NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: EXTENSION DECISION IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002011

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, SCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: EXTENSION DECISION IN
SIGHT, LENGTH TBD


Classified By: CDA Michael Gallagher, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: The GONL appears poised to make a positive
decision in favor of extending its contribution to NATO's
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in
Uruzgan; the only significant remaining questions are: 1) for
how long?; and 2) what happens next? Negotiations within
Cabinet on the length of the extension continue, as PvdA
(Labor Party) ministers are drawing the line at an 18-month
extension followed by a phased withdrawal, while the
Christian Democrats are hoping for at least a 30-month
extension. The decision by the Cabinet to postpone
discussion on several contentious domestic issues bodes well
for a compromise on the length of the extension. GONL
officials are hopeful for a government decision by November
30, followed by parliamentary hearings, debate, and vote
prior to the winter break on December 20 -- but this date
could slip yet again. Given fractures within the Labor
Party, parliamentary approval for an extension will be
contentious, but a majority is still likely to emerge. Dutch
FM Maxime Verhagen hopes to make the argument at the NATO
Foreign Ministerial in Brussels on December 7 that the
international community must re-evaluate its efforts in
Afghanistan by the expiration of the Afghanistan Compact in

2011. In turn, Verhagen plans to use the same "international
rhythm" argument with parliament to lock-in a longer
extension for the Dutch -- to leave earlier than the
expiration of the Compact would be irresponsible. MFA Task
Force Uruzgan Coordinator Pieter-Jan Kleiweg discussed these
issues with polmiloff on November 20. End summary.

Exactly How Long Are We Talking About?
--------------


2. (C) Kleiweg acknowledged that the Dutch debate has shifted
from a question of whether the Dutch will extend in Uruzgan
to the length of the extension. He said Cabinet hopes to
take an unofficial decision in favor of the extension on Nov.
23, following a briefing by CHOD Gen. Berlijn. Then, the
GONL will officially notify parliament of its decision to
extend on Nov. 30 via an Article 100 letter. According to
Kleiweg, the Article 100 letter is "sitting in the computer,
almost ready to be sent" with the length of the extension the
only remaining blank to be filled. He said parliament will
convene hearings during the first two weeks of December; the
GONL plans to bring Afghan officials to The Hague to
participate. On Dec. 17, Kleiweg said PM Balkenende will
present the case to parliament on why the Dutch should
extend. Parliament will debate the extension on Dec. 18, and
most likely vote on Dec. 19 -- "all in time for Christmas,"
Kleiweg said. He added that this timeline has been shared
with parliamentarians, so that all involved know of the
GONL's intention to have a decision in place prior to the
winter break on December 20. (Note: Karen van Gennip, the
CDA's Spokeswoman for Foreign Affairs confirmed this timeline
to POLCOUNS on November 20. She suggested, however, that if
the cabinet was unable to reach agreement by November 30, it
would be better to hold off submitting the Article 100 letter
until after the recess, effectively pushing the debate back
until mid-January.)


3. (C) Regarding the length of the extension, Kleiweg
described a complex negotiation between Cabinet party members
PvdA (Labor) and the Christian Democrats. He said the Labor
Party parliamentary faction's tactic to insist publicly on
only an 18-month extension, followed by a complete withdrawal
from Uruzgan within two years, has set the baseline for
negotiations. Christian Democrats PM Balkenende and FM
Verhagen want an open-ended extension to support NATO, but
are pushing for a minimum of 30 months. Kleiweg said a
number of other domestic issues are complicating the
resolution of the extension time period, including revisions
to a "dismissal law" on hiring and firing employees, and
teachers' salaries. (Note: The Dutch Cabinet decided
yesterday to avoid a further impasse -- and potential
coalition crisis -- on the dismissal law by sending it to
committee for further review. End note.)


4. (C) Assuming the Cabinet can decide on an extension
length, Kleiweg said the next step would be to win the debate
with Parliament. He pointed to a divided Labor Party, whose
rank-and-file largely opposes an extension, as a looming

problem: the Labor Party in Cabinet may agree on an
extension, but fractures within the parliamentary group may
prevent the party from voting "as one" following the
parliamentary debate. If such is the case, then obtaining a
majority in parliament in favor of the extension "could be
dicey," Kleiweg said.

International Rhythm?
--------------


5. (C) In that respect, and in the effort to obtain a longer
extension, Kleiweg said FM Verhagen will lean heavily on the
argument that the Dutch cannot turn their backs on the
international community prior to the expiration of the
Afghanistan Compact in 2011. Kleiweg said Verhagen will
argue that an "international rhythm" or consensus is building
in the Netherlands, Canada, and the United Kingdom in favor
of examining progress and determining a way forward in
mid-2010 prior to the expiration of the Afghanistan Compact
-- to leave Uruzgan prior to this review would be
irresponsible, Kleiweg said. He also suggested that an
examination of ISAF be apart of this review, including
whether it is then appropriate to end or recast ISAF to focus
more on training and mentoring.


6. (C) Kleiweg said FM Verhagen will make this "international
rhythm" case during the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting
at the NATO Foreign Ministerial in Brussels on December 7.
According to Kleiweg, Verhagen hopes to announce at the NAC
that the GONL has decided to extend in Uruzgan (contingent on
parliamentary approval),and then will push for Allied
consensus on an international community review of efforts in
Afghanistan, including ISAF, in mid-2010. Kleiweg said
Verhagen hopes to take some "tangible agreement" on such a
review away from the NAC so that he in turn can take it back
to The Hague and lock-in parliament to extend in Afghanistan
until the end of 2010.

Georgia on My Mind?
--------------


7. (C) Kleiweg acknowledged that the Dutch continue to look
at the Georgian offer of 200 troops plus helicopters as part
of any extension plans. He said a Dutch MOD delegation
returned from Tbilisi "impressed," and noted that FM Verhagen
has dropped his political objections (i.e., Dutch concerns
about Georgia's readiness for the NATO membership action
plan) to including Georgia in an extended Dutch mission in
Uruzgan. Kleiweg understood that the Dutch MOD had contacted
our DAO regarding possible U.S. strategic airlift and armored
vehicle assistance for the Georgians. Polmiloff noted a
recent request by the Dutch MOD to approve a Dutch third
party transfer of 18 YPR 765 armored vehicles (based on the
M113) to Chile, questioning if such vehicles might be better
suited for Afghan National Army or Georgian troops, given
critical shortfalls in Uruzgan. Kleiweg replied, "that's a
damn good question!" Regardless, Kleiweg said the Dutch did
not expect to determine whether they will use the Georgian
offer prior to the parliamentary debate, and speculated that
they may end up taking "some, but not all" of the offer --
the Article 100 letter to parliament will be "sufficiently
vague" to leave open the possibility of including Georgian
assets.

Karzai Postponing?
--------------


8. (C) Kleiweg said President Karzai had planned to visit The
Hague on December 19-20, but that some questions regarding
the commencement of Eide may prevent his travel. Kleiweg
speculated that Karzai had known far in advance that the
timing with Eide might preclude his travel. Given the
planned timeline to obtain parliamentary approval by December
19, coupled with the seemingly positive direction of the
extension debate, Kleiweg suggested that Karzai's visit was
no longer as vital as once deemed.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) An extension looks more and more likely, with the
length of the extension and defining an "exit strategy" the


only real questions remaining. Kicking the can down the road
on contentious domestic issues like the dismissal law bodes
well for the Cabinet to reach a compromise -- the coalition
is on shaky ground, and both Labor and the Christian
Democrats do not want to appear as if they cannot reach
agreement on two successive issues. Verhagen's
"international rhythm" is consistent with what we have heard
from MFA Political Director Pieter de Gooijer on the Dutch
perceived need to reassess NATO's mission in Afghanistan in

2010. The Dutch will seek to build consensus with the UK and
Canada when Verhagen speaks at the NAC on December 7. On
Georgia, we have the strong impression that the Dutch believe
the Georgian offer is more trouble than it is worth, and may
be looking for convenient excuses (inability by USG to assist
with strategic airlift and armored vehicles, objections from
Australia) outside Dutch control to turn Georgia down. End
comment.

Gallagher