Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TOKYO2477
2007-06-04 06:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:
JAPAN RESPONDS TO RUSSIA-BURMA NUCLEAR DEAL
how-toVZCZCXYZ0001 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHKO #2477 1550601 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 040601Z JUN 07 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4153 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7252 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2158 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1686 RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 2227 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 3311 RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0439
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 002477
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN, EAP, EUR, T
EAP/J FOR HYAMS AND WEBSTER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2017
TAGS: PREL AU BM RS KNNP IAEA JP
SUBJECT: JAPAN RESPONDS TO RUSSIA-BURMA NUCLEAR DEAL
REF: STATE 72586
Classified By: DCM Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 002477
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN, EAP, EUR, T
EAP/J FOR HYAMS AND WEBSTER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2017
TAGS: PREL AU BM RS KNNP IAEA JP
SUBJECT: JAPAN RESPONDS TO RUSSIA-BURMA NUCLEAR DEAL
REF: STATE 72586
Classified By: DCM Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) On May 30, EST Officer delivered points in reftel to
Satoshi Kikuchi of the Non-Proliferation, Science and Nuclear
Energy Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).
Kikuchi said that Japan shares many of the U.S. concerns
about the announced Russia-Burma civil nuclear agreement, and
is "watching it carefully" from the perspective of
non-proliferation, safety, and security. However, he said
that Japan has no plans to express its concerns publicly, but
rather will continue to urge the Burmese in private
discussions to "play by the rules" with their IAEA
commitments. Kikuchi mentioned that Burma has not approved
the IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol, and that Japan has
raised this with the Burmese. Kikuchi added that Burma would
need to renounce the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) from the
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement if it wished to develop a
nuclear reactor.
2. (C) On approaching Russia with Japan,s concerns, Kikuchi
brushed aside any urgency, responding that Russia has
indicated to Japan that the deal is very much in the initial
phase.
3. (C) Comment: Japan,s initial response suggests that it
is balancing concerns over the nuclear risks of the
Russia-Burma deal with its own regional and bilateral
interests. Its approach in dealing with Burma on this
agreement appears consistent with that on other sensitive
issues. Japan has been notably reluctant to join U.S. and
European allies in publicly criticizing Burma,s human rights
record, seeing instead an important role for itself in
staying actively engaged with an increasingly isolated Burma,
particularly as a counterweight to China. With Russia, Japan
may tread cautiously in raising concerns about the Burma
nuclear deal, as Japan itself is in discussions with Russia
on a civil nuclear agreement that would include Russia
enriching uranium from Japan,s spent nuclear fuel stored in
Europe for eventual use in Japanese reactors. (Nuclear power
provides roughly 30% of Japan,s electricity needs). Embassy
contacts at the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
(METI) have said that a potential deal with Russia may also
include commercial opportunities for Japanese firms to
participate in Russia,s nuclear energy expansion plans. End
Comment.
SCHIEFFER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN, EAP, EUR, T
EAP/J FOR HYAMS AND WEBSTER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2017
TAGS: PREL AU BM RS KNNP IAEA JP
SUBJECT: JAPAN RESPONDS TO RUSSIA-BURMA NUCLEAR DEAL
REF: STATE 72586
Classified By: DCM Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) On May 30, EST Officer delivered points in reftel to
Satoshi Kikuchi of the Non-Proliferation, Science and Nuclear
Energy Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).
Kikuchi said that Japan shares many of the U.S. concerns
about the announced Russia-Burma civil nuclear agreement, and
is "watching it carefully" from the perspective of
non-proliferation, safety, and security. However, he said
that Japan has no plans to express its concerns publicly, but
rather will continue to urge the Burmese in private
discussions to "play by the rules" with their IAEA
commitments. Kikuchi mentioned that Burma has not approved
the IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol, and that Japan has
raised this with the Burmese. Kikuchi added that Burma would
need to renounce the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) from the
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement if it wished to develop a
nuclear reactor.
2. (C) On approaching Russia with Japan,s concerns, Kikuchi
brushed aside any urgency, responding that Russia has
indicated to Japan that the deal is very much in the initial
phase.
3. (C) Comment: Japan,s initial response suggests that it
is balancing concerns over the nuclear risks of the
Russia-Burma deal with its own regional and bilateral
interests. Its approach in dealing with Burma on this
agreement appears consistent with that on other sensitive
issues. Japan has been notably reluctant to join U.S. and
European allies in publicly criticizing Burma,s human rights
record, seeing instead an important role for itself in
staying actively engaged with an increasingly isolated Burma,
particularly as a counterweight to China. With Russia, Japan
may tread cautiously in raising concerns about the Burma
nuclear deal, as Japan itself is in discussions with Russia
on a civil nuclear agreement that would include Russia
enriching uranium from Japan,s spent nuclear fuel stored in
Europe for eventual use in Japanese reactors. (Nuclear power
provides roughly 30% of Japan,s electricity needs). Embassy
contacts at the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
(METI) have said that a potential deal with Russia may also
include commercial opportunities for Japanese firms to
participate in Russia,s nuclear energy expansion plans. End
Comment.
SCHIEFFER