AVM MORIYA BLAMES DEFMIN KYUMA FOR UNDERMINING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001116 SIPDIS SIPDIS OSD FOR LAWLESS/SHINN/HILL/BASALLA; COMUSJAPAN FOR J00/ J01,/J4/J5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2017 TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL JA SUBJECT: AVM MORIYA BLAMES DEFMIN KYUMA FOR UNDERMINING DPRI IMPLEMENTATION REF: NAHA 47 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (S) Summary: Ministry of Defense (MOD) Administrative Vice Minister Takemasa Moriya accused Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma of derailing negotiations with the Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG) on implementation of the May 1, 2006 Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) agreement during an informal March 8 dinner. Moriya accused Kyuma of reaching a secret deal with Governor Hirokazu Nakaima to adjust the construction plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) agreed upon by the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) last year. Moriya claimed that Nakaima was motivated only by business interests and can no longer be trusted as a partner in the implementation process. He added that MOD is considering coercive measures that had been contemplated last year in the case of an opposition victory in the November, 2006 Governor election. End Summary. ¶2. (S) During a March 8 dinner hosted by Independent Okinawan Diet Member Mikio Shimoji, MOD AVM Moriya lashed out a Defense Minister Kyuma for sabotaging implementation of the FRF portion of the May 1, 2006 Alliance Transformation Roadmap. Moriya said that it is increasingly clear that Kyuma had secretly promised Gov. Nakaima that he could deliver a bilateral agreement to move the FRF's "V-shape" runway off-shore and is unwilling to back out of this commitment regardless of pressure from Washington or his own government. ¶3. (S) Moriya said he was unsure of why Kyuma got himself into this fix, but suggested that it may be related to under-the-table financial dealings with local business interests. Moriya was less speculative about Nakaima's motives, asserting that the Governor is beholden only to his business cronies and unconcerned about the interests of other local political leaders or the residents of Okinawa. Moriya said that neither Nakaima nor Vice Governor Nakazato could be trusted, and characterized Nakaima as "just as bad as (former Govs.) Inamine or Ota." While characterizing Kyuma as the main trouble-maker within the central government on the FRF, Moriya said that Finance Minister Koji Omi, Okinawan Affairs Minister Sanae Takaichi, and National Security Assistant Yuriko Koike have also tried to insert themselves in unhelpful ways for various personal or financial reasons. ¶4. (S) Moriya asserted that Kyuma has seriously put himself in a corner over the FRF. Kyuma knows that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is furious with his freelancing, but is clearly even more concerned about the prospect of failing his partners in Okinawa. Given the circumstances, Moriya claimed that Kyuma has only two ways out: convince the USG to change the FRF plan or get himself fired by the Prime Minister. Moriya suggested that Kyuma could cite expulsion from the cabinet to explain to his Okinawan associates why he was unable to deliver his end of the deal on the FRF. Moriya asserted that Kyuma's decision not to pursue a 2 2 meeting in March was based on concern that it would reveal that his effort to change the USG position on the FRF had failed. ¶5. (S) Moriya singled out Higashi Namakon Corp. CEO Hirotsugu Nakadomari as the key figure in the initiative to move the FRF off-shore. According to Moriya, Nakadomari worked for former Okinawan Gov. Nishime and had planned a political career of his own. A political scandal severely tarnished Nakadomari's name, making a run for office impossible. Instead of seeking election himself, Nakadomari turned to the construction business and backroom politics. Moriya said Nakadomari has managed to leverage his money and political acumen to position himself as the "kingmaker" in northern Okinawa politics. TOKYO 00001116 002 OF 002 No More Carrots? -------------- ¶6. (S) Moriya suggested that recent actions by Kyuma and, especially, Nakaima have totally ruined prospects for a cooperative way forward with the OPG on the FRF. Moriya noted that MOD will require cooperation from the Governor at five different points in the implementation process, each offering an opportunity for further protracted haggling. Rather than pursuing further discussions with the OPG, Moriya said it was time to prepare for unilateral action. ¶7. (S) In this context, Moriya touted MOD's environmental "pre-survey" work that will be conducted on the reef area off Camp Schwab prior to the formal environmental impact study. Moriya emphasized the importance of moving ahead on this before the May coral spawning season so that work on the FRF project will not slip into next year. Information collected by MOD could later be inputted into the formal environmental certification process, he added. While in theory this could be approved by the OPG, Moriya said that MOD is preparing to move ahead with Special Measures legislation that would suspend OPG's authority to issue permits for DPRI-related survey work. He expressed confidence that the ruling coalition, and perhaps even the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ),would support such legislation as long as it was introduced after the July 22 Upper House election. Realignment Legislation on Track -------------- ¶8. (C) On a more positive note, Moriya offered an upbeat assessment of prospects for Diet passage of base realignment legislation, which includes provisions to allow the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) to finance DPRI projects on Guam. Moriya said that the DPJ appears set to support the bill, but assessed that final Diet action may not come until late May/early June. Comment: Bad, but Not Fatal -------------- ¶9. (S) It is remarkable how freely Moriya shared his contempt for Kyuma and his role on the FRF with USG interlocutors. Moriya's casual remark that "Kyuma never tells me anything" suggests that rumors of a breakdown in communications between the Defense Minister and his deputy are on the mark. Unfortunately, there are also indications that Gov. Nakaima and his top aides have also stopped talking to Moriya and his MOD team, leaving early agreement on FRF construction in doubt. ¶10. (S) Moriya's advocacy of taking a harder line with Okinawa is consistent with recent comments by working level MOD officials. It is far from certain, however, that MOD would receive backing from the Prime Minister's Office or ruling coalition for using coercive action, especially Special Measures legislation, against the conservative Nakaima. If quiet MOD-OPG negotiations do fail, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Kantei would likely seek to use more subtle means, such as withholding payments to DPRI-affected Okinawan municipalities, to apply pressure on Nakaima to cooperate. SCHIEFFER