CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

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TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE
WEEK ENDING APRIL 20


This is CWC-36-07.

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INDUSTRY CLUSTER - OCPF SITE SELECTION METHODOLOGY
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1. (U) Facilitator Luis Garcia (Spain) held an April 17
consultation to discuss the opinion of the Legal Advisor
Santiago Onate regarding what information could be made
available on an anonymous facility list. Onate carefully
laid out his opinion, based on the Verification Annex part
IX, Section B, paragraphs 25, 8, 1 and 4. Onate opined that
it would be easy to provide information as laid out in
paragraphs 1 and 4, referred to directly in paragraph 25.
However paragraph 25 did not exclude the possibility of
providing States Party information discussed in paras 5 and
6, providing that the Executive Council approved such
inclusion. Finally, the key is the random selection
process, regardless of what mechanisms are put into place.


2. (U) Delegations agreed that Onate's exposition was very
clear and well thought out. However, some (Mexico, Turkey,
Cuba, India, Iran, Brazil, South Africa) heard that only
information in paras 1 and 4 could be used by states to make
anonymous facility selections. Others (Canada, Netherlands,
Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, U.S.) heard that other
information could be included, but only with long
negotiations leading to consensus. Germany, supported by
China, Cuba, Brazil, Mexico, and New Zealand, urged
delegations to restrict themselves to the anonymous
information presented in para 4, in order to reach agreement
quickly.


3. (U) The facilitator noted that he had heard no delegation
state that it could not consider supporting his proposal
(although del rep explicitly stated that the U.S. could not
join consensus on the proposal; Switzerland also was very
negative). He announced that he would revise his proposal
based on the discussion and circulate it in the next week or
so for discussion during the June industry week. Canada
called for consideration in a separate venue of the
information provided in OCPF declarations. Such discussions
would allow delegations to find information that would better
reflect the relevance to the Convention of OCPFs. Finally,
Garcia stated that if prospects for consensus did not appear
promising, he would step down as facilitator.

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INDUSTRY CLUSTER - TRANSFER DISCREPANCIES
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4. (U) The co-facilitators (Merel Jonker of the Netherlands
and Kiwako Tanaka of Japan) held a consultation on this topic
on April 17. They circulated a very slightly modified
non-paper (dated 10 April 2007) on "Understanding/Guideline
on import and export data for the AND declaration for
Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals and for Schedule 2 plant site
declarations." They made it clear that the intention of such
a guideline or understanding would not be to harmonize
national legislation on data collection, but rather come to a
common understanding about the types of data that needs to be
collected in order that future declarations generate fewer
discrepancies. They also acknowledged that these
improvements will still result in some discrepancies.


5. (U) The heart of the guideline would be definitions for:

-- Import and export: "The physical movement of scheduled
chemicals from the territory of one State to the territory of
another State, excluding mere transit operations and
transshipments where there is not change in the original
country of destination of the Scheduled chemicals."

-- Transit: "... physical movements in which goods are
passing through the territory of a country."

-- Transhipment: "the procedure under which goods are
transferred from the importing means of transport to the
exporting means of transport within the same port, free zone

or other area outside the customs territory of the State
concerned."


6. (U) Germany proposed a slight modification to the
definition of "transhipment": "The procedure under which
goods are transferred from one means of transport to another
means of transport within the same ..."


7. (U) There was some concern expressed by Germany, the UK,
and Italy about the amount of time something can be stored
within a free port, etc. before it needs to be declared as an
import. They also expressed concern about the complexity of
the issue of free ports in general.


8. (U) Turkey expressed concern about the true value of this
exercise, given that so many SPs do not as yet have
legislation. Although a valid point, it was also pointed out
that such guidelines might ensure that legislation yet to be
developed could incorporate these guidelines from the
beginning.


9. (U) The co-facilitators intend to start preparing a first
draft of a decision that would lay out the guidelines as
discussed to date. Again, this would not be legally binding
on SPs to change their legislation, but rather present the
guidelines in a formal way. This will be discussed at the
next round of consultations.

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INDUSTRY CLUSTER - LATE DECLARATIONS
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10. (U) The facilitator (Larry Denyer, U.S.) met with the TS
at their request the day prior to the consultation (April 17)
to discuss additional comments from the Legal Adviser's
Office (LAO) on the latest draft decision. The comments were
not substantive - they still think the concept of "nil
declarations" is defensible - but rather a concern about the
term "nil declarations" itself. They suggested avoiding the
introduction of this new term but rather working around it in
the text of the decision. It was too late to introduce these
changes to delegations during the consultation. Rather,
these comments were summarized at the end of the consultation
and will be considered in the next draft.


11. (U) The consultation on April 18 was sidetracked by
early, general interventions by South Africa, Iran, and, to a
lesser extent, India, Turkey, and New Zealand. This
concerted intervention was surprising, as there has been
little concern expressed to this concept in the past. Their
questions dealt with the overall intention of the decision,
how it would adequately address the issue of late
declarations, etc. This seemed to be somewhat orchestrated,
at least by Iran and South Africa, but it did indicate a
fundamental lack of understanding on the part of these
delegations on how we have gotten to where we are.


12. (U) This resulted in rehashing information that has been
presented in the consultation previously in detail. This
also resulted in the TS defending the need for such a
decision for probably the first time publicly. Italy,
Australia, and the UK intervened to express support for the
need for "nil declarations" and their general satisfaction
with the current decision text.


13. (U) Iran requested that the TS prepare a paper to outline
the nature of the problem, current TS practices, how data
(particularly late data) is used by the TS, and how this type
of decision would help the TS. The other protagonists,
joined surprisingly by Germany, supported this request for a
TS paper. The TS did not object to preparing such a paper.

SIPDIS
In a subsequent meeting with the TS, the facilitator agreed
to outline a general structure for such a paper upon which
the TS would build.


14. (U) The next steps for the facilitator are: (1) to
develop (in the next few days) an outline for the paper the
TS will prepare; and (2) prepare and distribute a revised

SIPDIS
draft of the decision text to take into account the most

recent comments by LAO. The facilitator is also concerned
with the general timing for this consultation, as there are
only two more EC sessions (June and September) before the
next CSP. Serious consideration will be given to additional
consultations outside of the usual Industry Cluster week or
multiple sessions during those weeks to speed up progress
toward a decision this year.

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OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUP (OEWG) ON THE SECOND REVCON
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15. (U) Ambassador Parker (UK) chaired a meeting of the
open-ended working group for the Second Review Conference on
April 20. The meeting covered national implementation
measures (Article VII) and consultation, cooperation and
fact-finding (Article IX). As has been the case to date, the
meeting only filled the morning session.


16. (U) Parker began the meeting by briefly reminding
delegations where things stand regarding a topic from the
previous meeting - NGO participation. He encouraged
delegations to provide the names of possible NGO participants
to the TS in advance of the next OEWG meeting. If
delegations have any concerns about specific NGO
participants, he suggested that, in addition to bringing
those concerns to the next meeting, that they share these
concerns with their Bureau representative so that these could
be discussed in advance within the Bureau. The TS will
distribute a paper within the next week or two that will
summarize these procedures.

Article VII


17. (U) The German ambassador suggested that Article VII need
not receive that much attention during the RevCon because of
ongoing efforts in this area and progress to date. He did,
however, suggest that implementation (including legislation
and enforcement) be the first consideration, taking
precedence over the challenges of scientific and
technological developments and that, to do otherwise, would
be an injustice to those SPs that have fully implemented
Article VII.


18. (U) The Netherlands ambassador agreed with the German
prioritization, looking at the "score card" of progress, the
likelihood that all National Authorities might be established
before the RevCon, and assistance efforts as things to build
on. He also suggested ongoing exercises to build National
Authority capabilities, addressing synergies between Articles
VI and VII, that other regimes could benefit from the CWC
experience, and further work on trade controls, chemical
brokering, and integrating technologies.


19. (U) The Iranian ambassador agreed that legislation needed
to come first before looking to other improvements. He also
suggested a general review of national legislation to ensure
conformity with the Convention and to identify legislative
challenges, and suggested that this could guide further
action by the TS, the EC, and the CSP. He suggested that
trade in Scheduled chemicals and transfers of technology were
areas where legislation may go contrary to the CWC. He also
suggested a review and open discussion of the "reservations"
that accompanied the instruments for some SPs and the
implications. He noted the significant progress made
(including National Authority establishment),while noting
that legislation is lagging, and pointed to the Plan of
Action as the reason behind this progress. He also suggested
promoting public awareness of the CWC.


20. (U) New Zealand pointed to the Plan of Action and the
significant progress made since the First RevCon, while
noting that more work remained. Assistance and "gentle
encouragement" were the heart of the success and should
continue to address the legislative challenges that will
still remain going into the Second RevCon. She suggested
that a lack of industry can cause some smaller SPs to give
the CWC lower priority and suggested continued targeted
assistance, focusing on senior political and parliamentary

leaders, drawing on linkages to UNSC 1540, and encouraging
high-level ministerial attendance at the RevCon as means to
further progress.


21. (U) Finland encouraged using current momentum as a means
to further progress.


22. (U) China pointed to national implementation as key, and
noted the Plan of Action's role in the significant progress
made. He suggested that the progress to date is significant,
given the relatively young treaty and organization, and that
this indicates national commitment to the CWC. He suggested
review of experience gained to date from the Plan of Action
to improve both the quality and quantity of our efforts. He
encouraged SPs in their commitment to their own work, as well
as outreach, and for the TS to enhance its engagement with
SPs to help meet their needs.


23. (U) Japan stated that national implementation is a key
element in counter-terrorism efforts. He noted that about 50
percent of SPs are still without comprehensive legislation.
He encouraged more coordination between the TS and SPs to
effectively use expertise in solving existing problems. He
also encouraged the TS to continue to share its lessons
learned in its documents, etc.


24. (U) Mexico suggested that continuing technological
developments are a challenge to industry, the CWC, and
individual SPs. The RevCon should encourage enhanced SP
efforts, taking into account progress made under current
"encouraging" efforts. He encouraged States Parties to
particular focus on legislation and reporting their progress
to the TS.


25. (U) The Del referenced the non-paper that would be
released on this topic next week and placed on the external
server. The Del also deployed Washington guidance.


26. (U) The UK stated that national implementation is
fundamental, noted progress made under the Plan of Action,
and indicated that more needs to be done. He indicated the
importance of initial declarations and notifications and
pointed to the implications of late declarations, asking the
RevCon to encourage full and timely implementation of all
aspects of the CWC. He suggested that industry can help in
this process, as compliance with the Convention is an issue
of their reputation within their communities, much as it is
with environmental responsibilities, Responsible Care, and
supply chain management. He also pointed to the industry
advisory committee to the UK National Authority as an example
of how sharing ideas in this area can be done.


27. (U) Russia discussed the importance of keeping our
commitments as SPs, whether they be destruction or Article
VII. He suggested that doing so ensures security and keeps
toxic chemicals out of the hands of terrorists. He pointed
to the Plan of Action's role in the success in establishing
National Authorities and expected a similar result for
legislation. He saw the RevCon having a role in helping SPs
meet these obligations, while encouraging such SPs to request
such assistance.


28. (U) Algeria pointed to the good results achieved through
the Plan of Action's cooperative, comprehensive actions. He
saw Article VII progress enhancing general security, while
noting the difficulties that developing countries are
experiencing. He encouraged focus on legislation and
encouraged new approaches and initiatives.


29. (U) Italy pointed to national implementation as a
priority and suggested that the RevCon not focus on the
establishment of National Authorities (because of the
progress already made) but rather on legislation and
administrative measures. He also encouraged SPs to get
drafts of their legislation to the TS as soon as possible and
report their overall progress to the TS.


30. (U) France encouraged the RevCon's Article VII efforts to
focus on (1) its link to universality, (2) ongoing

cooperation (referencing the recent EU joint action),(3) the
quality of our programs, (4) counter-terrorism (including
UNSC 1540),and links with industry (synergies with Article
VI, accurate and timely declarations, and inclusion of
industry in committees, etc.).


31. (U) The Indian ambassador noted the fundamental nature of
our Article VII efforts, and pointed to our progress under
the Plan of Action as a demonstration of political will. She
noted the balancing of legislative work with competing
priorities for many SPs. She also expressed concern for the
ability of the CWC and national legislation to respond to
developments in science and technology. She also said that
understanding of the verification regime is key to progress
in these areas.


32. (U) Sweden noted the progress made in the establishment
of National Authorities, while noting the work remaining,
particularly relating to legislation. He also said that the
lack of national implementation measures cannot be used as an
excuse for failure to meet obligations under the CWC. He
referenced UNSC 1540 and its importance in dealing with
non-State actors and terrorism.


33. (U) Brazil mentioned its ongoing assistance effort with
Portuguese-speaking nations under Article VII and
universality (e.g., Angola).

Article IX


34. (U) For the most part, delegations simply presented
now-familiar positions on challenge inspections. India,
Russia, Mexico and even Tunisia expressed a desire to resolve
the "unresolved issues" regarding challenge inspections from
the PrepCom, implying that a challenge inspection should not
be requested until this has been accomplished. Several
delegations also implied that all other avenues of
consultation and cooperation must be exhausted before a
challenge inspection could be requested.


35. (U) Cuba stated that this is a necessary and important
provision of the CWC, but that good faith consultations
should prevail. Cuba also spoke in favor of "demystifying"
the concept of challenge inspections. Iran supported the
call for the TS to resolve outstanding issues regarding their
procedures (e.g., triggering, notification, equipment,
reporting) but also pointed to the fact that there has been
no serious request for clarification to date implies that
there is value in normal consultations and avenues of
communication; Iran also made a "joking" reference to holding
an Article XII exercise.


36. (U) The UK recommended that the second Revcon reaffirm
the right of States Party to use a challenge inspection as a
valid compliance tool, and supported regular TS exercises and
contingency planning to maintain a high level of readiness.
The UK rep also acknowledged the concerns many SPs have
expressed regarding the abuse of challenge inspections, but
pointed out that the fact that there have been no challenge
inspections to date is in itself an indication that SPs are
not inclined to abuse this provision. The U.S., drawing on
the Article IX non-paper, highlighted the validity of the
challenge inspection as an important tool for ensuring
compliance and noted the responsibility of SPs, not just the
TS, in ensuring fellow SP adherence to the Convention.

SIPDIS

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DUTCH INDUSTRY CHALLENGE INSPECTION EXERCISE
--------------


37. (U) Amb. Martin Lak (Netherlands) provided more details
in the April 17 WEOG meeting about their plans to hold a
challenge inspection exercise at a chemical industry site.
The exercise will be held the week of September 10-14 at a
DSM plant site in Delft. He said that representatives from a
very limited number of delegations would be invited as
observers for the entire week, while a much broader list of
visitors (Del thinks this will include all members of the EC,
but will need to verify this) will be invited to observe

certain portions of the exercise.


38. (U) Lak asked WEOG delegations to consider a couple of
options for evaluating EC procedures during a challenge
inspection: (1) holding a simulated EC meeting the week
before the exercise (leadership could be simulated by someone
other than the EC Chair); (2) holding a simulated meeting of
the EC the week after the EC to review the report; or (3)
hold an information meeting of the EC under its formal
leadership several weeks after the exercise to review the
exercise report. Lak indicated that even in the absence of
broad support for the first option, it might be possible to
convene an ad hoc group of delegations on a voluntary basis.
The Dutch NA would appreciate hearing the thoughts of WEOG
delegations on these options. Del will need to confirm
Washington's thoughts on this before responding back to Lak.

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DESTRUCTION OF AUSTRIAN OLD CW
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39. (U) During the OEWG meeting, Ambassador Petri (Germany)
mentioned that the Austrian old CW that was discussed during
EC-48 was successfully destroyed on April 19.

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ALBANIA
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40. (U) With continuing technical problems at the Qaf Molla
CWDF, it has become clear that Albania will be unable to
complete destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile before
EC-49 in June, setting the stage for a politically difficult
EC session in which a number of delegations may look to set
an unhelpful precedent for the U.S. Del rep met with the
Albanian delegation and the TS to discuss the most recent
equipment failures at the facility and the report language
mandated update the TS will issue on April 25.


41. (U) An advance look at the update indicated that it
draws heavily on the national paper Albania submitted during
EC-48, but also provides a general overview of more recent
problems. TS recommends the GOA supplement the TS document
with a national paper, in which a greater level of detail
will be appropriate, as soon as possible. Del will work with
the TS and like-minded delegations in the coming months to
gauge what approach to Albania's inability to meet its
established deadlines might be politically acceptable.

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TS UPDATE TO WEOG ON MARADYKOVSKY

SIPDIS
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42. (U) Policy Review Branch head Per Runn provided a very
detailed update to the original TS briefing on operations at
Maradykovsky. In an unexpected departure from previous
U.S./TS discussions, the TS actually minimized its references
to similar operations at Aberdeen, and Runn was balanced in
his response to several politically pointed questions from
delegations. The schematics presented by the TS generated
some discussion on interim versus final reporting, and France
restated its request for a thorough TS paper on end point of
destruction, to include a description and/or comparison of
verification practices at all CWDFs to date. Finally, Runn
indicated the TS would be giving a similar briefing to the
Eastern European Group next week.


43. (U) U.S. del indicated that experts in Washington would
need to carefully study the Maradykovsky Facility Agreement
and Verification Plan as soon as they were made available,
but that the U.S. continues to define EPOD as occurring after
the hydrolysate/reaction mass from a two-step process has
been destroyed, and indicated a desire to see that standard
applied to all possessor states. The response from
delegations was mixed; most delegations were generally
supportive of the TS approach, citing the fact that the
second stage was under verification as the primary concern,
although some indicated lingering concerns that no "way out"
is left that would result in Russia eventually opting not to

destroy the reaction mass. The UK rep indicated privately
that London is quite satisfied with the approach, and
inquired as to whether Washington would expect a change in
the UK position in support of the U.S.


44. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL