Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TOKYO1557
2007-04-10 05:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

JAPANESE CONCERNED BY NORTH KOREAN "PROPAGANDA";

Tags:  PREL PHUM KN JA 
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #1557/01 1000541
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 100541Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2489
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6515
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1607
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2588
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 001557 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM KN JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE CONCERNED BY NORTH KOREAN "PROPAGANDA";
PASS POLICY PAPERS ON DPRK TO U.S., PRC, ROK, RUSSIA


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan for reasons
1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 001557 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2017 TAGS: PREL PHUM KN JA SUBJECT: JAPANESE CONCERNED BY NORTH KOREAN "PROPAGANDA"; PASS POLICY PAPERS ON DPRK TO U.S., PRC, ROK, RUSSIA Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Japan is concerned by what it considers an increased volume of North Korean propaganda that asserts Japan has not made apologies for past "criminal" conduct and that Pyongyang has done all it can to address the abductee issue. MOFA Deputy Director for Asian and Oceanian Affairs Junichi Ihara told Embassy Tokyo POLITICAL Minister Counselor April 8 that Japan wants its friends to know that it is sincere in its desire to normalize RELATIONS with the DPRK, that former Prime Minister Koizumi did acknowledge Japan's "deep remorse and heartfelt apology" in the 2002 Pyongyang statement, and that Tokyo is not using the abduction issue as an "excuse" not to normalize relations. Ihara said it is Japan's goal to get this message to Kim Jong-Il through the North's negotiators, and that the progress towards normalization Japan seeks can only be realized once Kim Jong-Il makes the strategic decision that he, too, wants normal relations. ¶2. (C) To counter the North's propaganda campaign, MOFA has prepared two non-papers entitled "Japan's Basic Stance on DPRK Issues" and "Why the Government of Japan Considers the Abduction Issue Unresolved." The texts of both follow below. Ihara told us he had last week delivered similar demarches and copies of the papers to diplomats from the Russian, Chinese, and South Korean embassies. He reported they had listened passively and taken the message on board. ¶3. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT: Japan's Basic Stance on DPRK Issues - April 2007 ¶1. Japan's Basic Policy concerning the Japan-DPRK RELATIONS The Government of Japan (GOJ) seeks to normalize its relations with the DRPK, on the basis of (i) comprehensive resolution of the outstanding issues of concern between Japan and the DPRK, including the abduction issue, nuclear issue, and missile issue, as well as (ii) settlement of the unfortunate past, in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. ¶2. Abduction Issue At the Japan-DPRK summit meeting held in Pyongyang on September 17, 2002, Chairman Kim Jong-II acknowledged for the first time that the DPRK had abducted Japanese citizens, offered an apology and pledged to prevent recurrence of such acts. To date,
the GOJ has identified 17 Japanese citizens as victims of abduction by the DPRK. Only five of them have returned to Japan. Abduction is an extremely important issue that affects the lives and safety of the Japanese people, and therefore without resolution of this issue, there can be no normalization of RELATIONS with the DPRK. In line with this policy, the GOJ strongly urges the DPRK to immediately return the victims and their family to Japan, provide a full account of the victims and hand over those responsible for the abductions. ¶3. Nuclear Issue The DPRK's possession of nuclear devices is totally unacceptable. The GOJ believes that, at this point, the Six-Party Talks is the most appropriate forum to deal with the nuclear issue. The GOJ strongly urges the DPRK to take concrete actions toward the abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in accordance with the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, the document adopted by the Six Parties on February 13, 2007, and the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718. ¶4. Missile Issue The DPRK's missile activities such as development, experiment, production, deployment, and export of its ballistic missiles are a grave concern for the entire international community. Precisely for this reason, UNSCR 1718 decides that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and shall abandon all its ballistic missile programmes. The GOJ urges the DPRK to fully and expeditiously implement this Security Council Resolution. ¶5. Settlement of the unfortunate past Japan's basic position on the unfortunate past is stated in the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration: "The Japanese side regards, in a spirit of humility, the facts of history that Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Korea through its colonial rule in the past, and expressed deep remorse and heartfelt apology." Regarding how to settle this issue, the Declaration lays out the following basic principles. Japan and the DPRK have agreed that they would advance the normalization talks according to these principles. (i) After the normalization of the relations, the Japanese side will provide the DPRK side with economic co-operation, including grant aids, long-term loans with low interest rates and such assistances as humanitarian assistance through international organizations, over a period of time deemed appropriate by both sides, and will provide other loans and credits by such financial institutions as the Japan Bank of International Co-operation with a view to supporting private economic activities. (ii) Both sides will mutually waive all their property and claims and those of their nationals that have arisen from causes, which occurred before August 15, 1945. These principles are the same as those adopted with Japan and the ROK normalized their diplomatic RELATIONS in 1965. END TEXT. ¶4. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT: Why the Government of Japan Considers the Abduction Issue Unresolved - April 2007 To date, the Government of Japan (GOJ) has identified 17 Japanese citizens as victims of abduction by the DPRK and has demanded the DPRK to return them immediately. The DPRK claims that: "Five surviving abductees have returned to Japan, eight others have died, two have never entered the DPRK, and the other two have not been confirmed to have entered the DPRK." As stated below, however, the DPRK has provided no evidence confirming their claim of the "deaths" of the eight abductees, and has not yet revealed the whole truths regarding the abduction issue. ¶1. The DPRK has not provided any objective evidence confirming the "deaths" of the 8 abductees. In September 2002, the DPRK provided the GOJ's investigation team with "death certificates" of the eight abductees in question. But after the GOJ challenged the authenticity of these documents, the DPRK admitted in 2004 that the documents had in fact been hastily made during the 2002 visit of the investigation team. The DPRK has ever since continued to fail to provide any evidence of the "deaths" of the eight abductees. Furthermore, in 2004, the DPRK provided the GOJ with what they claimed to be the "remains" of two of the eight abductees, including those of Ms. Megumi Yokota. When DNA analysis was conducted on these two "remains" in accordance with the criminal law procedure of Japan, the detected DNA sequences proved to be different from those of the two abductees. ¶2. The alleged causes of "deaths" of the eight abductees are unnatural even when the situation of the DPRK is considered. The DPRK claims that among the 13 Japanese citizens whom the DPRK admitted having abducted, eight abductees died during the years 1979-1996. As mentioned earlier, however, the DPRK has been unable to provide any evidence corroborating these "deaths". Furthermore, the explanations given by the DPRK on events leading to the "deaths" of the abductees are extremely unnatural. For example, the DPRK explains that one abductee died from heart attack while swimming, despite the fact that he did not know how to swim when he was in Japan. Another Abductee "died from heart failure" at the age of 27, although she was witnessed to be in good shape one day before the day on which the DPRK claims she died. These cast much doubt on the credibility of the explanations by the DPRK. ¶3. The DRPK has given refuge to the hijackers of the 1970 Japan Airlines hijacking case and supports their activities. The DRPK has been denying the irrefutable involvement of those hijackers in the abduction of three Japanese citizens. Testimonies to the Japanese court by an ex-wife of a hijacker disclosed that one of the hijackers had actually abducted Ms. Keiko Arimoto in 1982 during her trip in Europe. He is on the international "wanted" list for this case. There is also evidence indicating that wives of the hijackers were involved in the abduction of Mr. Toru Ishioka and Mr. Kaoru Matsuki, which also occurred in Europe in 1980. The DPRK's denial of the hijacker's involvement in those cases raises doubts as to the credibility of the explanation by the DPRK on these three abductees, who the DPRK claims have died. ¶4. The DPRK has not yet accepted responsibility for the 1987 Korean Airlines bombings, and has therefore denied the fact that one of the culprits for the bombing had been trained by a Japanese abductee. From testimonies given by Kim Hyon Hui, a former DRPK agent who carried out the bombing, to the ROK court and information provided by the abductees who have returned to Japan, "Lee Un-Hae", an instructor of this former DPRK agent, was identified as Japanese abductee Ms. Yaeko Taguchi. The DRPK has flatly denied any such fact, which has cast doubt on the overall explanation by the DPRK regarding the safety of Ms. Taguchi. END TEXT. SCHIEFFER

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