AMBASSADOR SCHULTE BRIEFS JAPAN'S OPPOSITION ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 002501 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP TRGY IR IN JA SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR SCHULTE BRIEFS JAPAN'S OPPOSITION ON U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER, REASONS 1.5 (B),(D). ¶1. (C) Summary. Ambassador Greg Schulte provided a well-received DVC briefing on U.S nonproliferation policy to opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Diet members on May 15, at their request. Questions focused primarily on what the DPJ members characterized as differences between U.S. treatment toward nuclear development in India and Iran. End summary. ¶2. (C) Nearly 20 opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) legislators from both houses of the Diet attended a Tokyo American Center-sponsored digital video conference briefing by Ambassador Greg Schulte on U.S. nonproliferation policy at the Tokyo American Center on May 15. The attendees, including former party leader Katsuya Okada and "Next Foreign Minister" Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi, are members of the DPJ Committee to Promote Nuclear Nonproliferation. The DPJ requested a briefing to clarify U.S. policy, especially with regard to Iran and India. Feedback from participants indicates that they were pleased with the opportunity to engage directly with Ambassador Schulte. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Schulte explained that we are at a pivotal moment for nonproliferation policy. New challenges that threaten to undermine the system also create opportunities to strengthen the international regime. He defined the three greatest threats as noncompliance, loopholes that allow states to claim "peaceful use" for nuclear development; and terrorism on the part of non-state actors. He cited stiffer consequences for noncompliance, a better system to guarantee access to nuclear fuel, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism as positive outcomes in response to these growing threats. Ambassador Schulte emphasized the need for global, sustained, and resolute diplomacy, and expressed appreciation for the close cooperation between the United States and Japan on nuclear nonproliferation issues. ¶4. (C) Most of the questions from the DPJ members focused on Iran and India. There was surprisingly little reference to North Korea. On India, the group voiced skepticism that the U.S. civil nuclear deal will buttress the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, noting that only civilian facilities designated by India are to come under IAEA safeguards. They worried that preferential treatment for India could lead to a loss of trust in the NPT, and lead to spiraling nuclear weapons races between India and Pakistan, and India and China. They questioned the ramifications if Japan were to oppose U.S. efforts to obtain a favorable decision on the agreement from the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). On Iran, they wondered why a country that former DPJ leader Okada described as, "still something of a democracy," was receiving such harsh treatment, and why the United States refused to believe Iranian claims that it is developing nuclear materials for peaceful use. Okada suggested that U.S. views toward Iran might be colored by the 1979 hostage crisis, and encouraged a broader compensation package, including full diplomatic normalization, to bring Iran back to the fold. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Schulte responded by noting that the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement actually strengthens the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, by bringing two-thirds of India's nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, and bringing India closer to the NPT mainstream. India merits this special treatment, he asserted, because it is a transparent democracy and a partner in the war on terror, with a mostly peaceful foreign policy and a fairly good track record on nonproliferation. He emphasized that the agreement does not recognize India as a nuclear weapons state, and should actually make it more difficult for India to produce nuclear weapons by limiting 14 of 22 nuclear facilities to energy production. The agreement recognizes the reality that India wants to become a nuclear TOKYO 00002501 002 OF 002 weapons state, and will never accept IAEA safeguards on all of its facilities. Ambassador Schulte described current U.S. policy as focused on progress in continuing negotiations with India over additional safeguards, and quiet consultations with other members of the NSG. He did not anticipate soliciting formal responses from the NSG at this point, although a consensus decision would be required by U.S. law in order to seal the agreement. ¶6. (C) Iran, on the other hand, was already an NPT signatory, but had chosen to violate its obligations and move in the exact opposite direction of India on this issue, Schulte noted. He briefed the DPJ legislators on diplomatic efforts at the IAEA and the UN Security Council to convince Iran to change course, noting that targeted sanctions and the weight of world opinion were beginning to have an effect. He reminded the audience that the United States had also offered carrots, in addition to sticks, promising to assist Iran with peaceful nuclear development and discuss diplomatic normalization in return for rejoining the NPT regime. Based on the available evidence, however, facilities such as those at Natanz were developing technologies that could only be used for military purposes. Coupled with a history of deception over its nuclear facilities and ties to the A.Q. Khan network, there can be little doubt that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear weapons. He noted that current assessments put that development at the year 2011, at the earliest, adding that there is still time for diplomacy, but not for complacency. He praised Japan for playing a major role in working to convince Iran to change course, as well as for support in the UN on Security Council Resolutions 1937 and 1947. He cautioned that a third resolution might still be necessary. In the same way, Ambassador Schulte observed in response to a question from DPJ member Takeshi Maeda, China is the only one of five recognized nuclear weapons states that is actually increasing its nuclear inventory. Japan shares the responsibility for encouraging China to play a constructive role in the region. SCHIEFFER