CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): QUESTIONS

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000060 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) NSC FOR LEDDY WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHINA DURING DECEMBER BILATERAL MEETINGS REF: 06 THE HAGUE 2603 This is CWC-04-07. ¶1. (SBU) During the U.S.-China bilateral meetings held in The Hague, December 11-13, 2006, the Chinese delegation submitted written questions to the U.S. (Note: Questions were submitted in Chinese and translated by Michael Yan, State Department interpreter.) Questions covered a wide range of topics concerning start-up and operations of a chemical weapons destruction facility, focusing primarily on safety, health and environmental concerns. Mr. Dale Ormond, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Elimination of Chemical Weapons, provided general responses to many of the issues raised during a question and answer session. ¶2. (SBU) Begin text. (Internal numbering in Chinese document.) ¶1. Issues Concerning CWDF Pre-Assessment, Systemization and Operations a. To learn about U.S. practices in the areas of CWDF safety evaluation, especially procedures and standards used in the design review and standards, including designated design parameters of the destruction process, safety evaluation procedures and requirements for key equipment such as thermal detonation chambers; b. To learn about U.S. procedures and experiences in systemization tests, especially in installing and testing of the cascading areas and of the entire ventilation system; c. CWDF accident response/handling in the U.S. Facilities need to have in place a command system so as to determine the nature of any accidents and standards to handle all types of accidents and to take corresponding emergency measures (such as partial shutdown or total shutdown). ¶2. Personnel Safety at CWDF d. What are the overarching considerations for segmentation of areas in a ventilation system? Do you take into consideration ventilation during an accident? e. Composition and configuration of the health and safety monitoring system used in the U.S. CWDFs; f. Protection classification levels, PPE, and decon systems and procedures; g. Any training for CWDF personnel? If so, how is it done? ¶3. Medical Facilities and First Aid at CWDF h. Any regulation or legislation requirements for medical and first aid at CWDFs in the U.S.? Is it required in the U.S. to have in place an occupational hazard evaluation system and an occupational hazard control system? i. Is it required to have in place particular health standards for facility personnel and the public in the vicinity ? A must to have physical exams, health files, psychological consultation and therapy in the U.S.? If so, how is it done? For potential casualties, what kind medical equipment and medical staff should a CWDF be equipped with? ¶4. Other Issues j. CW Detection Most of the chemical weapons abandoned by Japan are buried deep underground and found underwater. China is experiencing difficulties in detecting and identifying these. Does the United States have experience in detection, excavation, and recovered of non-stockpiled CWs? We are especially interested in detection equipment and related technologies for CWs buried deep or found underwater. k. In addition to the main Haerbalin CWDF, China and Japan are in talks about using mobile facilities to destroy small quantities of abandoned CWs found in other areas. The Chinese side would like to learn about U.S. experience in this area, such as how to handle the co-relation between mobile facility capacity, destruction rate, and environmental considerations; systemization of key equipment such as incineration chambers, their destruction rate and operation control, usage and maintenance cycles. End text. ¶3. (U) Ito sends. BLAKEMAN