TRILATERAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION FORUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 TOKYO 002030 SIPDIS SIPDIS OSD/APSA FOR SHINN, LAWLESS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2012 TAGS: PREL MARR AS JA SUBJECT: TRILATERAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION FORUM INAUGURAL MEETING REF: TOKYO 977 TOKYO 00002030 001.2 OF 009 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Joseph R. Donovan, reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At the first meeting of the trilateral Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF),U.S., Japanese and Australian diplomatic and defense officials agreed on a range of trilateral initiatives, including: -- a U.S.-Japan-Australia P-3C exercise in October 2007; -- seminars to deepen trilateral coordination on: airlift coordination, broader logistics cooperation, HA/DR real-world "lessons learned", HALE/UAV operations in the Pacific, and Seahawk helicopter operational lessons learned; -- endorsement of plans to hold the first meeting of a Trilateral Missile Defense Forum in July; -- participation by Japan and Australia in the humanitarian deployment of the USS Peleliu to Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. A lack of clear arrangements for classified information sharing between Japan and Australia, and Japan Coast Guard resistance to maritime security discussions were identified as problems to address. Japan asked for a concrete proposal from the U.S. on how to contribute to the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The U.S. offered to host the next SDCF meeting in October in Hawaii, and proposed adding NATO Partnerships and Afghanistan to the agenda. END SUMMARY. SDCF GOAL: CONCRETE, OPERATIONAL DEFENSE COOPERATION -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) U.S., Japanese and Australian diplomatic and defense officials held the inaugural meeting of the trilateral Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) on April 12 in Tokyo, marking the launch of a new body aimed at deepening concrete defense cooperation among the three countries. ¶3. (U) The U.S. delegation was led by Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Ambassador SIPDIS Stephen Mull, and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs James Shinn. Representatives from State (PM, EAP and EUR),OSD/APSA, the Joint Staff, PACOM, Pacific Fleet (PACFLT),Pacific Air Forces (PACAF),USFJ, CNFJ, Seventh Fleet, the Missile Defense Agency, the U.S. Coast Guard, and Embassy Tokyo also attended. 
¶4. (U) Japan's senior delegates MOFA Director-General for North American Affairs Shinichi Nishimiya and MOD Director-General for Defense Policy Kazuo Ofuru, acted as hosts for the meeting. The Australian delegation was led by DOD Assistant Secretary for the Americas, North and South Asia and Europe Rachel Noble, and DFAT Assistant Secretary for Strategic Affairs Bryce Hutchesson. Both Japanese and Australian delegations included military personnel from a range of services. COMMON VALUES, COMMON SECURITY CONCERNS TOKYO 00002030 002.2 OF 009 -------------- ¶5. (U) Delegation leads from each side struck similar themes in opening remarks: the evolution of trilateral cooperation into the defense and security realm was a natural and welcome development. Like other complementary trilateral venues, the SDCF is rooted in common values and strategic interests. At the same time, its primary role would be to promote concrete operational cooperation between the U.S., Japan and Australia in the defense and security realm. ¶6. (U) A/S Mull, and his Australian and Japanese counterparts highlighted the North Korean threat, China's lack of transparency into its military modernization, maritime security, ballistic missile defense, proliferation, peacekeeping, and counter-terrorism as key issues in the region. The U.S. partnership with Japan and Australia is global, said A/S Mull, adding U.S. appreciation for the contributions of both countries to efforts in IRAQ and Afghanistan. ¶7. (SBU) Australia DFAT's Hutchesson added that while Australia is not a participant in the Six Party Talks, the GOA stands ready to support the agreement, including through energy assistance to North Korea. Hutchesson also noted that India is an important partner, but Canberra is "not ready for a security relationship." On IRAQ and Afghanistan, Australia is "there for the long haul," he said, adding that SDCF discussions on peacekeeping and humanitarian operations have direct relevance to on-the-ground activities in both countries. ¶8. (SBU) Japan has deepened its alliance with the U.S. (especially through realignment and missile defense),and launched a new security relationship with Australia, as well as a new partnership with NATO, said MOFA's Nishimiya. The "cold war" with North Korea and China's military expansion were particular concerns for Japan, though the joint statement issued earlier that day by Prime Minister Abe and visiting Chinese Premier Wen included agreement by both sides to "improve the transparency of their policies," he said. GROWING AUSTRALIA-JAPAN SECURITY TIES -------------- ¶9. (C) The recent Australia-Japan Joint Security Declaration, issued by Prime Ministers Abe and Howard, marked a historic strengthening of the two countries' security ties, said MOD Director-General Ofuru. MOD had been pleasantly surprised by the positive public and press response, he said. While not explicit in the Declaration, Ofuru confirmed to PDASD Shinn that intelligence sharing was one of the intended areas for expansion with Australia. Although Canberra is "not in the business of explaining itself to China," said Australia DFAT's Hutchesson, Beijing had been briefed in advance on the Declaration, and seemed to receive the news "in the spirit it was intended." HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE / DISASTER RESPONSE -------------- -- PACIFIC GLOBAL AIR MOBILITY SEMINAR (PGAMS): TOKYO 00002030 003.2 OF 009 ¶10. (SBU) The Joint Staff's Lt Col Rick Weir outlined plans to hold a Pacific Global Air Mobility Seminar on May 17-18 at Yokota Air Base to examine how the three country's militaries can better coordinate their airlift assets, especially in response to natural disasters. Joint Staff, with OSD guidance, will organize the seminar, with 5th Air Force/USFJ as hosts. Australia DOD's Noble said the Royal Australian Air Force was working hard to ensure one of its new C-17 transport aircraft would be available as a display, though this was not yet finalized. Japan is keen to take part, said MOD Defense Councilor Akira Kamata, but it may be difficult to provide a CH-47 helicopter for display as the U.S. has requested. Japan also needs to confirm under what SOFA status the Australian aircraft and personnel would enter Yokota, said MOFA's Nishimiya. ¶11. (SBU) As a follow-on to airlift discussions, Australia's Noble proposed to take the lead in organizing a similar seminar on broader logistics cooperation, including sealift. -- PELELIU PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: ¶12. (SBU) PACFLT's Dean Vaughn briefed the group on plans for a 127-day deployment by the transport ship USS Peleliu on a public health mission to Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Japanese and Australian medical personnel, dentists and engineers -- both civilian/NGO and military -- are invited to participate, he said. Offers for participation in the Peleliu Pacific Partnership can be sent directly to PACFLT. ¶13. (SBU) Australia is likely to offer a military medical team of up to 12 members to join the Peleliu's visits to Vietnam, Papua New Guinea, and possibly the Solomon Islands, said DOD's Noble. The Philippines is not an option for Canberra, she said, due to the absence of any SOFA-type arrangement. ¶14. (SBU) The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) may send some medical personnel, said MOD Defense Councilor Kamata, and will discuss the deployment with Seventh Fleet on April 23. OSD Senior Country Director for Japan Suzanne Basalla emphasized the joint nature of the Peleliu Pacific Partnership, and pointed out that even though the mission is ship-based, services other than the MSDF could participate. Japan MOD responded that might be possible "in the future", but that Japan's Self Defense Force participation would be restricted to MSDF in this "initial step." (NOTE: MOD officials have told the Embassy that JMSDF may send "one or two" doctors, but that the Ground Self-Defense Forces, whose medical teams have extensive overseas experience, have resisted any suggestion they deploy aboard a naval vessel. END NOTE). Japan MOFA's Deputy Director-General Umemoto noted that MOFA was considering sending one doctor to join the Peleliu mission. ¶15. (SBU) PDASD Shinn suggested that all parties should take advantage of the opportunity these projects present to hone skills in a controlled environment, rather than attempt ad hoc trilateral coordination during a real crisis. Japan MOFA Deputy Director General Umemoto replied that the reality in Japan is that bureaucracies tend to respond when things are forced upon them, but otherwise find reasons to erect TOKYO 00002030 004.2 OF 009 roadblocks to progress. -- DISASTER RELIEF "LESSONS LEARNED" ¶16. (SBU) Japan MOFA's Umemoto suggested a trilateral "lessons learned" conference where our response to the tsunami and other humanitarian disasters could be reviewed by SIPDIS the three countries together, rather than on a bilateral basis, as has been done in the past. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE -------------- -- "KEEN EDGE" EXERCISE LESSONS LEARNED: ¶17. (C) USFJ Deputy Commander Major-General Timothy Larsen provided an after-action report on the February 2007 U.S.-Japan command-post exercise "Keen Edge", which simulated an intensive ballistic missile attack on Japan. The exercise underscored the need for an integrated response to a missile attack, not merely an integration of U.S. and Japanese BMD assets or of military-military decision-making, but also of inter-agency involvement. In a real crisis, a missile could strike Japan within minutes; it was vital to ensure contingency planning involved all relevant government agencies in advance. The exercise helped illuminate different approaches by the U.S. and Japan on what to defend, where to deploy BMD assets, how to conduct operations, and who makes decisions in a crisis. ¶18. (C) Larsen proposed a Keen Edge-type exercise to include Australian observers or participants. Japan MOD's Kamata agreed to take up the suggestion for future consideration. Australia DFAT's Hutchesson noted that it is not clear what role its forces might play in either a Keen Edge-like exercise or BMD in general, given that Australia is not at present seeking missile interception capability. ¶19. (C) MOFA's Umemoto commented that Keen Edge had made clear the alliance was evolving beyond the traditional spear-and-shield division of labor between the U.S. and Japan, in which U.S. forces were solely responsible for offensive strikes. In BMD, at least, U.S. and Japanese roles were now almost the same. ¶20. (C) Because Australia plays no formal role in defending Japan, and Australia and Japan lack an information sharing agreement, said Umemoto, Japan has some concerns about sharing Keen Edge activities trilaterally. He pledged to study the matter further. (NOTE: Australia DOD's Noble told A/S Mull in bilateral discussions the following day that Australia does indeed have an intelligence-sharing agreement with Japan MOD, but that Japan MOFA is apparently not aware of it. END NOTE). -- TRILATERAL MISSILE DEFENSE FORUM (TMDF): ¶21. (C) Missile Defense Agency representative LCDR Thuy Do outlined plans for the first meeting of the Trilateral Missile Defense Forum (TMDF),set for July in Colorado Springs. All parties agreed to exchange lessons learned at the TMDF, but plans for a table-top exercise had been halted by concerns over the ability to share classified information with Australia. A/S Mull and PDASD Shinn pressed Japan for a TOKYO 00002030 005.2 OF 009 policy-level commitment to solve the disclosure problem. ¶22. (C) MOD's Ofuru acknowledged that trilateral discussions on BMD would inevitably involve classified information; he said Japan would need to discuss the issue further internally. Although Japan and Australia lack an agreement to share classified information, it might be possible to devise temporary, forum-specific guidelines as a workaround. MOFA's Umemoto was more categorical, stating that for Japan, defense planning is an activity done exclusively with the U.S. Until the role of Australia in BMD is clear (including in a defense of Japan scenario),Japan will be uncomfortable sharing sensitive defense information with Australia. ¶23. (C) Australia would like to engage trilaterally on BMD as much as possible, said DOD's Noble, but Canberra's thinking on BMD is "still very immature." Until a DECISION on policy direction is made by the Australian government, the ability to cooperate with Japan will be limited, she said. However, the GOA is keen to learn more about BMD, and the Trilateral Missile Defense Forum, while ambitious, is a good opportunity to do so. U.S. and Japanese representatives agreed that, until the information sharing issue is resolved, a table-top exercise will not be possible. -- C2BMC DEMONSTRATION: ¶24. (C) Missile Defense Agency officials provided a lunchtime demonstration of the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) system, underscoring the importance of an integrated, layered defense in order to effectively stop incoming missiles. PDASD Shinn stressed that, because a North Korean missile can reach Japan in minutes, an operational response would have to be worked out well in advance. Japan MOFA's Umemoto asked tactical questions about the positioning of Aegis ships, and their vulnerability to incoming missiles. Australia DFAT's Hutchesson voiced some skepticism about what useful role Australian ships might play in a North Korean missile launch scenario. INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR): -------------- -------------- -- P-3 EXCHANGE: ¶25. (C) All parties agreed to expand an already planned Japan-Australia P-3C aircraft exercise to include U.S. Navy aircraft. The exercise will take place in October 2007 at Kadena and Atsugi bases, with details to be worked out through Navy channels. MOFA's Umemoto hailed this as an "early harvest" for the SDCF. -- HIGH ALTITUDE LONG ENDURANCE (HALE) UAV COOPERATION: ¶26. (C) PACAF and Joint Staff representatives briefed on U.S. plans to deploy nine Global Hawk HALE UAVs to Guam by 2009, and suggested a trilateral concept-of-operations for the Western Pacific. Japan and Australia could share the benefits of Global Hawk's ISR capabilities by helping with support costs, joint basing, and sensor development. PACAF planned a demonstration of the Global Hawk from Guam in April 2008, and welcomed Japanese and Australian participation. All agreed to a U.S. proposal to organize a trilateral seminar to further examine the HALE UAV concept-of-operations TOKYO 00002030 006.2 OF 009 in the Pacific, and to identify interoperability and policy issues for further action. ¶27. (C) Japan is highly interested in the HALE UAV, including its possible use for missile defense, said MOD Director for Plans & Programs Kawamura. MOD is keen to include funds for the HALE UAV in the Ministry's August 2008 draft budget request, and would need to make the case why it helps the defense of Japan. UAV capability is a high priority for Australia, said DOD's Noble. Canberra is pursuing several UAV projects, including one with the U.S. Navy. Over the last year, Australia had expanded its ability to share a common operating picture (COP) with PACOM, and was keen to see that shared with other regional partners, like Japan. NONPROLIFERATION: -------------- -- UNSCR 1718 TRILATERAL WORKING GROUP: ¶28. (C) Australia DFAT officials presented an update on the Trilateral Working Group on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718 sanctions against North Korea. Even with signs of progress in the Six-Party Talks, it is important to continue enforcement of UN sanctions. Hutchesson noted that there has been a 70 percent increase in sharing of intelligence on North Korean shipping among the three partners. The March 30 Trilateral WG meeting in Canberra had produced an agreed list of sanctions enforcement options, to be held in reserve for consideration by policy-makers as necessary. The options include a capability demonstration, such as an in-port cargo inspection; the establishment of a maritime scrutiny area; and the overt or clandestine surveillance of North Korean shipping. The U.S. also offered additional training opportunities, focused on radiation detection, at the DHS/Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in South Carolina. ¶29. (C) Based on information received from Washington that morning, A/S Mull and PDASD Shinn confirmed U.S. inter-agency backing for the options paper. (NOTE: Japanese and Australian Embassy officials confirmed April 13 that their governments have also cleared fully on the options paper. END NOTE). -- PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI): ¶30. (C) Japan provided an update on its plan to host a PSI maritime exercise in the fourth quarter of 2007. The exercise will last 2-3 days (no date yet set),with further planning to take place at a 18-22 June PSI gaming exercise in Newport, Rhode Island. Japan asked for U.S. and Australian help in contributing participants and a "target ship," and in soliciting participation from Asian countries, in particular. Australia DOD's Noble said Canberra was finalizing plans to provide a naval vessel for the exercise. MARITIME SECURITY -------------- -- MARITIME EXERCISES / NAVY-COAST GUARD INTEROPERABILITY: ¶31. (SBU) PACFLT's Dean Vaughn gave an overview of maritime exercises and port visits annually conducted by U.S. assets TOKYO 00002030 007.2 OF 009 in the Pacific. Any one of these could be made into a trilateral event, he proposed. He also explained the different roles of the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, and how the U.S. combines the different strengths of each to ensure interoperability (e.g. Coast Guard teams, which have the law enforcement authority the Navy lacks, embark aboard Navy ships to enable greater mobility). ¶32. (SBU) A/S Mull emphasized that maritime security is an issue too big for any single agency to handle alone; it requires reaching beyond "turf" boundaries. Maritime security was a vital part of the SDCF agenda, and each country's coast guard and any other relevant agency should be welcome to take part in trilateral discussions on the issue. ¶33. (C) Japan MOFA's Umemoto acknowledged "internal problems," citing the Japan Coast Guard's (JCG) traditional aversion to involvement in any activity with military partners. He pledged to "seriously" seek a resolution, reaching out to the Japan Coast Guard to encourage their participation. ¶34. (C) Australia's approach to maritime security is thoroughly inter-agency, explained MOD's Noble, with all matters handled by the Border Protection Command -- a body that includes defense, customs, fisheries, and quarantine agencies, with links to the transport and immigration departments as well as the attorney general and the federal police. She also outlined legislation that grants the Australian Navy authority to act in support of immigration, customs and other law enforcement bodies. ¶35. (SBU) Australia conducts a range of annual maritime security exercises: with most ASEAN countries bilaterally, as well as combined exercises with Singapore and Thailand; Brunei, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines; one with the Five Powers Defense Act member states; and aerial surveillance patrols with Malaysia and various Pacific Island countries. Australia also offers training on topics such as maritime surveillance for its regional partners, and provides a Pacific Patrol Boat Fund to assist Pacific Island country maritime security efforts. ¶36. (C) Noble proposed several concrete ideas for trilateral cooperation: (1) a "lessons learned" seminar on the Seahawk naval helicopter, a common platform for all three countries; (2) trilateral discussion of "air independent submarine propulsion systems"; and (3) U.S. and Japanese involvement in a "Maritime Assistance Needs Analysis" currently being discussed between Australia and the Philippines. U.S. representatives welcomed all Australian proposals, particularly endorsing the idea of a Seahawk seminar, and proposed that follow-up take place through Navy channels. PEACEKEEPING -------------- -- PEACEBUILDING: ¶37. (SBU) A/S Mull outlined ongoing U.S.-Australian collaboration on the training of third-country peacekeepers through the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI), and invited Japan's participation. He suggested Japanese assistance could be most valuable in three areas: by TOKYO 00002030 008.2 OF 009 contributing military engineers and/or funding to construct regional peace-keeping centers, including for field exercises; support for training courses, e.g. by funding travel costs of trainees; and by providing Self-Defense Force personnel as trainers and/or students. ¶38. (SBU) MOFA's Umemoto welcomed "any detailed concrete proposal" from the U.S. side on how Japan could contribute to GPOI initiatives, noting with confidence "there is a positive role Japan can play." Any request for funds for GPOI would need to be included in MOFA and/or MOD draft budgets before they are finalized in August. ¶39. (SBU) MOFA's use of overseas aid funds for peacekeeper training would need to navigate around several constraints, explained Foreign Policy Bureau Senior Coordinator Takehiro Funakoshi. It would be "easier" if Japan's funds could be shown going to a peacekeeping-focused facility, he said. Director-level MOFA officials had recently visited the Five Fields training facility in Mongolia, but it had the semblance of being a regular army base, he said. (NOTE: Funakoshi confirmed separately to Embassy officials that Japan "does not need a guarantee" that funding or equipment provided would never be used for non-peacekeeping purposes, but stressed that "appearances" are important. MOFA is not inclined to fund travel costs, he noted, as this is "not a very tangible contribution." END NOTE). ¶40. (SBU) Japan MOD sees GPOI as a "significant opportunity" and is keen to know "what is expected" of them, said Defense Councilor Kamata. Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) sent observers to Khaan Quest 2006; MOD is considering doing the same for this year's exercise, he said. He added that SDF capabilities for international cooperation, including peacekeeping, improved with the recent creation of a Central Readiness Force by the Ground Self-Defense Forces. ¶41. (SBU) A/S Mull agreed that the U.S. would provide a concrete proposal to Japan on possible contributions to GPOI in the coming days. JOINT COMBINED TRAINING ACTIVITIES -------------- -- Joint Combined Training Capability (JCTC): ¶42. (C) Australia MOD's Noble outlined the JCTC concept that had been developed jointly with PACOM, and plans to validate its use as a network-enhanced "architecture" to enhance "high-end" training through the U.S.-Australia exercise Talisman Sabre in late June. Canberra wanted to invite Japanese representatives to a "special tailored briefing" on the JCTC concept during the exercise, as well as a subsequent broader brief including representatives from Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. ¶43. (C) Japan MOD's Kamata replied that Japan would "seriously consider" Canberra's invitation to the JCTC brief and to observe Talisman Sabre, noting it would be a "very meaningful step." Any future participation of SDF units would be more difficult, he noted, unless their role could be justified as in "defense of Japan." Japan MOFA Oceania Division Director Asari added that mention of plans for "joint exercises and training" in the recent Australia-Japan TOKYO 00002030 009.2 OF 009 Joint Security Declaration had been explained to the Diet as "having mainly humanitarian operations in mind." NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶44. (SBU) A/S Mull said the U.S. would like to host the next SDCF meeting in Hawaii in October, and would take the lead on crafting the agenda. PDASD Shinn noted how impressive inter-agency coordination seemed between defense and diplomatic agencies on all sides, and suggested the group aim to work through any residual stove-piping (e.g. Japan Coast Guard reservations about SDCF discussions on maritime security). He highlighted the "emphatic agreement" on the direction of trilateral defense cooperation, and the clear economies of scale in acting together. The task now, he suggested, was to make the tough decisions involving money, personnel and navigating "legal ambiguity" to operationalize that commitment. ¶45. (SBU) A/S Mull said the U.S. would like to add two new agenda items: NATO Global Partnerships, and cooperation in Afghanistan. Japanese and Australian representatives praised the SDCF meeting as a highly positive "first step," welcomed the proposal of Hawaii as venue for the second round, and pledged to consider the U.S. proposal for new agenda items. DONOVAN