Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TOKYO2190
2007-05-15 09:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

JAPANESE PLEASED WITH PRIME MINISTER ABE'S TRIP TO

Tags:  PREL ECON ETRD ENRG XF EG KUNC QA SA AE JA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 TOKYO 002190 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2017
TAGS: PREL ECON ETRD ENRG XF EG KUNC QA SA AE JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE PLEASED WITH PRIME MINISTER ABE'S TRIP TO
THE MIDDLE EAST

REF: A. TOKYO 1760


B. RIYADH 965

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4(b) a
nd (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 TOKYO 002190 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2017 TAGS: PREL ECON ETRD ENRG XF EG KUNC QA SA AE JA SUBJECT: JAPANESE PLEASED WITH PRIME MINISTER ABE'S TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST REF: A. TOKYO 1760 ¶B. RIYADH 965 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4(b) a nd (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: PM Abe's April 28-May 2 visit to the Middle East was a "great success" which enabled Tokyo to advance its "Japan and the Middle East: Entering a New Level" policy goal, according to MOFA contacts. National Security Advisor Koike told Charge d'Affaires that Abe enjoyed the trip, which took him to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Egypt. During his trip Abe announced two major initiatives: a Japanese-Saudi agreement to allow Saudi Arabia to store oil in Okinawa storage tanks, and a $1 billion Japanese loan to Abu Dhabi. In return for both, Japan received assurances of stable flows of oil. In Egypt, the two sides discussed plans to collaborate on a science and technology university and the upcoming Japan-Arab Conference. PM Abe was accompanied by a business delegation of over 180 high-level representatives. In addition to advancing commercial interests, PM Abe discussed with his counterparts political challenges facing the Middle East region, including Iraq and Iran. Koike said her impression is that the Gulf states, while concerned about the situation in Iraq, are more preoccupied by Iran. Abe reiterated Japan's support for the Maliki government and all of the joint statements issued after each of the five stops called upon Iran to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions. The joint statements also reflected Japan's concerns about global warming, North Korea and the status of abductees, the Middle East Peace Process and Lebanon, and Japan's desire to obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- "JAPAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST: ENTERING A NEW LEVEL" -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Prime Minister Abe's April 28-May 2 visit to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Egypt was characterized in very positive terms by National Security Advisor Koike and as a "great success" by MOFA Second Middle East Division Principal Deputy Director Motosada Matano in separate readouts provided to Charge and political officer, respectively. (Note: Commercial and energy aspects of the visit will be reported septel.) Abe's meetings with the leaders of Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Egypt were very positive, and the Japanese were impressed by the TOKYO 00002190 002 OF 006 warmth and high level of the receptions they received at all their stops. Matano said that MOFA believes the trip successfully advanced Tokyo's theme for the visit, which was "Japan and the Middle East: Entering a New Level." It is Japan's hope, he explained, to take its relations with the oil producing states of the Middle East beyond the "supplier-buyer" level, and to establish a "multi-layered" relationship that also includes enhanced commercial relations as well as increased political dialogue, both on bilateral and regional issues. ¶3. (C) During the visit, two substantive agreements were announced. The first involves a deal between Japan and Saudi Arabia, whereby the Saudis will store approximately 5.25 million kiloliters, an amount equivalent to 10 days of Japan's consumption, in tanks located on Henza Island in Okinawa Prefecture. The second involves an agreement with Abu Dhabi in which Japan will extend a $1 billion low-interest loan in return for a steady supply of oil for the next ten years. ¶4. (C) With regard to PM Abe's brief stop in Cairo, MOFA First Middle East Division Director Hideo Sato told political officer that while he recognized the "real hidden agenda" of the trip was to assure a steady flow of oil to Japan, he considered the Egypt portion to be the most important for establishing long-term Japanese connections to the Middle East. Underscoring Japan's goal of developing human potential through education, the two sides discussed plans to expedite the establishment of the Egypt and Japan University for Science and Technology (E-JUST). According to this plan, Egypt will provide the infrastructure while Japan will provide the faculty. PM Abe and President Mubarak also discussed the Japan-Arab Conference slated to be held in Alexandria in November. According to Sato, the plan is bring over 200 prominent politicians, businessmen, and academics from around the Arab world to meet with 50 Japanese counterparts in a "Davos-like" gathering. Sato conceded the plan is ambitious, but is hopeful that it will help start to build long-lasting bridges between Japan and the Arab world that will transcend the current "oil sales only" relationship. Egyptian Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission Salah El-Sadek had very little to say about the visit, telling political officer that the trip to Cairo was really just a sideshow for the main event: PM Abe's courting of the oil-rich and commercially prosperous Gulf states. -------------- TOKYO 00002190 003 OF 006 CONCERNS ABOUT IRAQ AND IRAN -------------- ¶5. (C) Iraq and Iran figured prominently in the discussions Abe had with all the leaders he met. With regard to Iraq, Koike explained that most of the Gulf leaders are willing to offer public support for Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and his government, even though in reality their feelings about him are lukewarm. The exception is Saudi Arabia. King Abdallah's disdain for Maliki, both personally and for his government, was open and evident, Koike told Charge. The King told Abe that Iraq's constitution should be amended and a new leader found. Matano echoed this report, telling political officer that the King has very negative views of Maliki, is suspicious of his capabilities to govern, and is doubtful about whether supporting him is in the best interests of Iraq. Saudi Arabia believes Maliki leads only the Shia, is under the influence of Iran, and is not capable of leading all Iraqis. ¶6. (C) UAE's Prime Minister Muhammad asserted to Abe that the only country in the region that truly supports the Maliki government is Iran, according to Matano. Muhammad said the Gulf countries all believe that Iran is exercising too much influence in Iraq and that the smaller countries of the region all defer to Saudi Arabia's lead regarding attitudes toward Iraq and Maliki. That said, the GCC countries will continue to support Iraq, as they have no other choice, and are hopeful that eventually the situation there will improve. Muhammad commented to Abe, reported Matano, that although the United States may have the power to defeat a country, it lacks the power to rebuild one. ¶7. (C) Koike reported to Charge that although Iraq is of concern to the Gulf Arabs, they are more preoccupied with what is taking place with regard to Iran. In all the discussions Abe had with the heads of state, it was clear they are concerned about Iran's rising influence in the region. They are apprehensive about Tehran's efforts to become a nuclear power and believe Iranian activists are at work in their countries sowing the seeds of dissent and rebellion. That said, they are unsure what to do. They do not want to further provoke Tehran and are ambivalent about whether a new, stronger UN Security Council resolution will be helpful, Koike stated. According to Matano, Egypt shares the concerns of the Gulf states about Iran, but when discussing its nuclear program stressed that Israel should be held to account also. The Qatari leadership delivered the TOKYO 00002190 004 OF 006 same message to Abe. Interestingly, Matano reported that Saudi King Abdallah, while expressing strong concerns about Iranian intentions, seemed to be less concerned about Tehran's nuclear program. The King reportedly told PM Abe that since the Koran prohibits nuclear weapons, he is certain Iran's nuclear intentions are purely peaceful. Nevertheless, the joint statements issued following the visits to all five countries contained language urging Tehran to comply with Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747. -------------- BUCKING UP THE TROOPS -------------- ¶8. (C) PM Abe took advantage of his presence in the region to visit Japanese Self Defense Force units supporting both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. In Abu Dhabi, he visited with the crews of two Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force vessels, a destroyer and a supply ship, which are currently deployed to the Indian Ocean. In Kuwait, he journeyed to Ali Al Salim Air Base to inspect Air Self Defense units deployed to support the United Nations and Coalition Forces in Iraq. Matano said both visits generated the hoped-for media coverage and photo ops. Koike told Charge that the morale of the Japanese troops in both locales is very high. -------------- OTHER KEY ISSUES -------------- ¶9. (C) Japan succeeded in winning recognition for its role in the Middle East Peace Process, making sure that all the joint statements issued (except the one with Qatar) referred to its Corridor of Peace and Prosperity initiative in the West Bank. Support for democracy in Lebanon was also included in all except the statement with the UAE. The need for North Korea to address the abductee issue was highlighted in all, and each of the Arab countries except for Kuwait in some form pledged support for Japan's bid to win a permanent seat on the Security Council. Support for the Japan-GCC Free Trade Agreement, currently being negotiated, was mentioned in all the statements except for Egypt's, which was also the case for references to concern about global warming. The full texts of all the joint statements are available on MOFA's website, www.mofa.go.jp. -------------- TOKYO 00002190 005 OF 006 UNHAPPY BUSINESS DELEGATION -------------- ¶10. (C) Accompanying Abe to the Middle East was a delegation of over 180 Japanese businessmen, including nearly 70 CEOs, who traveled on a government-charted 747. Isao Iijima, policy secretary to former Prime Minister Koizumi, told us prior to SIPDIS the trip that Keidanren -- the preeminent Japanese business federation -- was not happy about having to send a delegation, but was effectively dragooned into doing so, as Abe wanted to make a big impression on his hosts. Keidanren Director General Nakamura described the trip - his first to the Middle East - to Economic Minister Counselor as "mind-boggling." The heat, the religioisity, the perceived low local work ethic, the enormous contrast in development across the region all provided points for astonishment. Nakamura reported that the Japanese executives did not meet even one local businessman as all their meetings took place with government officials only. Consequently, although the impressions of the trip were vivid, the nature and pace of the trip -- five stops in as many days with only 11 hours in Cairo -- lead to no noteworthy commercial development. Matano, commenting to political officer, expressed relief that none of the business delegation had suffered health problems due to the heat and pace of the trip. He brushed off the fact that no deals were made by observing the purpose of taking the delegation along was simply to familiarize them with the commercial opportunities to be found in the Gulf region. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Japan clearly wishes to play a more prominent role in the Middle East. However, PM Abe's whistle-stop tour seemed high on symbolism but short on substance. It gave him the chance to discuss issues of concern with Gulf and the Egyptian heads of state and to modestly advance bilateral relations. The presence of a huge business delegation was meant to signal Japan's serious intent to take advantage of commercial opportunities in the Gulf region, but given the high-speed pace of the trip the impressive list of businessmen really had no time to do anything other than act as members of an entourage. For the immediate future, we predict Japan will continue to support the Maliki government and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, continue to urge a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear standoff, play a TOKYO 00002190 006 OF 006 modest role in attempts to broker useful deals between parties to the Peace Process, and attempt to take advantage of commercial opportunities that become available. Tokyo's major interest in the region will remain ensuring conditions that enable a steady flow of oil to Japan. SCHIEFFER

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