NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DUTCH POSITIVE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002048 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017 TAGS: PREL PINR SNAR MOPS AF NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DUTCH POSITIVE ON COUNTERNARCOTICS MESSAGE Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Dutch are pleased to hear that aerial spraying is "off the table" for Afghanistan this year, but recognize that greater efforts are needed in southern Afghanistan to counter poppy cultivation. The Dutch continue to focus heavily on promoting alternative livelihood development in Uruzgan, but do not rule out enhanced eradication programs provided they are "tribally balanced" and do not unfairly target poor farmers at the expense of "protected" wealthy growers. In a November 30 meeting with INL PDAS Schweich, Dutch interlocutors were responsive to the message that allies must present a united front on counternarcotics, and noted that the new USG counternarcotics strategy provides "a lot to think about." END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On November 30, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) PDAS Thomas Schweich discussed the USG Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan with Aart Jacobi, director of the Dutch MFA's Department of Human Rights, Humanitarian Aid, and Peacebuilding. Louise Anten, Head of the MFA's Peacebuilding and Good Governance Office, and Jos Schellars, Deputy Director of the MFA's Western Hemisphere Department, also participated in the meeting; Schweich was accompanied by INL Special Assistant Daniel Weisfield, POLCOUNS Andrew Schofer, and POLMILOFF Jason Grubb (notetaker). NEW STRATEGY/NEW MESSAGE: -------------- ¶3. (C) Schweich noted that in August 2007, the USG developed a new counternarcotics strategy based on extensive interagency review of the evolving situation in Afghanistan. While poppy production in Northern Afghanistan was decreasing, he said, production in the South has increased significantly in recent years. The new approach, therefore, is designed to maintain and strengthen progress in the North while developing measures to tackle the deteriorating situation in the South. A key part of the new strategy, he added, is public information, which must take into account the motivations of those cultivating poppies. According to a new UN report, poppy cultivation is no longer associated with poor farmers; most of the growth is taking place in insecure regions to the benefit of wealthy and powerful individuals. Schweich acknowledged that the situation in Uruzgan is somewhat unique in that it does have more "poor farmers" growing poppy than other provinces, such as Helmand. The main point of the new strategy, however, is to target rich, corrupt landholders who are taking advantage of an insecure situation to grow poppy, not the poor who have fewer choices. ¶4. (C) To re-calibrate the new strategy, the USG is developing new ways to get out the message about the negative impact of poppy cultivation. For example, instead of relying on radio broadcasts and billboards, the USG is focusing on more on traditional "word of mouth" mechanisms such as "shuras" with village elders and religious leaders to communicate directly with local communities. "Poppy Elimination Program" teams, or "PEP teams," are a critical part of this effort, including in Uruzgan. Anten noted that the recently deployed PEP team in Uruzgan is already starting to show positive results, including an immediate (small) reduction in poppy cultivation. According to Anten, the PET has held at least two shuras with the support of Uruzgan Governor Hamdan, sending a very clear message that growing poppies is undesirable on both religious and security grounds. On the basis of these meetings, she added, Governor Hamdan had set a goal of eradicating "90 percent" (or 8,000 hectares) of poppy cultivation in the province. Anten and Schweich agreed that while this was probably an overly ambitious goal, it nevertheless sends a clear message to the growers. ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOODS: -------------- ¶5. (C) Following a question from Jacobi on alternative livelihoods, Schweich said that the USG is often misperceived as focusing solely on eradication efforts. He noted that the USG spends USD 150-200 million per year on counternarcotics-specific alternative livelihood projects. He said USAID is also adapting its strategy to focus more on how to get alternative crops to market; more emphasis has been placed on exports and infrastructure to get these goods to where they can be sold at a good price. Schweich also described the "Good Performers Initiative," in which local villages are rewarded with USD 50,000 each for ceasing poppy cultivation. He noted that the USG and the UK are looking for additional donors to this program. In addition, Schweich stressed that for every 1,000 hectares of ceased poppy cultivation after the initial 10 percent, the USG will grant USD 1,000,000 toward the provincial government. He said the challenge will be to ensure that the provincial governor uses the money at the local level with those villages directly responsible for reducing poppy cultivation -- which is why the initiative will disburse funds through a dual-key system requiring the concurrence of both the provincial government and the regional PRT. ¶6. (C) Anten and Jacobi described Dutch efforts to promote alternative livelihoods in Uruzgan, including a pilot program to promote saffron production. According to Anten, saffron comes closest to poppy production in terms of price, yield, volume, and shelf-life. Jacobi also noted that the Dutch were distributing apricot and almond trees to 2,500 Uruzgan families. The Dutch have also recently signed a contract with the German NGO GTZ to develop more effective means of getting alternative crops to market. KEEPING A UNIFIED MESSAGE ON ERADICATION: -------------- ¶7. (C) On eradication, Schweich acknowledged that the U.S., the Afghan government, and allies differed on the merits of aerial spraying. He noted that the USG had recently reached an internal consensus to begin a "pilot project" of aerial spraying in Nangarhar Province -- a province in which U.S. forces were currently stationed. The U.S. had been prepared to target an area of approximately 4-5,000 hectares for spraying in conjunction with heavy outreach to convince the local population of the safety of the operation, and to stress that the USG was targeting rich, corrupt farmers. If the experiment had proved successful, he added, the USG would then have cited this to promote aerial spraying in other areas as an alternative to dangerous and less effective ground-based eradication efforts. President Karzai, however, has refused to approve the program, so aerial spraying is now "off the table" for this year. ¶8. (C) Now that spraying is "off the table," according to Schweich, it is vitally important that the international community demonstrate unity in pushing for a "plan B" of other eradication measures. Perceived differences between allies, he noted, have successfully been used by Karzai and other to justify inaction, thereby protecting the poppy cultivators and traffickers. Schweich stressed that while developing alternative livelihoods was a useful way to wean poor farmers away from poppy cultivation, it has little effect on the more powerful and wealthy growers. For that reason, a credible threat of eradication must be part of our overall strategy. In the past, however, the allies -- including ISAF -- have sent mixed messages on eradication. Faced with a united front, Karzai would have a greater incentive to take serious action against the most powerful drug lords -- including, for example, Jan Mohammed, the former governor of Uruzgan (and chief rival of Hamdan.) ¶9. (C) Jacobi and Anten said the Dutch were pleased to see the aerial spraying option "off the table" for this year, as aerial spraying options were not politically sustainable in the Netherlands. They also agreed that eradication efforts should focus on wealthy, powerful individuals rather than poor farmers; the Dutch also believed such efforts must be "tribally balanced." Schweich noted that poppy production in Uruzgan was -- contrary to initial predictions -- stable or decreasing slightly this year. Anten agreed this was a positive sign, but regretted that this information came "too late" to influence Dutch perceptions prior to the recent debate on extending Dutch troops in Uruzgan. (Note: On November 30, the Dutch cabinet announced its intention to continue the deployment for an addition two years.) Jacobi and Anten also took on board the need for a single, unified message to the Afghan government, expressing frustration with Karzai's apparent complacency on this issue regardless of the cost in security and stability. COMMENT: -------------- ¶10. (C) The Dutch are clearly pleased to see aerial spraying "off the table" this year, and were perhaps surprised to find that our views on eradication and alternative livelihoods are much closer than usually portrayed in the local press. Without making any promises, Jacobi and Anten made clear that they understood the need for improved allied cooperation and coordination on counternarcotics. According to Jacobi, PDAS Schweich's presentation "has given us a lot to think about." ¶11. (U) PDAS Schweich has cleared on this cable. Arnall