CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SUPPORT FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000204 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN, ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) NSC FOR LEDDY WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017 TAGS: PARM AORC EIND OPCW CWC CBW IR SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SUPPORT FOR BLOCKING IRAN AS EXECUTIVE COUNCIL CHAIR REF: STATE 11293 (NOTAL) Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits, U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). This is CWC-10-07. ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Javits spoke with the Ambassadors of the UK, France, Germany, Japan and South Korea, as well as OPCW Director General Pfirter on the unacceptability of Iran as the Chair of the OPCW Executive Committee. There was unanimous acceptance of that position, nuanced differences regarding how to address the issue, and initial discussion of possible alternative candidates from the Asian Group. End Summary. ¶2. (C) UK: UK Amb. Parker was very familiar with the U.S. objection to Iranian Amb. Ziaran as Chair of the OPCW EC, and agreed that it would not be possible to accept an Iranian chairmanship. He noted that there were lessons that could be drawn from the experience of the failed Iranian attempt to get the chairmanship of the working group (WG) for the Second Review Conference, a position held by Parker. In that case, it was critical that Iran heard a consistent message from WEOG and numerous other delegations that they could not accept Iranian chairmanship of the WG. That would again be essential with regard to any Iranian push for the EC Chair, and Parker pledged that the UK will help in making that case to other delegations. He would also talk to the DG about how the UK could assist in this matter. ¶3. (C) However, Parker candidly stated that due to his chairmanship of the RevCon WG, there was a limit to the extent to which UK fingerprints could be on the effort to deny Iran the chairmanship. Particularly as Iran is the Asian Group representative on the WG, the UK needed to ensure that the EC issue was handled in a manner that ensured Iran would not block progress on preparations for the RevCon. With regard to who might be a good candidate from the Asian Group to serve as EC Chair, Parker's first choice would be the Malaysian Ambassador, second would be the Indian Ambassador, and third would be the Chinese Ambassador. ¶4. (C) Germany: FRG Amb. Petri expressed Germany's support for the U.S. opposition to Iran as EC Chair. Javits emphasized that it would be important in particular for the UK, France and Germany to take an active role in ensuring that Iran did not get the chairmanship. Petri replied that Germany has already done some discreet lobbying with some delegations from the Asian Group. ¶5. (C) France: French Amb. Gaussot said he appreciated the U.S. position in opposition to Iran, adding that he thought the best course would be to persuade Ziaran to not press to obtain the job. Gaussot said that he understood the demarche in Paris would only be done on the afternoon of Feb. 2, so he could not provide more commentary at this point. However, he promised to contact Javits next week after the demarche had been completed and Paris had given him instructions on the matter after some consideration. ¶6. (C) Director General Pfirter: The DG fully agreed that it would not be possible to have Iran serve as the Chair. He emphasized that at this point, Ziaran has not circulated any written notification to the Asian Group that he seeks the EC Chairmanship. Should another Ambassador from the group be first to circulate such a document, Iran would then be in the much more difficult position of having to challenge that individual. It was therefore important to see if a suitable Ambassador could be found to "formally" indicate his/her candidacy. The DG's personal recommendations were to first see if the South Korean Ambassador would be willing, then the Malaysian Ambassador and then the Philippine Ambassador, whom the DG thought would also be a well-accepted choice. ¶7. (C) South Korea: The South Koreans had already expressed to the U.S. del reservations about an Iranian EC Chairmanship. ROK Amb. Choi told Javits the topic has not been discussed formally within the Asian Group, and that at this time no meeting had been scheduled by the Asian Group coordinator (Pakistan) to decide on the group nominee. Choi agreed with Javits that it would be valuable to note the Iranian Ambassador as Vice-Chair of the cluster handling financial and administrative issues already had a key position. Choi stressed that it would be important to have an alternative candidate to Iran. Javits asked Choi whether he might be willing to serve as EC Chair, and Choi clearly was not comfortable with the suggestion. He made clear that he would not be willing to compete for the position. However, he indicated a willingness to serve as chair if it were clear that he were the consensus candidate from the Asian Group. ¶8. (C) Japan: Japanese Amb. Komachi concurred on the need to find a good alternative candidate. Komachi mentioned Amb. Choi as his preference, and Javits recounted the discussion. Komachi stated that Choi's reluctance could be due to the fact that his deputy will be returning this month to an assignment in the MFA. However, Komachi promised to broach the issue with Choi as soon as possible. ¶9. (C) Komachi subsequently reported back to Javits that Choi also had made clear that he did not want to compete for the chairmanship but would be open to serving if he were the consensus candidate. Komachi told Javits that he then had spoken to the Philippine Ambassador about a possible ROK candidacy, and the Philippine Ambassador had given his personal view that Choi would be acceptable to ASEAN states. Komachi then said that he would broach the issue of a ROK candidacy with the Malaysian Ambassador. ¶10. (C) Continuing on the topic of possible candidates from the Asian Group, Komachi thought the Indian Ambassador would be an excellent EC Chair, although she might be reluctant to accept a "neutral" position and give up an "advocacy" position. With regard to the Malaysian Ambassador, Javits noted that she had done a good job as head of one of the key drafting groups that prepared for the First RevCon in 2003. Komachi raised the prospect of the Thai Ambassador, but then commented that the Thai Embassy staff was somewhat weak. (Note: The same could be said of the Philippine Ambassador, who has a thin and somewhat inexperienced staff, but is solid, well-liked and pro-U.S.) ¶11. (U) Javits sends. ARNALL