NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: ZEROING IN ON THIRD

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001856 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, SCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: ZEROING IN ON THIRD PARTNERS Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Coalition, Peacekeeping, and Multinational Cooperation Debra Cagan visited The Hague October 2 to discuss potential GONL extension plans regarding its ISAF mission in Uruzgan province, Afghanistan. In a series of productive meetings, Cagan inquired what public statements the GONL required from potential third country partners prior to making any extension decision. GONL officials across the board acknowledged difficult domestic political situations in potential partners -- as such, no public statement from these partners would be required at this time. What is more important are firm political commitments from partners that the GONL could rely upon in order to comfortably forward a positive extension decision to parliament, preferably prior to the NATO Informal Defense Ministerial in Noordwijk on October 24-25. While the Dutch plan to keep the identity of any potential partners notional at this time, they had hoped to specify what functions these partners might undertake in Uruzgan. Cagan advised less specificity and more flexibility in this regard, thus allowing military planners to identify appropriate tasks for their military contributions. ¶2. (C) Summary cont.: Cagan and Dutch officials reviewed the list of seven modules the Dutch have identified as areas that potential partners could help fill. GONL interlocutors acknowledged that a small contribution from France -- filling an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT),for example -- would give them significant political coverage with the Dutch parliament. Any further contributions from the French, perhaps toward the Battlegroup company, would be a coup. Other promising potential partners included Norway, Slovakia and Latvia, but Cagan stressed that obtaining such assistance would require Dutch PM Balkenende's direct intervention. Dutch officials greatly appreciated USG support, noting that U.S. efforts to find third partners were helping reverse several weeks of negative trends on the extension question. ¶3. (C) Summary cont.: In addition to these potential contributors, DASD Cagan's subsequent visit to Prague determined that the Czechs might be willing to contribute up to an infantry company for deployment in Uruzgan, provided the request be "properly handled" by the Dutch. Also, a Bulgarian positive response to the Dutch request for assistance appears to be quite possible, provided the Dutch request be formally sent via letter from Dutch CHOD Gen. Berlijn to Bulgarian CHOD Gen. Stoikov. During a phone conversation between Gen. Berlijn, Ambassador Arnall, and DASD Cagan on October 5, Gen. Berlijn agreed to send a letter to Gen. Stoikov, and recommend to PM Balkenende that he call Czech PM Topolanek. End summary. ¶4. (SBU) During a series of meetings on October 2, DASD Cagan met with Dutch CHOD Gen. Berlijn and Director of Operations Gen. Eikelboom, MOD Director of General Policy Lo Casteleijn, MFA Deputy Political Director Wim Geerts and Task Force Uruzgan Coordinator Pieter-Jan Kleiweg, and finally with Advisor to the Prime Minister on National Security Affairs Karel van Oosterom. So, What Do You Need? -------------- ¶5. (C) DASD Cagan asked two fundamental questions regarding Dutch requirements in obtaining a positive GONL decision to extend: 1) Does the GONL need to say anything specifically to the Dutch parliament or public in order to "get over the first hump" on the extension question; and 2) What does the GONL need in terms of public statements from potential third partners prior to the GONL making a positive decision? Dutch interlocutors across the board stated that nothing needed to be made public prior to a decision. Geerts and van Oosterom acknowledged that many third partner offers were contingent on difficult domestic political situations, and public statements might not be possible or even backfire. What is more important are firm political commitments in principle from partners that the GONL can rely upon in order to comfortably forward a positive extension decision to Parliament. Casteleijn reiterated that, ideally, the Dutch would like to forward a decision to Parliament prior to the NATO Informal Defense Ministerial in Noordwijk on October 24-25, but MFA officials acknowledged a decision could slip to the first week in November when the foreign affairs budget must be finalized. ¶6. (C) Instead of a public statement from potential partners, GONL interlocutors planned to treat any partner much along the lines of their initial deployment to Uruzgan. Casteleijn and Geerts reminded that the GONL had referred to Australia as "country X" prior to the parliamentary debate on the deployment -- instead of naming their partner, the Dutch focused on what that partner would bring to the table. Cagan advised caution on naming specific roles that any potential partner might fulfill -- better to be flexible and allow military planners to identify appropriate tasks for their military contributions. Geerts and van Oosterom took this on board, and Geerts was confident that the GONL could formulate language that would inspire confidence in the partnership, while still giving an indication of the roles that partner might fulfill without going into details. The Seven Modules -------------- ¶7. (C) All Dutch interlocutors expressed frustration with NATO and SACEUR; one official commented that the force generation process "appears broken," and that the bilateral approach was making more headway. That said, the Dutch would appreciate any assistance the USG could provide in terms of pressuring NATO to do more. Dutch CHOD Gen. Berlijn provided an updated list of the seven "modules" and a state-of-play matrix regarding negotiations with potential third partners on which the Dutch were seeking assistance: 1) Base Protection; 2) 2 Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs); 3) Role 2 Medical Facility; 4) PRT mission team; 5) Company Battlegroup for force protection; 6) 2-4 F-16s; and 7) Additional Combat and Transport Rotary Wing. While all seven modules were important, Gen. Berlijn indicated that the OMLTs, company Battlegroup, and base protection elements were most crucial to fill. Other GONL officials in later meetings were less specific, pointing to the need for a credible third partner. -- Module 1 Base Protection: The Dutch have focused on Slovakia as a potential partner on base protection. Geerts and Kleiweg confirmed that the Slovaks made an initial proposal of approximately 70 troops that could be used for base security and an additional five personnel for OMLT air operations/maintenance, but Kleiweg expected the Slovaks to make an additional offer -- perhaps as high as 150 troops. Cagan agreed that Slovakia could provide base protection, provided such protection was for inner perimeter, fixed site security only. She said the Dutch might need to train and equip the Slovaks to a certain degree, as well. Cagan said any formal U.S. intervention regarding Slovakia might backfire, but we could help behind the scenes. Cagan suggested Latvia provide the base protection element; Kleiweg confirmed that the Dutch had approached the Latvian Foreign and Defense Ministers regarding a partnership in Uruzgan, and had been told "no." Cagan pushed back, noting that the Latvians had just withdrew a combat company from Iraq -- they have the capacity and capability, so the Dutch should not take "no for an answer." She suggested PM Balkenende call the Latvian President directly in order to "get the right answer"; National Security Advisor van Oosterom agreed to make that recommendation to his minister. (Note: Kleiweg told polmioff October 3 that FM Verhagen called his Latvian counterpart on teaming in Uruzgan, and was told Latvia might reconsider if Norway agrees to team with the Dutch. Gen. Berlijn conveyed the same message to DAO. End note.) -- Module 2 Two OMLTs: The Dutch have identified France, Australia, Slovakia, and Hungary as potential OMLT contributors. Cagan said France has agreed to deploy two OMLTs in the near term, and potentially up to four. Based on an initial check with U.S. military officials in Afghanistan, she said a French OMLT deployed to Uruzgan in August 2008 would be acceptable; the trick now would be persuading the French to agree to deploy. GONL Interlocutors confirmed that a high-level delegation will visit Paris October 5 for further discussions regarding a French OMLT. They agreed that getting French participation in Uruzgan would be a tremendous coup, solving many of their concerns regarding a credible third partner. Gen. Berlijn also mentioned the Dutch were considering a trade with the French -- Dutch support in Chad for French support in Afghanistan, but such talks had not progressed. Cagan agreed to work with U.S. Embassy Paris and U.S. military officials in Afghanistan to make clear to the French that the USG supports a French OMLT in Uruzgan, thereby assisting the Dutch delegation's visit on October 5. Geerts also mentioned that Hungary offered an OMLT in Uruzgan. Cagan suggested that any Hungarian OMLT be in addition to their PRT in Pol-e Khomri, and noted that Dutch training and equipping would be required, with the understanding that interoperable equipment is key to command and control. -- Module 3 Role 2 Medical Facility: The Dutch have focused on Singapore as a medical facility contributor, and have deferred Australia's lead. Gen. Berlijn noted that if the Netherlands could replace the field hospital in Uruzgan, the GONL might deploy it to Darfur. (Note: The Australian Ambassador to The Hague tells us Development Minister Koenders returned from his regional trip to Africa stating there was "no longer any interest" in a Dutch field hospital in Darfur. It is not clear how this might affect Dutch plans to remove the hospital from Uruzgan. End note.) Cagan also suggested Croatia, Slovenia, and Armenia as potential field hospital contributors -- given the upcoming election in Croatia, however, such a request should be couched in humanitarian terms and not as a military contribution. -- Module 4-5 PRT Mission/Battlegroup Company: Cagan agreed with Generals Berlijn and Eikelboom that the Norwegian Telemark battalion was ideal for the PRT Mission and Battlegroup Company. Dutch interlocutors noted that MOD State Secretary van der Knaap would visit Oslo on October 3 for further discussions. Gen. Eikelboom suggested that perhaps too much attention was being paid to requesting the entire battalion when a company would suffice; Cagan agreed, noting that a company would work from rotational standpoint. Geerts, Kleiweg, and Casteleijn were quick to point out Norwegian Socialist opposition to any deployment in southern Afghanistan -- "it's too hard." Cagan suggested the Dutch were quickly running out of time, and advised that PM Balkenende make a direct appeal to PM Stoltenberg, emphasizing that without Norwegian assistance, the Dutch would not be able to extend and NATO's ISAF mission would be jeopardized. Following this, Cagan suggested U.S. Embassy Oslo could follow-up. Van Oosterom appreciated this coordinated, two-pronged approach, and agreed to make that recommendation PM Balkenende. (Note: Kleiweg told polmiloff October 3 that PM Balkenende planned to call PM Stoltenberg on October 5. End note.) Gen. Berlijn also said Paris "did not say no" regarding a Battlegroup company; the Dutch plan to raise this during their high-level visit on October 5. Cagan suggested Bulgaria and Albania might have the capability and capacity to provide the Battlegroup company. She visits Sofia on October 5, and said she would raise this with the Bulgarian PM. -- Module 6 F-16 Support: GONL interlocutors and Cagan agreed that Denmark was giving positive signals on F-16 support in Kandahar. Gen. Berlijn noted that the Belgians had turned down the Dutch request for F-16 support, which looks even more final given the current caretaker government in Brussels. But Casteleijn said Belgium should not be counted out. -- Module 7 Additional Combat and Rotary Wing: All GONL interlocutors inquired if the USG might be willing to maintain its helicopter bridge in RC-South; Cagan deferred to Secretary Gates on that matter. The Dutch said they were SIPDIS considering asking UAE whether they might be willing to provide Apache and F-16 support; Cagan offered to check with CENTCOM on that possibility. (Note: Kleiweg told polmiloff October 3 that the GONL approached Turkey at the Director General level regarding helicopter support. Turkey appeared willing to consider the Dutch request, Kleiweg said, but the Dutch were not optimistic. End note.) Other Potential Ideas -------------- ¶8. (C) Cagan also suggested several other options that GONL officials agreed to consider. First, she suggested that if Germany was reluctant to deploy troops to southern Afghanistan, perhaps it might agreed to financially underwrite the training necessary for some third country partners. She noted that some NATO Allies deployed in the north had no caveats regarding deployment in the south -- these Allies could be replaced by other, thereby freeing up their potential assistance. Cagan noted that while unfamiliar with the NATO process, she had been told by certain MAP country officials that Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia are required to take a battalion out of circulation for a year for NATO certification purposes -- perhaps these battalions might gain certification while deployed in Afghanistan. Finally, she suggested the Dutch talk to the Portuguese Guardia Nacionale regarding police training. Czech Help? -------------- ¶9. (C) In formal discussions with Czech MOD Deputy Minister Bartak, the Military General Staff, and MFA Deputy Minister Pojar, DASD Cagan raised the possibility of the Czech Republic contributing forces toward a Dutch extension mission while visiting Prague on October 4. (Note: The Deputy Ministers are the decision-makers in both Ministries. End note.) According to Bartak and Pojar, the Czechs would welcome a request by the Dutch to assist, provided such a request was "properly handled," i.e., the request was made at an appropriate level, such as PM Balkenende. Pojar added that a Dutch request should not be a hard sell to the Parliament because it highlights Czech assistance to an EU partner. Bartak said the Czechs would be willing to contribute up to an infantry company toward the effort, but would need Dutch assistance for training and equipment assistance. Ambassador Arnall relayed this information to van Oosterom and Geerts for Dutch follow-up. Bulgarians Receptive -------------- ¶10. (C) On October 5 in Sofia, DASD Cagan met with Bulgarian CHOD Stoikov, the Military General Staff, MOD, MFA, and NSC senior officials, and Nikola Kolev, the Bulgarian President's Chief of Staff. After Cagan outlined the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and stressed the importance of the Dutch request for Allied assistance, CHOD Stoikov agreed to seriously discuss military assistance to the Dutch with Bulgarian President Parvanov. Although hesitant at first, Kolev understood the importance of the Dutch request and will discuss it with his president, provided Dutch CHOD Gen. Berlijn send an official request in writing to Bulgarian CHOD Gen. Stoikov. In a later phone conversation on October 5 with Ambassador Arnall and Cagan, Dutch CHOD Gen. Berlijn agreed to send the letter to Gen. Stoikov. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) The Dutch are once again energized after several frustrating weeks of negative trends on the extension question. They appear set to pursue this fully through bilateral channels; in their view, NATO has done very little to help them find partners. In that regard, GONL interlocutors emphasized they appreciate any support the USG can give. Dutch delegations are currently in Oslo and Bratislava, with another high-level delegation heading to Paris on October 5. PM Balkenende is engaged, planning to call his Norwegian counterpart by the end of the week. The message is clear: even a small contribution from France -- such as an OMLT -- would give the Dutch significant political coverage. A Czech company would provide a crucial piece of any Dutch extension mission. Contributions from Norway -- and possibly Latvia following suit -- would also be key, with any additional contributions from Slovakia, Bulgaria, or Hungary as added bonuses. High-level calls from Washington to France or Norway on behalf of the Dutch might help tip the scales in favor of a mission extension. ¶12. (U) DASD Cagan has cleared on this cable. Arnall