CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001526

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR LEDDY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE
WEEK ENDING AUGUST 17


This is CWC-72-07.

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IRAQ
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1. (U) Del reps, along with UK rep Karen Wolstenholme, met
on August 16 with a group of senior Verification staff to
discuss planning/follow-up on Iraq's initial declaration.
Verification chief Horst Reeps was well prepared with an
agenda and copies of CW and industry declaration general
status and follow-up actions from the Amman workshop in
December 2006 (all E-mailed to Washington). In short, Reeps
believes that in order to continue forward progress, the best
course of action is to schedule a follow-up workshop, in
order to provide a concrete target for capitals to work
toward. The week of September 17 was proposed, with the
understanding that this would be taken back for an initial
reaction from Washington, London and Baghdad. The stated
Technical Secretariat goal for the next workshop would be a
100% complete initial declaration that the U.S. and UK deemed
acceptable.


2. (U) Regarding certain specific questions provided by
Washington:
-- There has been no communication between the TS and Iraqi
experts since the December meeting.
-- Reeps anticipates the Director General would make an
initial statement about the unique security situation
immediately following Iraqi accession (i.e. at the beginning
of the 60-day window before the initial declaration is due).
The TS proposed that further delay could be accompanied by
"other forms" of verification, e.g. photos and/or video
footage that coalition forces provide.
-- The TS provided a response on the comments provided by the
U.S./UK (E-mailed to Washington).


3. (U) Reeps believes he could assemble a TS team in about
48 hours, and tasked the External Relations Division to start
looking into visa and other requirements for another Amman
workshop. (Note: If the U.S., TS and others settle on a date
independent of a third reading of the CWC by the Iraqi
Parliament, the TS ability to rapidly assemble the team
becomes somewhat less important.) Reeps requested the U.S.
and UK also begin working actively in capital and with
Baghdad and Amman to:

-- Make initial inquiries about support in Amman.
-- Assemble a tentative team to participate in a follow-up
workshop.
-- Assess how much progress, if any, the Iraqis have made
since the last workshop.
-- Begin pushing for the same level of expertise (same people
as at the December meeting, if possible) to attend a
September follow-up in Amman.
-- Based on progress reports, encourage Iraqi experts to
complete the last session's "homework" prior to attending a
follow-up.
-- Obtain, if possible, an electronic copy of where the
Iraqis currently stand on their declaration to share with the
TS.

SIPDIS


4. (U) The TS was pleasantly surprised in December at the
progress the Iraqi delegation had made since the previous
workshop. They also found that the experts in December were
able to get answers from Baghdad on several issues while
still in Amman. Although this might occur again, del reps
noted that this type of progress and responsiveness should
not be assumed, and asked what the TS envisioned in a
worst-case scenario of the Iraqis turning up having made no
further progress on the declarations and being unable to
reach counterparts in Baghdad from Amman.


5. (U) Reeps indicated at that point it would be nice for
the U.S. and UK to "fill in the blanks." The TS also
highlighted their desire to have footage/photos wherever
possible - particularly of former production facilities like
Al Muthanna - in order to:

-- Provide some visual of the state of Iraq's former program
for member states that might be inclined to ask probing
questions.
-- Act as a sort of stop-gap measure in lieu of actual
inspections.


6. (U) In a subsequent discussion with the UK rep, the joint
concerns expressed were:
-- How willing and able the U.S. and UK would be to share
photos/videos.
-- How realistic it is to anticipate making any contact with
the Iraqi experts in Baghdad in time for a September meeting.

-- What will happen if experts turn up to the meeting with
nothing more than the product of the last workshop.


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CURRENT TS BUDGET
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7. (U) Director of Administration Ron Nelson noted that the
TS currently is facing a difficult budgetary situation, as it

SIPDIS
has not received payments of 2007 assessed contributions from
the U.S., Japan and Mexico. At the current rate of
expenditure of six million Euros a month, and without
payments of assessed contributions, Nelson said that
discretionary purchases by the TS would cease in
September/October, resulting in reductions of operations and
suspension of further recruitment.

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INDUSTRY CLUSTER - LATE DECLARATIONS
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8. (U) As reported earlier, the July 10 consultation on this
issue resulted in the facilitator (Larry Denyer, U.S.)
revising the previous facilitator's draft decision to
incorporate the strong opinions expressed by delegations and
to try to preserve as much of the heart of the decision as
possible. A later meeting with the South African delegate
(who brought many of the major points forward in the July 10
consultation) was very positive, including an offer of
assistance, if needed, in brokering an agreement with some of
the interested (and difficult) States Parties within his
regional group and the NAM - i.e., Iran, India, etc. Given
this positive step, the facilitator instructed the TS to
distribute the new facilitator's draft decision text (along
with a red-line version) to delegations, which was done on
July 27.


9. (U) This week, the facilitator met with representatives of
the Japanese and New Zealand delegations to get their
reactions to the new draft. Both felt that the new draft
retained the heart of the previous decision language, while
at the same time giving due consideration to the significant
concerns of some delegations. This was particularly
reassuring to hear from the New Zealand delegate, as she was
also vocal in opposition to the previous draft during the
July 10 consultation. Both delegations committed to getting
a thorough review from their capitals in advance of the next
consultation on September 4. The facilitator will meet with
the delegation of India during the week of August 27 and has
also made similar offers to meet to the delegations of Canada
and China and is awaiting their response.

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RECOMMENDATION ON INDUSTRY ISSUES
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10. (U) Del rep had a discussion with Kiwako Tanaka (Japan)
who stated that Merel Jonker (Netherlands),her
co-facilitator on the transfer discrepancies issue, would be
moving to a new assignment at the end of September. Tanaka
sounded as though she would not want to continue the
facilitation with Jonker's departure. However, it is also
fair to say that any realistic progress on this issue has
been accomplished by specific steps taken by the TS. With
the facilitation on late declarations finishing up in the

next few weeks, there would be no facilitations in the
industry cluster.


11. (U) The delegation has two recommendations for
Washington's consideration. First, the del urges the U.S.
focus on working with the TS on the concrete industry issues
that matter, such as the DG's note on modifying the OCPF site
selection mechanism, and possible tweaking of OCPF
declaration format/content in light of the Canadian paper.
On this and other issues, the most productive way to proceed
is working with key TS personnel, such as Industry Inspection
chief Bill Kane and others. Del sees little reason for
facilitators or consultations. (Note: we will need to have
discussions on risk assessment chaired by Ambassador Dastis
of Spain. But those are not consultations aimed at achieving
some type of a recommendation or proposal from Dastis. End
Note.) Until the RevCon, the exercise should be del
recommendations and Washington requests to address specific,
practical issues with the TS, such as sampling and analysis.


12. (U) Second, the del believes the real opportunity to
revitalize the industry cluster is clearly the RevCon. And
this depends on what kind of a RevCon Washington wants. If
the decision is to have a "do no harm" RevCon, then the U.S.
can lay out a refusal to (for example) re-open Schedules, and
other red-lines. The U.S. can combine that by saying that we
should deal with any industry issues on an ad hoc basis as
they arise. However, if the Washington decision is made for
a more ambitious agenda, the RevCon would be the place for
the U.S. to lay out where it wants the industry cluster to
focus attention in the next five years.


13. (U) Del is pleased to see that Washington is initiating
discussions on what outcome is desired at the RevCon, and
will be providing input. The industry cluster may benefit
most from such a deliberation. If the conscious decision is
made for a "do no harm" RevCon, and case-by-case handling of
industry issues, that is certainly an acceptable outcome.
Del simply wants to ensure that this is the result of a
thorough deliberation, and not just a policy adopted by
default.

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PRC VIEWS ON EC-50
--------------


14. (U) Del rep met with PRC Deputy PermRep Li Hong on
August 18 to discuss key issues for the upcoming EC. With
regard to Article XI, where Li is the facilitator, he stated
that Iran, Cuba and some other NAM delegations were pushing
him hard to move ahead on an Article XI action plan. Del rep
reiterated Ambassador Javits' point that we can only have an
action plan if all delegations are in agreement on what we
want to accomplish. That clearly is not yet the case
regarding Article XI. Li was patently not enthusiastic about
pushing the action plan issue, and was supportive of the idea
that this would be a more appropriate topic for work in the
run-up to the RevCon. It would be better in that forum to
see the extent to which there was any kind of political
consensus.


15. (U) Del rep reiterated that Ambassador Javits had pushed
for the earlier Article XI co-facilitation to focus on
concrete steps, and if Li were to make that the goal of his
consultation, it would get greater U.S. support (obviously
depending on the concrete steps under consideration). Li
again was very supportive, and said that he would try to
focus his 3-4 consultations before the Conference of States
Parties in that direction. He also said he was considering
making a pitch for States Parties to provide voluntary
contributions that could be ear-marked for Article XI
projects. Li flatly said that he could not keep Iran and
others from raising the action plan, but said that pushing it
toward the RevCon would make his immediate task easier.


16. (U) On export controls, Li stated that Iran has pressed
him hard to have his consultation address this issue,
reiterating that he could not keep Iran from raising any
particular topic. Del rep reiterated U.S. objections and

concerns, and said if Iran wants to discuss this matter in
consultations, the U.S. and other WEOG delegations had our
responses ready.


17. (U) On the DG's announcement of a modification to the
OCPF selection methodology, del rep raised the Cuban request
to have this included on the EC-50 agenda. Li's "energetic"
response made it clear that the Cuban request was at China's
instigation. Li said that the DG's change would have a
substantial increase in the number of OCPF inspections in
China, and was a matter of grave concern in Beijing. When
asked if the PRC would challenge the DG's modification, Li
said that was indeed the case. Del rep emphasized that the
U.S. view is that this action was completely within the DG's
authority.


18. (U) Del rep added that when the last modification had
taken place, the EC-27 report language stated that the DG
would be looking for inputs from member states on the impact
of that particular change in methodology. Certainly, we
would anticipate that the DG would welcome SP inputs this
time around as well. If that was what China meant by
"challenging" the DG, certainly all SPs would want to compare
notes of the impact of the change to see if it had the
desired result. Li merely reiterated that as the impact on
China would indeed be substantial (he declined to give a
number on projected additional OCPF inspections),it was
important to fully discuss the issue at the EC.


19. (U) Turning to the number of OCPF inspections in the
proposed 2008 Budget, del rep stated that the U.S. wanted to
see even a nominal increase in OCPF inspections in 2008,
which was particularly important in the run-up to the RevCon.
Li flatly said that, particularly due to the DG's change in
the site selection methodology, Beijing could not accept even
one additional OCPF inspection in 2008.


20. (U) Li then raised the issue of zero nominal growth
budgets. He asserted that there is now a discussion among
some delegations (and not just NAM delegations) about whether
we have hit the limit with regard to ZNG budgets and whether
the 2009 budget would have to contain some type of increase.
Part of this is due to the view that the TS has now gotten
rid of any excess fat. Part of it is attributable to the
view that the OPCW exists to handle a variety of tasks, not
just to serve as a showcase of budgetary restraint. Del rep
said that if other delegations or the TS have proposals for
additional expenditures or projects, the U.S. would simply
ask for a thorough assessment of whether they are appropriate
for the OPCW and provided value for money.

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WITHDRAWAL OF AMCIT APPLICATION
--------------


21. (U) Del rep was informed by Ron Nelson, head of
administration, that Jonathan Tucker, an Amcit who had
applied for a P-4 position in the Verification Branch, had
withdrawn his application. Tucker is extremely capable and
experienced and looked likely to get the position. Indeed,
Nelson said that DG Pfirter had informally indicated support
for Tucker. Unfortunately, Tucker grew frustrated by the
various administrative requirements connected with the TS
hiring procedure, and the lengthy wait this generated. Del
rep understands Nelson has raised the Tucker case with the
Human Resources branch, and also indicated his personal
frustration at how Tucker (and presumably other applicants)
are being handled.


22. (U) The key problem was the fact that HR did not stay in
contact with Tucker to keep him informed that his application
was indeed being processed and that he was still under
serious consideration for the job. While it does not appear
to be the case that Tucker requested an update and was given
no response, Tucker clearly had gone several months without
any word from HR. Nelson noted that while all applicants
cannot be given constant updates on the status of their
application, certainly the key candidates sought by the TS
should be kept apprised of their situation. One of the other

frustrations expressed by Tucker was the fact that he had
been given a one-week notification of the scheduling of his
interview. Nelson said that HR would give applicants more
preparation time.


23. (U) Nelson emphasized to del rep that he will be
discussing with his HR staff improvements in their treatment
of applicants, particularly those who make the short list.
He concedes that Tucker certainly did not get the feeling
that he was sought by the OPCW, and that such a process will
make it more difficult to get the best quality personnel for
TS positions.

SIPDIS


24. (U) Ito sends.
Schofer