PREMIER WEN JIABAO'S JAPAN VISIT: GETTING BACK ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001743 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2017 TAGS: PREL CH TW KS JA SUBJECT: PREMIER WEN JIABAO'S JAPAN VISIT: GETTING BACK ON TRACK REF: A. TOKYO 01555 ¶B. BEIJING 02483 ¶C. BEIJING 02481 TOKYO 00001743 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for Reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Marked more by warm atmospherics rather than specific agreements, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's April 11-13 Japan visit is being characterized as a successful and important step forward in the relationship by Japanese diplomats and others. One disappointment, however, was the failure to reach agreement on joint gas development in the East China Sea prior to the summit. The Japanese media featured Wen's "man of the people" approach and praised Prime Minister ABE and Wen's agreement to boost cooperation on energy and environmental protection. Wen's deft use of public diplomacy succeeded in improving Japanese public perceptions of China and his visit likely paved the way for future high-level visits. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Premier Wen Jiabao's April 11-13 visit to Japan was hailed as a major success by nearly all those involved. His 56-hour visit was packed with official and informal events. Arriving in the afternoon on April 11, Wen spent the rest of the day with PM SHINZO Abe, first during a 1.5-hour meeting and then at a 1.5-hour dinner. ¶3. (C) On the 12th, following a well-publicized jog in the park, he met separately with Lower House leader Yohei Kono and Upper House President Chikage Ogi before addressing a joint session of the Diet. After speaking to a luncheon hosted by Keidanren (Japan Business Federation),he had a brief audience with the Emperor. He then rejoined PM ABE to kickoff the inaugural meeting of a new high-level bilateral economic dialogue. He spent much of the afternoon in separate 15-20 minute meetings with the heads of Japan's primary political parties: Liberal Democratic Party, New Komeito, Democratic Party of Japan, Social Democratic Party and Communist Party. He ended the day with a reception celebrating the 35th anniversary of the establishment of relations between the PRC and Japan. ¶4. (C) After a brief flight on the 13th to Kyoto, Wen met local political and business leaders before touring the area, visiting a farm family and playing baseball with students at Ritsumeikan University. He addressed a business symposium before returning to Beijing that evening. ¶5. (C) The major deliverable from the visit, according to MOFA sources, was the kickoff of a newly elevated economic dialogue. ABE and Wen attended the startup meeting and announced that MOFA Foreign Minister Taro Aso and Chinese Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan will co-chair the first formal session of the talks to be held in Beijing later this year. MOFA China Division Director Akiba relayed on April 16 that jockeying among the various Japanese government agencies for the leading role in the new economic dialogue had been intense. Akiba indicated that Foreign Minister Aso's substantial political strength had been the major factor in securing MOFA's position as the head of the Japanese side. ¶6. (C) In addition to increased economic cooperation, ABE and Wen agreed to boost efforts on energy cooperation and environmental conservation. China agreed to join international talks on a post-Kyoto framework, which could result in Beijing cutting greenhouse gas emissions, MOFA China Division Principal Deputy Director Kazuya Endo asserted on April 23. Tokyo and Beijing also agreed to strengthen environmental protection efforts to reduce air and water pollution. Japan will seek to improve energy efficiency in China by sharing Japanese technology. ¶7. (C) China agreed to establish regular civil passenger charter flights between Tokyo's Haneda Airport and Shanghai's Hongqiao Airport. Japan was disappointed Beijing was unwilling to set a start date for the new aviation routes to take effect, but understands Beijing needs to resolve technical obstacles first. Endo noted that Beijing is committed to increasing aviation routes, but due to its cumbersome bureaucracy, will need time to cut through the "red tape" necessary to equip Hongqiao, which only handles domestic traffic at present, for international flights. In addition, the South Koreans are also pressing the Chinese to TOKYO 00001743 002.2 OF 003 allow flights from Korea to land at Hongqiao Airport, according to Endo. Consequently, the Chinese, in consideration of their relations with Seoul, would likely want to reach agreement with Korea before accepting flights from Tokyo, Endo said. ¶8. (C) The failure to reach an agreement on joint development in the East China Sea before the summit was disappointing, and Tokyo will seek to reach an agreement before autumn, Endo conveyed. The joint press statement's language on East China Sea included new wording but did not offer any new ideas, and the distance between Tokyo and Beijing on joint development will be difficult to bridge, Endo acknowledged. Japan pushed for joint development of four gas fields, including the Shirakaba gas field (Chuxiao in Chinese) located near the median line. Beijing was unwilling to compromise, and the wording of the joint statement reflects Beijing's unchanged stance. ¶9. (C) Behind-the-scenes negotiation over the joint press statement continued right up until Wen arrived in Tokyo, Endo shared. Tokyo was pleased with the final draft and considered the joint statement text on "Chinese sympathy and understanding toward the humanitarian concern of Japanese people" to be a new and positive change on China's part. The statement indicating that Beijing hopes Japan will play "an even greater role in the international community," and is a step toward reaching a common understanding on UN reform, Endo suggested. Both statements are significant because, even though Chinese leaders have already verbally conveyed this to Japan several times over the past few months, it is the first time China has included it in a written statement, he emphasized. ¶10. (C) PM ABE pressed Wen for increased transparency in PRC defense matters and also asked for greater transparency in China's foreign assistance, according to MOFA contacts. Wen downplayed controversial issues during his visit, showing restraint when discussing history and Taiwan, our contacts observed. During a meeting with Prime Minister Abe, Wen said "History issues, if they are settled amicably, could result in a good political foundation for the development of bilateral relations; if handled poorly, they could become an obstacle," MOFA's Endo related. Turning to Taiwan, Wen told Abe that China will not accept an independent Taiwan but dropped efforts to pressure Japan to alter language on Taiwan in the joint press statement (Ref A). ¶11. (C) At a lunch in Kyoto, and during a dinner in Osaka with business leaders and Kansai governors, Wen accentuated the positive aspects of doing business in China. The local business community reacted well to his upbeat remarks. One Japanese attendee, when pressed for details on substance, told an Osaka-Kobe Consulate-General political officer "The important things are that Wen was here, and that my company's CEO had dinner with the Chinese Premier." Wen's "Common Touch" -------------- ¶12. (C) Wen went out of his way to demonstrate to both China and Japan that the "ice has melted" in bilateral relations, making that phrase a prominent sound bite in his speech before the Japanese Diet. His Diet speech, which was broadcast live in both Japan and China, received a standing ovation, albeit the applause volume dropped during the speech and some members appeared to doze off. China clearly wished to present an image of Wen as a "regular guy." NHK featured Wen mingling with locals during a morning jog through the park the morning of his Diet speech. Later in Kyoto, when greeted by flag-waving students at Ritsumeikan University, Wen stopped his motorcade, broke away from his security detail, and walked to the campus speech venue shaking hands en route, MOFA Ambassador-at Large Shichiro Amae relayed to Osaka-Kobe Consulate General officer. ¶13. (C) Wen demonstrated a willingness to go "off-script" several times during his visit to Kyoto and Osaka. He also seemed open to advice from his senior staff, and displayed a willingness to change his mind, Ambassador Amae noted. On the baseball field in Kyoto, he demonstrated personal determination, spending ten-plus unscripted and unselfconscious minutes running around and warming up before practicing his pitch in front of TV cameras, Amae related. TOKYO 00001743 003.2 OF 003 ¶14. (C) The efficient, yet comfortable, teamwork displayed by Wen's support staff was impressive, Amae remarked. Amae singled out three people who appeared closest to Wen: Commerce Minister Bo Xilai; Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council Li Shishi (who Amae said functioned as Wen's "second brain" and is fluent in English); and VFM Wu Dawei, of whom Wen seemed particularly fond. Comment: On Track -------------- ¶15. (C) Both Japan and China recognize the need to get bilateral relations on a constructive track, following the chilly Koizumi years. Wen's visit constitutes an important next step in that direction. Recalling the anti-Japanese riots in China two years ago, creating warm atmospherics of the Wen visit was a major achievement in and of itself. That said, the deliverables on economics, energy, and the environment were long on show and short on substance. The most worrisome issue -- the continued tensions over the gas fields in the East China Sea -- was left unresolved. MOFA officials and Diet members insist that Japan is committed to further strengthening ties with China. They see Wen's visit as a prelude to a visit by ABE to China following Japan's Upper House election in July and a President Hu visit to Japan early next year. History issues, however, will remain a potential thorn in Abe's side. SCHIEFFER