CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000504

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR LEDDY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR
48TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION (EC-48)

REF: STATE 29839 (NOTAL)

This is CWC-25-07.

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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) What promised to be an uneventful EC-48 on March
13-16 turned into a lengthy session that previewed important,
upcoming issues. Iran's tactics have focused the minds of
delegations on how to keep Iran from delaying work at future
EC sessions. The handling of the Albanian destruction issue
presages future discussions on how to deal with possessors
who do not meet destruction deadlines. There also will be
debates before EC-49 on end-point-of-destruction, with the
level of intensity depending on what Russia claims as
destroyed CW on April 29, and whether a draft facility
agreement and verification plan for Maradykovsky are
available for EC consideration.


2. (SBU) The Director General forcefully stated that the
Technical Secretariat will be looking at what appropriate
actions it can take within its area of competence to move
forward on the issue of an improved OCPF site selection
process. And as anticipated, Philippine Ambassador Romeo
Arguelles was elected the new EC Chair, effective May 12.
While a number of "administrative" items were approved, a
substantial amount of work was deferred to EC-49 largely due
to Iranian intransigence. The rolling backlog of issues will
make EC-49 more difficult, and if Iranian obstructionism
continues, will generate a serious problem for future
sessions. End Summary.

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IRAN
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3. (SBU) Delegations have grown increasingly exasperated
with Iran's obstructionist tactics, and a major topic of
discussion after EC-48 has been how to prevent such problems
in the future. While the primary issue on which Iran kept
delegations in the OPCW until very late on March 16 was
report language on Albania, Iran also made life difficult for
the Germans and Austrians in finalizing report language on
handling old CW found in Austria. And it aggravated the TS
with repeated requests to edit the DG's report on the status
of possessor states in destroying CW stocks, not resisting
one last dig by having the document "received" rather than
"noted" by the EC.


4. (SBU) One new factor which may help in restraining Iran
in the future is the palpable Russian anger with Iran over
its delaying tactics on the Albanian report language.
Russian Amb. Gevorgian was clearly displeased with having to
engage so extensively with the Iranian deputy, rather than
the Iranian Ambassador. Gevorgian was also livid when Iran
lied about the extent to which Russia failed to bring Iran
into the discussions about Russian-proposed report language.
While other delegates have not retained their anger with Iran
over past delays and obstructionism, there may be something
different about Russian deputy PermRep Gavrilov stressing
that "this will not be forgotten" and stating that he is
instructing Russian delegates not to cooperate with Iran. In
short, Iran may have overplayed its hand at EC-48, and the
U.S. will work with others to see if it will be possible to
contain Iranian delaying tactics in the future.

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ALBANIA
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5. (SBU) Having completed destroying 1% and 20% of its
stockpiles by EC-48, Albania requested a revised date of 1
December 2007 for its 45% and 100% deadlines and made its
case during the destruction informals. As predicted in
earlier reporting, this was not well received by SPs, due
primarily to concerns about the legality of making such a

request after the final extension request deadline of 29
April 2006 and the implied retroactive approval from the CSP.
Both Russia and Iran expressed concerns about transparency in
relation to Albania missing its revised deadlines. After
taking into account the serious legal concerns expressed not
only by SPs, but also by the TS (who noted it would be
impossible to support a draft decision for which there was no
legal basis),Albania withdrew its request and instead tabled
national paper detailing its destruction progress.


6. (U) At the request of Iran, the paper was received rather
than noted by the EC. In what was clearly a play to set a
strict precedent for the U.S., Iran prolonged negotiations on
the final report language, the final version of which called
upon Albania to take measures to redress the situation (a
clear reference to Article VIII, paragraph 36),requested the
TS to inform the EC by 25 April 2007 on destruction progress,

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and noted that the EC would consider the matter at EC-49. In
order to get around attempted Iranian edits to the
laboriously crafted paragraph 5.7 of the report, a paragraph
5.8 was added that reminded States Parties to fulfill their
obligations under the Convention.


7. (SBU) While Albania will (hopefully) have completed
destruction by the June EC, it appears the issue of how to
address what some delegations view as "non-compliance" will
not disappear. The focus of many delegations regarding use
of Article VII is now under consideration, along with the
Russian suggestion of using Article XII. Some delegations
have advised the U.S. that it would be worth considering and
offering an alternative to relying on these particular
Articles, the implication being that it is important to begin
this process now if the U.S. wishes to avoid being labeled
non-compliant in 2012. Otherwise, a continued refusal to use
Articles 12 or 8 with no alternative action could leave the
U.S. in a difficult situation.

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END POINT OF DESTRUCTION
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8. (U) There already had been heightened interest well
before the EC regarding the TS evaluation of operations at
Maradykovsky. That interest has continued to grow
significantly, particularly with the Russian presentation at
the destruction informals (below). And with the Russian 20%
destruction deadline of April 29 looming, WEOG attention on
the differences between Russian and TS accounting remains
high. Inevitably, the WEOG and side-bar discussions have
focused on the ostensibly similar situation of U.S.
operations at Aberdeen.


9. (U) There will certainly be more WEOG discussions on this
matter before the June EC, and we fully anticipate that the
UK, FRG and France will want to discuss this at the Close
Allies meeting in May. The delegation assessment is that if
Russia indicates its second stage will remain under
verification and that it will pay any Article IV/V costs
related thereto, the TS and virtually all SPs will want to be
able to let Russia claim success at meeting the 20% deadline.
Any U.S. effort to block that success will face an uphill
struggle, if not a rebuff.

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OCPF SITE SELECTION METHODOLOGY
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10. (U) In his statement, the DG clearly expressed his
intention of consulting with the Chair, Bureau and the
facilitator so that the TS could address the technical issues
involved with the OCPF site selection methodology. The DG
emphasized that the work would be done on the areas which lie
within the competence and authority of the TS. Facilitator
Luis Garcia (Spain) is not pleased with the DG's decision,
and has scheduled two site selection consultations during
industry week. Del understands the relevant TS offices
(Verification and Legal Advisor's Office) are already working
on the issue, per the DG's request.



11. (U) The following items are noted in accordance with the
numbering used in the final report for EC-48.

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Item Three: Statement by the Director-General
-------------- -


12. (U) The DG referred to the requirement in the extension
requests granted to India, Libya, Russia, A State Party,
China/Japan and the U.S. to issue status reports at 90-day
intervals. He hoped his report on how to fulfill that
obligation is satisfactory. He spoke at length about the
status of destruction in these SPs, and noted India's
destruction should be completed ahead of its revised final
deadline. He referred to the problems with the Albanian
destruction and Italy's request for an extension. He noted
that consultations on industry inspections have started under
CSP chair Dastis and reiterated the need for more OCPF
inspections.


13. (U) The DG drew attention to the submission of two
status-of-implementation reports for Article X and Article
XI. He informed the EC that the EU will provide support for
another Associate Program. Implementation support courses
were held in Liberia, Azerbaijan and Ecuador; courses on
improving national capabilities were held in Colombia,
Uruguay, and SPs in North Africa; and a course for first
responders was held in Trinidad and Tobago in sync with the
other CWC (Cricket World Cup). The DG reported the continued
success of the use of sampling and analysis during Schedule 2
inspections, noting that the fourth such inspection was
underway. (Del comment: Del has since learned that this
inspection was in India. End Comment.)


14. (U) The DG told delegations Barbados will accede to the
CWC on April 6, and universality efforts in 2007 will focus
on remaining non-signatories, particularly in the Middle
East. He noted Iraq's efforts toward accession and feels
they are close to completion. Pfirter said the ICA Division
will work on possible options on an OPCW office in Africa and
noted the departure of facilitator Andres Rugeles (Colombia).
The DG spoke at length about the recent chlorine gas attacks
in Iraq and the continued contributions to be made by the
OPCW in countering this kind of terrorism. On budget
matters, the DG noted a deficit in 2006 of four million Euros
because of SP payment shortfalls. This requires the TS to
closely manage the budget, and utilizing the working capital
fund should be a last resort. He said delegations cannot
have a zero-growth budget and fall short on full and timely
payment of annual dues.

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Item Four: National Statements
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15. (U) Extension requests granted at CSP-11 were the first
topic in most statements, which emphatically stressed that
April 29, 2012 is the final deadline for destruction of CW
stockpiles. Many said not meeting the deadline would
adversely affect the credibility of the CWC. The only
delegation to mention site visits was the EU. Another topic
frequently addressed was the verification regime, in
particular industry inspections. Some expressed concern that
the number of inspections is decided in budget consultations;
others want to make sure political elements are avoided; all
wanted a resolution on this matter as soon as possible.


16. (U) Another popular topic was Article VII, where SPs were
happy the program of assistance and cooperation has achieved
solid results. The EU linked implementation of Article VII
with UN resolution 1540. SPs were pleased at the
achievements of the universality action plan. Mexico and
South Africa - both with female Ambassadors - again discussed
gender distribution of jobs at the OPCW; South Africa also
noted the lack of Africans in leadership positions at the TS.
As ever, all NAM associated delegations referred to Article
XI as an important, yet neglected area of implementation of

the CWC and urged the appointment of a facilitator to begin
consultations and an Action Plan on Article XI.


17. (U) Continued support for the establishment of an Africa
Office was also mentioned in various statements. Japan and
China both mentioned Japanese abandoned chemical weapons in
China. The DG of Japan's ACW Office shared the national
statement with their Ambassador, outlining the work completed
thus far, in particular on ACW found in the Haerbaling
District in Jilin Province. He cited the difficult, but
successful retrieval of ACW in the Zhu Jian River in
Guangzhou City. For its part, China continued urging Japan
to intensify their efforts. Delegations noted the upcoming
tenth anniversary commemoration and work on the Second Review
Conference.


18. (U) Amb. Siamand A. Banaa of Iraq (which attended as an
observer) gave a statement and thanked the TS and delegations
for their support on the path to accession to the CWC. He
condemned the Iraq CW attack in Halabja in 1988, saying this
event helped lead to the creation of the CWC. Banaa said a
search of the former regime's documents found some companies
who provided the precursor chemicals. He also cited the
recent use of chlorine gas in terrorist attacks in Iraq,
saying they had been funded by neighboring countries. He
thanked Amb. Javits for referring to the attack in his
statement.

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Item Five: Status of implementation of the Convention
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19. (U) Item 5.1: The EC approved the plan for phase 3
destruction and verification at the chemical weapons
production facility for lewisite production at the Open Joint
Stock Company "Kaprolaktam-Dzerzhinsk", Dzerzhinsk, Russia.


20. (U) Item 5.2: The EC approved corrections to the
detailed plans for conversion of the CWPF (soman production)
at the Open Joint Stock Company "Khimprom", Novocheboksarsk,
Russia.


21. (U) Item 5.3: The EC noted the notification from Russia
of changes at the former facility for the production of soman
at the Open Joint Stock Company "Khimprom", Volgograd,
Russian Federation without debate. Del joined consensus
after satisfactory answers were received informally from
Russia in relation to concerns about certain technical
parameters.


22. (U) Item 5.4: The EC noted the Russian notification of
changes at the former facility for the production of mustard
gas at Chapaevsk without debate.


23. (U) Item 5.5: The EC noted the TS Note on the progress in
converting the former VX chemical weapons production facility
at Novocheboksarsk


24. (U) Item 5.6: Reports by States Parties. U.S., Russia
and India provided oral reports. The U.S. referred back to
the presentation by Dr. Hopkins at the destruction informals.
The U.S. also commended Russian progress, but highlighted
its position that TS verification of the second stage of
destruction is critical, and expressed a hope that the draft
facility agreement and verification plan for Maradykovsky
would be made available to delegations without further delay.



25. (SBU) Item 5.7 and 5.8: Albanian CW destruction. Noted
above.


26. (U) Item 5.9: DG's Report on progress made by SPs granted
extensions of deadlines for the destruction of Category 1 CW.
Prior to the EC, Iran requested deletion of a reference to
the U.S. commitment to "complete destruction by 2012, or as
soon as feasible." Given the protracted negotiations on this
point at the CSP, del and TS agreed to remove this particular
reference. Further requests by Iran to remove references to

the U.S. detailed plan (the submission of which was
questioned by Iran and Russia in the run-up to CSP-11) were
rebuffed by the U.S. and TS, to avoid setting the dangerous
precedent that factual documents should be opened to
negotiation. As a result, Iran requested that the document
be received rather than noted. (Del comment: Iran made
clear that Tehran intends to pay particularly close attention
to all future reports on destruction, a factor Washington may
wish to consider in its review of EC-49/DG.1, which outlines
the TS thoughts on the final extension request 90-day
reporting requirement. End comment.)


27. (U) Item 5.10: Indian National Paper. The EC noted a
national paper by India entitled, "Status of the Chemical
Weapons Destruction and Destruction of Chemical Weapons
Production Facilities" without debate. Del will follow-up
with a letter to the Indian delegation asking for a
clarification about plans for the equipment from the CWDF.


28. (U) Item 5.11: Italian OCW Destruction Extension. The EC
approved a draft decision for the Italian extension of the
deadlines for the destruction of its old chemical weapons.
Germany indicated that while it appreciated Italy's
transparency, it believes there is an inherent ambiguity in
the CWC treatment of old and abandoned CW that is open for
interpretation, and that this should not be considered to set
a precedent.


29. (U) Item 5.12: Article VII. The EC noted without
discussion the DG's report on progress made implementing the
decision of the CSP-11. Facilitator Maarten Lak
(Netherlands) thanked delegations for their support and
introduced his successor, Kimmo Laukkanen (Finland). Del rep
joined in thanking Lak and made the additional points per
Washington guidance.


30. (U) Item 5.13: Article X. Discussion of the report was
deferred to EC-49 with a specific request for the facilitator
to hold consultations on the report, most likely in May.


31. (U) Item 5.14: Article XI. At the request of Iran, the
EC deferred until EC-49 consideration of the DG's report on
status of implementation of Article XI.


32. (U) Items 5.15-5.19: UK Facility Agreements. At the
request of Iran and Russia, the EC deferred to EC-49
amendments to a UK facility agreement, and three UK facility
arrangements. The UK reported in WEOG some progress on these
in discussions with Iran, but also made it clear that
deferment of these documents was not a major concern.


33. (U) Item 5.20: Schedule 2 Facility Agreements. The EC
noted the DG's Note giving a progress update on Schedule 2
facility agreements. During preparation of report language,
Iran asked that the TS be requested to provide an update on
this report for EC-49, which was accepted.


34. (U) Item 5.21: 2005 Verification Implementation Report
(VIR). The EC noted the DG's Note on the issues identified
in paragraph 4 of the Chairperson's summary of consultations
held on the 2005 VIR. After the matter was closed, Germany
intervened to note the importance of speedy conversion of
CWPFs and updated, meaningful, and correct reports on
verification implementation in the future.


35. (U) Item 5.22: Handling of confidential information by
the TS. The EC noted the DG's report on the implementation
of the regime governing the handling of confidential
information by the TS in 2006.


36. (U) Item 5.23: Corrections to revised specifications for
two items of approved equipment. The EC approved a TS note
on corrections to revised specifications for two items of
approved equipment.


37. (U) Item 5.24: Austrian OCW. Germany and Austria
coordinated extensively with the TS to ensure detailed legal
and technical briefings by the TS to SPs in the open session.

The EC approved the proposal for transport of OCWs to the
CWDF in the FRG, following extensive Austria/FRG side-bar
discussions with Iran on report language.

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Item Six: List of new validated data
--------------


38. (U) Item 6: India asked to defer Tables 2 and 3 to a
later session, but was willing to approve Table 1. However,
Russia requested to defer the entire note to EC-49 to allow
delegations more time to review the data.

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Item Seven: Report of the OIO and External Auditor
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39. (U) Item 7.1: OIO Implementation. At the request of the
U.S., the EC deferred action on the DG's report on the
implementation of the recommendations of the Office of
Internal Oversight so that consultations could be held before
EC-49.


40. (U) Item 7.2: External Auditor. Similarly, at U.S.
request, the EC deferred action on a TS Note on the status of
implementation of the recommendations of the External Auditor
so that consultations could be held.

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Item Eight: Establishment of an OPCW Office in Africa
-------------- --------------


41. (U) Items 8.1 and 8.2: The EC was briefed by facilitator
Andres Rugeles Pineda (Colombia),who was thanked for his
service as he is to depart The Hague.

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Item Nine: Administrative and financial matters
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42. (U) Item 9.1: OPCW Income and expenditure for 2006. The
EC noted the report.


43. (U) Item 9.2: Transfer of funds in 2006. The EC noted
the DG's note on the transfer of funds in 2006.


44. (U) Item 9.3: Adjustment of the DG's gross salary. The
EC adopted a decision adjusting the DG's salary so that it is
in line with UN salaries at the same rank.


45. (U) Item 9.4: Proposed alignment of OPCW Staff Regulation
3.2(a) with the corresponding UN Staff Regulation. At the
request of the U.S., the EC deferred action until EC-49. Del
rep emphasized the request for a TS assessment of financial
impact of this change.

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Item Ten: Privileges and Immunities
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46. (U) The EC concluded the agreement between the OPCW and
Chile on privileges and immunities. Del rep made the
statement per Washington guidance.

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Item Eleven: Chairperson and Vice-Chairpersons
-------------- --


47. (U) The EC elected Ambassador Romeo A. Arguelles (the
Philippines - Asian Group) as the Chairman of the EC for the
term 12 May 2007 to 11 May 2008. Representatives from the
following SPs were elected as Vice-Chairs for the same
period: Algeria (Africa),Chile (GRULAC),Ireland (WEOG),
and Russia (Eastern Europe).

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Agenda Item Twelve: Any Other Business
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48. (U) Items 12.1-12.4: Chlorine attacks in Iraq. Amb.
Javits recalled the remarks in his statement on the
importance of having the EC include report language
condemning the terrorist attacks in Iraq using chlorine gas.
Iran was strongly supportive of such language, and provided
additional text.


49. (U) Item 12.5: Composition of Committee on Relations with
Host Country. The committee members are the EC Chair, host
country rep Amb. Lak, DG Pfirter and two members from each
regional group: Africa - Algeria and South Africa, Asia -
Iran and Pakistan, Eastern Europe - Croatia and Russia,
GRULAC - Guatemala and Mexico, and WEOG - Switzerland and the
U.S.


50. (U) Item 12.6: Composition of ABAF. The EC approved the
following changes -- Takayuki Kitagawa vice Chiho Komuro,
Donggy Lee vice Jae-woong Lee, Ali Reza Haizadeh vice Hadi
Farajvand and Emily Spencer has resigned.

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DESTRUCTION INFORMALS
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51. (U) The TS provided their usual briefings on verification
activities and declaration related information. When
briefing on destruction progress at Maradykovsky, the TS
confirmed that the composition of the reaction mass was less
than 0.1% VX, and that the reaction mass was awaiting thermal
treatment. The TS reported that more than 85% of the bombs
have been pre-treated, and about 28% have been drained. The
TS did not/not include the pre-treated munitions or the

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drained reaction mass in its assessment of total destruction,
which they reported as being about 10%. Russia, of course,
continues to assert that it has destroyed more than 17%, and
that by 26 April 2007 will have completed destruction of
8,553.4 MT of Category I agent. Russia reported that
construction is underway for the second train to process
liquids such as the reaction masses.


52. (U) Germany, while commending Russia on its significant
progress in destruction, commented on the discrepancy between
the TS and the Russian numbers for completed destruction. The
U.S. agreed with Germany's statement, and noted that the
numbers given by Russia are not consistent with its
understanding of treaty requirements. The U.S. also pointed
out that it is not claiming complete destruction until the
second phase is complete, i.e., the reaction mass is
destroyed. The U.S. also commented that it would like to view
the (overdue) facility agreement and verification plan.


53. (U) Russia responded by saying that Russia's methods
fully comply with the text of the CWC, as there is no
paragraph stating that destruction is only complete when the
reaction mass is destroyed. Russia commented that the DG
report on progress of destruction has contradictions which
demonstrate unequal treatment of destruction in different
SPs, and that the same standards applied for Russia should be
applied to the facilities at Aberdeen and Newport. (Note:
Russia was referring to a difference in terms applied to the
neutralized VX in both SPs. In the portion of the report
referring to Russian destruction, the report refers to the
neutralized agent simply as "reaction mass", while in the
U.S. portion it calls the agent "neutralized".).


54. (U) India reported that it has destroyed 80% of its
stockpile, and plans to destroy 12% more during its next
campaign, which will be from 15 July 07 through 15 March 08.


55. (U) Albania reported that it had destroyed 20% of
Category I and 73% of Category II as of 12 March. At the
destruction informals, Albania informed the delegations that
it intended to submit a request to extend the 45% and 100%
deadlines to 1 Dec. to the EC, so as to avoid having the CSP
approve the extension request retroactively. However, because
the reasoning behind this choice of dates was not clearly
articulated, this generated immediate confusion and comments

from other delegations. Russia asked for more detail on the
operational problems encountered, and wondered why 1 Dec. was
necessary when Albania has shown that it will actually
destroy the stockpile much more quickly than that. Russia
also wondered if it was possible to request an extension on a
final deadline when the deadline for requesting such an
extension (i.e., April 2006) has already passed.


56. (U) In an attempt to assist the Albanian rep, whose
command of the English language is a bit shaky, the U.S.
responded to clarify that Albania had not anticipated these
issues, even up to the CSP. It therefore could not possibly
have made the request by April 2006. The 1 Dec. deadline was
just to address legal concerns and provide room for any
further issues that might be encountered. Russia reiterated
that the CWC is clear and nothing can be done. SPs must
follow the CWC, and legal terms must be fulfilled.


57. (U) Iran agreed with Russia's request for more
information, and also requested a TS assessment of Albania
and those helping Albania. Iran also asked about the last TS
visit to the site before the CSP, and whether it assessed
then if Albania would make its deadlines. The DG stepped in
and responded that these problems arose after the CSP and
could not possibly have been predicted in advance of the CSP,
as the problems were connected to the equipment.


58. (U) A State Party announced that it had destroyed 83% as
of 11 March, and will be able to destroy 99.8% (not clear why
they cannot get this last 0.2% in) by 28 April 2008. It
therefore will be able to meet their 100% deadline.


59. (U) China and Japan conducted their usual dance, as China
announced that Japan excavated 97 ACWs in Guandong province.
However, it was a very difficult and inconvenient operation,
as over 500 people had to be evacuated, and fishing boats had
to be moved, etc. China reported that Japan has fulfilled its
requirements as an abandoner, but has been slow on
destruction efforts. Japan reported that it hopes to soon
begin construction of a destruction facility, and that while
the operation to recover the ACWs from the riverbed in
Guandong province (which required blocking the flow of the
river, and thus moving the fishing boats) was indeed the most
difficult operation, it had gone smoothly.


60. (U) Italy reported on the difficulties it had encountered
with its OCW, and announced that it was submitting a draft
decision for a request to extend the destruction deadline to

2012.


61. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL