NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: ENCOURAGED BY POTENTIAL

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001625 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, SCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: ENCOURAGED BY POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS, BUT NOT ENOUGH Classified By: CDA Michael Gallagher, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: While initially upset by a perceived delayed response by NATO to their call for assistance, the Dutch acknowledge the search for further contributions toward a Dutch-led ISAF mission extension in Uruzgan is beginning to bear fruit. According to Dutch officials, potential contributors include the Danes and Slovaks, and possibly the Norwegians. Australia also will increase its contribution to the mission, and could help find an additional partner. While these potential contributions are encouraging, the GONL is quick to note that more help is required to overcome the problematic domestic political situation in favor of an extension. For that reason, the GONL has delayed making a decision until October in the hopes of further solidifying the case in favor of extending. The GONL appreciates Washington's patience and low-profile, and would be grateful for "arm-twisting" assistance in capitals and at NATO. End summary. Timeline -------------- ¶2. (C) On August 30, the GONL informed the Dutch Parliament via letter that the government was still considering the Uruzgan extension question. The letter notes that the Cabinet will not make any decision before the end of the summer. MFA Deputy Political Director Wim Geerts told Polcouns August 29 that the Dutch want to wrap up the extension issue prior to the NATO Defense Ministerial in Noordwijk at the end of October. Task Force Uruzgan Coordinator Pieter-Jan Kleiweg told polmiloff August 31 that the GONL is stressing "quality over speed" in its decision-making process. Kleiweg said the Dutch traditionally view September 21 as the end of summer, and a Cabinet decision will not occur until after this date -- most likely the first week of October. The parliamentary debate will take place immediately after the decision. Kleiweg kidded that "Indian Summers often occur in October," but reiterated that the Dutch MFA and MOD want the Cabinet to make the right decision to extend in Uruzgan -- they need the extra time to ensure that happens. Need for a Third Partner -------------- ¶3. (C) The main reason for the delay, explained Kleiweg, was the lack of progress in finding a third partner to assist the Dutch-led mission with the Australians. He reiterated that it is NATO's responsibility to fill the ISAF mission in Uruzgan -- this means helping the Dutch find a third partner. He noted that until very recently, the Dutch had not seen much progress at NATO, despite a delegation by Dutch CHOD Gen. Berlijn and Geerts to NATO HQ to plead the Dutch case, and FM Verhagen challenging NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer during a private conversation to do more to help the Dutch or risk losing the Dutch altogether. Kleiweg described a perception in The Hague -- whether accurate or not -- that NATO has not been very helpful regarding the search for a third partner, and the Dutch Parliament has picked up on it. Demonstrating to Parliament that NATO has exhausted every potential partner will prove crucial in the subsequent debate on extending, Kleiweg said. ¶4. (C) That said, Kleiweg and Geerts acknowledged summer vacation plans may have delayed some from answering the Dutch call for help, and confirmed the search for further contributions is beginning to bear fruit. Kleiweg said SACEUR sent a letter to ten Allies -- based on potential positive political will and lack of a contribution in the south -- requesting they consider teaming with the Dutch in Uruzgan. The Dutch targeted these ten countries as potential partners and initiated a "bilateral blitz" on capitals. Geerts and Kleiweg said the Dutch received "positive feedback" from the Slovaks, although it appears internal Slovak politics will prevent the Slovak FM from making any announcement in that regard when he visits The Hague on September 13. Geerts and Kleiweg also confirmed that the Danes appear ready to deploy F-16s to Kandahar to assist RC-South. Finally, Geerts said Australia was looking to increase the size of its military contribution, and possibly bring in yet another partner. (Note: Geerts declined to comment, but several reports suggest the Australians might be trying to persuade New Zealand, Singapore, or Indonesia to contribute. End note.) ¶5. (C) Kleiweg confirmed Oslo was seriously considering a contribution, but declined to give specifics. He referred to Dutch and Norwegian press reports, and accused disparate factions within the Norwegian government of leaking the possible partnership. Kleiweg said the Dutch have been very careful to keep any partnership under wraps, and are not pleased that the "serious Dutch plea for assistance is falling victim to Norwegian domestic politics." Geerts confirmed several high-ranking delegations to Berlin to plead the case for German military contributions, but to no avail. Kleiweg said a German NGO will likely opt to work in Uruzgan on development projects, but a German security contribution was unlikely. ¶6. (C) Geerts described these potential contributions as "good news," but probably not enough for a positive extension decision. Kleiweg also pointed to budgetary limitations and the need to demonstrate progress on development as key extension factors. He confirmed that the Dutch are pushing hard on other Allies to solve the shortfall in RC-South created by the redeployment of U.S. helicopters in January 2008, but also acknowledged the hope that NATO will "solve that problem" as the Dutch struggle to find the right combination of contributions to extend. Problematic Domestic Political Situation -------------- ¶8. (S) According to Geerts, the volatile Dutch domestic political situation and divisions within the governing coalition could still create serious obstacles to an extension. So far, there is tentative agreement among five of the six relevant Cabinet ministers to support an extension -- PM and CDA party leader Balkenende, FM Verhagen, Minister for Youth and Family Affairs and CU party leader Rouvoet, DM van Middelkoop, and -- with serious reservations -- Development Minister Koenders. Geerts said Koenders supports the mission, but is under tremendous pressure from his party PvdA (Labor),whose rank-and-file oppose an extension. He said Koenders is secretly traveling to Afghanistan in early September, and will be "looking for evidence" for progress on reconstruction to help bolster his case. ¶9. (S) The wildcard remains Finance Minister and Labor Party leader Bos, who remains unconvinced regarding an extension but has thus far kept quiet in public. A majority of Labor opposes extending, and the party leadership is up for grabs in early October. At the moment, former UN Mission in Sudan Head of Mission Jan Pronk appears a near-certain choice to become the new Labor Party chairman, a position from which he will be able to influence Bos and Labor Party policies. Pronk has, so far, kept his views on an extension quiet and may have mixed feelings; although he is widely viewed to be more "left" than Bos, the former Development Minister is also a confirmed internationalist whose son recently served as Dutch POLAD. Nevertheless, Bos is in the unenviable situation of either upsetting his party's rank-and file if he supports an extension, or isolating himself within the Cabinet if he opposes. ¶10. (C) For the most part, opposition parties have behaved in a restrained manner on the extension debate, despite the recent tenth Dutch military casualty in Uruzgan. Opposition party members included in a recent parliamentary committee trip to Uruzgan returned "still skeptical, but much less skeptical" regarding a potential extension. Surprisingly, left-of-center Green Left has been impressed with the development progress the Dutch are making in Uruzgan. The right-of-center VVD (Liberal Party),on the other hand, continues to push for more burden-sharing within NATO -- and has promised to make this an issue during any extension debate. That said, VVD party leader Mark Rutte recently visited Afghanistan with SACEUR, and returned notably impressed with Dutch efforts. Other Obstacles -------------- ¶11. (C) Kleiweg pointed to several other potential obstacles that could derail the extension question. First and foremost was poppy eradication -- Kleiweg said the GONL understands that counter-narcotics strategy is determined by the Afghan government, but does not support eradication without alternatives. Any decision made next year favoring ground-spraying would "send negative shockwaves through The Hague," he said, and could undercut Koenders' support for an extension. Kleiweg also pointed to expected governor and police chief appointments by President Karzai. He said Karzai was considering appointing Matiullah as police chief of Uruzgan, which would also harm Dutch extension efforts. Kleiweg expressed appreciation for Amb. Wood's intervention in Kabul opposing Matiullah's nomination, and hoped the USG would continue such opposition. Finally, Dutch public support for any extension still remains low. According to a poll published on August 31, 54 percent of respondents opposed any extension -- Kleiweg said the GONL still has its work cut out in explaining to the Dutch public why an extension is "the right thing to do." Bottom Line -------------- ¶12. (C) Geerts described the extension situation as in better shape than a few weeks ago, namely due to potential contributions from the Slovaks, Danes, and Australians. The Dutch are clearly not yet out of the woods, however, especially as the Dutch require one more serious partner, while the domestic political scene is still turbulent. Geerts appreciated the "low USG profile" and urged Washington to keep it up. That said, Geerts appreciated any "arm twisting" we might be able to provide in capitals and with NATO in urging others to answer the Dutch calls for additional assistance. Gallagher