CBRN DEFENSE WORKING GROUP PLENARY

UNCLAS TOKYO 001901 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS FOR COMUSJAPAN FOR J00 E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL JA SUBJECT: CBRN DEFENSE WORKING GROUP PLENARY ¶1. (SBU) Summary: DASD Richard Douglas led the U.S. delegation to the Japan-U.S. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group (CDWG) Plenary on April 18, 2007. The Principals approved the CDWG Work Plan for 2007-2008, which features a bilateral capability assessment, collaborative research and development (R&D) projects, and decontamination, medical response, and foreign consequence management seminars. Both sides shared relevant CBRN threat assessments, and discussed the importance of coordinated strategic communications. Event and Participants -------------- ¶2. (U) Richard Douglas, DASD for Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation and Global Threats, led the U.S. delegation to the Japan-U.S. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group (CDWG) Plenary on April 18 in Tokyo. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Deputy Director-General (DDG) for North American Affairs Kazuyoshi Umemoto and Ministry of Defense (MOD) DDG for Defense Policy Hironori Kanazawa led Japan,s delegation, which included participants from: Japan,s Cabinet Secretariat; National Police Agency; Ministry of Health, SIPDIS Labor and Welfare; Fire and Disaster Management Agency; and Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. The U.S. delegation included representatives from: OSD Policy; OSD Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L); USPACOM; USSTRATCOM; U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ); Joint Staff J5, J8; National Defense University; the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); and the United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC). Context -------------- ¶3. (U) The two sides established the CDWG in August 2006 in response to the October 2005 Security Consultative Document, &U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.8 One section of this document identified the importance of improving bilateral and defense cooperation in response to attacks by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including disposal and decontamination of WMD. Proceedings -------------- ¶4. (U) The Plenary began with a presentation of the After Action Report from a CBRN Tabletop Exercise conducted at the Japan Air Self Defense Forces Staff College in January 2007. The exercise identified policy, operational and capability shortfalls in bilateral CBRN defense response, and highlighted specific issues for the CDWG to address. The two sides jointly developed a 2007-2008 Work Plan based on the exercise results. ¶5. (U) Highlights of the Work Plan include: a Decontamination Seminar in June 2007, a bilateral capability assessment conducted throughout 2007, Japanese observation at a Foreign Consequence Management Tabletop Exercise conducted for USFJ in October 2007, a Medical Response Seminar in October 2007, and ongoing meetings of R&D experts. The next CDWG Plenary is scheduled for April 2008 in Washington, at which the two sides will present research and development collaboration projects. ¶6. (SBU) The Plenary also featured intelligence briefings by each side on the assessed CBRN threat to Japan and globally. The two sides presented updates on each of the key events highlighted in the Work Plan, and stressed the importance of coordinated strategic communications regarding CBRN defense. The U.S. side briefed the concept of a Joint Information Center, a centralized communications hub that ensures information flow in the event of a catastrophic incident. Both sides emphasized the importance of close cooperation between the military and civilian agencies, and urged continued active participation of the relevant Japanese agencies and ministries. The plenary concluded with formal adoption of the Work Plan. Side Discussion -------------- ¶7. (SBU) During a side discussion Mr. Douglas raised the importance of Japan,s contribution to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),and thanked his Japanese counterparts for their offer to host the next major PSI exercise in October. MOD officials indicated it will be difficult to solicit Japanese Coast Guard support because of the Coast Guard,s concerns about maintaining good relationships with its South Korean and Chinese counterparts. MOD officials, however, reiterated their support for the exercise. ¶8. (U) DASD Douglas has cleared this cable. DONOVAN