DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 05/22/07-2

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 002290

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SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 05/22/07-2


INDEX:

(6) Reappointment of Takeshima as head of FTC gives rise to
objections in ruling camp

(7) Examining the Abe administration: Collective self-defense (Part
2): Will Japan be allowed to intercept ballistic missiles headed for
the United States?

(8) Commentary: Reality-based discussions needed for SDF activities

(9) Interview on collective self-defense (Part 1): Shoichi Nakagawa
suggests debating collective self-defense from various angles

ARTICLES:

(6) Reappointment of Takeshima as head of FTC gives rise to
objections in ruling camp

MAINICHI (Page 3) (Slightly abridged)
May 19, 2007

Yoshiaki Nakagawa

Objections are erupting in the ruling parties against officials
reported by media as already chosen by the government for such posts
as chair of the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) and the president of the
Narita International Airport Corporation (NAA). The personnel
selection for those posts requires Diet approval. Because of the
objections, the ruling parties put off holding a meeting of a
project team intended to reach an agreement (on the selections).

The official in the spotlight now is FTC Chairman Kazuhiko Takeshima
(64). He assumed his post in July 2002 during the Koizumi
administration. At one point recently, it was assumed he would
retire from the post in September, after serving a five-year tenure,
but the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) began making
arrangements to reappoint him to the same post, presumably because
the Antimonopoly Law will be amended next year to hike fines on
bid-rigging.

Takeshima, after serving as director-general of the National Tax
Administration Agency, joined the Kantei in 1998. Serving as deputy
assistant chief cabinet secretary, Takeshima was deeply involved in
bring about the passage of the so-called privacy act. Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe was then Takeshima's supervisor as deputy chief cabinet
secretary. After assuming the post of chair of the FTC, Takeshima

SIPDIS
has energetically disclosed not only bid-rigging cases involving
companies but also bureaucracy-initiated ones.

For this performance, Takeshima reportedly has received high marks
from Abe, but some observers think that the Ministry of Finance
(MOF) found itself in a difficult position to recommend someone to
the Kantei as a successor to Takeshima. The post of the FTC chairman
has been almost always occupied by former MOF officials, although
Takeshima's predecessor was Yasuchika Negoro, who came from the
Ministry of Justice. MOF apparently wanted to keep the post
indefinitely.

However, the Kantei and MOF have been at odds over the issue of
employee placements by government ministries and agencies. Given
this, even though the ministry recommended (former Vice Minister)
Hosokawa and (current Vice Minister) Fujii, who is soon to retire

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from the post, the Kantei would not accept either. So,
"the second best way is to get Takeshima reappointed," a senior MOF
official analyzed.

Around then, the Asahi Shimbun reported in its morning edition of
May 17 that Takeshima's reappointment had been confirmed. That day,
the ruling camp's project team on Diet approval of the personnel
selection was planning to meet in the Diet, but they did not meet,
though the reason why the meeting was canceled was unknown.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Secretary-General Hidenao
Nakagawa, referring to the reappointment of Takeshima as chair of
the FTC, told reporters on May 17: "I think it is a good thing for
him to firmly address bid-rigging cases to eliminate them." He
expressed an intention to welcome the reappointment, but another
senior member of the ruling parties revealed: "Takeshima is very
good at cracking down on bid-rigging cases, but if he should go too
far, everybody would back away and he would not be able to do
anything."

(7) Examining the Abe administration: Collective self-defense (Part
2): Will Japan be allowed to intercept ballistic missiles headed for
the United States?

YOMIURI (Page 4) (Abridged slightly)
May 20, 2007

"On April 25, North Korea unveiled a new mid-range ballistic missile
under development during its military parade in Pyongyang."

Based on this information from the United States in late April, the
Defense Ministry has step up its efforts to collect intelligence.

The new North Korean missile, already referred to as Musudan among
US authorities, is believed to have a range of 5,000 kilometers.
This means Guam, where there are US bases, is within its range. The
Musudan is also believed to be more accurate than the Taepodong-2
(6,000 kilometers). The North Korean missile threat is becoming a
real possibility for the people of the United States.

"Japan is in a situation where we cannot shoot down a ballistic
missile that may be headed for the United States."

The government's blue-ribbon panel to discuss the legal system for
national security held its inaugural meeting on May 18 in which
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe urged the members to examine the current
situation in which the country is not allowed to use the missile
defense system for intercepting a ballistic missile possibly headed
for the United States.

At present, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) takes this view:
"Japan is not allowed to intercept missiles headed for other
countries because doing so corresponds to an act of collective
self-defense."

But Abe, since his tenure as deputy chief cabinet secretary, has
repeatedly indicated: "It's nonsense to shoot down only those
missiles targeting Japan and overlook those headed for the United
States. The American public would find such a view absolutely
absurd."

Abe's concern became reality when US Ambassador to Japan Thomas
Schieffer held a press conference last October in which he said:

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"What would happen if a missile were launched by an adversary and a
Japanese naval vessel had the ability to knock that missile down?
Would it have to wait until it could be finally determined that the
missile was headed for Japan? Given the few minutes that are
involved in missile defense decisions, it is better for us to answer
that question now."

Japan was not armed with the missile defense (MD) system last
October. Schieffer added: "The answer will be absolutely critical to
the function and future of our alliance." Basically it is about the
Japan-US alliance rather than about technology. Politically
speaking, saying "no" is not an option.

In justifying an act of shooting down missiles targeting Japan, the
government cites police powers for eliminating dangerous objects
intruding into Japan's airspace. Responding to a ballistic missile
constitutes an invocation of the defense right under international
law. But in the case of Japan, SDF activities are based on police
powers until a defense mobilization order is issued.

The government has a plan to justify shooting down US-bound missiles
with police powers. The reason is because chances are high that
missiles headed for Guam and Hawaii would fly over eastern Shikoku
and Aomori, respectively. But a senior Defense Ministry official
thinks such is improper, noting: "Technically speaking, it's rather
difficult to use such logic because the altitudes of ballistic
missiles targeting such places are quite different from those headed
for Japan."

Intercepting ballistic missiles would become possible in 10 years'
time. The governments of Japan and the United States have been
jointly developing a highly powerful and accurate next-generation
interceptor missile with the aim of producing it in 2015. Once
deployed, Aegis vessels in the Sea of Japan would be able to shoot
down US-bound missiles.

Intelligence between the two counties must also be integrated in
order to allow US early warning satellites and SDF and USFJ radars
to detect fired ballistic missiles by using the MD system.

An agreement was reached in the Japan-US Security Consultative
Committee meeting (2 plus 2) held in Washington on May 1 to
establish an MD joint operational screen.

The AIR Self-Defense Force's Base AIR Defense Ground Environment
(BADGE) system has been steadily providing intelligence to the US
military since late April.

Some opposition party lawmakers think providing intelligence to the
US corresponds to collective defense. The government's position is
that providing intelligence not specifically instructing the US
military to fight back does not pose any problems legally.

A senior SDF official took this view: "There won't be enough time to
determine whether a fired missile is headed for Japan or the United
States unless the entire system, including the radars, miraculously
functions 100%."

The government's view that the SDF is not allowed to intercept
US-bound missiles might hinder the defense of Japan.

(8) Commentary: Reality-based discussions needed for SDF activities


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YOMIURI (Page 12) (Full)
May 18, 2007

Hidemichi Katsumata, senior writer

The government has now set up an advisory panel, which will review
the government's conventional way of reading and interpreting the
Constitution over the right of collective self-defense, focusing on
specific cases. I hope the panel will hold broad discussions
envisioning various activities to be conducted by the Self-Defense
Forces.

The Council for Rebuilding the Legal Foundation of National
Security, which consists of former Foreign Ministry and Defense
Ministry officials and experts, cites four cases to be studied.
There are problems to be cleared up in each case.

Case Study 1: Is Japan allowed to intercept a ballistic missile
aimed at the United States?

The government has been taking the position that Japan's missile
defense (MD) system will not be used to defend a third country,
according to its statement released by Chief Cabinet Secretary
Fukuda. The government has said Japan would not be allowed to
intercept a ballistic missile even for the purpose of protecting the
United States as an ally. However, the government is also aware that
the alliance will collapse if Japan overlooks a missile headed
toward the United States, as noted by a senior official of the
Defense Ministry.

MD is a system that Japan and the United States are developing
together to cope with newly emerging threats, such as North Korea's
nuclear arsenal and missile deployment. The key is in the hands of
the United States. If not for its intelligence and technologies,
Japan cannot shield its people. For instance, the security
environment surrounding Japan is undergoing a sea change. MD
necessitates collective self-defense, and Japan must be allowed to
intercept US-bound missiles passing near Japan.

Another problem is that the act of intercepting missiles is grounded
police authority stipulated in the Police Officers Duty Performance
Law. Under international law, a country's police authority is within
the scope of its territorial soil, waters, and airspace only.
International waters and outer space are outside the scope of police
authority. It is difficult for the notion of police authority to
account for an Aegis ship's interception of a missile flying in
outer space at a high altitude.

Why? The threat of a ballistic missile falls under the category of
imminent violations. International law allows invoking the right of
self-defense in such situations. However, the SDF is to act under
the Police Officers Duty Performance Law until an order for defense
operations is given in the event of emergencies. Accordingly, the
panel would have to review the Self-Defense Forces Law.

Case Study 2: In the event a US naval vessel comes under attack on
the high seas when an SDF vessel is acting in concert with that US
ship, is the SDF vessel allowed to fight back?

This theme is not only in the case of US naval vessels, as seen from
the fact that the Maritime Self-Defense FORCE currently deploys a
squadron in the Indian Ocean to act in concert with multinational
forces engaged in an antiterror campaign.

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Even more realistically, if and when there are illegalities like
terrorism on the Straits of Malacca and other sealanes that are
vital to Japan, coastal countries would form a coalition of the
willing with Japan, the United States, Australia, and other
countries. We want the panel to discuss what kind of legal
interpretation and scheme will be needed in that case for the SDF to
act in concert with the naval forces of foreign countries acting in
the same sea area for the same purpose.

One high-ranking official of the government has indicated this view:
"If that is when an SDF vessel is running alongside a foreign
country's naval vessel, we can't tell at once which is targeted. In
that case, it's possible to fight back (under SDF Law Article 95) to
protect weaponry (in legitimate self-defense)." However, it is rare
for warships to run alongside in their operations since their
weapons and radar detection range farther today. We want the panel
to hold discussions to meet the realities of places where the SDF is
actually working.

Case Study 3: If a foreign country's troops come under attack when
they are working with SDF members in United Nations peacekeeping
operations, are these SDF members allowed to rush to the scene of
the attack and fight back?

When Ground Self-Defense FORCE members were deployed in Iraq, they
worked in an area covered by British and Australian forces. If GSDF
troops were attacked, British and Australian troops would go to the
rescue of those GSDF members as their duty. However, the GSDF is not
allowed to rescue British and Australian troops if they were
attacked. That is because SDF personnel engaged in international
activities are allowed under the current law to rescue only "those
who are under their control."

Rescue activities could develop into the constitutionally prohibited
use of armed FORCE (i.e., combat). This is why the SDF is not
allowed to do so. However, all countries participating in
international cooperation recognize that their activities are United
Nations members' responsibilities stipulated in the Charter of the
United Nations. Even in the case where their troops have no choice
but to use weapons, they recognize that their use of weapons in that
case is not an act of exercising the right of self-defense as their
sovereign right but is a sanction measure based on a UN resolution.
The panel would have to separate this case from the right of
collective self-defense in their discussions.

Case Study 4: How far is Japan allowed to back up US and
multinational forces?

Then, what if an emergency situation breaks out in the periphery of
Japan? In that event, Japan is to support US forces "in the rear"
where no combat operations are conducted, as stipulated in the Law
Concerning Measures to Ensure Japan's Peace and Security in the
Event of Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan or the so-called
"regional contingency security law" for short. However, Japan is not
allowed to provide weaponry and ammunition.

The government says providing weaponry and ammunition to US and
multinational forces is tantamount to an act of exercising the right
of collective self-defense since such could be linked to their use
of armed force. This logic, however, can pass muster only in Japan.
In the eyes of an adversarial country, Japan's act of providing
logistical support-such as bases, provisions, and fuel-would appear

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to be Japan's participation in collective self-defense even though
such rear-echelon support is not conducted in a combat area.

(9) Interview on collective self-defense (Part 1): Shoichi Nakagawa
suggests debating collective self-defense from various angles

NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full)
May 21, 2007

The government and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have
set in full motion a debate on the question of whether to allow
Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense, now a
constitutional taboo. Based on the discussions of a blue-ribbon
panel of hand-picked experts on whether to allow the use of that
right, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe aims to set the stage for
constitutional revision. But opinions are divided over
reinterpretation of that right. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun will
interview the policy chief of each party, starting with Shoichi
Nakagawa, who chairs the LDP's Policy Research Council.

-- What do you think is the meaning of launching the discussion of
the right to collective self-defense now?

Nakagawa: "The prime minister's pet argument is to allow the
exercise of the right to collective defense. With the collapse of
the cold-war system, challenges facing Japan on the security front
are changing, such the threats from terrorism, North Korea's nuclear
weapons and its missiles. In terms of defending the security of the
country and the people, I think it is only natural to put that right
on the agenda for discussion. By this fall, when the panel comes up
with a conclusion, our party, too, wants to reach our own
conclusion."

-- The panel's debate seems to center on four specific cases, such
as whether the Self-Defense Forces' (SDF) ships can guard US vessels
if they come under attack on the high seas.

Nakagawa: "Our party's special committee will discuss cases other
than the four the government's panel plans to examine. Without any
prejudice, we will examine what we should do and shouldn't do under
the current Constitution in consideration of the present state of
security. The time and the situation are changing. How to define
terrorism? Is the right of belligerency not allowable if the enemy
is asymmetric (or the enemy is not a state)? I think it is difficult
to deal with these cases in line with the previous interpretation."

-- There is a view that the Constitution should be amended to allow
the exercise of the right to collective self-defense instead of just
constitutional reinterpretation.

Nakagawa: "The government should not easily reinterpret the
Constitution in terms of the impact on diplomatic ties with other
countries, as well as other countries' security. When it comes to
what Japan should do for its self-defense and international
contributions, in some cases, constitutional amendment is required.
According to provisions in the National Referendum Law,
constitutional revision will come in three years at the earliest.
Until then, it is necessary to distinguish between what we can do
within the current framework of the Constitution and what we can't
do unless constitutional revision is made."

-- Do you mean that Article 9 must be revised in the future so that
Japan can use the right to collective defense?

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Nakagawa: "Aside from debate on whether Japan can recognize the
right to collective defense, when I read Article 9 without any
prejudice, I feel somewhat strange about it. The provision specifies
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the
nation and the threat or use of FORCE as means of settling
international disputes. It leaves me under impression that even a
self-defense war is not recognized."

-- The junior coalition partner New Komeito is cautious about the
exercise of collective defense.

Nakagawa: "I don't think coalition partners always have to share the
same views. We accommodate each party's differences regarding other
subjects, as well. Our LDP has just begun discussion. No limitations
are placed on debate. Various approaches are welcome."

SCHIEFFER