SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL KEATING'S VISIT TO JAPAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 001474 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR U.S. PACOM, ADMIRAL KEATING E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2022 TAGS: PGOV PINR JN SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL KEATING'S VISIT TO JAPAN Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER. REASONS 1.4 (B),(D). Overview -------------- ¶1. (C) You take your command as Japan contemplates major changes in its approach to our alliance and Japan's role in the region and the world. Prime Minister SHINZO Abe's government is focused on expanding Japan's ties, including security relations, with new partners like Australia and India. It is taking a more active role, on its own and in partnership with us, to expand its role in South, Southeast, and Central Asia. Japan has deployed forces overseas in support of U.S.-led coalition efforts in Iraq, the Indian Ocean, and for Southeast Asia tsunami relief. These experiences have not only improved the ability of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to operate with our military abroad, but also deepened their experience working with other U.S. partners, including Australia and NATO. Japanese public support for our alliance is at an all-time high. Polling also shows that the popularity of the SDF has increased following overseas deployments. ¶2. (C) Bilaterally, we are rapidly moving towards a more balanced partnership in which Japan plays a more direct role in its own defense and in operations with U.S. forces in the region and beyond. Japan's embrace of ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation is driving policy makers and politicians to review post-war restrictions on the exercise of collective self-defense. Enhanced interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces has increased the sharing of intelligence on a political as well as operational basis. China's growing economic and military power and North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons development have made the need for a close alliance with the U.S. very concrete to the Japanese man-in-the-street. ¶3. (C) Progress on the policy and operational fronts have unfortunately not been matched by an increase in Japan's financial outlays for security. Japan's defense budget has stagnated for the past five years, even as the SDF has assumed ambitious new roles and missions. Maintaining Japan's Host Nation Support, traditionally a pillar of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, will become increasingly difficult over the coming years. The current Special Measures Agreement (SMA),covering approximately $1.1 billion of Japan's HNS contributions, is set to expire on March 31, 2008. We need to constantly remind Japanese leaders of the growing gap in defense spending between the U.S. and Japan and the political risk for Japan if it were to reduce its share of alliance responsibilities any further. Domestic Politics -------------- ¶4. (C) You will be arriving in Japan just ahead of nation-wide local elections and the campaign for the critical July 22 Upper House vote. If the LDP seriously under-performs expectations, ABE could face a challenge to his leadership from within his party. Support for Abe's cabinet dropped dramatically in the first few months of his administration. Abe got off to a strong start with popular fence mending visits to Beijing and Seoul. But his decision to allow the return of party rebels kicked out of the LDP under former Prime Minister Koizumi has tarnished his credentials as a reformer and driven his approval ratings down to the low 40's. A series of scandals and gaffes by Cabinet ministers has led to a media image of ABE as weak and indecisive. ABE is blessed, however, with a feckless and disunited opposition camp. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is almost certain to pick up seats in the July Upper House election, but small gains are not likely to topple ABE from his leadership position. 5, (C) The deterioration of Abe's political fortunes has made him more cautious. We assess that it will be more and more difficult to get the Japanese to break any new ground with us on security policy initiatives until the July elections are out of the way. The same is true on the economic front. Japan is back from the economic slump of the 1990's, thanks in large measure to the reforms of former Prime Minister Koizumi. Prime Minister ABE pledged to continue a robust economic reform agenda, seeking an "open and innovative" economy. Further reform is fundamental to raising Japan's economic growth rate and removing obstacles to strengthening the bilateral economic relationship. So far, however, Abe's actions indicate a lack of commitment to economic reform, partially due to a resurgence of anti-reform elements within the LDP and to caution prior to the July 2007 Upper House Elections Foreign Policy -------------- ¶6. (C) Six-Party Talks with North Korea have increased Japanese anxieties that they will be marginalized as our leading ally in Asia. The Japanese are worried that we could disregard their concerns over the abduction issue in an effort to reach a deal with the North Koreans. Their initial reaction to the Six-Party Talks Agreement has been generally positive, but with an undercurrent of unease that Japan's abduction issue was not adequately addressed. Many of our political interlocutors concede that the agreement on the nuclear issue is a good thing, but worry that the United States "again passed Japan" and cut a deal with the DPRK. The failure of Japan-DPRK Working Group talks in Hanoi on the abduction issue earlier this month has increased public unease over Japan's possible isolation within the Six-Party framework. 7, (C) Relations with both Koreas have been complicated by the reaction of Abe's right-wing supporters to Congressman Honda's resolution on Japan's treatment of "comfort women," girls and women forced to work in military brothels during WWII. ABE has vacillated between reassuring the international community that past official apologies still stand and appeasing hard-line supporters who are seeking to "revise" the official history of the issue. ABE called President Bush to reaffirm that his government would stand by the apology made in the 1993 Kono agreement. ABE hopes this will quiet American critics at least long enough for him to have a successful summit April 26-27. ¶8. (C) ABE has done a better job about stabilizing Japan's relations with China. Beijing has been careful not to be drawn into the public debate on comfort women, which could risk creating another chronic irritant like former Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. An upcoming series of high-level visits, including Premier Wen Jiabao's visit the same week as yours, should keep the bilateral atmospherics positive for the immediate future. ¶9. (C) Despite the recent upbeat tone in Japan-China relations, China is viewed among policymakers in Tokyo as Japan's most significant long-term diplomatic and security challenge. Beijing's recent anti-satellite test has exacerbated long-standing concerns over China's long-term defense build-up. Japanese military planners are increasingly focused on PLA activities in the East China Sea. Concern over the PRC's growing political and military clout is driving Japan to diversify its strategic relationships. Prime Minister ABE has advocated closer relations with NATO and a "Quad" forum that would bring together the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. Foreign Minister Aso has also promoted the concept of an "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity," which would expand Japan's activities in South and Central Asia. The Japanese government also launched an initiative last May at the "Island Summit" in Okinawa to enhance Japanese engagement with the Pacific island nations with an eye towards limiting PRC influence. Security Policy -------------- ¶10. (C) ABE has set out to accelerate Japan's progress towards "normalcy" in its security policy by strengthening the bilateral alliance and reaching out to others with new proposals. In a speech before the Atlantic Council in January, he declared Japan's ambition to deepen ties with NATO, and to not shy away from dispatching forces overseas to support international efforts. Japanese officials have since sought to downplay any expectations of "boots on the ground" in Afghanistan, however, or of any sudden breakthroughs in SDF interaction with NATO. ABE will be particularly cautious on defense policy in the lead-up to the July election. Nevertheless, he has secured Diet backing to extend Japan's oiler support mission in the Indian Ocean, and requested that the Diet extend the ASDF airlift mission Kuwait and Iraq for another two years. ¶11. (C) Another initiative immune from Japan's recent pre-election go-slow stance is trilateral defense cooperation with the U.S. and Australia. The inaugural meeting of the Assistant Secretary-level Australia-Japan-U.S. Security and Defense SIPDIS Forum (SDCF) will be held in Tokyo during your visit. Japan and Australia issued a Joint Declaration on Security in early March that makes Canberra Japan's closest defense partner aside from the U.S. While not a treaty with security obligations, the Joint Declaration calls for deepening cooperation across a spectrum of areas - such as disaster relief, information sharing, maritime security - and creates a regular "2 2" meeting of foreign and defense ministers to spur progress forward. ¶12. (C) After the July election, we expect the Prime Minister to follow through on his pledge to reassess Japan's self-imposed prohibition on collective self-defense, particularly as it relates to the use of BMD assets to defend the U.S. against incoming missiles. ABE has not revealed his position on draft "blanket overseas dispatch" legislation -- which would obviate the need for separate legislation to bless each Self-Defense Force deployment abroad. Defense policy realists within the LDP advocate using such legislation as a vehicle to break the ban on using force abroad, but other elements in the ruling coalition insist that the issue can only be resolved through formal revision of the constitution's pacifist Article 9. Alliance Transformation -------------- ¶13. (C) Efforts to implement the landmark "2 2" Security Consultative Committee (SCC) May 1, 2006 Alliance Transformation Roadmap are progressing well. The Japanese government took a major step forward in fulfilling its side of the agreement in February when the Cabinet approved legislation to facilitate work on base realignment. The law, which may pass the Lower House as early as this month, includes measures to induce cooperation from base hosting communities and to facilitate investment in infrastructure and housing on Guam. The Japanese government will also start survey work at Camp Schwab for the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). The Okinawan government has given tacit approval for this activity and appears prepared to assist in accelerating realignment activities on the island. ¶14. (C) While we welcome Japan's initiative thus far on realignment, we need to remind Tokyo to stay committed on funding. They will cover an estimated $26 billion in costs for realignment alone between now and 2014 (although this amount is not discussed publicly). Japan will point to this price tag in arguing for sharp cuts in Japan's Host Nation Support contributions. Negotiations on a new 5-year Special Measures Agreement (SMA) are expected to begin this summer. SMA is a likely subject for discussion at the May 1 SCC meeting and perhaps the April Washington summit. SCHIEFFER