NETHERLANDS/EU: MARCH PRE-GAERC DEMARCHE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000396 SIPDIS SIPDIS NAIROBI FOR SOMALIA WATCHER ADDIS FOR U.S. MISSION TO THE AU E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017 TAGS: PREL ENRG EUN KPAL PGOV PHUM AF BK IR IS SO SU, UZ, YI, NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU: MARCH PRE-GAERC DEMARCHE REF: STATE 23592 Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew J. Schofer; reasons 1.4 (b an d d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Following the PIC, the Dutch expect a continued but significantly smaller EU military presence in Bosnia over the next year. On Kosovo, they await Serbia's and Kosovo's responses to SE Ahtisaari's proposals. The GONL is skeptical on the Palestinian GNU but will wait to see how the administration shapes out. On UNSCR 1737, the Dutch report no change in position - they will support additional nuclear-related sanctions but insist that room be left for political dialogue. On Sudan, the Dutch hope to roll out additional bilateral support to UNMIS and AMIS but will continue to push other EU members to do more. On Somalia - unlikely to be raised - the Dutch are supportive of, and willing to continue pushing for, an early release of EU funds but will not contribute bilaterally. On Uzbekistan, the Dutch will support German engagement but say they will not agree to lifting or easing sanctions until tangible human rights progress is seen. On climate change and related energy issues, the Dutch are inclined to support ambitious EU targets. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Poloff delivered reftel demarche February 27 to MFA Deputy European Correspondent Jeroen Boender and followed up February 28 at the MFA's monthly pre-GAERC briefing for non-EU missions. Poloff spoke also with Security Policy officer Pieter Blusse, regarding Somalia and Sudan. Econoff delivered relevant points to Femke Hoogeveen, MFA Economic and Environmental Affairs policy officer. Western Balkans -------------- ¶3. (C) In Bosnia, Boender said, the Dutch expect to see a reduction of the Dutch presence from 280 troops to about 90 - roughly in-line with overall EU reductions in KFOR. He added that the GONL views the outcome of the PIC Steering Board meeting as providing a one-year window of opportunity for police and "other" reforms. ¶4. (C) Boender said the GONL does not expect much, if any, debate on Kosovo, absent a response from Belgrade and Pristina on Ahtisaari's proposals. Middle East -------------- ¶5. (C) The Dutch, said Boender, are quite pleased with Secretary Rice's talks with Olmert and Abbas. That said, the SIPDIS GONL is skeptical of the Government of National Unity's commitment to Quartet principles. The Dutch would like to see how the Palestinian cabinet evolves and what policies will be adopted but did not offer suggestions on how the EU might influence this process. ¶6. (C) On Iran and UNSCR 1737, the Dutch maintained their position that additional sanctions, which they think are warranted by the IAEA's February 22 report, must be proportional, reversible, and connected to the nuclear program. In short, Boender said, "sanctions should leave room for political dialogue." Sudan/Darfur -------------- ¶7. (C) The Dutch will continue to push the EU to do more on Sudan, Boender said. To date, only the UK has pulled its weight, he added. MFA Security Policy officer Pieter Blusse said that the Dutch are working on a light support package for UNMIS and AMIS, which he thought would likely be finalized soon. Somalia -------------- ¶8. (C) On the related issue of Somalia, Blusse felt that negotiations in Brussels had succeeded in softening the THE HAGUE 00000396 002 OF 002 Italian position and allowing for an earlier deployment from the EU's 15 million Euro reserve. Blusse said that some concern remained in Dutch official circles about Uganda's ability to operate absent a serious peace dialogue and sought reassurances that the UPDF could succeed. He also looked forward to a reasonably competent proposal from the AU, which he believed necessary to move toward a release of the funds. ¶9. (C) Blusse said that rumors of Euro 2 million of bilateral Dutch funding for Somalia - about which post had heard nothing - were unfounded. The Dutch will support the Somalia mission only through the EU and will continue to focus their bilateral assistance on Sudan and the Great Lakes. ¶10. (C) Blusse added that the GONL had been asked to support a proposed Burundese contingent in Somalia. He said that Dutch military officials did not agree with U.S. assessments (reportedly relayed in Addis by U.S. military personnel) that the Burundese army could handle the Somalia mission. For this reason, the GONL was unlikely to support the request. Uzbekistan -------------- ¶11. (C) The GONL supports German attempts to open a meaningful dialogue on human rights, with the important caveat that an easing or lifting of sanctions must be preceded by tangible human rights improvements. The Dutch, Boender said, are skeptical of the Uzbek commitment and believe that a reported Uzbek note verbale to the EU - saying no further talks on Andijon are contemplated - justifies this skepicism. Energy Issues and Climate Change -------------- ¶12. (C) Econoff delivered reftel points to Hoogeveen. The Dutch, according to Hoogeveen, will support a unilateral EU greehouse gas emissions reduction target of 30 percent, with a fallback to the earlier 20 percent target. Hoogeveen said the GONL will support a binding 10 percent biofuels target and a binding 20 percent renewables target for EU countries, the latter to be achieved by 2020. She had no immediate comment on possible U.S.-EU cooperation. ARNALL