C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000204

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN, ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR LEDDY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017
TAGS: PARM AORC EIND OPCW CWC CBW IR
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SUPPORT FOR
BLOCKING IRAN AS EXECUTIVE COUNCIL CHAIR

REF: STATE 11293 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits, U.S. Permanent Representative
to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Reasons
1.4 (B) and (D).

This is CWC-10-07.


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Javits spoke with the
Ambassadors of the UK, France, Germany, Japan and South
Korea, as well as OPCW Director General Pfirter on the
unacceptability of Iran as the Chair of the OPCW Executive
Committee. There was unanimous acceptance of that position,
nuanced differences regarding how to address the issue, and
initial discussion of possible alternative candidates from
the Asian Group. End Summary.


2. (C) UK: UK Amb. Parker was very familiar with the U.S.
objection to Iranian Amb. Ziaran as Chair of the OPCW EC, and
agreed that it would not be possible to accept an Iranian
chairmanship. He noted that there were lessons that could be
drawn from the experience of the failed Iranian attempt to
get the chairmanship of the working group (WG) for the Second
Review Conference, a position held by Parker. In that case,
it was critical that Iran heard a consistent message from
WEOG and numerous other delegations that they could not
accept Iranian chairmanship of the WG. That would again be
essential with regard to any Iranian push for the EC Chair,
and Parker pledged that the UK will help in making that case
to other delegations. He would also talk to the DG about how
the UK could assist in this matter.


3. (C) However, Parker candidly stated that due to his
chairmanship of the RevCon WG, there was a limit to the
extent to which UK fingerprints could be on the effort to
deny Iran the chairmanship. Particularly

as Iran is the
Asian Group representative on the WG, the UK needed to ensure
that the EC issue was handled in a manner that ensured Iran
would not block progress on preparations for the RevCon.
With regard to who might be a good candidate from the Asian
Group to serve as EC Chair, Parker's first choice would be
the Malaysian Ambassador, second would be the Indian
Ambassador, and third would be the Chinese Ambassador.


4. (C) Germany: FRG Amb. Petri expressed Germany's support
for the U.S. opposition to Iran as EC Chair. Javits
emphasized that it would be important in particular for the
UK, France and Germany to take an active role in ensuring
that Iran did not get the chairmanship. Petri replied that
Germany has already done some discreet lobbying with some
delegations from the Asian Group.


5. (C) France: French Amb. Gaussot said he appreciated the
U.S. position in opposition to Iran, adding that he thought
the best course would be to persuade Ziaran to not press to
obtain the job. Gaussot said that he understood the demarche
in Paris would only be done on the afternoon of Feb. 2, so he
could not provide more commentary at this point. However, he
promised to contact Javits next week after the demarche had
been completed and Paris had given him instructions on the
matter after some consideration.

6. (C) Director General Pfirter: The DG fully agreed that it
would not be possible to have Iran serve as the Chair. He
emphasized that at this point, Ziaran has not circulated any
written notification to the Asian Group that he seeks the EC
Chairmanship. Should another Ambassador from the group be

first to circulate such a document, Iran would then be in the
much more difficult position of having to challenge that
individual. It was therefore important to see if a suitable
Ambassador could be found to "formally" indicate his/her
candidacy. The DG's personal recommendations were to first
see if the South Korean Ambassador would be willing, then the
Malaysian Ambassador and then the Philippine Ambassador, whom
the DG thought would also be a well-accepted choice.


7. (C) South Korea: The South Koreans had already expressed
to the U.S. del reservations about an Iranian EC
Chairmanship. ROK Amb. Choi told Javits the topic has not
been discussed formally within the Asian Group, and that at
this time no meeting had been scheduled by the Asian Group
coordinator (Pakistan) to decide on the group nominee. Choi
agreed with Javits that it would be valuable to note the
Iranian Ambassador as Vice-Chair of the cluster handling
financial and administrative issues already had a key
position. Choi stressed that it would be important to have
an alternative candidate to Iran. Javits asked Choi whether
he might be willing to serve as EC Chair, and Choi clearly
was not comfortable with the suggestion. He made clear that
he would not be willing to compete for the position.
However, he indicated a willingness to serve as chair if it
were clear that he were the consensus candidate from the
Asian Group.


8. (C) Japan: Japanese Amb. Komachi concurred on the need
to find a good alternative candidate. Komachi mentioned Amb.
Choi as his preference, and Javits recounted the discussion.
Komachi stated that Choi's reluctance could be due to the
fact that his deputy will be returning this month to an
assignment in the MFA. However, Komachi promised to broach
the issue with Choi as soon as possible.


9. (C) Komachi subsequently reported back to Javits that
Choi also had made clear that he did not want to compete for
the chairmanship but would be open to serving if he were the
consensus candidate. Komachi told Javits that he then had
spoken to the Philippine Ambassador about a possible ROK
candidacy, and the Philippine Ambassador had given his
personal view that Choi would be acceptable to ASEAN states.
Komachi then said that he would broach the issue of a ROK
candidacy with the Malaysian Ambassador.


10. (C) Continuing on the topic of possible candidates from
the Asian Group, Komachi thought the Indian Ambassador would
be an excellent EC Chair, although she might be reluctant to
accept a "neutral" position and give up an "advocacy"
position. With regard to the Malaysian Ambassador, Javits
noted that she had done a good job as head of one of the key
drafting groups that prepared for the First RevCon in 2003.
Komachi raised the prospect of the Thai Ambassador, but then
commented that the Thai Embassy staff was somewhat weak.
(Note: The same could be said of the Philippine Ambassador,
who has a thin and somewhat inexperienced staff, but is
solid, well-liked and pro-U.S.)


11. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL