CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000504 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) NSC FOR LEDDY WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 48TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION (EC-48) REF: STATE 29839 (NOTAL) This is CWC-25-07. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) What promised to be an uneventful EC-48 on March 13-16 turned into a lengthy session that previewed important, upcoming issues. Iran's tactics have focused the minds of delegations on how to keep Iran from delaying work at future EC sessions. The handling of the Albanian destruction issue presages future discussions on how to deal with possessors who do not meet destruction deadlines. There also will be debates before EC-49 on end-point-of-destruction, with the level of intensity depending on what Russia claims as destroyed CW on April 29, and whether a draft facility agreement and verification plan for Maradykovsky are available for EC consideration. ¶2. (SBU) The Director General forcefully stated that the Technical Secretariat will be looking at what appropriate actions it can take within its area of competence to move forward on the issue of an improved OCPF site selection process. And as anticipated, Philippine Ambassador Romeo Arguelles was elected the new EC Chair, effective May 12. While a number of "administrative" items were approved, a substantial amount of work was deferred to EC-49 largely due to Iranian intransigence. The rolling backlog of issues will make EC-49 more difficult, and if Iranian obstructionism continues, will generate a serious problem for future sessions. End Summary. -------------- IRAN -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Delegations have grown increasingly exasperated with Iran's obstructionist tactics, and a major topic of discussion after EC-48 has been how to prevent such problems in the future. While the primary issue on which Iran kept delegations in the OPCW until very late on March 16 was report language on Albania, Iran also made life difficult for the Germans and Austrians in finalizing report language on handling old CW found in Austria. And it aggravated the TS with repeated requests to edit the DG's report on the status of possessor states in destroying CW stocks, not resisting one last dig by having the document "received" rather than 
"noted" by the EC. ¶4. (SBU) One new factor which may help in restraining Iran in the future is the palpable Russian anger with Iran over its delaying tactics on the Albanian report language. Russian Amb. Gevorgian was clearly displeased with having to engage so extensively with the Iranian deputy, rather than the Iranian Ambassador. Gevorgian was also livid when Iran lied about the extent to which Russia failed to bring Iran into the discussions about Russian-proposed report language. While other delegates have not retained their anger with Iran over past delays and obstructionism, there may be something different about Russian deputy PermRep Gavrilov stressing that "this will not be forgotten" and stating that he is instructing Russian delegates not to cooperate with Iran. In short, Iran may have overplayed its hand at EC-48, and the U.S. will work with others to see if it will be possible to contain Iranian delaying tactics in the future. -------------- ALBANIA -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Having completed destroying 1% and 20% of its stockpiles by EC-48, Albania requested a revised date of 1 December 2007 for its 45% and 100% deadlines and made its case during the destruction informals. As predicted in earlier reporting, this was not well received by SPs, due primarily to concerns about the legality of making such a request after the final extension request deadline of 29 April 2006 and the implied retroactive approval from the CSP. Both Russia and Iran expressed concerns about transparency in relation to Albania missing its revised deadlines. After taking into account the serious legal concerns expressed not only by SPs, but also by the TS (who noted it would be impossible to support a draft decision for which there was no legal basis),Albania withdrew its request and instead tabled national paper detailing its destruction progress. ¶6. (U) At the request of Iran, the paper was received rather than noted by the EC. In what was clearly a play to set a strict precedent for the U.S., Iran prolonged negotiations on the final report language, the final version of which called upon Albania to take measures to redress the situation (a clear reference to Article VIII, paragraph 36),requested the TS to inform the EC by 25 April 2007 on destruction progress, SIPDIS and noted that the EC would consider the matter at EC-49. In order to get around attempted Iranian edits to the laboriously crafted paragraph 5.7 of the report, a paragraph 5.8 was added that reminded States Parties to fulfill their obligations under the Convention. ¶7. (SBU) While Albania will (hopefully) have completed destruction by the June EC, it appears the issue of how to address what some delegations view as "non-compliance" will not disappear. The focus of many delegations regarding use of Article VII is now under consideration, along with the Russian suggestion of using Article XII. Some delegations have advised the U.S. that it would be worth considering and offering an alternative to relying on these particular Articles, the implication being that it is important to begin this process now if the U.S. wishes to avoid being labeled non-compliant in 2012. Otherwise, a continued refusal to use Articles 12 or 8 with no alternative action could leave the U.S. in a difficult situation. -------------- END POINT OF DESTRUCTION -------------- ¶8. (U) There already had been heightened interest well before the EC regarding the TS evaluation of operations at Maradykovsky. That interest has continued to grow significantly, particularly with the Russian presentation at the destruction informals (below). And with the Russian 20% destruction deadline of April 29 looming, WEOG attention on the differences between Russian and TS accounting remains high. Inevitably, the WEOG and side-bar discussions have focused on the ostensibly similar situation of U.S. operations at Aberdeen. ¶9. (U) There will certainly be more WEOG discussions on this matter before the June EC, and we fully anticipate that the UK, FRG and France will want to discuss this at the Close Allies meeting in May. The delegation assessment is that if Russia indicates its second stage will remain under verification and that it will pay any Article IV/V costs related thereto, the TS and virtually all SPs will want to be able to let Russia claim success at meeting the 20% deadline. Any U.S. effort to block that success will face an uphill struggle, if not a rebuff. -------------- OCPF SITE SELECTION METHODOLOGY -------------- ¶10. (U) In his statement, the DG clearly expressed his intention of consulting with the Chair, Bureau and the facilitator so that the TS could address the technical issues involved with the OCPF site selection methodology. The DG emphasized that the work would be done on the areas which lie within the competence and authority of the TS. Facilitator Luis Garcia (Spain) is not pleased with the DG's decision, and has scheduled two site selection consultations during industry week. Del understands the relevant TS offices (Verification and Legal Advisor's Office) are already working on the issue, per the DG's request. ¶11. (U) The following items are noted in accordance with the numbering used in the final report for EC-48. -------------- - Item Three: Statement by the Director-General -------------- - ¶12. (U) The DG referred to the requirement in the extension requests granted to India, Libya, Russia, A State Party, China/Japan and the U.S. to issue status reports at 90-day intervals. He hoped his report on how to fulfill that obligation is satisfactory. He spoke at length about the status of destruction in these SPs, and noted India's destruction should be completed ahead of its revised final deadline. He referred to the problems with the Albanian destruction and Italy's request for an extension. He noted that consultations on industry inspections have started under CSP chair Dastis and reiterated the need for more OCPF inspections. ¶13. (U) The DG drew attention to the submission of two status-of-implementation reports for Article X and Article XI. He informed the EC that the EU will provide support for another Associate Program. Implementation support courses were held in Liberia, Azerbaijan and Ecuador; courses on improving national capabilities were held in Colombia, Uruguay, and SPs in North Africa; and a course for first responders was held in Trinidad and Tobago in sync with the other CWC (Cricket World Cup). The DG reported the continued success of the use of sampling and analysis during Schedule 2 inspections, noting that the fourth such inspection was underway. (Del comment: Del has since learned that this inspection was in India. End Comment.) ¶14. (U) The DG told delegations Barbados will accede to the CWC on April 6, and universality efforts in 2007 will focus on remaining non-signatories, particularly in the Middle East. He noted Iraq's efforts toward accession and feels they are close to completion. Pfirter said the ICA Division will work on possible options on an OPCW office in Africa and noted the departure of facilitator Andres Rugeles (Colombia). The DG spoke at length about the recent chlorine gas attacks in Iraq and the continued contributions to be made by the OPCW in countering this kind of terrorism. On budget matters, the DG noted a deficit in 2006 of four million Euros because of SP payment shortfalls. This requires the TS to closely manage the budget, and utilizing the working capital fund should be a last resort. He said delegations cannot have a zero-growth budget and fall short on full and timely payment of annual dues. -------------- Item Four: National Statements -------------- ¶15. (U) Extension requests granted at CSP-11 were the first topic in most statements, which emphatically stressed that April 29, 2012 is the final deadline for destruction of CW stockpiles. Many said not meeting the deadline would adversely affect the credibility of the CWC. The only delegation to mention site visits was the EU. Another topic frequently addressed was the verification regime, in particular industry inspections. Some expressed concern that the number of inspections is decided in budget consultations; others want to make sure political elements are avoided; all wanted a resolution on this matter as soon as possible. ¶16. (U) Another popular topic was Article VII, where SPs were happy the program of assistance and cooperation has achieved solid results. The EU linked implementation of Article VII with UN resolution 1540. SPs were pleased at the achievements of the universality action plan. Mexico and South Africa - both with female Ambassadors - again discussed gender distribution of jobs at the OPCW; South Africa also noted the lack of Africans in leadership positions at the TS. As ever, all NAM associated delegations referred to Article XI as an important, yet neglected area of implementation of the CWC and urged the appointment of a facilitator to begin consultations and an Action Plan on Article XI. ¶17. (U) Continued support for the establishment of an Africa Office was also mentioned in various statements. Japan and China both mentioned Japanese abandoned chemical weapons in China. The DG of Japan's ACW Office shared the national statement with their Ambassador, outlining the work completed thus far, in particular on ACW found in the Haerbaling District in Jilin Province. He cited the difficult, but successful retrieval of ACW in the Zhu Jian River in Guangzhou City. For its part, China continued urging Japan to intensify their efforts. Delegations noted the upcoming tenth anniversary commemoration and work on the Second Review Conference. ¶18. (U) Amb. Siamand A. Banaa of Iraq (which attended as an observer) gave a statement and thanked the TS and delegations for their support on the path to accession to the CWC. He condemned the Iraq CW attack in Halabja in 1988, saying this event helped lead to the creation of the CWC. Banaa said a search of the former regime's documents found some companies who provided the precursor chemicals. He also cited the recent use of chlorine gas in terrorist attacks in Iraq, saying they had been funded by neighboring countries. He thanked Amb. Javits for referring to the attack in his statement. -------------- -------------- Item Five: Status of implementation of the Convention -------------- -------------- ¶19. (U) Item 5.1: The EC approved the plan for phase 3 destruction and verification at the chemical weapons production facility for lewisite production at the Open Joint Stock Company "Kaprolaktam-Dzerzhinsk", Dzerzhinsk, Russia. ¶20. (U) Item 5.2: The EC approved corrections to the detailed plans for conversion of the CWPF (soman production) at the Open Joint Stock Company "Khimprom", Novocheboksarsk, Russia. ¶21. (U) Item 5.3: The EC noted the notification from Russia of changes at the former facility for the production of soman at the Open Joint Stock Company "Khimprom", Volgograd, Russian Federation without debate. Del joined consensus after satisfactory answers were received informally from Russia in relation to concerns about certain technical parameters. ¶22. (U) Item 5.4: The EC noted the Russian notification of changes at the former facility for the production of mustard gas at Chapaevsk without debate. ¶23. (U) Item 5.5: The EC noted the TS Note on the progress in converting the former VX chemical weapons production facility at Novocheboksarsk ¶24. (U) Item 5.6: Reports by States Parties. U.S., Russia and India provided oral reports. The U.S. referred back to the presentation by Dr. Hopkins at the destruction informals. The U.S. also commended Russian progress, but highlighted its position that TS verification of the second stage of destruction is critical, and expressed a hope that the draft facility agreement and verification plan for Maradykovsky would be made available to delegations without further delay. ¶25. (SBU) Item 5.7 and 5.8: Albanian CW destruction. Noted above. ¶26. (U) Item 5.9: DG's Report on progress made by SPs granted extensions of deadlines for the destruction of Category 1 CW. Prior to the EC, Iran requested deletion of a reference to the U.S. commitment to "complete destruction by 2012, or as soon as feasible." Given the protracted negotiations on this point at the CSP, del and TS agreed to remove this particular reference. Further requests by Iran to remove references to the U.S. detailed plan (the submission of which was questioned by Iran and Russia in the run-up to CSP-11) were rebuffed by the U.S. and TS, to avoid setting the dangerous precedent that factual documents should be opened to negotiation. As a result, Iran requested that the document be received rather than noted. (Del comment: Iran made clear that Tehran intends to pay particularly close attention to all future reports on destruction, a factor Washington may wish to consider in its review of EC-49/DG.1, which outlines the TS thoughts on the final extension request 90-day reporting requirement. End comment.) ¶27. (U) Item 5.10: Indian National Paper. The EC noted a national paper by India entitled, "Status of the Chemical Weapons Destruction and Destruction of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities" without debate. Del will follow-up with a letter to the Indian delegation asking for a clarification about plans for the equipment from the CWDF. ¶28. (U) Item 5.11: Italian OCW Destruction Extension. The EC approved a draft decision for the Italian extension of the deadlines for the destruction of its old chemical weapons. Germany indicated that while it appreciated Italy's transparency, it believes there is an inherent ambiguity in the CWC treatment of old and abandoned CW that is open for interpretation, and that this should not be considered to set a precedent. ¶29. (U) Item 5.12: Article VII. The EC noted without discussion the DG's report on progress made implementing the decision of the CSP-11. Facilitator Maarten Lak (Netherlands) thanked delegations for their support and introduced his successor, Kimmo Laukkanen (Finland). Del rep joined in thanking Lak and made the additional points per Washington guidance. ¶30. (U) Item 5.13: Article X. Discussion of the report was deferred to EC-49 with a specific request for the facilitator to hold consultations on the report, most likely in May. ¶31. (U) Item 5.14: Article XI. At the request of Iran, the EC deferred until EC-49 consideration of the DG's report on status of implementation of Article XI. ¶32. (U) Items 5.15-5.19: UK Facility Agreements. At the request of Iran and Russia, the EC deferred to EC-49 amendments to a UK facility agreement, and three UK facility arrangements. The UK reported in WEOG some progress on these in discussions with Iran, but also made it clear that deferment of these documents was not a major concern. ¶33. (U) Item 5.20: Schedule 2 Facility Agreements. The EC noted the DG's Note giving a progress update on Schedule 2 facility agreements. During preparation of report language, Iran asked that the TS be requested to provide an update on this report for EC-49, which was accepted. ¶34. (U) Item 5.21: 2005 Verification Implementation Report (VIR). The EC noted the DG's Note on the issues identified in paragraph 4 of the Chairperson's summary of consultations held on the 2005 VIR. After the matter was closed, Germany intervened to note the importance of speedy conversion of CWPFs and updated, meaningful, and correct reports on verification implementation in the future. ¶35. (U) Item 5.22: Handling of confidential information by the TS. The EC noted the DG's report on the implementation of the regime governing the handling of confidential information by the TS in 2006. ¶36. (U) Item 5.23: Corrections to revised specifications for two items of approved equipment. The EC approved a TS note on corrections to revised specifications for two items of approved equipment. ¶37. (U) Item 5.24: Austrian OCW. Germany and Austria coordinated extensively with the TS to ensure detailed legal and technical briefings by the TS to SPs in the open session. The EC approved the proposal for transport of OCWs to the CWDF in the FRG, following extensive Austria/FRG side-bar discussions with Iran on report language. -------------- Item Six: List of new validated data -------------- ¶38. (U) Item 6: India asked to defer Tables 2 and 3 to a later session, but was willing to approve Table 1. However, Russia requested to defer the entire note to EC-49 to allow delegations more time to review the data. -------------- -------------- Item Seven: Report of the OIO and External Auditor -------------- -------------- ¶39. (U) Item 7.1: OIO Implementation. At the request of the U.S., the EC deferred action on the DG's report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Office of Internal Oversight so that consultations could be held before EC-49. ¶40. (U) Item 7.2: External Auditor. Similarly, at U.S. request, the EC deferred action on a TS Note on the status of implementation of the recommendations of the External Auditor so that consultations could be held. -------------- -------------- Item Eight: Establishment of an OPCW Office in Africa -------------- -------------- ¶41. (U) Items 8.1 and 8.2: The EC was briefed by facilitator Andres Rugeles Pineda (Colombia),who was thanked for his service as he is to depart The Hague. -------------- --- Item Nine: Administrative and financial matters -------------- --- ¶42. (U) Item 9.1: OPCW Income and expenditure for 2006. The EC noted the report. ¶43. (U) Item 9.2: Transfer of funds in 2006. The EC noted the DG's note on the transfer of funds in 2006. ¶44. (U) Item 9.3: Adjustment of the DG's gross salary. The EC adopted a decision adjusting the DG's salary so that it is in line with UN salaries at the same rank. ¶45. (U) Item 9.4: Proposed alignment of OPCW Staff Regulation 3.2(a) with the corresponding UN Staff Regulation. At the request of the U.S., the EC deferred action until EC-49. Del rep emphasized the request for a TS assessment of financial impact of this change. -------------- Item Ten: Privileges and Immunities -------------- ¶46. (U) The EC concluded the agreement between the OPCW and Chile on privileges and immunities. Del rep made the statement per Washington guidance. -------------- -- Item Eleven: Chairperson and Vice-Chairpersons -------------- -- ¶47. (U) The EC elected Ambassador Romeo A. Arguelles (the Philippines - Asian Group) as the Chairman of the EC for the term 12 May 2007 to 11 May 2008. Representatives from the following SPs were elected as Vice-Chairs for the same period: Algeria (Africa),Chile (GRULAC),Ireland (WEOG), and Russia (Eastern Europe). -------------- Agenda Item Twelve: Any Other Business -------------- ¶48. (U) Items 12.1-12.4: Chlorine attacks in Iraq. Amb. Javits recalled the remarks in his statement on the importance of having the EC include report language condemning the terrorist attacks in Iraq using chlorine gas. Iran was strongly supportive of such language, and provided additional text. ¶49. (U) Item 12.5: Composition of Committee on Relations with Host Country. The committee members are the EC Chair, host country rep Amb. Lak, DG Pfirter and two members from each regional group: Africa - Algeria and South Africa, Asia - Iran and Pakistan, Eastern Europe - Croatia and Russia, GRULAC - Guatemala and Mexico, and WEOG - Switzerland and the U.S. ¶50. (U) Item 12.6: Composition of ABAF. The EC approved the following changes -- Takayuki Kitagawa vice Chiho Komuro, Donggy Lee vice Jae-woong Lee, Ali Reza Haizadeh vice Hadi Farajvand and Emily Spencer has resigned. -------------- DESTRUCTION INFORMALS -------------- ¶51. (U) The TS provided their usual briefings on verification activities and declaration related information. When briefing on destruction progress at Maradykovsky, the TS confirmed that the composition of the reaction mass was less than 0.1% VX, and that the reaction mass was awaiting thermal treatment. The TS reported that more than 85% of the bombs have been pre-treated, and about 28% have been drained. The TS did not/not include the pre-treated munitions or the SIPDIS drained reaction mass in its assessment of total destruction, which they reported as being about 10%. Russia, of course, continues to assert that it has destroyed more than 17%, and that by 26 April 2007 will have completed destruction of 8,553.4 MT of Category I agent. Russia reported that construction is underway for the second train to process liquids such as the reaction masses. ¶52. (U) Germany, while commending Russia on its significant progress in destruction, commented on the discrepancy between the TS and the Russian numbers for completed destruction. The U.S. agreed with Germany's statement, and noted that the numbers given by Russia are not consistent with its understanding of treaty requirements. The U.S. also pointed out that it is not claiming complete destruction until the second phase is complete, i.e., the reaction mass is destroyed. The U.S. also commented that it would like to view the (overdue) facility agreement and verification plan. ¶53. (U) Russia responded by saying that Russia's methods fully comply with the text of the CWC, as there is no paragraph stating that destruction is only complete when the reaction mass is destroyed. Russia commented that the DG report on progress of destruction has contradictions which demonstrate unequal treatment of destruction in different SPs, and that the same standards applied for Russia should be applied to the facilities at Aberdeen and Newport. (Note: Russia was referring to a difference in terms applied to the neutralized VX in both SPs. In the portion of the report referring to Russian destruction, the report refers to the neutralized agent simply as "reaction mass", while in the U.S. portion it calls the agent "neutralized".). ¶54. (U) India reported that it has destroyed 80% of its stockpile, and plans to destroy 12% more during its next campaign, which will be from 15 July 07 through 15 March 08. ¶55. (U) Albania reported that it had destroyed 20% of Category I and 73% of Category II as of 12 March. At the destruction informals, Albania informed the delegations that it intended to submit a request to extend the 45% and 100% deadlines to 1 Dec. to the EC, so as to avoid having the CSP approve the extension request retroactively. However, because the reasoning behind this choice of dates was not clearly articulated, this generated immediate confusion and comments from other delegations. Russia asked for more detail on the operational problems encountered, and wondered why 1 Dec. was necessary when Albania has shown that it will actually destroy the stockpile much more quickly than that. Russia also wondered if it was possible to request an extension on a final deadline when the deadline for requesting such an extension (i.e., April 2006) has already passed. ¶56. (U) In an attempt to assist the Albanian rep, whose command of the English language is a bit shaky, the U.S. responded to clarify that Albania had not anticipated these issues, even up to the CSP. It therefore could not possibly have made the request by April 2006. The 1 Dec. deadline was just to address legal concerns and provide room for any further issues that might be encountered. Russia reiterated that the CWC is clear and nothing can be done. SPs must follow the CWC, and legal terms must be fulfilled. ¶57. (U) Iran agreed with Russia's request for more information, and also requested a TS assessment of Albania and those helping Albania. Iran also asked about the last TS visit to the site before the CSP, and whether it assessed then if Albania would make its deadlines. The DG stepped in and responded that these problems arose after the CSP and could not possibly have been predicted in advance of the CSP, as the problems were connected to the equipment. ¶58. (U) A State Party announced that it had destroyed 83% as of 11 March, and will be able to destroy 99.8% (not clear why they cannot get this last 0.2% in) by 28 April 2008. It therefore will be able to meet their 100% deadline. ¶59. (U) China and Japan conducted their usual dance, as China announced that Japan excavated 97 ACWs in Guandong province. However, it was a very difficult and inconvenient operation, as over 500 people had to be evacuated, and fishing boats had to be moved, etc. China reported that Japan has fulfilled its requirements as an abandoner, but has been slow on destruction efforts. Japan reported that it hopes to soon begin construction of a destruction facility, and that while the operation to recover the ACWs from the riverbed in Guandong province (which required blocking the flow of the river, and thus moving the fishing boats) was indeed the most difficult operation, it had gone smoothly. ¶60. (U) Italy reported on the difficulties it had encountered with its OCW, and announced that it was submitting a draft decision for a request to extend the destruction deadline to ¶2012. ¶61. (U) Javits sends. ARNALL