JAPANESE VICE ADMIRAL UPDATES AMBASSADOR ON AEGIS

S E C R E T TOKYO 003028 SIPDIS SIPDIS OSD FOR APSA SHINN/SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA; COMUSJAPAN FOR J00/J2/J3/J5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2017 TAGS: PREL MARR PINR PGOV JA SUBJECT: JAPANESE VICE ADMIRAL UPDATES AMBASSADOR ON AEGIS INVESTIGATION Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) In a July 2 update for the Ambassador on the status of the GOJ's investigation into the AEGIS leak, Vice Admiral Kato said the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD) found no evidence that the Chinese national spouse of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) seaman involved in the case was spying for the PRC government, and would not indict her on charges of espionage. MOD assessed that third-country governments would not be able to use the file to reverse engineer the AEGIS system even though parts of the AEGIS file found on the hard disk drive contained information classified at the Special Defense Secrets level. MOD sought to improve information sharing with the U.S. side on the case and hoped to have a system in place for protecting classified information before the conclusion of the overall investigation. MOD, expecting little movement on the case before the July 29 Upper House elections, aimed to produce both an interim report and revised plans for protecting classified information by mid-August. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) On July 2, Vice Admiral Tamotsu Kato, Vice Chief of Staff of the JMSDF called on the Ambassador to provide an update on the Ministry of Defense's (MOD) investigations into the AEGIS leak. MSDF SEAMAN'S CHINESE WIFE NOT TO BE INDICTED -------------- ¶3. (S) Kato said MOD concluded the investigation into the Chinese spouse of the JMSDF seaman who had copied the AEGIS information onto his personal computer, found no evidence that she was spying for the PRC government and would not indict her on charges of espionage. (NOTE: She is currently serving a three-year sentence at a prison in Tochigi Prefecture on charges of immigration violation and shoplifting. END NOTE.) An examination of the hard drive in question revealed that it was last accessed in March 2006, but the seaman had met his wife in the summer of that year and married her in October when she became pregnant. The wife spoke only broken Japanese and had little knowledge about personal computers. The MOD also assessed that the wife showed no interest in either the seaman's duties or in his personal computer throughout the marriage. She knew, however, that her husband was a member of the MSDF when they first met. ¶4. (S) Kato noted that, out of the 45,000 JMSDF servicemen who were married, 186 were married to third-country nationals. He added that MOD policy precluded servicemen who were married to "critical countries" (i.e., PRC, Russia, DPRK) from assignments that involved handling classified information. HOW THE COMPROMISE OCCURRED -------------- ¶5. (S) Kato said the compromised AEGIS information originated from the Program Generating Center (PGC) in Yokosuka for use by JMSDF students using information originally obtained from Japanese sources. The First Service School in Eta Jima taught an overview course on the AEGIS system. The PGC sent the information to the school, where one of the instructors had copied it to his personal computer. He then allowed his students to copy the information for their studies. Leading Seaman Suzuki, who later copied the information to Petty Officer Second Class Naoi's computer, was one of the students. In light of this background, the MOD had narrowed its investigation to three questions: -- Who took the information from the PGC? -- Who made copies for personal use? -- Who distributed the information to the students? DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: AEGIS RE-CREATION UNLIKELY -------------- ¶6. (S) Kato said the Maritime Police (a subordinate unit of the Maritime Staff Office) currently had custody of the hard disk drive, but MOD decided shortly before his meeting with the Ambassador to allow the U.S. to make a copy of the original for joint forensic analysis using American equipment. According to MOD's damage assessment, the file in question did not contain sufficient information on the AEGIS system that could be used by third-country governments to reverse engineer the AEGIS system. The 800-page AEGIS file was not a direct translation of the material provided by the USG, but a patchwork of various portions of U.S. documents compiled by the GOJ, only parts of which contained classified information at the Special Defense Secret category. INVESTIGATION NARROWED DOWN TO 100 INDIVIDUALS -------------- - ¶7. (S) Kato revealed that 3,000 students have gone through the First Service School during the period of interest. About 2,000 of them received AEGIS training. MOD's investigative committee had narrowed down to 100 individuals who might have been involved in the case, although it remained unclear exactly which ones had access to the data. Nevertheless, Kato asserted, MOD had not yet found any evidence to suggest that the information was leaked by the ¶100. JMSDF officials had passed their findings and awaited final evaluation from the U.S. side, particularly whether the information could be used by third countries to counter the AEGIS system in combat. SYSTEM FOR INFO PROTECTION BY MID-AUGUST -------------- ¶8. (S) Citing some glitches in information sharing at the working-level on the damage assessment, Kato said MOD assigned Rear Admiral Togo on the GOJ side to improve coordination. He also conveyed MOD's desire to create an information "pipeline" with DATT for sharing classified information about the case. MOD wanted to come up with a system for ensuring the protection of classified information passed between JMSDF and the U.S. Navy before the conclusion of the overall investigation, considering that cooperation between JMSDF and the Kanagawa Prefectural Police was a joint investigation and was expected to be slow in producing results. He noted that there would not be much movement until after the Upper House elections on July 29. MOD, however, based on recent meetings with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Pacific Fleet Commander, sought to produce both an interim report and an effective means for protecting classified information by mid-August. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (S) The JMSDF is intent upon containing the damage done by the AEGIS leak. It wants to bring its investigation to conclusion without doing further damage to its relationship with the U.S. Navy in particular and the USG in general. The JMSDF is convinced that an investigation conducted by someone outside military channels can only do harm to their interests. We recommend continued pressure to produce a transparent, credible report by an entity without a clear conflict of interest. Clearly, the Japanese would like this problem to go away. Just as clearly, it is in USG interest to know how widely this information was distributed and who might have obtained it through counter-intelligence efforts. SCHIEFFER