DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR CROUCH'S VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 001211 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR WILDER AND MILES E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2017 TAGS: PREL PARM PTER PHUM ECON ETRD EAID MARR KWBG UNSC, NATO, RS, XF, IZ, IN, AS, KS, KN, JA SUBJECT: DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR CROUCH'S VISIT TO JAPAN Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d ) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Japan is committed to ballistic missile defense and working toward early deployment of the missile defense agreement, DFM Yachi told DNSA Crouch that during February 26-27 meetings. Japan is troubled by the lack of transparency in China's military development and developmental assistance. As key players in the region, the U.S., Japan, China and Russia should have a stable framework within which to resolve major issues, Yachi stated. He asked that the abduction issue be resolved before North Korea is removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. PM Abe understands and supports the U.S. position In Iraq, he assured, adding that Japan wants to be involved and "not just handed a bill." On UNSC reform, Yachi expressed disappointment that, after nine months, the U.S. had still not responded to Japan,s "Option D" proposal. FM Aso stressed that dismantling the DPRK's nuclear weapons program is the most important long-term issue facing Japan. DefMin Kyuma reassured that Japan is committed to the realignment agreement and "now focused on implementation." END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) During a visit to Tokyo February 26-27, Deputy National Security Advisor J.D. Crouch, Jr., called on FM Taro Aso, DM Fumio Takemasa Kyuma, and National Security Advisor Yuriko Koike, and held extensive meetings with Deputy Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi, who was accompanied by a number of MOFA Directors General. He also meet with Vice Minister of Defense Moriya, members of the Diet, and engaged in public diplomacy events with print and television journalists, as well as with university students. Dr. Crouch was accompanied to his meetings by National Security Council Acting Senior Director for Asian Affairs Dennis Wilder, Executive Assistant Richard Miles, Embassy Tokyo Charge d'Affairs Joe Donovan, and by Embassy notetakers. -------------- MEETINGS WITH DFM YACHI -------------- ¶3. (C) DNSA J.D. Crouch spent several hours on February 26 and 27 with Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Shotaro Yachi discussing a wide range of bilateral and regional issues. Yachi was accompanied by a number of MOFA Directors General who came and went from the meetings depending upon the subject being discussed. The highlights of these discussions are as follows: Bilateral Issues -------------- ¶4. (C) U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE AND USFJ REALIGNMENT -- Prime Minister Abe is committed to strengthening bilateral security ties and appreciated President Bush's strong message of support for Japan following the North Korea nuclear test, Yachi stated. As Abe noted in his January 26 policy speech, Japan is committed to ballistic missile defense and is striving for an early deployment of the missile defense agreement. Japan still faces some difficulty in implementing its commitments associated with USFJ realignment, Yachi noted, but PM Abe is working hard to get agreement from the local communities. The bill to provide funding for troop relocation is expected to pass this Diet session, and the general agreement on protecting sensitive bilateral military information will probably pass within the next few weeks, or within a couple months at the latest. Government officials, both in and outside of MOFA, already have a heightened awareness on the need to protect sensitive information, Yachi explained. Yachi stressed his opposition to arguments that Japan should develop a nuclear deterrent. Tokyo's dependence on U.S. nuclear protection means that Japan is, for all intents and purposes, also a nuclear power. It is therefore "stupid," he opined, for observers to state in public that the U.S. would not defend Japan in the case of an attack. Rather, critics and others should make clear that the U.S. would definitely defend Japan. ¶5. (C) U.S.-JAPAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION: Intellectual property rights, energy security, and bilateral trade will be discussed at the sub-cabinet economic dialogue meeting in April, Yachi related. In response to Crouch's suggestion that, while the time was not right for a free trade agreement (FTA),we should be thinking ahead to a time when this might be possible, Yachi replied that while he personally thinks it would be a good idea to start the discussion at a very high level, Japan is not ready for this domestically. The WTO Doha Round negotiations are one reason Japan is reluctant to move forward on an FTA at this time. Japan wants to be involved in the Doha core discussions and is worried that the United States and European Union will reach an agreement, without including Japan in the discussions, and then expect Japan to foot the bill, Yachi cautioned. Yachi emphasized that this has happened before and he requested the United States keep Japan informed on these negotiations. China -------------- ¶6. (C) Yachi said that China's lack of transparency in its military programs remains of concern to Japan, but reported that overall Sino-Japanese relations are improving. In a meeting Yachi held with Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo, both sides agreed to a "mutually beneficial relationship built on common strategic interests," and plan to pursue a "win-win" relationship by undertaking a large-scale cooperative project such as bilateral nuclear cooperation or joint development of gas fields in the East China Sea. Regarding China's continued lack of transparency, VFM Yachi noted that PM Abe, during his visit to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on 12 January, secured a commitment from German Chancellor Angela Merkel to oppose lifting the European Union's arms embargo to China. Observing that transparency on China's economic assistance to African countries like Sudan was also important, Yachi urged the international community to devote greater attention to this issue and obtain China's adherence to international codes of conduct on providing international assistance. ¶7. (C) U.S.-China relations are generally positive, Crouch replied, although ongoing issues such as China's lack of military transparency, as well as trade and currency revaluation disputes, could present significant challenges this year for Beijing and Washington. While the U.S. is pleased with China's efforts to help the Six-Party Talks reach an agreement, concerns about China's military modernization remain. Highlighting the strong international reaction to China,s January 11 anti-satellite (ASAT) test, Crouch opined that the lack of information from Beijing on the purpose and intention of China's military modernization was alarming, and not in China's interests. Though the U.S. supports China's "peaceful rise," it is important that the U.S. and alliance partners work together in joint efforts such as ballistic missile defense (BMD) to support the alliance, Crouch said. The U.S. is also closely watching China's aid diplomacy in Africa, with particular focus on how China's provision of development aid to African countries impacts corruption and democratic development in the region. Russia -------------- ¶8. (C) As key players in the Asia region, the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia should have in place a stable framework among them to resolve key issues and maintain peace and stability in the region, Yachi suggested. Focusing on Japan-Russia relations, Yachi indicated that the January session of the Japan-Russia Strategic Dialogue - the first such meeting between the two countries - was "quite good," but emphasized the need to resolve the outstanding territorial dispute over the Northern Territories. Yachi speculated that the upcoming meeting between PM Mikhail Fradkov and PM Abe might result in an agreement to start negotiations on nuclear energy cooperation, which is of importance to Japan. Noting Russia's "very aggressive efforts" to control the supply and transportation of energy due to high oil and gas prices, as well as Moscow's efforts to limit U.S. influence in Central Asia and the Caucuses, DNSA Crouch explained that the U.S is calling upon Russia to be a stable supplier of energy, while also urging other nations to diversify their energy supply and transport. North Korea -------------- ¶9. (C) While Japan views the recent Six-Party Talks agreement as a positive initial step toward resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, VFM Yachi made two requests of the U.S. as the Six-Party process moves forward and separate working groups are convened. First, Japan would like to convene the Japan-North Korea working group prior to the U.S.-North Korea working group meeting out of concern that Pyongyang will not take the Japan-North Korea session - particularly resolution of the abduction issue - seriously if the U.S. and North Korea meet first. Should this arrangement not be possible, Tokyo requests that the two meetings be held at the same time. Second, Japan wants resolution of the abduction issue to be a requirement for removing North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. Responding to Yachi's statement that Japan does not want Japan-North Korea issues to be left behind, DNSA Crouch agreed to discuss the timing of the respective working group meetings with EAP A/S Hill, and assured Yachi that removal from the state sponsors of terrorism list "would not happen overnight." South Korea -------------- ¶10. (C) While affirming Japan's commitment to building positive relations with South Korea, VFM Yachi expressed frustration with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, recalling three separate occasions between October and December 2006 in which Roh raised historical grievances with Japan. Noting Roh's interest in visiting Japan, Yachi stated that, frankly, the atmosphere in Japan was not conducive to extending Roh a warm welcome, a point Yachi has conveyed to his South Korean counterpart. While acknowledging that it will be a difficult year for Japan-ROK relations (and that little could be done before the election),Japan is nevertheless focused on laying the groundwork for improved future relations with South Korea. Near term events include hosting a number of cabinet-level visits and sponsoring a Japan-South Korea youth exchange program, Yachi said. India -------------- ¶11. (C) Citing the low volume of bilateral trade and educational exchanges between Japan and India, VFM Yachi highlighted several upcoming events aimed at enhancing Japan-India ties, including a March visit to Japan by Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee for the two countries' first ministerial-level Strategic Dialogue. Yachi shared other ideas to expand ties with India, including an idea by PM Abe to create a quadrilateral forum that would include India, the U.S., Japan, and Australia. While China's sensitivities would have to be considered, such a meeting could be useful in fostering greater dialogue and cooperation among the "four democracies," he said. DNSA Crouch cautioned in response that the U.S., Japan, and Australia should be careful of creating a new forum that would require a significant level of diplomatic energy and resources, without necessarily being able to effectively address key issues of concern. While the U.S. is in favor of the idea conceptually, Crouch explained, it would be better to target an area in which progress would be relatively easy to achieve, and that is separate from initiatives pursued within the current U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral framework. Regarding the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement, Yachi shared that PM Abe, with advance notice to President Bush, will tell PM Mukerjee during his March visit that Tokyo will give the issue "positive consideration." Iraq -------------- ¶12. (C) Japan respects the new U.S. Iraq policy, understands and supports Washington's efforts, and believes that the new strategy will succeed in Baghdad, Middle East Bureau Deputy Director General Hideki Ito stated. However, much remains to be done in order to bring about reconciliation between the different factions. Japan seeks to make its own contribution, by inviting 15 participants to join a reconciliation council meeting in Tokyo. Japan also increased its economic assistance by USD 100 million this fiscal year for use in Iraq by international organizations. Finally, the Abe Administration plans to funnel USD 4.5 million through UNHCR to assist Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria (USD 1.5 million and USD 3.0 million respectively). Yachi applauded President Bush for sending what he described as a "strong signal that the U.S. would not stay forever" in Iraq. PM Abe understands and supports the U.S. position. In a pitch to be included more in meetings regarding Iraq, Yachi added "We want to do more if we are involved. However, if we are not involved, we would say 'please don't send the bill to us.'" Middle East -------------- ¶13. (C) Japan plans to invite representatives from the Palestinian Authority, Israel, and Jordan to attend Four-Party Talks in Tokyo in March, DDG Ito explained. Tokyo hoped that the gathering would generate proposals for long-term confidence-building measures. MOFA is currently engaged in discussions with Palestinian officials regarding the talks and Tokyo hopes the Palestinians might take steps to reconcile with Israel. Crouch replied that with regard to the Palestinian issue, the United States would take a "wait and see" approach because: 1) Washington is not certain what final form the new Palestinian government will take, and 2) the U.S. had received signals from other Middle East countries indicating that we should not rush to embrace the new government. The international community would need to encourage Hamas to recognize Israel, he underscored. The U.S. will not ask Israel to sit down with a government that does not recognize Israel's existence. UNSC Reform -------------- ¶14. (C) The United States supports Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC, Crouch assured Yachi. The United States is concerned, however, that all of Japan's proposals on UNSC reform have been "framework" type proposals that allow a number of countries to join at once without specifying which countries. Allowing in a number of nations at one time could weaken the UNSC's effectiveness. Moreover, given the uncertainty of UN voting patterns, it would be difficult to predict which countries would acquire seats. Crouch said that ideally, the United States would prefer if Japan could join the UNSC first with other countries joining later, although he admitted that this option would be difficult to realize because it would be hard for Japan to garner the required number of UN votes as the sole candidate. Yachi agreed the UNSC must remain an effective instrument, but expressed disappointment that the United States has not yet responded to Japan's Model D proposal more than nine months after it was presented. NATO - Europe -------------- ¶15. (C) Japan appreciates U.S. support for Tokyo's efforts in Europe where Japan hoped to have closer relations with NATO, Yachi said. "Japan should be a de facto member of NATO," he said, but limit its involvement to peacekeeping operations. PM Abe hoped to speak before the North Atlantic Council on an annual basis and hoped to begin talks with NATO "soon." -------------- MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER TARO ASO -------------- ¶16. (C) Dismantling the DPRK nuclear weapons program is the most important long-term issue facing Japan, FM Aso told DNSA Crouch during a February 27 meeting, agreeing that the recent Six-Party Talks agreement is merely the beginning of a long negotiation process and that the real test will lay in the DPRK's follow-through. Publicly, however, the Government of Japan must place priority on resolving the abduction issue. Aso reported that Japanese investment in China is recovering after a 31 percent decline caused by perceived Chinese hostility, and said that he has noticed a fairly dramatic positive change in attitude by Chinese leaders toward Japan. He believes today's China resembles Japan in the bubble years and predicted an economic downturn after the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Dealing with such a downturn will be just as difficult as dealing with China's rise, as the Chinese government does not know how to manage a soft landing, he warned. Aso noted that the Japanese people's stance on self-defense has changed dramatically over the last several years, primarily due to Kim Jong-il's actions. -------------- --- MEETING WITH ADVISOR FOR NATIONAL SECURITY KOIKE -------------- --- ¶17. (C) Japan cannot accept North Korea's removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, Japan's National Security Advisor Yuriko Koike told DNSA Crouch February 27, and asked for U.S. support on the abduction issue and close coordination of their respective working groups with the DPRK. Koike said she will do her utmost to facilitate the quick implementation of the October 2005 Security Consultative Committee agreement, and advocated expediting cooperation on ballistic missile defense. DNSA Crouch pointed to unresolved BMD-related issues, including whether co-developed systems can be used to defend the United States. He reasoned that it "makes no sense" to have parallel systems that cannot communicate. Koike explained that Japan's plan to establish a Japan National Security Council fills a need created by the post-Cold War situation. The Japan National Security Council (JNSC) will serve as a forum for collaboration with the U.S. National Security Council and facilitate better coordination on national security issues, Koike reported. The creation of a JNSC reflects Prime Minister Abe's strong leadership as part of his advocacy of "embarking into the future from the post-war regime." In the post-Cold War era, the JNSC will fill a need and help assure a stable security environment for Japan and East Asia, she observed. -------------- MEETING WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE FUMIO KYUMA -------------- ¶18. (C) In contrast to recent troublesome statements about U.S. policy in Iraq and the realignment process, Minister of Defense Fumio Kyuma told DNSA Crouch on February 27 that the Ministry of Defense is committed to the realignment agreement and is "now focused on implementation," highlighting MCAS Futenma relocation as his "number one task." On Iraq, Kyuma stressed his appreciation for U.S. efforts there, saying "we are here to support." Renewing Diet authorization for Japan's air transport mission in Iraq would be one of his highest priorities, he said. On the need for a Japanese NSC, Kyuma predicted the body, once established, would grow through experience. His advice to Prime Minister Abe had been that good personnel would be the key to the NSC's success. ¶19. (C) DNSA Crouch also met separately with MOD Administrative Vice Minister Takemasa Moriya who focused on the same issues, delivering consistent messages. In addition, Moriya stressed the importance of cooperation on ballistic missile defense (BMD) issues. In planning a response to the North Korean missile threat, he said Japan would need to determine, in careful coordination with the U.S., whether it should rely solely on the U.S. ability to strike missile bases, or develop a limited strike capability of its own. Citing Hezbollah rocket attacks against Israel, he said Japan was also concerned about the emerging threat of missiles fired by guerillas and from ships. Moriya also waxed nostalgic about his visit to the White House in June 2006 with former Prime Minister Koizumi, praising it as "the best experience" of his career. -------------- PUBLIC DIPLOMACY INITIATIVES -------------- ¶20. (SBU) In addition to his meetings with officials, Dr. Crouch also engaged in a number of public diplomacy initiatives. He attended a lunch hosted in his honor with members of the Diet where he was able to explain U.S. policies and listen to their concerns. He participated in a press roundtable for print journalists which led to a number of stories and also gave interviews to Fuji-TV and NHK television, both of which received air time, along with clips of his meeting with Minister of Defense Kyuma. Finally, Dr. Crouch also conducted an academic roundtable at Waseda University, engaging in a very well received exchange with a number of graduate and undergraduate students. ¶21. (U) This cable has been cleared by DNSA Crouch. SCHIEFFER