inter-agency task force to review information assurance issues in December, 2006. The group is chaired by Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Junzou Matoba and includes representatives from CIRO, the Ministry of Justice/NPA, Ministry of Defense (MOD),Cabinet Office, MOFA, and the Public Security Information Agency (PSIA). This group, he added, is expected to produce a report by the end of August recommending specific information assurance policies, including the establishment of a government-wide security clearance system. For this reason, he added, it is important that all of these organizations take part in the BIATF. ¶6. (S) Yanagisawa emphasized that getting the TOR right will determine the success or failure of the BIATF process. Yanagisawa said he would convey U.S. concerns, including on inter-agency participation in BIATF, to Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki later in the day. Yanagisawa SIPDIS said that he would ensure that U.S. concerns are quickly and accurately conveyed to both the Chief Cabinet Secretary and Prime Minister. SCHIEFFER