CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000313 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) NSC FOR LEDDY WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 16 This is CWC-16-07. -------------- UNIVERSALITY - P-5 AMBASSADORS MEETING -------------- ¶1. (SBU) On February 12, the P-5 Ambassadors met to discuss universality efforts. Following welcoming remarks by Amb. Javits, DG Pfirter provided an update on universality efforts. On the three Caribbean non-SPs, the DG said he had specifically mentioned the Bahamas, Barbados and the Dominican Republic in UN discussions last year. Barbados and Bahamas provided a written response indicating that they are moving forward. Barbados said the decision to accede is completed, and they need an assessment on implementation requirements. The DG noted that the Technical Secretariat has offered to send a technical assistance team. A TS team would also be sent to the Bahamas. ¶2. (SBU) As for the Dominican Republic, the DG noted that they have signed the CWC, and Amb. Javits has been contacting senior individuals to get them to complete the accession process. The DG indicated he would make a personal approach if that were needed, however, he thought action by the DR might not be until the second half of the year. Pfirter noted that he has also used the OAS meeting in Washington last December to press these non-SPs, and the OAS Secretary General had committed to assist in pressing these states. ¶3. (SBU) On Africa, the DG noted that Somalia clearly is not in a position to take any decisions. On Guinea-Bissau, France has helped apply pressure, and Portugal has also said it will provide help. The DG then noted that Angola may be the least promising non-SP in this region, and they have sent mixed signals on their willingness to accede. On the Middle East, the DG noted that he was in Jerusalem in 2006 and was not ready to say that there are no prospects for progress concerning Israel. Pressure and contacts should be maintained on all states in the region. The CWC should not be held up by other unsolved regional issues, not should it be held in abeyance until all WMD issues are resolved (as has been argued by Egypt). ¶4. (SBU) Lebanon has taken the legislative step and is now waiting for a Foreign Minister to send the instruments of accession. The DG noted that it was critical that all parties in Lebanon supported this action. The DG noted that Egypt had sent observers to the December Conference of States Parties, and that he will be visiting Egypt in April under an invitation from a foreign policy council. He will also have meetings at the Egyptian MFA, which hopefully indicates Egypt has made the decision to continue contacts. On Syria, the DG saw no glimmer of hope. There had been a meeting in New York, at which Syria merely restated its old position, linking all WMD issues. And while Syria sent someone to the Rome universality workshop, it did not send an observer to the CSP. ¶5. (SBU) On the Rome event, the DG noted that it was a success, and there should be similar meetings in the future to press non-SPs, and to show the OPCW commitment to universality. The next workshop would be in the second half of 2007 and planning is under way. Possible venues would be France, Spain or Turkey. The DG broached the idea of possibly organizing it in a North African state, but the question is whether one could be found that would invite Israel. The DG added that whatever the venue, he would be looking for the P-5 to provide support in pressing non-SPs to attend. The DG concluded his statement by addressing North Korea, commenting that while the UNSC resolution addressed all WMD programs in the DPRK, he recognized that the nuclear issue would have to be resolved before any other issues could be addressed. ¶6. (SBU) The discussion then turned to the universality action plan, which technically ends at the November CSP. UK Amb. Parker noted that it would be "sterile" to roll over the action plan. Returning to the DG's comments, the UK thought it might be optimal to work out a lobbying strategy from the TS, or address the Directors General of relevant regional and SIPDIS other organizations. The UK suggested that after Lebanon completes accession, it might be best to focus on Egypt, as it may be necessary to further isolate Syria. More generally, the UK noted that one possibility is somehow connecting and utilizing the 10th anniversary commemorations, the CSP and the 2008 Review Conference together to rededicate SPs to the goal of achieving universality. ¶7. (SBU) The DG then noted that in October, there will be an item in the First Committee on the 10th anniversary. Poland and the Netherlands will lead this effort, and there is consideration of a two-hour high-level meeting to highlight universality. There might be a symbolic statement in which the UN Secretary General might assist, and the DG noted that the SYG had been invited to the 10th anniversary events. Pfirter went on to state that UNSCR 1540 might be another hook that could be utilized as well as resolutions condemning terrorism. ¶8. (SBU) The UK asked whether the UN resolution, traditionally submitted by Poland, could be sharpened. Russian Amb. Gevorgian commented that it is difficult to change the text that has been passed routinely for many years. French Amb. Gaussot and Chinese Amb. Xue agreed with Russia on the difficulty of getting new, sharper text. The French then noted that it really does not seem possible to do anything on Syria right now. The Chinese commented that bilateral or regional efforts would be most productive to continue dialogue and engagement, and supported TS workshops. ¶9. (SBU) Pfirter opined that setting a target of 4-5 new SPs in 2007 might be reasonable. The target was six in 2006, and that had been met. Amb. Javits noted that a general statement can be made at the CSP and possibly commentary on some specific countries. For the RevCon, the decision has to be taken on whether a target should be named. ¶10. (SBU) Finally, Russia asked that the P-5 return to the issue of a joint demarche, which had last been discussed quite a while ago. It would be necessary to assess if the timing is right and if the format is acceptable. The UK noted that everyone agreed in 2006 that the timing was not right. China flatly said that it doubts the wisdom of a common demarche. They specifically questioned the desirability of such an approach regarding Syria, Israel and North Korea. Instead, China is pleased with the way the DG is handling this matter. France also said that it doubted that this is the right time for a common demarche in the Middle East. This would not be as efficient as bilateral discussions. Amb. Javits added that it is important to have complete agreement before proceeding with something as weighty as a common demarche. As such, it might be best to be patient and be sure it is appropriate for such action. ¶11. (SBU) Russia responded that the Chinese comments show why P-5 meetings are needed. The UK offered to hold the next meeting, and there was consensus to try to schedule it around April 16, before the DG makes his trip to Egypt. -------------- -------------- INDUSTRY CLUSTER - OCPF SITE SELECTION METHODOLOGY -------------- -------------- ¶12. (U) Facilitator Luis Garcia (Spain) held consultations on February 13 and 14 to further discuss his proposal and draft decision documents. First, Garcia summarized the developments in the consultations under his leadership. Next, the Technical Secretariat presented the results of its latest round of computations, done at the request of India. Using the total number of 118 OCPF inspections from the approved 2007 budget and the OCPF database as of January 2007 (73 states declared a total of 4957 OCPFs),the TS computed the results for four scenarios (e-mailed to ISN/CB) and interpreted the four outcomes. ¶13. (U) Delegations reacted strongly to the presentation, noticing for the first time the significant impact the high A14 values of their facilities had on their expected inspection numbers. For example, South Africa had the same expected number of inspections (about two) as did another SP with 150 facilities, purely a result of the differing A14 values. China began by protesting the latest round of calculations, noting a number of problems: the expected number of Schedule 3 inspections was not included, the treaty-mandated cap on Schedule 3 and OCPF inspections was not included, and the latest OCPF numbers were not used (Note: China privately told del rep that the number of Chinese OCPFs was about 400 facilities too high). ¶14. (U) Some delegations began to publicly question the proposed methodology. Austria noted that because three of its six facilities were PSF pesticide plants, its expected number of inspections jumped significantly, consistent with the expected numbers of a number of states with much larger OCPF industries. Finally, China, Mexico and New Zealand stressed the urgency of completing our work as soon as possible, to ease the disproportionate burden on states with smaller industries. ¶15. (U) Next, the facilitator led a discussion of the operative section of his draft decision document. Delegations generally cleaned up the text, eliminating duplications (OP1 and OP3) and considering how best to clarify a confusing paragraph instructing SPs how to make their proposals. Finally, delegations discussed potential deadlines and how best to ensure a consensus decision would be implemented as soon as possible. ¶16. (U) Delegations only made it to the second item on the agenda for the February 14 consultation: what elements should be included in the anonymous list of plant sites. Garcia began by stating that, in his personal opinion, the list should not contain anything not mandated by the CWC, i.e., no A14 values and no production range codes. The TS supported this view. Germany also supported the facilitator, stating that the alleged anonymity was just that - alleged. If the A14 were provided, National Authorities soon could determine which facilities were in which countries. France asked if the TS planned to randomize the facility identification codes every year, in order to protect their identities. Other delegations protested, wondering what this might mean for the element which allowed states' proposals to remain in effect until modified. Brazil, India, Iran, France and South Africa supported the view that additional information could not be provided. ¶17. (U) Canada, supported by Australia, China, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands, and Pakistan, noted that Verification Annex Section 9, paragraph 8 did not exclude distribution to SPs of a plant's declared production range or whether the plant used PSF. These variables should be provided as a basis for SPs proposals. Finally, the UK noted that if variables were not on the anonymous list, they could not be used to make proposals, making the entire process silly. Switzerland made an impassioned intervention, noting that it did not know where the consultation was going. Were delegations working to ensure that the most relevant sites would be inspected? Or, were we working to remove, step-by-step, the very tools needed to do so? The route at hand if approved would render the entire exercise meaningless. ¶18. (U) Australia jumped in, noting that we are deadlocked, and that the methodology at this juncture is at most marginally better than the current system. Australia, supported by Cuba, Iran, and the U.S., recommended that the consultation "pause" for a time. Canada, supported by Iran, reminded delegations that our mandate is to consider how to implement paragraph 11(c),not the entire selection methodology. Because delegations have expanded the mandate, the consultation is getting bogged down. The facilitator, supported by Mexico, noted that in his opinion, the consultations should not take a break. We have a lot of work remaining. The issue at hand is the anonymous list, and, perhaps as a compromise, the A14 value should be provided. ¶19. (U) In response, New Zealand recommended that the TS institute a temporary fix while the debate of how states would make contributions to the selections continues. For instance, New Zealand recommended that the first step be modified to selection of OCPFs for each SP with probability proportional to 1 1/2 sqrt (OCPFs) and the second step be modified to selection of the facilities within the country with probability proportional to 1 1/2 sqrt (A14). ¶20. (U) Germany reentered the fray by stating that all states had agreed to the facilitator's proposal, and that the issue at hand is the anonymous list. The U.S. responded that it had agreed to discuss and consider the proposal, but the del reps had never indicated that the U.S. supported the proposal. Instead, the U.S. is becoming more convinced that the facilitator's proposal is going down an unacceptable path, making a pause to reflect on the goal of this exercise critical. -------------- INDUSTRY CLUSTER - TRANSFER DISCREPANCIES -------------- ¶21. (U) The February 13 consultation on this topic centered on the definitions of import and export, as laid out in the most recent co-facilitators' non-paper, dated 29 January ¶2007. One of the facilitators presented the details of the non-paper, along with the various scenarios that were presented therein. ¶22. (U) The discussion that followed highlighted the complexity of the issue. There was considerable confusion about the fact that this is intended to only affect Article VI declarations and not meant to be an additional requirement to existing national customs measures. The fact that was pointed out, however, is that, even if this is meant to be separate from customs, it certainly requires careful thought about whether it should impact customs measures. ¶23. (U) India expressed its concern over the complexity of the import/export issue, stating that this type of change would require significant outreach efforts to industry and traders to ensure that they understand their obligations. The UK said that their recent discussions with industry show favor for the current non-paper definitions, but they share the same concerns as India about the ramifications of its complexity. ¶24. (U) Switzerland and others pointed out that the resulting data comes only from industry, and that customs only does periodic spot-checks. Canada and other delegations were quick to point out that such an action as proposed would not limit discrepancies but, at best, reduce the number of discrepancies. The facilitators acknowledged this point and that this cannot be the goal of this consultation, as it is an impossible task. ¶25. (U) Del rep reminded the delegates of the general support expressed in an earlier consultation for the redefining of what a discrepancy is - moving from a percent screen to one based on corresponding treaty thresholds. The facilitators said that, in light of the earlier, general support for the redefinition, the TS had already put this into place, and that the most recent round of clarification requests sent to SPs were based on this new definition. There were several delegations that were surprised by this, and Australia expressed strong dissatisfaction that the TS had moved forward unilaterally and so quickly. ¶26. (U) In closing, the facilitators asked that delegations bring their proposals back to capitals to get reactions for the next round of consultations. -------------- INDUSTRY CLUSTER - LATE DECLARATIONS -------------- ¶27. (U) The focus of the February 14 consultation was: (1) the November 3 draft decision language on "nil declarations" prepared by the facilitator (Denyer, U.S.),and (2) example reminder letters and notes verbale that SPs could use to make "nil declarations." ¶28. (U) Several delegations gave minor editorial suggestions to the text of the draft decision. Australia asked how the decision might require SPs who are late submitting their declarations (whether nil or otherwise) to provide the reasons why. Options were discussed. Although supportive of nil declarations, New Zealand expressed concern on the success of small SPs in meeting these obligations. Others also expressed concern about the potential "burden". Switzerland suggested that, once a SP submitted a nil declaration (or perhaps even a nil initial declaration),that declaration could stand until amended. This would be consistent with what is done for OCPF declarations. There was also a suggestion by Turkey and others that the decision be more specific as to what the TS should report and do with the data gathered, including emphasis on future work to address factors that contribute to late declarations. ¶29. (U) Although the discussion on the TS's example reminder letters, etc. went well, there was some confusion about how these documents would be used. The facilitator made it clear that these documents were meant solely for helping the delegations present understand options for putting a nil declaration decision in place and that these documents would not be annexes to or in any other way affect the decision itself. ¶30. (U) The facilitator committed to making the minor editorial changes requested, to try to address the more general concerns expressed, and to try to distribute a modified text fairly soon. Also, the facilitator will provide a modified text to the TS in the upcoming days to allow their comments, including the Legal Advisor's thoughts on the requirement of "reasons." ¶31. (U) In a later meeting with the Japanese delegation, they expressed concern about the burden of "nil declarations" on small island states. The facilitator was able to address some of his ideas for the next draft of the decision text and how this dealt with their concerns. -------------- -------------- INDUSTRY CLUSTER - ARTICLE VI RISK AND INSPECTION FREQUENCY -------------- -------------- ¶32. (U) As a result of the protracted debate on the 2007 program and budget, the Executive Council "decided to undertake discussions, under the industry cluster, in 2007, with the assistance of relevant experts of the Secretariat and States Parties, on the main issues related to the implementation of the verification regime established by Article VI of the Convention, including, inter alia, the frequency of inspections of the different categories of the facilities to be inspected as required by the Convention." With this in mind, Ambassador Dastis (Spain) chaired a meeting on February 15 to open a dialogue on this topic. The meeting was attended by the DG and DDG. ¶33. (U) In his opening remarks, the DG noted the following: work on the 2008 program and budget had already begun; the TS was preparing (as highest priority) a paper on Schedule 2 facilities, including inspection experience to date; and the need to receive early direction from SPs. ¶34. (U) Bill Kane (Industry Verification) made brief opening remarks in which he summarized the rather limited work that has been conducted on this topic to date, referencing: the October 2000 TS paper on the relative risk of Schedule 2 facilities (which methodology is still in use); the Schedule 3 selection decision of 1999; the urgent need for an OCPF site selection decision; and the fact that the "inclusion of additional declaration information" could be useful in improving OCPF site selection. India and others supported the T sharing of inspection experiences. ¶35. (U) Seveal delegations (including South Africa and Mexic) discussed the inequity of the TS's current OCPF ite selection methodology. South Africa (suppored by India) also noted the need to balance any uture increases in OCPF inspections with a new seection methodology. (Of note, South Africa quesioned rhetorically that, if the decision is to reduce the number of Schedule 2 inspections, what would be done with the exta inspections?) Mexico expressed a need to retun to the Schedule 2 inspection frequency assumptios, noting that the "3 times in 10 years" approac in place was meant for the least-risky facilitie and that the others might need to be inspected ore often. Iran also asked for background inforation on the methodology used for Schedule 1 faclities. ¶36. (U) Iran, supported by others, requsted the preparation of a background paper by theTS on this topic. Although willing to have suchmaterials prepared, the DG insisted that SPs disuss this carefully to decide exactly what was needd, as he felt that existing documents, includingthose prepared during the budget discussions of lst fall, might be sufficient (and he was concernd about limited TS resources). Ambassador Javit suggested the preparation of an annotated bibligraphy of applicable documents from the past that ight help delegations organize this work, along wth making the relevant documents available on th external server (currently, available documentsonly go back to 2003). This was widely supported, and the TS committed to providing the bibliography. ¶37. (U) Canada noted that, given the long history of this issue, our expectations on the outcome of these discussions should be tempered. Even if common agreement could be found on the "risky" characteristics of various facilities, delegations would likely still have different ideas of what characteristics should be of highest concern when making inspection decisions. He encouraged this discussion to focus not only on inspection frequency, but on the relative value of subsequent inspections, given inspection experience. ¶38. (U) The meeting ended with Ambassador Dastis agreeing that two more meetings would be held before the March EC. The next meeting will be in two weeks, and the following meeting will be during the first week of March, with details on the discussions to be provided later. -------------- -------------- MOST RECENT SCHEDULE 2 INSPECTION WITH S&A - THE UK -------------- -------------- ¶39. (U) During the February 13 WEOG meeting, the UK delegation announced that they had recently completed a Schedule 2 subsequent inspection that involved sampling and analysis. The delegation said that things went fairly well, noting the following points of interest: - The inspection team left the analytical equipment running until the very end of the inspection, just in case there was a need to re-run an analysis. The result was a slight delay in the end of the inspection, as they needed time to pack up the analytical equipment. - The host team did not run parallel analyses, but were prepared to do so, if they felt they were needed. This choice was made strictly because of the cost that would have been involved. - As was done during the Swiss and Chinese inspections, the TS arranged in advance for the inspection equipment to be SIPDIS delivered directly to the site, where technical equipment inspection was performed. - Although this site has historically expressed serious concerns regarding confidential business information (e.g., even the name of the plant site manager is "highly protected"),the analyses were performed in open-mode. ¶40. (U) In further discussions with the UK delegation, several other points were raised with del rep: - The delegation was not certain exactly what arrangements the TS had made to get the equipment to the site. They speculated that the bulk of the equipment may have come by truck through the Chunnel. However, given the Chunnel's restrictions on compressed gases, these were flown into Heathrow - not the normal point-of-entry. - The delegation acknowledged that the TS arrangements alleviated the National Authority's burden of having to arrange transport of this equipment to the site. And, given that the UK would be able to do that via truck, they acknowledged that this would be much more difficult via air transport in a State Party like the U.S. -------------- GERMAN UNCERTAINTIES RESOLVED -------------- ¶41. (U) In a previous WEOG meeting, the German delegation discussed a Schedule 2 inspection that had resulted in an uncertainty because of the inspection team's inability to "close the loop" on the material balance. In the February 13 WEOG meeting, the German delegation announced that this uncertainty had been resolved. ¶42. (U) In further discussions with the German delegation, del rep learned that the uncertainty was resolved by follow-up "visit(s)" to the site by the TS, during which additional records were provided. This was not done in the way of another inspection, but rather some other arranged visit. Clearly, this option was available to the TS, given the relative nearness of the plant site. And the German delegation seemed to feel that this was a satisfactory solution. However, this could be seen as problematic as a routine avenue for resolution of inspection uncertainties. -------------- ARTICLE VII OUTREACH - THE PADILLA INITIATIVE -------------- ¶43. (U) On February 15, del reps (Sanders and Denyer) met with a representative of the Japanese delegation (Kiwako Tanaka) and a representative of the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Takuya Igarashi),at their request. The topics they wished to discuss were: (1) Indonesia-Japan-Australia industry workshop on 26-27 February in Jakarta; (2) U.S. initiatives to assist the "20-in-10" States Parties; (3) assistance to East Asian States Parties; and (4) assistance by means of promoting industry dialogue. ¶44. (U) The Japanese delegation expressed concern about the size of Asia and their ability to tackle all of the SPs therein. They said that they would only consider outreach efforts for those SPs with national implementing legislation (but where Article VII is not fully satisfied) in the following order of priority: (1) East Asia - Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, the Philippines; (2) Central and South Asia - Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan; (3) West Asia - Jordan, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates; and (4) small island states - Fiji. Clearly, the Japanese focus is on East Asia. When pressed, they said they were not likely to turn their attention to their second priority - Central and South Asia - until 2008. And, the expectation is that West Asia and the small island states would not be addressed at all. ¶45. (U) After some discussion, the Japanese delegation said that their Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the Philippines a promising target for assistance this year. They have already talked about this with the Philippines, as was reported in last week's cable. They did seem interested in pursuing further discussions on joint assistance with the U.S. and, potentially, Australia for efforts like this. ¶46. (U) The Japanese delegation was very interested in how the APEC Chemical Dialogue might be used to forward Article VII goals. Their only concern is whether the right people would attend the Dialogue, noting that environmental and safety personnel might not also handle CWC issues. Del rep shared the U.S. experience during inspections, that often a single representative at a site handles all regulatory issues, including environmental and CWC concerns, but conceded this might not always be the case at a corporate level. ¶47. (U) The Japanese delegation also shared that South Korea has expressed an interest in assisting other SPs in their Article VII efforts. We concluded that future discussions about Asia should probably include Australia and Korea. -------------- EXTERNAL AUDITOR AND OIO REPORTS -------------- ¶48. (U) Facilitator Rick Snelsire (U.S.) called a meeting on February 12 to discuss OPCW documents EC-47/S/4 on Implementation of Recommendations of the External Auditor and EC-47/DG.4 on Implementation of the 2005 Report of the Office of Internal Oversight. The facilitator went through both reports, and while acknowledging that the documents had already been noted in the CSP report, said he wanted to reinforce the precedent of holding consultations to discuss all such reports. ¶49. (U) EC-47/S/4 -- The facilitator asked the TS to discuss the progress of Results Based Budgeting (RBB). Budget chief Rick Martin noted the TS has asked program managers to review RBB and said they are adding their suggestions to the coming year's budget. This is an effort to make the budget more transparent. India asked if they will use the performance-scorecard approach to targets, and the TS indicated it will continue a narrative approach. Iran questioned if the suggestion under the Travel Office to have an in-house contracted travel agency with a comprehensive agreement has been implemented. Martin said it had started in January 2007, and in response to a question by Italy said they are currently reviewing travel policies to make certain their system is cost effective and efficient. In response to a question from the facilitator, Martin said the next report of the External Auditor will be out on March 15. ¶50. (U) EC-47/DG.4 -- There was little comment here. Iran and India questioned whether the Dutch Accreditation Council should be certifying that the OPCW, and in particular the lab, are in compliance with ISO standards. The TS said this certification was primarily focused on the lab. The next OIO report will be issued in May. The facilitator noted there will be another meeting soon after the next relevant report is issued. -------------- DONORS MEETING/GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP -------------- ¶51. (U) Konstantin Gavrilov, the Russian Deputy PermRep, invited delegations from the donors group to a February 16 meeting at the Russian Embassy. Ostensibly it was to brief on the results of the January 23 meeting in Berlin of the Working Group on Global Partnership. In fact, it turned out to be a request for donors contributing to Russian CW destruction efforts to bring an enhanced group of experts to the March 12 donors meeting. However, Gavrilov undercut the importance Russia attaches to this meeting by conceding that it will be the usual working-level team from Moscow, and not/not senior officials, such as deputy head of the Russian Federal Agency for Industry, Viktor Kholstov. ¶52. (U) Noting that he had attended the Berlin meeting, Gavrilov said there had been a general agreement for more intense activity by the G-8 plus the larger group of donors. He emphasized that 2007-2008 was important for Russia with regard to getting destruction facilities up and running, and commented that there were extensive discussions in Berlin on CW destruction. Gavrilov then went through the numbers for how much Russia has shelled out, and how much the donors have promised and actually provided. He said the total amount pledged was 45 million pounds and 9.7 million pounds had been received. With regard to the U.S. number, he commented that Parsons is estimated to get $20 million annually "just to be the U.S. sub-contractor." ¶53. (U) Gavrilov then made the point to New Zealand, Italy and others that the Russian view is that it would be better to have bilateral agreements, rather than have them "piggy-back" onto U.S. and other programs. He added that the report from Moscow is that an agreement on a bilateral with Italy is close. Annie Marie (France) reported that French ratification of the bilateral agreement apparently could be completed by the end of the month. Gavrilov said he understood Russia had already ratified the bilateral with France. ¶54. (U) Gavrilov closed by stressing that the Russian del is ready to assist if any of the donors had questions or encountered difficulties, and, if nothing else, would convey the query to Moscow and try to get a response. Attendees were Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, FRG, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, UK, and the U.S. ¶55. (U) Javits sends. BLAKEMAN