CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000223 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) NSC FOR LEDDY WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 2 This is CWC-11-07. -------------- RECENT MEDIA COVERAGE OF U.S. CW DESTRUCTION -------------- ¶1. (U) In response to inquiries over the past several weeks, del rep briefed WEOG on recent press articles concerning the U.S. chemical weapons destruction program. With respect to Dupont's recent decision not to treat the VX hydrolysate from Newport, del rep explained that the program impact was still being assessed, alternative options were being explored, and that it is possible that the incineration sites may be able to make up Newport's relatively small contribution to the 45% milestone. Del rep also addressed articles generated by the Nunn/McCurdy submission to Congress, which indicate completion of destruction at the two sites remaining to be constructed could be delayed until 2020 and 2023. ¶2. (U) Del rep offered a brief explanation of the Nunn/McCurdy process to address questions delegations are likely to have about the timing of release of this new information, and why the figures are so different from those submitted with the U.S. extension request. Del rep also indicated that questions exist as to whether additional funding now might significantly accelerate progress, and that this issue of funding is to be distinguished from statements made last year, which still hold true, that the U.S. inability to complete destruction by 2012 cannot be altered by increasing the program budget. Delegations had no immediate questions, although the German representative later indicated his hope that this was a political ploy to increase program funding. -------------- ALBANIA CW DESTRUCTION -------------- ¶3. (U) Although destruction operations at the Qaf-Molla CWDF officially began February 1, due to significant program delays, Albania has already missed its first two intermediate deadlines (approved during CSP-11),and will miss its third intermediate deadline and the final deadline, April 29, 2007, established by the Convention for complete elimination of its CW stockpile. Del rep met with the Albanian delegation and senior members of the Verification division to discuss a sensible, transparent way forward. There have been an increasing number of questions concerning Albania's inability to meet its recently established deadlines, and, regardless of the relatively small scope of operations in Albania, it seems unwise to set the precedent that further extensions of intermediate deadlines are not required. ¶4. (U) A letter explaining the general nature of the delays, and the fact that several weeks of operations will be required before new deadlines can be credibly established, will be submitted to the Technical Secretariat, along with a request to make this information available to member states. Del will work with the Albanian delegation and Washington to ensure an extension request for the 45% and 100% deadlines is submitted as soon as possible, and that maximum transparency is provided in the interim. -------------- END POINT OF DESTRUCTION -------------- ¶5. (U) Delegations are demonstrating an increasing interest in returning to the issue of defining the End Point of Destruction. Del rep, in discussions with the UK and WEOG Coordinator Christer Ahlstrom, has recommended any discussion of the topic in WEOG be preceded by a briefing from the TS on current operations at the Maradykovsky CWDF, particularly in light of the fact that the Russian Federation has yet to table a draft facility agreement or verification plan for this facility. Internal opinions at the TS as to the nature of operations at this particular site range from serious concern about the adequacy of measures being used to mutilate the munitions, to a fairly high comfort level that reaction mass and metal parts mutilation are being handled appropriately. ¶6. (U) One thing is certain; the TS is not inclined to make any political judgments as to whether or not the VX will be considered destroyed after the first stage of treatment, and simply intends to present a factual accounting, leaving the politics of EPOD to the member states. The TS is, however, drafting a paper on the topic for the DG, and some TS members have indicated their belief that it might be appropriate to return to the definition in light of current and future practices and technologies to be used. ¶7. (U) Del rep will follow up with Ahlstrom and members of the TS to encourage that a briefing be provided by the end of the month. Del rep will also reassure States Party that the U.S. does not intend to change its definition of EPOD, and will claim destruction credit only after the second stage of treatment. WEOG delegations, most notably the UK and Germany, are likely to take a firm position supporting the U.S. definition, given the uncertainty as to precisely what technologies and secondary treatment methods will be employed at future Russian facilities. While this issue may not be specifically addressed at the March Executive Council, it will certainly receive increasing attention as the Russian 20% deadline of April 29, 2007 approaches. -------------- 90-DAY REPORTING REQUIREMENT -------------- ¶8. (U) Delegation has now on several occasions been approached by the TS regarding the U.S. intent to comply with the 90-day reporting requirement stipulated in the Convention as a condition for granting of an extension of the final deadline for CW destruction. Most recently, Ambassador Khodakov (Secretary of the Policy Making Organs) noted that many important decisions regarding deadlines were taken during CSP-11, and so he expects that the possessor states will submit updates as required. Although it was assumed earlier in the process that the destruction updates offered during the destruction informal sessions preceding EC meetings would likely suffice, this no longer appears to be the case. ¶9. (U) Given the sometimes lengthy gaps between EC sessions, and the general atmospherics surrounding not only the granting of the extension request, but also recent news that the U.S. is unlikely to complete destruction before 2023, delegations are likely to expect strict compliance with this reporting requirement. Del will quietly query the Russian del, who has stated that provision of this information should not be a problem for Moscow, to gauge the level of detail Russia intends to provide. Del recommends Washington consider what format and depth might be most appropriate and be prepared to submit the first update before the end of July. ¶10. (U) Javits sends. ARNALL