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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
07TOKYO3168 2007-07-11 09:28:00 SECRET Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

JAPAN'S RESPONSE ON DPRK NUCLEAR DISCUSSION LIST

Tags:   PREL KNNP KN JA 
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					S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 003168 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2017
TAGS: PREL KNNP KN JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN'S RESPONSE ON DPRK NUCLEAR DISCUSSION LIST
AND DECLARATION

REF: A. STATE 93191

B. TOKYO 3103

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, Reasons 1.4 B/D



1. (S) Summary: The Japanese Government agrees with the
U.S. approach to discussions with North Korea on the nuclear
list and subsequent declaration, according to Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Non-Proliferation, Science and Nuclear
Energy Division Director Tomiko Ichikawa. In a July 11
meeting with Acting Political Counselor, Ichikawa praised the
thoroughness with which the U.S. approach had been prepared
and repeatedly expressed appreciation for the opportunity
afforded Japan to comment. Ichikawa welcomed the fact that
both facilities and materials were covered in all sections
and emphasized as "indispensable" the inclusion of nuclear
weapons not only in the declaration but also in the
discussion phase, as the U.S. approach made clear. Ichikawa
conveyed a detailed response (text in paragraph 6) containing
Japan's comments on our paper, noting it represented an
inter-agency cleared product. She described Japan's
suggested changes, e.g., making the plutonium section more
inclusive and addressing DPRK research and development
activities in all sections, as technical in nature. Ichikawa
pledged Japan's continued cooperation, noting it would be
essential for us to remain in full agreement if our
negotiations with North Korea were to succeed. End Summary.



2. (S) In a July 11 meeting with Acting Political
Counselor, MOFA Non-Proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy
Division Director Tomiko Ichikawa conveyed Japan's response
to the U.S. approach (ref A) to discussions with North Korea
on the nuclear list and subsequent declaration. Ichikawa
said Japan welcomed the thoroughness with which the U.S.
paper had been prepared and stated that Japan was in overall
agreement with our approach. She recalled her recent
consultations in Washington, noting that many of the ideas
discussed at that time were reflected in the U.S. approach.



3. (S) Ichikawa noted with satisfaction the fact that
nuclear facilities and materials were covered in all
sections, and emphasized as "indispensable" the inclusion of
nuclear weapons not only in the declaration but also in the
discussion phase. She described Japan's suggested changes to
the U.S. approach as technical in nature. For example, she
noted that DPRK research and development activities are
explicitly mentioned in the section on the uranium program
and should be covered in a similar manner in the sections on
the plutonium program and weapons. Ichikawa thought the
difference might simply be a drafting issue, but wanted to
flag the importance of covering R&D activities across the
full spectrum of the DPRK nuclear programs. In the section
on nuclear weapons program, Ichikawa asked whether the U.S.
intended to include missiles.



4. (S) Ichikawa asked that the U.S. also consider how to
make this part of the Six-Party process move quickly. She
noted that IAEA's "normal way of doing business" in verifying
nuclear declarations can take years, something that would be
unacceptable in the case of North Korea.



5. (S) In conclusion, Ichikawa pledged Japan's continued
cooperation, noting it was essential that the U.S. and Japan
remain in full agreement if our negotiations with North Korea
were to succeed.



6. (S) Following is the text of Japan's response to the
U.S. approach.

Begin text:

Japan's Comments and Questions to the U.S. Non-Paper
"Complete Declaration of DPRK Nuclear Programs"

General
=======

TOKYO 00003168 002 OF 003





1. We agree with the following approach of the U.S.
non-paper:

-- "list" and "the complete declaration" need to cover both
facilities and materials.

-- nuclear weapons programs need to be addressed in the
discussion of "a list" and included in "the complete
declaration."

-- information on R&D, procurement, past activities,
personnel and organization is also important. In this
connection, it may be good to specifically mention R&D
activities including facilities for R&D in addition to "key
personnel and organizations" under Next Phase, as they may
exist independently from the three categories (plutonium,
uranium and weapons.)



2. As the U.S. non-paper suggests, the discussion of "a
list" will probably be of general nature, setting the scope
and depth of the information to be included in "the complete
declaration." We would like to know how the U.S. intends to
conduct the discussions at each stage, as the description
under three categories (plutonium, uranium and weapons) in
both Initial Phase and Next Phase include concrete elements,
and the exact relations between those elements in Initial
Phase and Next Phase are not very clear. (For reference,
Japanese non-paper proposes to indicate broad categories in
the discussion of "a list" and to include detailed
information under each category in "the complete
declaration.")



3. With relation to the facilities, it is important to
include information on location, capacity and design
information in addition to operating records.



4. We would like to know how the U.S. intends to handle the
declaration, in particular, how to ascertain its completeness
and correctness in the Six Party process.

Initial Phase
=============



1. Plutonium Programs

-- The first phrase "Includes all DPRK nuclear reactors since
they produce plutonium" seems to give a narrow impression as
the scope. It would be better to make clear that all the
facilities will also be covered, using the same sentence as
under Uranium Program: "Includes all activities and
facilities related to plutonium production cycle." Also,
while the next sentence refers to the entire fuel cycle, it
does not address the following elements in the plutonium
cycle: uranium mining, yellowcake, U308, UF4 and uranium
metal.



2. Uranium Programs

-- The first phrase "Includes all activities and facilities
related to uranium enrichment, including materials and
facilities associated with the production of fuel for
reactors" seems to be too wide as the scope for the uranium
enrichment programs. It may create confusion between
plutonium cycle and uranium cycle. We would like to suggest
to move the reference to "production of fuel for reactors" to
the section of Plutonium Program, as we understand that "the
production of fuel reactors" in the DPRK does not involve
uranium enrichment. It would be better to move the elements
from uranium mining to uranium metal to Plutonium Programs,
or to state that these elements are related to both Plutonium
and Uranium Programs.



3. Nuclear Weapons Program

-- We would like to know U.S. view on whether or not the

TOKYO 00003168 003 OF 003


means of delivery of nuclear weapons should also be addressed
in the context of "a list" and "the complete declaration."
(It needs to be addressed somewhere in the Six Party Talks.)

Next Phase
==========



1. Plutonium Program

-- It is important to include all programs (including R&D)
and all equipment, in the similar way as they are addressed
under Uranium Program.



2. Uranium Programs

-- The first phrase "Information should be sufficient to
enable an accurate determination of the total amount of
uranium handled in any way and of the final disposition of
any and all uranium..." seems to be too wide as the scope for
the uranium enrichment programs, and may create confusion
between plutonium cycle and uranium cycle. We would like to
suggest to state that these elements are related to both
Plutonium and Uranium Programs.
End text.
SCHIEFFER