NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DASD CAGAN'S DEC. 12

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002061

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/WE, SCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DASD CAGAN'S DEC. 12
VISIT TO THE HAGUE

Classified By: CDA Michael Gallagher, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: During her December 12 meetings with Dutch
officials, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (A) for
Coalition, Peacekeeping, and Multinational Cooperation Debra
Cagan stressed the GONL has the unique opportunity --
especially with a long lead-time to August 2008 -- to work
with potential contributors to ensure its extended ISAF
mission in Uruzgan is well-prepared, integrated and
coordinated. She stressed that the key to ensure a
successful mission is enhanced training for potential
contributors, and that the USG is willing to coordinate such
training and consider equipment assistance requests, provided
the Dutch help financially with the training. Dutch
interlocutors agreed that enhancing training was important,
but expressed some skepticism regarding the ability to find
funding in an already stretched budgetary situation. They
agreed, however, to review the situation and continue
dialogue on the subject. Cagan also discussed Dutch
intentions regarding the Georgian offer, the status of other
Uruzgan troop contributors, and a Dutch request to extend a
2005 U.S. security guarantee to come to the assistance of
Dutch troops in trouble. End summary.


2. (U) In a series of meetings on December 12, DASD (A) Cagan
met with VCHOD Gen. Bertholee, MOD Director for General
Policy Affairs Lo Casteleijn, and MOD J-5 CAPT Bauer at the
MOD, and later with the PM's Foreign Affairs Advisor Karel
van Oosterom and MFA Deputy Director for Security Affairs
Henk Swarttouw. U.S. participants included Ambassador
Arnall, ARMA COL Calbos, Executive Assistant COL Art Collins
(ret.),COL Rick Selleck from Allied Command -
Transformation, and polmiloff Jason Grubb.

Financial Assistance for Training/Equipment
--------------


3. (C) DASD Cagan hoped that her latest visit to The Hague
would be the first in an on-going discussion to help the
Dutch -- and NATO -- ensure that the partners contributing to
the Dutch ISAF mission extension in Uruzgan province are
well-prepared, integrated and interoperable. She emphasized
that discussion at this point is preliminary in nature,
especially as the Dutch parliament is currently debating the
extension -- but she hoped to give the Dutch options to think
about as they look ahead to their extension. Cagan noted
that the Dutch have a unique opportunity to get the extension
right, especially with the long lead-time to August 2008, to
demonstrate how a NATO mission should be properly trained and
equipped.


4. (C) Cagan said the key to getting the mission right is
training -- many NATO Allies can improve their contributions
to Afghanistan with enhanced counter IED and
counterinsurgency training. She noted recent problems with
Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs),which could
be helped with additional training prior to deployment. But
she said the Dutch and the Alliance would stand to benefit
from additional training for some of their potential mission
partners. In that respect, she said the USG -- in
conjunction with Allied Command Transformation (ACT) -- is
willing to provide such training for these contributors at
the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels,
Germany, or through mobile training teams, and could also
potentially help with capacity and equipment issues.


5. (C) In exchange for training and potential equipment
assistance, Cagan asked for financial support. She suggested
that for approximately 10-20 million euros, the USG could
provide the potential training necessary to greatly improve
any Dutch extension. Cagan emphasized that Dutch financial
assistance should be viewed as an investment, and stressed
the importance of creating equal partners within NATO so that
new members can do more.

MOD: Interested, But Difficult
--------------


6. (C) Gen. Bertholee described the proposal as "very
interesting," and agreed with Cagan that few NATO Allies
possess counterinsurgency experience. He also agreed with

the need to invest in new members, but suggested that the
Dutch parliament is very reluctant to pledge additional
financial assistance toward the Dutch mission in Uruzgan.
Gen. Bertholee reiterated the very strong feeling in
parliament regarding burden-sharing within the Alliance. He
suggested that Dutch capacity at this point was "extremely
limited" -- they can barely train their own troops. However,
both he and Casteleijn agreed to "look at the finances" to
see what might be possible.


7. (C) Casteleijn agreed that NATO -- and the Netherlands --
is coming to the realization that more must be done in order
to become "truly expeditionary," as well as being able to
function in a civilian environment. He noted that the Dutch
experience is growing in this regard, primarily based on its
mission in Afghanistan. Casteleijn questioned the timing of
the suggestion that potential contributors might require
additional training, especially as the GONL is trying to make
the argument to parliament that these contributions will
allow the Dutch to extend in Uruzgan. Moreover, additional
financial assistance for training might bolster the argument
that these contributions are more trouble than they are
worth. Finally, he suggested that any training be done in
conjunction with the Dutch to improve interoperability.
Cagan assured Casteleijn that such discussions were
preliminary in nature, and certainly not for public
consumption, that that training would be coordinated with the
Dutch.

PM's Office/MFA: Unofficially Skeptical
--------------


8. (C) Van Oosterom also agreed with the importance of
elevating the level of training for potential partners, but
was skeptical that Dutch politicians would concur. He
explained that one of the key conditions in getting the
coalition member Labor Party (PvdA) on board was reducing the
total cost of the mission. Technically, the GONL was able to
answer that demand as the "official" cost will be 70 million
euros less than the initial mission. Van Oosterom explained,
however, that the funding for the mission will come from a
number of different sources, including an enhanced defense
budget, reconstruction and development funding from the MFA,
and even from parts of the national budget. In that respect,
he said, the Dutch are already stretched financially to the
limits. As an "unofficial answer" in what he agreed should
be a continued dialogue, van Oosterom was skeptical the Dutch
could even find 10-20 million euros for a worthy cause like
training.

Georgia
--------------


9. (C) Cagan complimented Georgian military efforts in Iraq,
describing Georgian 1st and 3rd Brigades as having been
trained to U.S. standards regarding counter IED and maneuver
tactics, and willing to "do the job" with no caveats. She
directly asked whether the Dutch intend to use the Georgian
contribution, and suggested the Georgians might be
well-suited for a border security mission in eastern
Afghanistan. Gen. Bertholee replied that diverting the
Georgians to the east would "create problems" for the Dutch.
Casteleijn added that officially, the GONL has been telling
parliament that it is still reviewing the Georgian offer, but
that did not preclude the Dutch from using the Georgians.
Cagan appreciated the direct answer, and noted that if the
Dutch want the Georgians, they deploy to Uruzgan.

Other Contributors
--------------


10. (C) Cagan said she had heard frustration expressed by
Hungarian colleagues over the Dutch allegedly walking back
from an agreement to forgive the debt associated with turning
over the PRT mission in Baghlan in exchange for a Hungarian
OMLT in Uruzgan. Gen. Bertholee and Casteleijn noted that
there was a two million euro debt associated with the
turnover, but there was "no issue" from the Dutch perspective
as the Dutch had already agreed to forgive the debt. Gen.
Bertholee and CAPT Bauer noted recent problems with the
Hungary regarding the Uruzgan contribution -- the Hungarians

want to provide infantry support, while the Dutch would
prefer Budapest provide combat support based on the Hungarian
engineering experience in Iraq. CAPT Bauer said the Dutch
assess the Hungarian infantry support element as not
reliable, and would require additional infantry support from
the Dutch in order to be useful.


11. (C) Cagan noted the French plan to reinforce its OMLT,
bringing total personnel up to approximately 80 troops, and
that the French would have access to Dutch food and medical
services. Bauer confirmed this, describing the need to
expand Dutch facilities to accommodate the larger number of
forces. Bauer described cooperation thus far with the Czechs
as "good," but lamented the fact that the Czechs only plan to
contribute forces for six months. Cagan noted the six-month
deployments from U.S. experience were a parliamentary
necessity in the Czech Republic, and suggested the Czechs
might be willing to stay longer -- even with their added
responsibilities in Lowgar.

Security Guarantee
--------------


12. (C) Both Casteleijn and van Oosterom raised the "security
guarantee" clause the GONL had provided to parliament at the
end of 2005 in which NATO and U.S. forces would come to the
aid of Dutch forces in trouble. They questioned whether such
support would be extended to include the new mission in
August 2008 -- such a guarantee would be important for next
week's debate in parliament. Cagan offered to take that up
with U.S. military authorities.

The End in 2010?
--------------


13. (C) Van Oosterom described the GONL letter to parliament
announcing the decision to extend in Uruzgan as "awkward" due
to numerous political compromises. He drew attention,
however, to the paragraph noting the Dutch intention to
withdraw its Task Force Uruzgan from Afghanistan by December

2010. Van Oosterom said such language is specific to answer
critics in the opposition, but also sufficiently vague to
ensure that the Dutch leave open the possibility of
conducting other military missions in other parts of
Afghanistan. Likewise, with the Dutch intention of gradually
turning the PRT in Uruzgan over to civilian control, van
Oosterom did not leave out the possibility that the Dutch
might stay in Uruzgan with a significant, albeit civilian,
presence.


14. (U) DASD Cagan has cleared on this cable.
Gallagher