NETHERLANDS: SCENESETTER FOR PARLIAMENT VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001918 SIPDIS SIPDIS DOD FOR TARA JONES E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2017 TAGS: PREL PHUM NATO AF SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: SCENESETTER FOR PARLIAMENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON, OCT 22-26 REF: A. THE HAGUE 1898 B. THE HAGUE 1856 C. THE HAGUE 1810 D. THE HAGUE 1785 E. THE HAGUE 1729 Classified By: Michael Gallagher, Charge D'Affaires, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The upcoming visit of representatives of the Dutch parliament,s Foreign Affairs Committee to Washington October 22-26, 2007 provides a good opportunity to build the necessary public support for sustaining a significant Dutch military deployment in Uruzgan beyond 2008. Although visit was initially scheduled for the purpose of reviewing U.S. detention policy -- still a hot issue in the Netherlands -- subsequent developments (reftels) make the Afghanistan deployment debate a higher priority for the USG. ¶2. (C) The Dutch Cabinet hopes to make a positive recommendation to extend the Dutch mission to Parliament in mid-November, but will only do so once sufficient third-party troops have been secured to assure majority support. Although the subsequent Parliamentary debate will be contentious, ultimately the coalition parties -- along with at least one opposition party -- should deliver enough votes to ensure a clear majority, provided the proposed extension &package8 has full support within cabinet. At the moment, however, most opposition parties and the second-largest party in the Coalition (PvdA) still have serious doubts regarding the mission. (Note: Bios of all delegation members have been forwarded separately to EUR/WE.) ¶3. (SBU) Post recommends that high-level USG interlocutors use every opportunity to reinforce the message that: - Dutch troops in Uruzgan are a vital component of the NATO mission, and are contributing significantly to the improvement of life in Afghanistan. - Although it is a Dutch decision, the U.S. -- as a NATO ally -- supports the work the Dutch are doing and hope it will continue. - Within the NATO context, the USG is actively supporting Dutch requests for additional partner support in Uruzgan, and hope these efforts will shortly bear fruit. - The departure of Dutch troops would be a serious blow to ISAF, to NATO, and, ultimately, to the people of Afghanistan. END SUMMARY. BACKGROUND: -------------- ¶4. (C) The Dutch cabinet is expected to announce its decision on the Uruzgan deployment in mid-November. We are working hard with the Dutch on a bilateral basis and through NATO to try and find credible third partners who will give the Dutch the political coverage necessary to extend their mission beyond August 2008. Although the government is leaning toward a positive extension decision, the Cabinet is divided on the issue, with the Labor Party (PvdA) more skeptical than either the Christian Democrats (CDA) or Christian Union (CU). Prime Minister Balkenende (CDA) hopes eventually to build consensus in favor of an limited extension in coordination with a significant &third party8 troop contribution (as previously reported by The Hague and USNATO),but this process is still ongoing and will take until at least mid-November. ¶5. (C) The Parliamentary dynamic, meanwhile, is even more complicated than the situation inside the Cabinet. Any overseas deployment requires approval by the Dutch parliament. The initial Dutch mission to Uruzgan province received overwhelming support across the political spectrum, but only after a long, contentious debate lasting several months. Since then, the deteriorating security situation in Uruzgan and perceived lack of progress on the reconstruction front has weakened public support for any extension, causing some parties -- including the PvdA and the (now) opposition Liberal Party (VVD) -- to question their earlier support. COALITION PARTNERS: -------------- ¶6. (C) The governing coalition will be represented by five members of the delegation: Karien van Gennip (CDA),Coskun Coruz (CDA),Joel Voordewind (CU),Martijn van Dam (PvdA), and Harm-Evert Waalkens (PvdA). Of these parties, the Labor-Leftist PvdA is the most skeptical regarding an extension, and faces the greatest opposition from its members for lack of progress in Afghan reconstruction and for continuing insecurity. Party Leader Wouter Bos -- currently serving as Deputy PM and Finance Minister -- recently reviewed the party,s concerns with Ambassador Arnall (REFTEL A). More importantly, the PvdA leadership seeks to avoid a split in the party on this issue, as it could potentially force them out of government and into new elections they are likely to lose. PvdA,s coalition partners -- CDA and CU -- face less open dissension, but their members are also concerned about the toll of the deployment upon the Dutch military and lack of public support for the mission. The CDA, CU, and PvdA members will be looking on this trip for reassurances that the Dutch contribution to Uruzgan is meaningful and appreciated, and will be responsive to arguments that put it in a broader NATO and humanitarian/reconstruction context. OPPOSITION PARTIES -------------- ¶7. (C) On the right, the opposition parties will be represented by Hans van Baalen (Liberal Party, VVD) and Geert Wilders (Party for Freedom, PVV). Both are personally inclined to support a military mission in Afghanistan, but are concerned by the perception that the Dutch are being asked to &do more8 than other NATO allies. Van Baalen, in particular, also suffers from splits within the VVD on the issue. The former VVD Defense Minister Henk Kamp -- who set the terms for the first Dutch deployment decision -- has publicly opposed an extension on the grounds that &two years is two years.8 Both will appreciate assurances that we take seriously Dutch concerns about finding additional support and burden sharing more generally. ¶8. (C) The opposition members on the left -- Harry van Bommel (Socialists,SP) and Mariko Peters (Green-Left, GL) opposed the original deployment to Uruzgan and are unlikely to ever support extending the mission. While they do believe in helping the Afghan people build a democratic society, they are not convinced that ISAF is the appropriate method to do so, and would rather give financial support directly to the Afghan government. Our best bet is to neutralize the opposition Socialists and Greens, and strengthen the PvdA, with success stories on reconstruction. SENDING THE RIGHT MESSAGE: -------------- ¶I. Thanking the Dutch -------------- ¶9. (C) The Dutch have deployed nearly 1700 personnel to Uruzgan province, filling a critical hole in RC South. To date, 11 Dutch soldiers have given their lives in Afghanistan. The Dutch have teamed with Australia in Uruzgan, and have employed a mature &ink blot8 strategy linking secured zones with reconstruction projects. The Dutch have emphasized winning &hearts and minds8 through development assistance. However, they have not shied away from combat missions when necessary. When talking to the Dutch delegation, it will be important to note: -- We greatly appreciate Dutch sacrifices in Afghanistan. The deployment in Uruzgan is challenging, and the Dutch are one of the few Allies in NATO risking their soldiers and equipment on a daily basis in Regional Command South. -- The Dutch are filling a critical role in the south; without the Dutch, much of what we are accomplishing through ISAGF would not be possible. -- We value your sophisticated and mature approach emphasizing reconstruction, and winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. Your strong relationship with the local populace attests to this strategy. -- At the same time, we appreciate your willingness to fight when necessary. Unfortunately, with the constantly changing security situation in Afghanistan, it becomes necessary at times to engage the enemy, and you have answered the call. II. Supporting the Dutch Quest for Partners in Uruzgan -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) The Dutch would like to extend in Uruzgan, but must reduce its forces in order to gain domestic political support. As such, the Dutch have asked NATO for assistance in finding credible, third partners to bolster their deployment in Uruzgan, thereby allowing them to reduce their forces. At the same time, the Dutch have approached over 20 countries on a bilateral basis in the effort to find additional contributions. The Dutch have made clear ) in meetings with Secretaries Rice and Gates, among others ) that they need our help in finding third partners. We are working closely with the Dutch in The Hague, Brussels, and in Allied capitals in the effort to find additional contributions. Providing the parliamentarian delegation with specifics regarding our assistance is not recommended ) some parties may negatively view out coordination. It is important, however, to emphasize to the delegation that the message is clear that they need additional assistance: -- We share your concerns regarding burden-and risk-sharing within the Alliance. More NATO Allies must do more to support our collective efforts in Afghanistan ) that is what we agreed to do at the Riga Summit, and it is time to follow through on these promises. -- Recent meetings between Foreign Minister Verhagen and Secretary Rice, Defense Minister van Middelkoop and Secretary SIPDIS Gates, Assistant Secretary Fried and MFA Political Director Pieter de Gooijer, and others have made clear that you need help in your efforts to extend your mission in Uruzgan. -- We are working hard at the highest levels )- in The Hague, Brussels, Washington, and Allied capitals -- to help you find credible third partners to bolster the chances of a follow-on Dutch mission. III. Rebuilding Afghanistan Together -------------- ¶11. (C) The Dutch rightfully take pride in their foreign assistance programs. Rebuilding Afghanistan was a prominent theme that helped win support for the first deployment to Uruzgan. Critics of the mission argue that Dutch dreams for Afghan development are unrealized due to the security situation. In response, we should frankly acknowledge the limitations on reconstruction, while thanking the Dutch for their successes. We can emphasize that Dutch military efforts in more dangerous southern Afghanistan permit the Allies to boost development and reconstruction efforts elsewhere. -- We are grateful for your support for rebuilding Afghanistan. We recognize your expertise in development and your generosity. -- Together the Allies have boosted access to health care from for the population from 8% in 2001 to 80% in 2007. We,ve trained more than 10,000 doctors, nurses and midwives. -- Together, by reducing infant mortality, we are saving more than 85,000 lives every year. -- Together, we,ve boosted the number of girls in school from zero in 2001 to more than 1.5 million today. The number of boys has been raised from 900,000 in 2001 to more than 3.5 million today. GUANTANAMO -------------- ¶12. (C) Although Afghanistan is our top concern for this visit, we will improve the U.S. image in Europe with the visit to Guantanamo and discussion of U.S. detention and rendition policies. A number of our colleagues at the MFA have absorbed and adopted Legal Adviser John Bellinger,s premise: the international legal issues surrounding detentions are complex and challenging, and the Allies should address them together. Working with the Dutch MFA and distinguished Washington visitors, we have cooled the volatile debate in the Dutch parliament, but the topic is still controversial. This visit to Washington will shore up support for Mr. Bellinger,s forward-looking approach. Gallagher