VFM YACHI REVIEWS SUMMIT, BILATERAL ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 002481 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP USTR FOR AMB SCHWAB STATE PLEASE PASS TO USDA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2017 TAGS: PREL ECON EAGR PGOV MOPS MARR PHUM PINR ETRD KN, JA SUBJECT: VFM YACHI REVIEWS SUMMIT, BILATERAL ISSUES TOKYO 00002481 001.3 OF 005 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 b/d. Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The Japanese were very happy with April's summit between President Bush and Prime Minster Abe, Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi told the Ambassador June 1, and PM Abe would welcome a stopover in Tokyo by President Bush en route to the APEC summit in Sydney. Abe would also welcome a possible visit to Crawford in January. On regional and bilateral issues, Yachi expresed frustration with North Korea, saying Japan's patience was not unlimited, and he raised the concern that despite substantial efforts by the Japanese, "the goalposts had been moved" regarding Japan's trafficking-in-persons' assessment. On climate change, he said the Japanese highly appreciated the President's May 31 speech and suggested high-level bilateral discussions after the G-8 summit. He also initiated a long-range discussion of a possible bilateral free trade agreement, while indicating that political figures had been preparing the agricultural caucus for concessions at the WTO. Other topics included concluding a general security of military information agreement (GSOMIA),UN Security Council reform, the "Quad" with India, the upcoming counter-terrorism trilateral with Australia, Agricultural Minister Matsuoka's suicide, aid to Pakistan's federally administered tribal areas, and the departure of Ambassador Crouch from the NSC. End summary. April Summit: "Very Happy" with Results -------------- ¶2. (C) The Japanese were very happy with the April summit between President Bush and Prime Minister Abe, Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi told the Ambassador on June 1. The Ambassador noted that President Bush had enjoyed the visit, as well as the chance to meet Mrs. Abe, and that the leaders had had a number of opportunities for private conversation. Yachi agreed that since then there seemed to be a familiarity between the two leaders that had come out in subsequent phone calls. ¶3. (C) Calling it unprecedented for the prime minister to meet all the top leaders of Congress at the same time, Yachi described PM Abe's session with them as excellent. Echoing Yachi's tone, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Director General for North American Affairs Shinichi Nishimiya recalled that during the "trade war days," prime ministers often came away from meetings with Congressmen feeling battered by the questions, but that he had seen a sea change in the way this visit had played out. Speaker Pelosi had been mindful of the group's dynamics and had directed a meeting that was cordial, substantive, and fitting for a visiting foreign leader. The group had been able to discuss matters of international importance and not dwell on small bilateral irritants. The Ambassador complimented PM Abe's outreach to Congress and his upfront discussion of the "comfort women" issue, and urged the Japanese to consider more outreach during future visits. Next Summit Opportunities -------------- ¶4. (C) VFM Yachi inquired whether President Bush might visit Japan before the next APEC meeting in Sydney, saying that if such a visit were feasible, the president would be most welcome. DG Nishimiya added that PM Abe had raised the possibility with the President during a phone call two weeks earlier. TOKYO 00002481 002.3 OF 005 ¶5. (C) Further into the future, DG Nishimiya noted that PM Abe had let the President know that he was interested in a long-standing invitation to visit the ranch in Crawford, even if that meant traveling there in January. Nishimiya recognized that the window for the visit might be tight, given the holidays, the start of Japan's Diet session, and the State of the Union address, but he pointed out that Japan's hosting of the G-8 in 2008 will greatly complicate the prime minister's schedule starting in February. Moreover, DG Nishimiya stated that January could be a critical time for the prime minister and Japan's debate on collective security. The debate will resume this year after July's Upper House election and be propelled by the subsequent "wise men's group" report on the subject, and he implied that a January summit -- coming just before the Diet re-convenes -- could have a positive influence. North Korea -------------- ¶6. (C) Asking if there was any news from EAP A/S Hill, Yachi said that the Japanese were frustrated by the North Koreans and their short-range missile testing, and added that "our patience is not unlimited." He asked whether a failure of talks on Banco Delta Asia (BDA) should signal the end of Japanese forbearance. The Ambassador deferred to A/S Hill, but noted that U.S. patience was not unlimited either. ¶7. (C) VFM Yachi also alluded to rumors that Kim Jong-il was sick, or perhaps even dead. He claimed no special knowledge, but somewhat bemusedly referred to speculation that a double might be standing in for Kim, who was said to have "gentle eyes" while current photos showed a man with "cold eyes." GSOMIA -------------- ¶8. (C) Yachi stated that he would like to see the Ambassador and Foreign Minister Aso sign the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in the near future. He knew that there were accommodations to be worked out on both sides, but expressed hope that they could be resolved within a few weeks. The Ambassador noted that lawyers were still reviewing the text in Washington, but that he would be honored to participate in a signing ceremony once the agreement had been finalized. ¶9. (C) Referencing information security, the Ambassador raised the leak of Aegis data, stating that it was a serious matter. The U.S. government did not want to tell Japan how to conduct its investigation, but the incident was potentially damaging to the security of both the United States and Japan, and it was important that the United States be convinced that the investigation had been thorough and addressed counter-intelligence concerns. Yachi recognized the importance of the matter, noting that Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki had become personally involved when the SIPDIS leak was discovered, and promised to relay the Ambassador's message to appropriate parties within the Japanese government. UN Security Council Reform -------------- ¶10. (C) VFM Yachi laid out his understanding that the U.S. government was in the final stages of preparing a new UN Security Council (UNSC) reform proposal, and that the proposal would be shared with the Japanese after Secretary Rice had endorsed it. He said the Japanese had been encouraged by President Bush's remarks on UNSC reform, and that they hoped to see the proposal soon so that discussions TOKYO 00002481 003.6 OF 005 can be continued on what was an important topic. Trafficking-in-Persons Report -------------- ¶11. (C) Noting that the Trafficking-in-Persons (TIP) report's publication had been delayed, VFM Yachi stated that the Japanese understood that they were likely to be ranked as a Tier 2 country, a situation they found embarrassing. He said that was especially so when one considered the positive measures Japan had taken, including the passage of a related new law, and that there were countries like Colombia and Malawi receiving Tier 1 ratings. To be frank, he continued, the Japanese government felt that "the goalposts had been moved," and that its efforts ought to be reflected in the TIP report. ¶12. (C) DG Nishimiya added that the Tier 2 ranking was undermining DOMESTIC groups that were doing good anti-trafficking work through the Bali process. Not only did the ranking discourage them, it made it easier for other Asian nations to ignore their efforts. ¶13. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged the strides the Japanese have made and the legal and cultural issues that can complicate the TIP process. He committed to conveying the GOJ message to Washington. The "Quad" with India -------------- ¶14. (C) VFM Yachi stated that the Japanese government would like to proceed with the Quad concept in a "natural" way, and that the next step could be a substantive meeting including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, perhaps at UNGA or the ARF at the ministerial level. He stated he had met Foreign Secretary Menon in India two weeks previously and that, as the Quad was not involving itself in security issues, Menon had expressed no reservations about the group. ¶15. (C) On other cooperation with Australia, the Ambassador urged the Japanese to participate actively during the counter-terrorism trilateral in Sydney starting on June 4. He noted that a lack of Japanese engagement had frustrated the Australians in previous meetings. Climate Change -------------- ¶16. (C) The Japanese highly appreciated what President Bush said in his May 31 speech on climate change, said Yachi, who pointed to the 2008 deadline and mention of cooperation with Japan as particularly welcome. DG Nishimiya recalled that the April POTUS-PM Abe summit joint statement had referred to a high-level visit to Japan to further discuss climate change, but that work between the two sides in preparation for President Bush's announcement and PM Abe's statement last week had been so productive that the visit had not been necessary. Nonetheless, he suggested that it would be useful to have high-level bilateral discussions after the G-8 summit. FTA Discussions, Agricultural Trade, and the WTO -------------- --- ¶17. (C) VFM Yachi initiated a discussion of a possible free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States, stating that PM Abe had great interest in an agreement but that the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry (MAFF),among others, had reservations. There were also reservations among some who supported the Doha round, and Yachi had perceived some reluctance on the part of USTR to proceed. TOKYO 00002481 004.6 OF 005 ¶18. (C) The Ambassador countered that any movement toward an FTA hinged on Japan's agricultural sector. He acknowledged that all countries have sensitive issues, and that those sensitivities could be accommodated in the course of negotiations. Carving out an entire sector like agriculture, however, would be politically impossible, and what VFM Yachi may have sensed was USTR's unwillingness to enter taxing negotiations without sufficient assurances that agriculture would be part of the final agreement. Economic Minister-Counselor Klemm added that while the United States was receptive to an FTA, the current assessment is that Japan was not ready to commit the resources and political capital necessary to move forward. ¶19. (C) VFM Yachi agreed, but stated that MOFA, and he in particular, would like to see progress toward an FTA, and suggested that a study group composed of government, business, and academic members would be a good starting point. Econ M/C Klemm noted that preliminary information exchange on the subject had been constructive, and the Ambassador pointed to the tremendous opportunities that existed for both countries through an agreement. The Japanese would have to commit wholly to including agriculture, he re-iterated, to move forward -- both for FTA discussion and negotiations at the WTO. ¶20. (C) Yachi lamented somewhat the situation Japan found itself in at the WTO, where the consensus decision-making style presented some difficulties. Japan would like to be included in the G-4 group of discussants, he explained, or to see more G-6 meetings take place on the fringe of G-4 meetings, so that negotiators could go back to Japan's agricultural caucus and credibly present what the majority positions were among major agricultural states. DG Nishimiya stated that, since about March, powerful figures in the agricultural caucus like the late Agricultural Minister Matsuoka and Tadamori Oshima had been preparing people for a clash at the WTO for which there would be a need for serious concessions. In a uniquely Japanese way, he explained, they were preparing the way for a compromise, and he stated that if Japan were grilled at the G-4, the negotiators could go back to the caucus asking for concessions. ¶21. (C) If that were the case, the Ambassador suggested the Japanese should find a way to educate the U.S. government on what was going on, as well as the parameters of the possible. Who explained the situation, and to whom, could be worked out, but finding a trusted conduit for the information would be key to making progress. DG Nishimiya floated Oshima's name as a possibility, and then committed to informing the Ambassador of a GOJ interlocutor after further reflection. MAFF Minister Matsuoka's Suicide -------------- ¶22. (C) In response to a question from the Ambassador about Minister Matsuoka's death, VFM Yachi described suicide in Japan as a way of taking responsibility, and that prosecutors generally do not probe deeply into cases after a suicide has occurred. He noted that Matsuoka had been dogged by money scandals since his appointment eight months ago, and that some have compared the current incident to the recruit scandal that brought down PM Tanaka. That was going too far, assessed Yachi, who described the Matusoka scandal as not very deep-rooted. Nonetheless, three people at the organization implicated in bid-rigging had already committed suicide, so it was a serious incident, and he suggested it TOKYO 00002481 005.3 OF 005 would re-direct attention to PM Abe's initiative to curtail the "descent from heaven" (amakudari) practice of finding cushy post-retirement jobs for senior bureaucrats. He did not think the suicide would affect agricultural or trade policy. ¶23. (C) DG Nishimiya described Minister Akagi, Matsuoka's successor at MAFF, as a politician from the same mold. He was a proponent of an "active agricultural policy," meaning he would not just seek to defend the sector, but would try to change it, perhaps by seeking to export more. Matsuoka, however, had been more powerful than Akagi. Nishimiya did not think the change would affect agricultural policies or Japan's treatment of BSE, but it would make politics tough for PM Abe in the short term and could affect the Upper House elections. Aid to Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas -------------- -------------- ¶24. (C) Yachi said PM Abe had become interested in contributing aid in the federally administered tribal areas (FATA),and that he had considered Vice President Cheney to be enthusiastic about the idea when he had visited Japan. President Bush, however, had seemed perplexed when the topic was raised at the summit, and that had created some confusion for PM Abe. Moreover, DG Nishimiya pointed out that there were serious questions about how to deliver aid in the FATA, and Japan would welcome a discussion in Tokyo or Washington where such details could be discussed. The Ambassador granted that those were fair questions that deserved precise answers from the U.S. side. NSC Staffing -------------- ¶25. (C) Yachi asked if a successor to Ambassador Crouch had been identified, noting that Crouch had been a good friend of Japan. Yachi expressed his thanks for Crouch's service, as well as the work Deputy Secretary Negroponte is doing on the bilateral relationship, and said he hoped a person of similar stature would be found for the position. Meeting Participants -------------- ¶26. (U) Japan: Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi Director General for North American Affairs Shinichi Nishimiya Director, First North American Division, Takeo Mori (notetaker) United States: Ambassador Schieffer Economic Minister-Counselor Hans Klemm Economic Officer Marc Dillard (notetaker) SCHIEFFER