NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DUTCH POSITIVE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002048

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017
TAGS: PREL PINR SNAR MOPS AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DUTCH POSITIVE ON
COUNTERNARCOTICS MESSAGE


Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Dutch are pleased to hear that aerial
spraying is "off the table" for Afghanistan this year, but
recognize that greater efforts are needed in southern
Afghanistan to counter poppy cultivation. The Dutch continue
to focus heavily on promoting alternative livelihood
development in Uruzgan, but do not rule out enhanced
eradication programs provided they are "tribally balanced"
and do not unfairly target poor farmers at the expense of
"protected" wealthy growers. In a November 30 meeting with
INL PDAS Schweich, Dutch interlocutors were responsive to the
message that allies must present a united front on
counternarcotics, and noted that the new USG counternarcotics
strategy provides "a lot to think about." END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On November 30, International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INL) PDAS Thomas Schweich discussed the USG
Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan with Aart Jacobi,
director of the Dutch MFA's Department of Human Rights,
Humanitarian Aid, and Peacebuilding. Louise Anten, Head of
the MFA's Peacebuilding and Good Governance Office, and Jos
Schellars, Deputy Director of the MFA's Western Hemisphere
Department, also participated in the meeting; Schweich was
accompanied by INL Special Assistant Daniel Weisfield,
POLCOUNS Andrew Schofer, and POLMILOFF Jason Grubb
(notetaker).

NEW STRATEGY/NEW MESSAGE:
--------------


3. (C) Schweich noted that in August 2007, the USG developed
a new counternarcotics strategy based on extensive
interagency review of the evolving situation in Afghanistan.
While poppy production in Northern Afghanistan was
decreasing, he said, production in the South has increased
significantly in recent years. The new approach, therefore,
is designed to maintain and strengthen progress in the North
while developing measures to tackle the deteriorating
situation in the South. A key part of the new strategy, he
added, is public information, which must take into account
the motivations of those cultivating poppies. According to a
new UN report, poppy cultivation is no longer associated with
poor farmers; most of the growth is taking place in insecure
regions to the benefit of wealthy and powerful individuals.
Schweich acknowledged that the situation in Uruzgan is
somewhat unique in that it does have more "poor farmers"
growing poppy than other provinces, such as Helmand. The
main point of the new strategy, however, is to target rich,
corrupt landholders who are taking advantage of an insecure
situation to grow poppy, not the poor who have fewer choices.


4. (C) To re-calibrate the new strategy, the USG is
developing new ways to get out the message about the negative
impact of poppy cultivation. For example, instead of relying
on radio broadcasts and billboards, the USG is focusing on
more on traditional "word of mouth" mechanisms such as
"shuras" with village elders and religious leaders to
communicate directly with local communities. "Poppy
Elimination Program" teams, or "PEP teams," are a critical
part of this effort, including in Uruzgan. Anten noted that
the recently deployed PEP team in Uruzgan is already starting
to show positive results, including an immediate (small)
reduction in poppy cultivation. According to Anten, the PET
has held at least two shuras with the support of Uruzgan
Governor Hamdan, sending a very clear message that growing
poppies is undesirable on both religious and security
grounds. On the basis of these meetings, she added, Governor
Hamdan had set a goal of eradicating "90 percent" (or 8,000
hectares) of poppy cultivation in the province. Anten and
Schweich agreed that while this was probably an overly
ambitious goal, it nevertheless sends a clear message to the
growers.

ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOODS:
--------------


5. (C) Following a question from Jacobi on alternative
livelihoods, Schweich said that the USG is often misperceived
as focusing solely on eradication efforts. He noted that the
USG spends USD 150-200 million per year on
counternarcotics-specific alternative livelihood projects.
He said USAID is also adapting its strategy to focus more on
how to get alternative crops to market; more emphasis has
been placed on exports and infrastructure to get these goods
to where they can be sold at a good price. Schweich also
described the "Good Performers Initiative," in which local
villages are rewarded with USD 50,000 each for ceasing poppy
cultivation. He noted that the USG and the UK are looking
for additional donors to this program. In addition, Schweich
stressed that for every 1,000 hectares of ceased poppy

cultivation after the initial 10 percent, the USG will grant
USD 1,000,000 toward the provincial government. He said the
challenge will be to ensure that the provincial governor uses
the money at the local level with those villages directly
responsible for reducing poppy cultivation -- which is why
the initiative will disburse funds through a dual-key system
requiring the concurrence of both the provincial government
and the regional PRT.


6. (C) Anten and Jacobi described Dutch efforts to promote
alternative livelihoods in Uruzgan, including a pilot program
to promote saffron production. According to Anten, saffron
comes closest to poppy production in terms of price, yield,
volume, and shelf-life. Jacobi also noted that the Dutch
were distributing apricot and almond trees to 2,500 Uruzgan
families. The Dutch have also recently signed a contract
with the German NGO GTZ to develop more effective means of
getting alternative crops to market.

KEEPING A UNIFIED MESSAGE ON ERADICATION:
--------------


7. (C) On eradication, Schweich acknowledged that the U.S.,
the Afghan government, and allies differed on the merits of
aerial spraying. He noted that the USG had recently reached
an internal consensus to begin a "pilot project" of aerial
spraying in Nangarhar Province -- a province in which U.S.
forces were currently stationed. The U.S. had been prepared
to target an area of approximately 4-5,000 hectares for
spraying in conjunction with heavy outreach to convince the
local population of the safety of the operation, and to
stress that the USG was targeting rich, corrupt farmers. If
the experiment had proved successful, he added, the USG would
then have cited this to promote aerial spraying in other
areas as an alternative to dangerous and less effective
ground-based eradication efforts. President Karzai, however,
has refused to approve the program, so aerial spraying is now
"off the table" for this year.


8. (C) Now that spraying is "off the table," according to
Schweich, it is vitally important that the international
community demonstrate unity in pushing for a "plan B" of
other eradication measures. Perceived differences between
allies, he noted, have successfully been used by Karzai and
other to justify inaction, thereby protecting the poppy
cultivators and traffickers. Schweich stressed that while
developing alternative livelihoods was a useful way to wean
poor farmers away from poppy cultivation, it has little
effect on the more powerful and wealthy growers. For that
reason, a credible threat of eradication must be part of our
overall strategy. In the past, however, the allies --
including ISAF -- have sent mixed messages on eradication.
Faced with a united front, Karzai would have a greater
incentive to take serious action against the most powerful
drug lords -- including, for example, Jan Mohammed, the
former governor of Uruzgan (and chief rival of Hamdan.)


9. (C) Jacobi and Anten said the Dutch were pleased to see
the aerial spraying option "off the table" for this year, as
aerial spraying options were not politically sustainable in
the Netherlands. They also agreed that eradication efforts
should focus on wealthy, powerful individuals rather than
poor farmers; the Dutch also believed such efforts must be
"tribally balanced." Schweich noted that poppy production in
Uruzgan was -- contrary to initial predictions -- stable or
decreasing slightly this year. Anten agreed this was a
positive sign, but regretted that this information came "too
late" to influence Dutch perceptions prior to the recent
debate on extending Dutch troops in Uruzgan. (Note: On
November 30, the Dutch cabinet announced its intention to
continue the deployment for an addition two years.) Jacobi
and Anten also took on board the need for a single, unified
message to the Afghan government, expressing frustration with
Karzai's apparent complacency on this issue regardless of the
cost in security and stability.

COMMENT:
--------------


10. (C) The Dutch are clearly pleased to see aerial spraying
"off the table" this year, and were perhaps surprised to find
that our views on eradication and alternative livelihoods are
much closer than usually portrayed in the local press.
Without making any promises, Jacobi and Anten made clear that
they understood the need for improved allied cooperation and
coordination on counternarcotics. According to Jacobi, PDAS
Schweich's presentation "has given us a lot to think about."


11. (U) PDAS Schweich has cleared on this cable.

Arnall